No behavior change.
Adding `filePermissionsSentence` in decc673a inserted it directly under
`footerMessage`'s doc block, which left two block comments stacked and each
attached to the wrong function: `footerMessage` was undocumented, and its
"why not `secretStorageLabel`" rationale read as though it were about the
permissions helper, which it is not.
Moves that block back above `footerMessage`, and drops the inline comment
inside it that now duplicated the new helper's doc — and had gone stale
besides, since it still described two permission states rather than three.
Caught by @mcp-inspector-v2-f1 on a read of the pushed commit.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Repairs origin as well as answering the review. 2d2c787e committed the
`absorbFileSecretsIntoKeyring` tests without the implementation they
import, so the branch has been failing `tsc` since; this commit brings the
source across.
Round 5's four findings (two inline, two suppressed):
- **The stale-lock takeover was still racy.** Round 4 made *stealing*
liveness-aware but left the takeover as remove-then-recreate, which is
not an election: two waiters can both judge the same lock stale, the
first removes it and takes a fresh one, and the second then removes
*that* — both inside the section, which is the lost update the takeover
exists to prevent. Claiming is now an atomic `rename` to a
token-unique name, so exactly one waiter can take a given stale lock and
the losers get ENOENT. A failed claim also falls through to the deadline
instead of `continue`ing, so a takeover that can never succeed times out
rather than spinning forever on a swallowed error.
- **Every `stat` failure was read as "no file yet".** An existing file we
cannot inspect (EACCES on the directory, a mode-less filesystem) then
produced no warning at all, and the footer went on stating owner-only
permissions having verified nothing. There is now a third state,
`unknown`, carried end to end: `permissionsUnknown` on the descriptor, a
caveat that says the permissions could not be checked, a `warn` tone, and
its own branch in the footer sentence — which otherwise would have
claimed "Owner-only permissions." by omission, the same bug one layer up.
- **mountinfo decoded only `\040`.** The kernel escapes tab, newline and
backslash too (`\011`, `\012`, `\134`), so a mounted path containing any
of them was compared in its escaped form, matched nothing, and read as
the container's writable layer — `memory` selected and persistence
silently lost on a box that had arranged for it. Decoded as octal in
general now, since the rule is octal-in-general and a future addition
would otherwise reintroduce exactly this.
- **File-backed secrets vanished once a keychain appeared.** Save secrets
without libsecret, install libsecret, and the next run selects the
keychain and stops seeing them: still on disk, read by nothing, and
nothing looks broken. `absorbFileSecretsIntoKeyring` hands them over on
the run that finds a keychain, under the rules the two existing plaintext
migrations already use — keychain wins on conflict, the file is removed
only on complete success, and a file that cannot be read is never
deleted, because that is precisely the case where the values would be
lost.
Tests: a two-waiter race over one stale lock asserting a single holder
throughout; `unknown` from `readSecretFilePermissions` through the
descriptor to the footer sentence and tone; the hand-off's happy path,
keychain-wins, write-failure, undecryptable-file, empty-file,
malformed-key, and explicitly-configured-keyring cases; and six more
rejected descriptor shapes, including each file-only field on a non-file
kind. Full `npm run ci` green — 5,732 tests under the coverage gate.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The footer's file states now read "Secrets: Plaintext file. Owner-only
permissions." and "Secrets: Encrypted file. Owner-only permissions.",
and the band itself became the copy affordance for the path.
Three things worth reviewing:
- The path is no longer printed on the band. It goes to the clipboard
instead, which means the only place it stays *readable* is the
button's accessible name — so that carries it in full
("Copy secrets file path: /home/node/.mcp-inspector/secrets.json")
rather than a generic "Copy". A clipboard is no use to a screen-reader
user who cannot inspect it.
- "Owner-only permissions." is a claim of fact, so it is made only when
the mode was verified as 0600. `looseMode` is set exactly when it is
something else and could not be tightened, and the message says
"Mode 0644 — not owner-only." there. A footer that asserted the
opposite of the truth about a secrets file is the one failure this
band exists to prevent, so it has its own test.
- The footer phrases its own copy rather than reusing
`secretStorageLabel` for the file case: that label is parenthetical
("File (unencrypted)") because the startup banner appends
" at <path>" to it. The tone and the underlying facts still come from
the shared helpers, so the two surfaces cannot disagree about
anything that matters. Memory's line is still derived from the shared
caveat.
The click target is an `UnstyledButton` filling the band edge to edge —
a real control, reachable by keyboard and announced as a button, rather
than a click handler on a div. Padding moved from the band to the inner
row so the button has no dead margins.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Reads "Memory (this session only): Secrets are not written anywhere and
are lost on exit." — shorter tail than "lost when the Inspector exits",
and a colon separating the store from what follows it.
The colon is added at the footer's composition, not inside
`secretStorageLabel`. The label is also consumed alone by
`secretStorageSummary`, which appends " at <path>" for a file-backed
store, so a colon baked into the label would print
"File (encrypted): at /path" in the startup banner. It renders only when
a detail actually follows.
The caveat string is shared with the banner's warning line, so the
terminal picks up the shorter wording too.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Found on a re-read of the round-4 liveness work, not by review.
The heartbeat refreshed the lock directory's mtime unconditionally. After
a steal — possible when this process looked dead, or across hosts where
the pid check cannot apply — the directory belongs to someone else, and
touching it keeps *their* lock looking alive. If they then die, the stale
timestamp nobody is maintaining is being maintained by us, and a third
writer can never break in: a stale lock turned unbreakable, which is the
permanent outage the stealing exists to avoid.
The heartbeat now re-reads the owner stamp and clears itself when the
token no longer matches, so it only ever refreshes a lock we still hold.
The release path already checked the token; this closes the same hole on
the other side.
Tested by stamping a different owner onto a held lock and aging it: the
mtime stays old across several heartbeat intervals, and release leaves the
thief's lock intact.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Four findings (two inline, two suppressed), all taken. Three are the lock,
which is where the remaining sharp edges were.
- **A lock could be created and then never stamped.** If `mkdir` succeeded
but writing the owner token failed, the catch treated it as "cannot lock
here", returned the no-op release, and left the directory behind. The
mutation then ran unlocked *and* every later writer queued behind an
orphan nobody could deliberately release, until it aged out. The
acquisition now tracks whether it created the directory, removes it on a
failed stamp, and refuses rather than entering the section unlocked.
