Nine findings (six inline, three suppressed), all taken. Two were serious.
**The memory fallback made the migrations destructive.** Both migrations —
mcp.json in the remote server, client.json in `node-persistence` — lift a
plaintext secret off disk, write it to the secret store, and then delete it
from the file. That trade is safe only while the store is at least as
durable as the disk, which held by construction while `InMemorySecretStore`
was a test double. Making it a production fallback broke it: on an
unmounted container a plain `GET /api/servers` would have moved a user's
existing secrets into RAM and lost them at exit — destroying data on a
read.
`SecretStore` gains an optional `isDurable()`, absent meaning durable, and
both migrations withhold the disk delete when it answers false (the value
is still loaded, so the session behaves normally). The production fallback
is now a named `SessionSecretStore` rather than the bare
`InMemorySecretStore`, so the suite's many doubles keep standing in for a
*working keychain* — which is what they are there to be — and only code
that deliberately chooses RAM in production says so.
**Round 2's per-call descriptor never reached anyone.** Both web servers
resolved it once at startup and baked it into `initialConfig`, which
`/api/config` serves unchanged — so the freshness fix was inert for its
only consumer. The route now takes a `secretStorageResolver` and calls it
per request.
The lock needed three more fixes, and they compound:
- **Release removed whatever directory was at the path.** A holder whose
work outran the stale threshold would delete the *next* owner's lock,
letting a third writer into a section two processes believed they held.
Ownership is now stamped with a random token and release only removes a
lock still carrying it.
- **The timeout fell through to an unlocked write** — under contention,
the one moment another writer is provably active. It now throws
`SecretFileLockTimeoutError`, which `set` is allowed to do.
- **The first write of every process bypassed the lock**, because the
secrets directory does not exist yet and `mkdir` failed ENOENT. The
parent is created first. First writes are exactly when two processes are
most likely to start together.
Fixing the timeout exposed a fourth: with stale (10s) below timeout, a
waiter stole from a holder that was merely *slow* rather than dead —
reinstating the lost update. A holder now heartbeats its lock, so
"stale" means the holder is gone, and the timeout is what a live-but-slow
holder produces. Lock timings are injectable so the tests can exercise
contention, staleness, and timeout without spending the real intervals.
Also: the loose-permission state is carried into `SecretStorageInfo` as
`looseMode` and rendered as the caveat (it outranks the encryption caveat —
a file others can read