- **An old mtime was being treated as proof the owner was dead.** It is
not: a holder that is SIGSTOPed, starved by a blocked event loop, or on a
machine that suspended is alive and not running, and expiring it on
elapsed time alone takes the lock out from under a live critical section
— the lost update the lock exists to prevent, arrived at through the
machinery meant to prevent it. The heartbeat narrowed the window; it
could not close it, because the holder that most needs protecting is
precisely the one not running its timers.
The owner stamp now carries `pid` and `host`, and staleness only *opens*
the question — on the same host a waiter asks the OS whether that pid
still exists (`kill(pid, 0)`, which sends no signal; `EPERM` counts as
alive, so a holder running as another user is never stolen from). Only a
genuinely absent process is stolen from. Where the stamp cannot be
trusted — another machine over a shared filesystem, or a missing/corrupt
owner file — the mtime remains the answer, because the alternative is a
lock nothing can ever break, turning one dead process into a permanent
outage.
- **Podman was classified as a host.** `/.dockerenv` is Docker's marker and
rootless Podman has no equivalent of it, while its cgroup paths say
`libpod-<id>.scope` rather than the literal "podman" the pattern looked
for. Such a box fell back to a file in the ephemeral writable layer and
reported it as durable — the wrong way round to be wrong.
`/run/.containerenv` and `libpod` are both recognized now.
- **Two tests floated a second `acquireLock`**, so the test could finish and
`afterEach` could remove the temp directory while the acquisition was
still running. Both hold and settle it now.
Separately, a defect of my own found while re-reading round 3:
`describeFileStore` called `tightenSecretFilePermissions`, so the function
whose job is to *describe* the store issued a `chmod` on every
`GET /api/config` — once per page load, on a file another process may be
mid-write on. Split out a read-only `readSecretFilePermissions`; the repair
stays at startup, where it happens once and its outcome is announced.
Tests: a stale lock whose owner is alive is not stolen (and survives the
attempt), one whose pid is gone is, one stamped by another host is; a
failed ownership stamp reports and leaves nothing behind; Podman via both
signals; and the read-only permission check leaves a 0644 file at 0644.
Full `npm run ci` green — 5,711 tests under the coverage gate.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Weights the label so the band reads as a labelled fact rather than one
run of prose — the eye lands on what the line is about before reading
which store it names.
Rendered as a `span` inside the existing `Text` rather than as a sibling
in the `Group`: `Text` renders a `<p>`, so a nested one would be a `<p>`
inside a `<p>` (invalid, and the browser closes the outer paragraph
early), and a sibling would take the Group's `gap` and sit too far from
the value it labels. `inherit` keeps it at the label's own size.
Splitting the text is why the assertions move off `getByText`: it matches
a string against an element's *direct* text nodes, so "Secrets: OS
keychain" now reads as two fragments even though it renders as one line.
The unit tests, both modal tests, and the four stories assert
`toHaveTextContent` on the band instead, which reads the full subtree.
Verified in the running dev server: prefix 700, store name 500, both at
the same 12px.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Nine findings (six inline, three suppressed), all taken. Two were serious.
**The memory fallback made the migrations destructive.** Both migrations —
mcp.json in the remote server, client.json in `node-persistence` — lift a
plaintext secret off disk, write it to the secret store, and then delete it
from the file. That trade is safe only while the store is at least as
durable as the disk, which held by construction while `InMemorySecretStore`
was a test double. Making it a production fallback broke it: on an
unmounted container a plain `GET /api/servers` would have moved a user's
existing secrets into RAM and lost them at exit — destroying data on a
read.
`SecretStore` gains an optional `isDurable()`, absent meaning durable, and
both migrations withhold the disk delete when it answers false (the value
is still loaded, so the session behaves normally). The production fallback
is now a named `SessionSecretStore` rather than the bare
`InMemorySecretStore`, so the suite's many doubles keep standing in for a
*working keychain* — which is what they are there to be — and only code
that deliberately chooses RAM in production says so.
**Round 2's per-call descriptor never reached anyone.** Both web servers
resolved it once at startup and baked it into `initialConfig`, which
`/api/config` serves unchanged — so the freshness fix was inert for its
only consumer. The route now takes a `secretStorageResolver` and calls it
per request.
The lock needed three more fixes, and they compound:
- **Release removed whatever directory was at the path.** A holder whose
work outran the stale threshold would delete the *next* owner's lock,
letting a third writer into a section two processes believed they held.
Ownership is now stamped with a random token and release only removes a
lock still carrying it.
- **The timeout fell through to an unlocked write** — under contention,
the one moment another writer is provably active. It now throws
`SecretFileLockTimeoutError`, which `set` is allowed to do.
- **The first write of every process bypassed the lock**, because the
secrets directory does not exist yet and `mkdir` failed ENOENT. The
parent is created first. First writes are exactly when two processes are
most likely to start together.
Fixing the timeout exposed a fourth: with stale (10s) below timeout, a
waiter stole from a holder that was merely *slow* rather than dead —
reinstating the lost update. A holder now heartbeats its lock, so
"stale" means the holder is gone, and the timeout is what a live-but-slow
holder produces. Lock timings are injectable so the tests can exercise
contention, staleness, and timeout without spending the real intervals.
Also: the loose-permission state is carried into `SecretStorageInfo` as
`looseMode` and rendered as the caveat (it outranks the encryption caveat —
a file others can read is a live exposure, while "unencrypted" is a
property of a file only its owner can open), rather than living in a
startup log the browser cannot see; and `usableSecretStorage` validates
`pendingEncryption` and `looseMode` as the optional booleans/numbers they
are (`pendingEncryption: "false"` is truthy and would have printed advice
that is the opposite of the truth) and rejects file-only fields on a
keychain or memory descriptor.
Tests: both migrations against a session store with a durable control
alongside, so the guard is visibly the difference; `/api/config` serving a
changing resolver and falling back without one; lock ownership after a
steal, the timeout under a live holder, no-steal from a slow holder, and a
locked first write; `looseMode` through the descriptor, the caveat
ordering, and the tone; and five more rejected payload shapes. Full
`npm run ci` green — 5,704 tests under the coverage gate.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Seven findings, all taken.
- **The descriptor went stale after the upgrading write.** Round 1 made it
read the file instead of the policy, but it was still computed once and
cached beside the selection — so the first `set` under a newly-set
passphrase encrypted the file while `/api/config` kept serving "still
unencrypted" for the rest of the session, describing bytes this very
process had just changed. The *selection* stays cached (the banner, the
payload, and the store doing the writing must agree on which store it
is); the file descriptor is re-derived per call, which costs one read of
a small file per config fetch.
- **The mount check asked the wrong question.** Comparing a directory's
`st_dev` against its parent's detects a mount *at* that path, but a
volume mounted at `/home/node` leaves `/home/node/.mcp-inspector` an
ordinary subdirectory sharing its parent's device — so a durable
container setup was judged unmounted and demoted to session-only
`memory`. It now reads `/proc/self/mountinfo` and asks whether the
directory is *under* any mount other than `/`, which also catches the
same-device bind mount no `st_dev` test can see. Where mountinfo is
unreadable (macOS, Windows, a `/proc`-less container) it falls back to
the device comparison, now against `/` rather than the parent.
- **A decrypted payload was cast, not checked.** GCM proves the bytes are
authentic, not that they parse to the right shape. An array passes
`typeof === "object"`, takes the named assignment, and then
`JSON.stringify` drops every named property of an array — so `set` would
resolve having written a file without the secret it was handed. Silent
loss on the one operation whose entire contract is that it does not lose
things. Both branches now validate a non-array object of string values,
and a shape refusal is deliberately not rethrown as a key mismatch,
which would send the user to fix a working passphrase.
- **The read-modify-write cycle was only serialized in-process.** A
durable file is shared state and a second Inspector on the same box (a
CLI run beside a web session) could read the same map and overwrite the
first one's save, both reporting success. Mutations now take a
`mkdir`-based lock. A lock left by a killed process is stolen after 10s
— one `docker kill` must not brick secret writes permanently, which
would be a worse failure than the race. If the lock cannot be created at
all, the write proceeds unlocked rather than denying a real user a real
secret to prevent a race with a process that may not exist. Reads do not
lock: `writeStoreFile` is atomic, so a reader sees the old file or the
new one, never a torn one.
- **The permission repair was fire-and-forget while the docs promised
0600.** A file owned by another user, or on a read-only mount, stayed
exposed while the footer described it as protected. It now verifies the
resulting mode and warns, naming the actual mode, when it could not be
tightened.
- **`Group`'s theme carried a domain-named `secretStorageFooter`
variant**, which AGENTS.md reserves for app-wide primitive styling.
Renamed to the structural `stickyModalFooter`; the secret-storage
meaning stays in the element that owns it.
- The PR description still claimed the salt made a short passphrase safe,
contradicting the corrected comment and README. Updated.
Tests: both mount layouts that motivated the change (mount-at and
mount-above) plus the sibling-prefix, space-escaped, first-run, and
no-mountinfo cases; the array and non-string refusals on both the
plaintext and the authentic-ciphertext paths (the latter through a
hand-built fixture, since the store's own writer cannot produce that
state); lock exclusion, stale-lock stealing, the un-lockable fallback, and
two independent store instances racing; the permission report in all three
states; and the descriptor no longer going stale within one process. Full
`npm run ci` green — 5,688 tests under the coverage gate.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Six findings, all taken.
- The descriptor reported the *write policy*, not the file. Adding
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY` to an install that already has a plaintext
file flipped `store.encrypted` immediately, so the banner and footer
claimed "File (encrypted)" while the existing secrets sat readable
until the next `set`. `FileSecretStore.readOnDiskEncryption()` now
reads the envelope (never the payload, so it needs no passphrase) and
the descriptor is built from that. The transitional state gets its own
`pendingEncryption` flag, which changes the advice without softening
the verdict — "set a passphrase" is the wrong thing to tell someone who
already has, so the caveat names the pending write instead.
- The secrets file ignored the configured storage directory. A container
mounting only that directory was judged unmounted, fell back to
`memory`, and lost secrets the user had arranged to keep.
`defaultSecretFilePath()` now follows `MCP_STORAGE_DIR` — the variable
that already relocates OAuth tokens and `client.json` — between the
explicit `MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_FILE` and the `~/.mcp-inspector`
default. (The issue comment called it `MCP_INSPECTOR_STORAGE_DIR`; no
such variable exists.)
- `version` was never checked before the plaintext branch, so a
`{ version: 2, encryption: "none" }` file was read and silently
rewritten as version 1, discarding whatever the newer format added —
the same destroy-to-satisfy-an-additive-request case the encrypted
branch already refuses. Checked first now, so the answer no longer
depends on which encryption mode the newer writer chose.
- The doc comment claimed a per-file salt made "a short, memorable value
safe to use". It does not: the salt defeats precomputation, not
guessing, and the scrypt cost is deliberately a few milliseconds
because it runs on every read and write. Both the comment and the
README now say to use a high-entropy value, generated rather than
chosen.
- `usableSecretStorage` validated only `kind`, so a partial
`{ kind: "file" }` was cast through and — because a missing `plaintext`
is falsy — rendered as the quiet, neutral *encrypted* file. That is the
confident half-answer the guard exists to reject, produced by the
absence of information rather than by any claim the backend made.
`reason`, `durable`, and each kind's own required fields are checked.
- The footer's inline `Tooltip` carried four static props; extracted to a
`CaveatTooltip` constant per the `.withProps()` rule.
Tests cover each: the policy/file disagreement in both directions and the
no-file-yet fallback, `MCP_STORAGE_DIR` and its precedence against
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_FILE`, the version refusal (asserting the bytes
survive it) split from the unrecognized-cipher refusal it used to be
conflated with, `readOnDiskEncryption` including the keyless and
unparseable cases, five new rejected descriptor shapes, and the changed
caveat. Full `npm run ci` green.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Closes#1950
Before this, a box with no reachable OS keychain — the published
container (no D-Bus session, #1848), Android/Termux (no platform binary,
#1905), a minimal Linux install without libsecret — could not persist an
OAuth client secret or a stdio `env:` value at all. `KeyringSecretStore`
degraded into a store that silently holds nothing: `get` returned null,
`delete` no-opped, and `set` hard-failed with a 503. That is the correct
failure behavior, but it left the documented, supported way to run the
Inspector with no secret persistence whatsoever.
Adds the two missing implementations and, more importantly, the policy
that picks one and the surfaces that say which was picked.
- `FileSecretStore` — one `0600` JSON document at
`~/.mcp-inspector/secrets.json`, encrypted with AES-256-GCM whenever
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY` is set (scrypt, per-file random salt). The
whole map is encrypted as a unit rather than value-by-value so the
account names — `${serverId}:${field}` — are hidden too; a per-value
scheme would leave a readable index of which servers you hold a client
secret for. A file that can no longer be decrypted reads as empty
(matching the interface's read tolerance) but *refuses to be written*,
because replacing a file of still-valid secrets to satisfy an additive
request destroys data.
- `secret-store-selection.ts` — the policy.
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_STORE=keyring|file|memory` wins outright;
otherwise probe the keychain and, if unreachable, fall back loudly. The
fallback is `memory` in a container whose secrets directory is not on a
mount, and `file` otherwise — so mounting the volume the README already
recommends for the catalog flips the same run to durable storage with
no configuration, and an unmounted container gets the honest answer
rather than a file `--rm` will discard. Cached per process so the
banner, `/api/config`, and the store doing the writing cannot disagree.
- Automatic, but never silent. The downgrade prints at startup, rides
`GET /api/config`, and is named in a permanent 32px footer at the
bottom of both dialogs that accept a secret. A startup banner is seen
once by whoever started the process; a toast is seen once; a
dismissible banner is the thing a user dismisses before doing the work
it describes. The plaintext and memory cases render their caveat inline
in a warning tone — a warning you must hover to discover is not one.
- `SecretStoreUnavailableError` is now the base every store's `set`
throws, so the routes translate one condition into a 503 instead of
matching `KeychainUnavailableError` by name.
Docs: the container section of the root README gains a table of which
store you get and how to make secrets survive, plus the
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY` upgrade/mismatch rules.
Tests: the existing interface contract block is extracted to
`secretStoreContract.ts` and run against all three implementations, so
none can drift on the availability contract. `FileSecretStore` is tested
against a real temp filesystem — mode, cross-instance round-trip, that
the ciphertext does not contain the plaintext, the read-modify-write
race, and every refusal path. Full `npm run ci` passes, per-file gate
included.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
`npm audit --omit=dev` reported one high-severity finding in the
production tree, on both `main` and `v2/main`:
nanoid <3.3.18 — GHSA-2v37-7h3g-55p8
custom generators can loop indefinitely when size is zero
It arrives transitively, via vite -> postcss -> nanoid. `postcss`
depends on `nanoid@^3.3.11`, so the fix is an in-range lockfile bump in
all five installs — no package.json changed. `npm audit --omit=dev` is
now clean at the root and in each of the four client installs.
Applied as a targeted `npm update nanoid` per install rather than
`npm audit fix`. The latter reaches the same clean audit but re-resolves
the whole tree, and here dragged in an unrelated esbuild downgrade
(0.27.7 -> 0.27.2) across web/cli/tui — roughly 700 lines of lockfile
noise for a one-package security patch.
The issue also asked whether `vite` belongs in root `dependencies`,
since that placement is why this advisory appears under `--omit=dev` at
all. It does, and deliberately: `start-vite-dev-server.ts` imports
`vite` and `@vitejs/plugin-react` at runtime for `--web --dev`, and
`tsup.runner.config.ts` lists both as `external`, so a published install
resolves them from the root manifest. Moving them to `devDependencies`
would break `--web --dev` for consumers while passing every local check.
Left in place, with the reasoning recorded in the README's
dependency-placement paragraph so it need not be re-derived.
Verified: `npm audit --omit=dev` reports 0 vulnerabilities in all five
installs; `npm run ci` passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Dependabot security updates always target the default branch, so #1833,
#1840, #1913, #1925 and #2004 all landed on `main`. `main` is never merged
back into `v2/main`, so those fixes had no path to the develop branch and
every install off `v2/main` still resolved the vulnerable versions —
Dependabot will not re-raise them, since it considers them fixed on the
branch it watches.
Brings v2/main to parity: hono 4.12.25 -> 4.13.1, undici 8.5.0 -> 8.9.0,
body-parser 2.2.2 -> 2.3.0, ip-address 10.1.0 -> 10.5.0, fast-uri
3.1.0 -> 3.1.5, plus qs, type-is, express-rate-limit, hasown,
side-channel and es-object-atoms, across the root, web, cli and tui
installs. Two direct declarations move with them: cli undici ^8.9.0 and
web hono ^4.13.1.
The files are taken from the reconciled v2.3.0 milestone-merge tree, so
the root version stays 2.3.0 rather than regressing to main's 2.2.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTHVxSu8AUgHRLvo1ntZ8H
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
`runWithCommandAuthRecovery` rethrows anything that isn't an
`AuthRecoveryRequiredError`, and 17 of its 18 call sites were bare
`void runWithCommandAuthRecovery(...)` — so any non-auth failure of a
user-initiated list reload (Retry, Load next page, the pagination-mode
toggle) became an unhandled rejection in the browser.
Neither gate that should catch it could: `void` is the sanctioned
suppression for `no-floating-promises`, and `smoke:web:browser` — which
hard-fails on exactly this signal — never connects to a server.
Add `runCommandInBackground`, a fire-and-forget wrapper that owns the
rejection, and route every background command through it, so a new call
site cannot reintroduce the gap by omission. An optional `errorTitle`
picks the reporting: omitted where the list panel already renders the
failure with a Retry (a toast would duplicate it), passed where nothing
else records it — `logging/setLevel` and the tasks refresh.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
#1954 wired the list-load error off the aggregate managed stores only.
With `paginatedLists` on, those stores deliberately skip their all-page
walk, so their error is permanently null — while the paged stores that
actually drive the sidebar had no error state at all and `loadPage` had
a try/finally with no catch. A failing list showed an empty panel with
no alert and no Retry, and the connect-time `void loadPage(undefined)`
left an unhandled rejection.
- Give PagedTools/Prompts/ResourcesState observable error state: an
`errorChange` event plus `getError()`, set in a new catch in
`loadPage`, cleared on the next success and on disconnect. The
rejection is still re-thrown, matching ManagedListState — callers'
auth-recovery wrappers key off it to detect a 401.
- Catch the connect-time load's rejection (`.catch(() => {})`) now that
the failure is recorded as state rather than lost.
- Select the error by mode in `usePaginatedList`, the same way `items`
already is, and read it in App.tsx from the pagination model.
- Rename `useManagedListError` to `useListError`: both store families
expose an identical `errorChange`, so the hook declares that one-event
contract itself instead of importing ManagedListEventMap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 1. The helper's contract is exactly-once teardown
and the test asserted it must not lean on Hono's own re-entry guard, but
neither the implementation nor the test actually enforced that: the
listener had no local guard and the test aborted only once.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Both SSE handlers installed their subscriber, primed the stream so
Firefox's fetch() resolves (#1858), and only then registered onAbort.
Hono's onAbort has no already-aborted replay and abort() fires only the
subscribers registered at that moment, so a client disconnecting while
the priming write was in flight fired nothing: the session event
consumer / server-list subscriber stayed installed, the mcp.json watcher
was never stopped, and the handler parked forever on a promise nothing
would resolve.
Add primeAndHoldSseStream, which registers one listener before the first
await — it both cleans up and releases the hold, collapsing the previous
duplicate onAbort registrations. Priming still happens after the
subscriber is installed, since callers treat the stream's first bytes as
proof they are subscribed.
Closes#1999
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
clients/web emits two bundles — dist (the Vite SPA) and build (the tsup
prod-server runner) — but only dist was in globalIgnores, so `npm run lint`
parsed ~1.2MB of generated output and reported an unused-eslint-disable
warning from inside the vendored undici source. Its three sibling clients
already ignore their build/ output.
Closes#2043
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-19 review on #2035 -- a divergence introduced by
my own round-14 guard rather than by the original code.
The SDK validated a value inside `encodeValue`, i.e. only after looking one
up by a DECLARED name. The restored guard checked the caller's whole map, so
an unrelated entry failed a template that never mentions it. Measured on
9caac43d:
tryExpandUriTemplate("x://{id}", { id: "7", stale: "a".repeat(1_000_001) })
=> error: The value for "stale" exceeds the 1000000-character limit
RFC 6570 ignores an extra variable, so this refused a perfectly valid read.
`valueLengthError` now takes the names to consider and both callers pass the
template's declared set.
Copilot's second half is worth taking on its own: strict expansion parsed
the template THREE times -- inside `templateError`, again for the name list,
again to expand -- and the template is server-controlled and may be 1 MB.
It is now parsed once and reused, with validation split into
`sdkTemplateError` (the constructor's unclosed-brace and length/count
limits) and `partsError` (this module's own grammar), so `templateError` and
strict expansion share both halves rather than duplicating either.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-18 review on #2035. Two suppressed comments, both
holes in my own recent fixes rather than in the original code.
1. Round 16's grouping keyed off the length-announcing lead byte alone, so
it accepted sequences RFC 3629 forbids -- and the comment claiming they
fell back to per-triplet counting was simply wrong. Measured on 05bbfe50:
x{+v:1} "%C0%80x" => "x%C0%80" overlong
"%E0%80%80x" => "x%E0%80%80" overlong
"%ED%A0%80x" => "x%ED%A0%80" UTF-16 surrogate
"%F4%90%80%80x" => "x%F4%90%80%80" past U+10FFFF
The lead-byte ranges are now the well-formed ones -- C2-DF, E0 only with
A0-BF, ED only with 80-9F, F0 only with 90-BF, F4 only with 80-8F -- so
each of the above falls back to one triplet, which is what the fallback
was always documented to do. The legal boundary cases (%E0%A0%80,
%ED%9F%BF, %F4%8F%BF%BF) are tested alongside, so tightening the ranges
cannot quietly start splitting valid characters.
2. The preview never ran the read's template validation. It expands
expression by expression, so `x://{a}}/{b}` with both fields filled
previewed `x://1}/2` -- a URI whose stray `}` makes every read refuse.
Validation moved into an exported `templateError` that both callers
consult, so they cannot drift. It subsumes the narrower rule round 12
added here ("leave the invalid part standing"), which still let the REST
of such a template expand: the refusal is per template, not per
expression, so the preview now shows the template verbatim -- literals
unencoded included, since half-normalizing an unreadable template invents
a string the server never published. Two existing tests asserted the
weaker behavior and now assert this one.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-17 review on #2035. A real crash, and a class the
earlier prototype work missed rather than a narrower version of it.
`toString`, `constructor` and `__proto__` are valid RFC 6570 variable names,
and `completions` starts as `{}`. So for such a name:
completions["toString"] ?? [] => the prototype's FUNCTION
`??` catches only null and undefined, so that function went to Mantine's
Autocomplete as its `data`, and the field crashed on first render with
`TypeError: data.map is not a function` -- reproduced by reverting the fix
under the new test.
The earlier rounds fixed this for the *values* map, which is seeded with
every declared variable and so always has the key as an own property. The
completions map is the one name-keyed map this component reads WITHOUT
having seeded it, which is what made it the surviving instance. Both reads
now go through `Object.hasOwn` -- the render, and the stale-dropdown check
that clears a variable's options on the next keystroke.
Only the autocomplete branch could reach it, so the regression drives that
branch: completions supported, a `{toString}` template, type and submit.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-16 review on #2035. Two suppressed comments, both
real, and both refinements of fixes from the previous two rounds rather than
defects in the original code.
1. Round 11 settled on "a pct-encoded triplet counts as one character", but
a multi-octet character spans several triplets -- `%C3%A9` is one `é`.
Measured on a3dd8563:
x{+v:1} v = "%C3%A9x" => "x%C3" a lone lead byte, decoding to nothing
`prefixUnits` now recognizes a well-formed pct-encoded UTF-8 sequence from
its lead byte (RFC 3629: C2-DF two octets, E0-EF three, F0-F4 four;
continuations 80-BF), longest alternative first so a four-octet sequence
is not read as a two-octet one followed by loose triplets.
A malformed sequence -- a lead byte with too few continuations, or a stray
continuation -- matches no sequence alternative and falls back to
per-triplet counting. That is the conservative direction: it counts as
MORE units, so truncation keeps less rather than emitting octets that
were never in the value.
2. Round 14's per-value ceiling only covered the read. The panel calls
`previewUriTemplate` on every keystroke, and that path expands expression
by expression, so it reached the allocation-heavy encoders with the same
oversized value -- submission refused while the UI froze on the paste
anyway. Both paths now share one exported `valueLengthError`, checked
before any encoding happens.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-15 review on #2035.
1. `readResourceFromTemplate` had no regression distinguishing this module
from the SDK expander it replaced: the existing test uses `report.txt`
and the transport tests expand separately and call `readResource`, so all
of them pass either way.
Writing that test corrected something I had asserted twice in this PR.
The first version used `foo/bar` -- and verified by reverting the wiring,
it still passed. `encodeURIComponent` DOES encode `/`, so the SDK expands
`foobar://events/{topic}` to `foobar://events/foo%2Fbar` exactly as this
module does. #1919 was the WEB PANEL's own `String.replace`, not the SDK
expander, which the TUI path was using correctly all along.
The test now uses `a!b`. `!` is a sub-delim: RFC 6570 requires it
encoded, `encodeURIComponent` leaves it bare, so the SDK returns
`foobar://events/a!b` and the assertion fails. Re-verified by reverting
the wiring -- 2 of the 10 tests fail (this one and the malformed-template
refusal), where before the change none did.
2. The module summary said "shared by every client" a dozen lines above the
paragraph explaining the CLI is not a consumer. Now says web and TUI.
Also records, on MAX_VALUE_LENGTH, the audit prompted by round 14: the
per-value ceiling was the ONLY guard lost with `UriTemplate.expand`. The
template-length (1e6), expression-count (1e4) and variable-name-length (1e6)
limits all live in the SDK's `parse()`, which runs from the constructor --
and strict expansion still constructs a `UriTemplate`, so they remain
enforced. The restored limit is the SDK's `MAX_VARIABLE_LENGTH`, read from
the pinned dist rather than assumed.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-14 review on #2035. Three suppressed comments,
all real; each measured on 1c595e96 before acting.
1. A brace surviving in a literal is an unmatched one, and not a legal
literal character. The SDK's constructor rejects an unclosed `{` but
reads a stray `}` as text, and this parser did the same:
expandUriTemplateStrict("x://a}", {}) => "x://a}"
-- a "URI" carrying a brace, with the panel enabling the read on it.
Both halves are now refused the same way, so the withhold behavior
covers the whole class rather than the half the SDK happened to catch.
2. Replacing `UriTemplate.expand` also removed its 1,000,000-character
per-value ceiling. Nothing else bounded what reached the
allocation-heavy encoders, so a pasted or programmatically supplied
megabyte-plus value went straight through. Restored at the SDK's own
limit -- the guard it was, not a new policy -- and the error names the
offending variable.
3. `templateVariables` re-scanned an expression's whole varspec list for
every one of its names to compute `conforming`, which is quadratic in a
multi-name expression. Templates are server-controlled and the SDK
admits one up to 1 MB, so a single expression can carry thousands of
short comma-separated names, and this runs on the render thread.
Iterating the varspecs supplies the name and its conformance in one
pass.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-13 review on #2035. Two suppressed comments, both
real, both in the required-group work from round 7 rather than in the recent
preview rework.
1. `{a,a}` is ONE requirement named twice, but `requiredGroups` stored it as
a two-name group, so everything downstream read it as "either of these
will do". The TUI was left with a form it could not submit: its
`length === 1` test marked `a` optional while ResourceTestModal's guard
still refused a blank. The web panel offered the useless hint
"Any one of: a, a". Names are now deduplicated within the expression --
expansion still emits both occurrences (`x://{a,a}` -> `x://1,1`), which
RFC 6570 requires.
2. The per-field hint used `find`, so a variable in several shared groups
advertised only the first. With `{a,b}{b,c}{a,c}`, filling `b` satisfies
the first two and every visible hint then looks met while Read Resource
stays disabled on the unmet `{a,c}` -- a requirement with nothing on
screen pointing at it.
Fields now hint every shared group they sit in. That alone is not enough,
because no per-field hint can say WHICH group is still outstanding, so
the form states it directly: "Still needed: a or c", built from the same
`unmetRequiredGroups` the submit gate uses, so the message and the button
cannot disagree. `hasRequiredValues` is no longer called here -- the
panel derives both from the one list.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-12 review on #2035. Both halves are regressions
from my own round-10 rework, which replaced "expand a rewritten template
through the lenient expandUriTemplate" with a part-by-part assembly and so
lost two properties that implementation had for free. Reproduced on
c6fb6271:
previewUriTemplate("x://{v}", { v: "\ud800" }) => throws URIError
previewUriTemplate("x://{a,}", { a: "1" }) => "x://1"
The first is the worse one: the preview runs during render, so an escaping
throw unmounts the whole panel rather than disabling its button -- and an
unpaired surrogate is real input, since `encodeURIComponent` raises URIError
on one and a paste can deliver it. The panel already reports that case
properly through `tryExpandUriTemplate`; the display path now degrades to
the raw template instead of taking the panel down with it.
The second promised a URI the user could never send: `{a,}` is an invalid
template whose submission is refused, but `a` survives into the
expression's varspecs, so filling it previewed `x://1`. An invalid
expression is now left standing as written, which is what the rest of the
panel already says about it.
Tests for both, plus one asserting the valid expressions around an invalid
one still preview.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
A resume snapshot written before this change carries `selectedToolName`
where `ToolsUiState` now expects `selectedToolKey`. The blind cast in
`restoreTabUiFromSnapshot` carried it through as a stray field that would be
re-serialized on the next redirect. Route the Tools entry through a
`normalizeToolsUi` that drops it explicitly instead.
The name is deliberately not migrated to a row key: a snapshot lives for one
redirect (so this only arises when the app is upgraded mid-flight), and the
tools list is fetched after reconnect, long after restore — there is nothing
to resolve the name against. The selection is lost; search, form values, and
the run-as-task toggle restore intact.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-11 review on #2035, which corrects my own round-9
fix rather than the original code.
That fix grouped pct-triplets only under `+` and `#`, on the reasoning that
every other operator escapes a `%` anyway, so `%61` is three characters
rather than one. Wrong, in a way the narrower rule made visible one operator
over -- measured on 2e06b369:
x/{v:1} v = "%61%62" => "x/%25" truncated to a `%` that was never
a character of the value
RFC 6570 2.4.1 counts characters and says a pct-encoded triplet counts as a
single one, without reference to the operator. Grouping per-operator also
made the same input mean two different things: `%61` indivisible under `+`,
three loose characters under `{v}`. What the operator decides is how a
retained unit is *encoded* afterwards -- a simple expansion still escapes
the kept triplet's `%`, so `%61` goes out as `%2561` -- not what counts as
one character.
`prefixUnits` no longer takes an operator, and the test that codified the
old split now asserts the uniform rule across simple, named, and reserved
expansion.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
#1961 keyed the sidebar's React children by source position, but everything
downstream still identified a tool by `tool.name`. With a `tools/list` that
repeats a name, both copies highlighted at once, the click guard made the
other copy a no-op, and `tools.find((t) => t.name === …)` always resolved to
the first — so a later copy rendered but could never be opened.
Thread the row key through selection instead:
- `utils/toolUtils.ts` now owns `toolRowKey` (moved out of ToolControls) and
adds `findToolByRowKey`, which compares computed keys rather than parsing
one so the two can't drift.
- `ToolControls`: `selectedName` → `selectedKey`; the highlight and the click
guard compare keys, and `onSelectTool` emits the row key.
- `ToolsScreen`: `ToolsUiState.selectedToolName` → `selectedToolKey`, with
both lookups going through `findToolByRowKey`. Renamed through
`screenUiState.ts` and `App.tsx`'s `onToolsUiChange`.
`onCallTool` still sends `selectedTool.name` — the duplicated name is the
genuine wire identity; only the UI identity needed to be unique.
Also prefixes the excluded (SEP-2243) rows' keys: they render into the same
`Stack` as the list rows but index within their own list, so an excluded tool
sharing a name and index with a listed one collided in the key space.
Closes#2001
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-10 review on #2035. One inline comment, one
suppressed; both real.
1. Literals were copied through verbatim, but RFC 6570 3.1 requires them
pct-encoded on expansion -- the conformance case `café/{var}` expands to
`caf%C3%A9/value`. Measured on ef3f5e74 it produced `café/value`, raw
UTF-8 in the path; since this module replaced the SDK's expander for both
clients, nothing else was going to encode it. (The pinned SDK does not
either -- it returns `café/value` too -- so this is a gap we inherited
rather than introduced.)
`encodeLiteral` keeps reserved delimiters (a literal's `/`, `?` and `#`
are structure) and existing pct-triplets, and encodes the rest. A BRACE
passes through: it can only reach a literal from a malformed template,
where an unclosed `{` becomes trailing text, and `%7B` would leave a
string resembling neither the template nor anything the server can match.
This is also what removed the preview's placeholder machinery. No token
can survive a round trip now that literals are encoded, so the preview
assembles part by part instead -- `encodeLiteral` for literal runs,
`expandTemplateExpression` for filled expressions, `part.source` for the
rest. Both halves still come from the shared expander, so the preview
cannot promise a URI that submitting would not send, and the question of
what token could never collide with a server-supplied template is gone.
2. On the varname set I took the structural point rather than the
conclusion. `VARCHAR` is RFC-exact again; `-` and `~` moved into a
separately named `TOLERATED_VARCHAR` tier, and a name needing it parses
with `conforming: false`, surfaced on `TemplateVariable`.
So the grammar in the code says what the RFC says and the tolerance is
explicit and separately tested -- but the Inspector still expands
`{default-graph-uri}`, because real servers publish hyphenated names and
the SDK's matcher round-trips them. Refusing to read a resource that
demonstrably works is a worse failure for a debugging tool than expanding
a name the conformance suite would reject. A caller wanting RFC-exact
behavior refuses on the flag rather than re-deriving the grammar.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-9 review on #2035.
RFC 6570 2.4.1 counts the prefix in *characters* and is explicit that a
pct-encoded triplet counts as a single one. Truncation went by code point,
so it cut a triplet in half -- measured on 6acaff70:
x{+v:5} v = "%61%62%63%64%65%66" => "x%61%256"
The orphaned "%6" is not a triplet, so encodeAllowReserved then (correctly)
escaped its `%`, and the value went out carrying a byte the caller never
asked for. Now "x%61%62%63%64%65".
Triplets are units only under `+` and `#`. Under every other operator the
encoder escapes a `%` anyway (`%61` -> `%2561`), so the three characters
really are three and grouping them would mis-count the prefix -- asserted
both ways. Astral code points remain single units under both, which is what
`Array.from` was there for.
Also corrects the comment on `readResourceFromTemplate`, which still said
the shared helper drops blank values. It has not since 6acaff70: `params`
passes through as given, so only an absent key omits its expression and a
direct API caller can request `?q=` deliberately. A caller whose values come
from a form drops its own blanks first.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-8 review on #2035 (one inline comment, one
suppressed). Both real.
1. RFC 6570 distinguishes an UNDEFINED variable, which omits its whole
expression, from one defined as the empty string, which expands. The
expander was calling `definedValues` on the way in, collapsing the two --
so `x{?q}` with `{ q: "" }` gave `x` instead of `x?q=`, and there was no
way for any caller, `readResourceFromTemplate` included, to request
either that or `x;q`. Key presence is now honored, including §3.2.7's
rule that the matrix operator drops the `=` for an empty value (`x{;q}`
-> `x;q`, while `?`/`&` keep it).
Dropping blanks is a FORM concern, so it moved to the two form
boundaries: the web panel seeds every declared variable with "" and the
TUI's ink-form returns "" for every untouched field, so neither can tell
"never touched" from "deliberately empty" -- but that is a fact about a
text input, not about the template, and it has no business deciding what
a template means for every other caller.
Six unit tests and one integration test encoded the old collapse and now
assert the corrected meaning. The prototype-collision cases get stronger
rather than weaker: a blank `{?toString}` expands to `?toString=` -- its
OWN empty value -- where the original bug expanded the inherited
function's body.
2. The expansion error is now `role="alert"`. It can appear while typing (a
pasted value that cannot be encoded), and plain text is not announced, so
a screen-reader user met a disabled Read Resource with no stated reason.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Server Settings already has a Custom Headers editor, so adding one to the
manual add form created a second place to edit the same field. The reporter
had also conditionally withdrawn #1915 — "editing that information from the
server settings dialog is sufficient" once #1848 closed, which it has.
Reverts the add-form editor, the shared KeyValueRows element, the optional
`settings` argument on addServer / updateServer, and the App-level merge
helper. What remains are two defects found while working in
ServerSettingsForm, which this PR now closes instead (#2040): the Custom
Headers hint misstating OAuth precedence, and the key/value rows' missing
accessible names.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-7 review on #2035. Two suppressed comments, both
real; each reproduced against this branch before acting.
1. `parseVarSpec` was a "strip the first `*`, trim, split on `:`" pass, so
it accepted shapes RFC 6570's varspec production does not admit --
measured on the previous commit:
x://{*id} name "id" => "x://abcdef" explode is a TRAILING modifier
x://{id*:3} name "id" => "x://abc" the two modifiers are exclusive
x://{ id } name "id" => "x://abcdef" whitespace is not a varchar
x://{a b} name "a b" => "x://1" ditto -- and it emits into the URI
`{id*:3}` is the worst of them: it silently truncated the value through a
combination the grammar forbids. Parsing is now one anchored regex --
a varname, then at most one trailing `*` or `:1-9999`.
The name set is `varchar` widened by `-` and `~`, deliberately. A name is
the one thing expansion emits into the URI WITHOUT encoding it (`;`, `?`
and `&` write `name=value`), so the rule it has to satisfy is "needs no
encoding" -- RFC 3986 unreserved plus pct-encoded, of which the RFC's own
varchar is a subset. Strict varchar would refuse `{user-id}`, which real
servers publish and which the SDK's matcher round-trips; refusing to read
a resource that demonstrably works is a worse outcome for a debugging
tool than a name one character outside the production. Everything now
rejected is a shape we would otherwise have to guess at.
2. The TUI built its "Missing required template variable(s): ..." list with
its own bare `values[name]` filter while gating on `hasRequiredValues`,
which reads own properties only. For a variable legitimately named
`constructor` the two disagreed: `({})["constructor"]` is `Object`, whose
`.length` is 1, so the list came out empty and the error named no field
at all while the submit stayed blocked. Both now come from one exported
`unmetRequiredGroups`, with `hasRequiredValues` defined in terms of it.
Also renames a test whose title still said multi-name query expressions were
left "to the SDK, which handles them" -- expansion has been owned here since
935113d1; the behavior it asserts is naming, not delegation.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Ports the two behaviors PR #2033 (the parallel attempt at #1919, now closed
as a duplicate) got right and this branch did not.
1. An expression declaring no variable is a malformed template, not one
with a member to skip. RFC 6570 requires at least one varspec per
expression and admits no empty member, so `{}`, `{,}`, `{a,}`, `{?}`
and `{*}` (an explode modifier is not a name) now make the template
invalid. Skipping them was the more dangerous reading: `x://{}`
expanded to `x://` while the form rendered no inputs, so its
"everything required is filled" check was vacuously true and it
submitted a URI that is not the template the server published.
2. The read is withheld when expansion fails. `expandUriTemplate`'s
raw-template fallback exists for the preview, which runs during render
-- but the submit path used it too, so an invalid template was read
with its braces intact and the server answered with a confusing "not
found" for a defect that is not the user's. `tryExpandUriTemplate`
returns the URI or the reason as a value the caller cannot mistake for
one; the panel gates Read Resource on it and prints the reason.
This also covers a value that cannot be encoded -- an unpaired
surrogate has no UTF-8 encoding, so `encodeURIComponent` throws
`URIError` on it, and a text input can hold one via paste.
`requiredGroups` now skips an expression naming no variable: an empty
group can never be satisfied, so it would gate the form a second time on
a condition nothing can meet, and the "any one of" hint built from it
would name no fields. The accurate reason is the malformed template,
which the expansion gate reports.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Round-4 review follow-ups on #2038.
The Custom Headers hint claimed a custom `Authorization` value is "ignored"
once OAuth is configured. Verified against the installed
@modelcontextprotocol/client: both SSE and streamable-HTTP `_commonHeaders()`
set the bearer first and then spread `requestInit.headers`, so a custom
value *overrides* the OAuth token. The hint told users the opposite of what
would happen, and could have them silently break their own auth. Corrected in
both places — the modal's new hint and the pre-existing one in
ServerSettingsForm, which carried the same wrong claim.
`utils/serverSettingsPatch.ts` imported both its shared types from
components, reversing the one-way `components -> utils` direction AGENTS.md
sets. `KeyValuePair` moves to `utils/keyValuePairs.ts` (KeyValueRows
re-exports it), and the mode is spelled as a literal union — still checked,
since `ServerConfigModalMode` must stay assignable to it at the call site.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 3 (PR #2039): clearing the banner when `selectedServer`
changes is not enough. Start disconnecting A, switch A → B → A, and by
the time the original request rejects both guards match again — the
attempt token is unchanged and the selected server is A once more — so
the stale failure lands on the freshly re-selected A. Bump the token on
every switch, so a round trip invalidates prior disconnects the same way
a one-way switch does.
New test drives exactly that interleaving; it fails without the bump
(the one-way test does not, which is why this needed its own).
Also attaches the before/after TUI screenshots the review asked for —
the review was right that "no UI change" stopped being true once the
banner was added — and corrects the PR description accordingly.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Two suppressed review findings.
With an override configured, the wrapper cloned and parsed every
successful application/json response — every tools/call result and every
resource payload on the direct CLI/TUI transports — only to conclude it
was not a metadata document. It now tests the request URL for the RFC
8414 / OIDC well-known paths first, so ordinary traffic costs one string
test and is returned untouched.
The read path also trusted StoredMCPServer's `string` type for the two
override fields, which a hand-edited mcp.json does not honor: the CLI and
TUI read the file directly and then `.trim()` these, so a number would
crash the server load. Guarded with cleanEndpointOverride, mirroring
cleanAuthorizationParams.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-6 review on #2035.
`toString`, `constructor`, `valueOf` and `__proto__` are all valid RFC
6570 variable names -- `varname` allows ALPHA / DIGIT / `_` / pct-encoded
-- and every lookup here was a bare `values[name]`, which finds
`Object.prototype`'s member for each of them. Measured: `({})["toString"]
!== undefined` is true with typeof "function", and `({}["constructor"] ??
"").length` is 1.
So a *blank* `{?toString}` field read as supplied and expanded a function
body into the URI instead of omitting the expression, and
`hasRequiredValues([["constructor"]], {})` returned true because
`Object.length` is 1 -- a required group satisfied by nothing.
All reads now go through an own-property `readValue`, and the web
preview's filled-check uses `Object.hasOwn`. `expandExpression` carries
the value through its filter rather than re-reading it afterwards, so the
"is it defined" test and the read cannot disagree and nothing needs a
non-null assertion.
The remaining six findings were documentation drifting behind the code,
which matters here because the comments are the argument for why this
module exists:
- The web helper still described the SDK's second-`?`-to-`&` rewrite as
something the preview relies on. That was removed last round.
- Three places still named the CLI as a consumer. It has no template form
and passes an already-expanded `--uri` to `readResource`.
- The PR description still described the superseded architecture
(expansion delegated to the SDK), i.e. the opposite of what now ships.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
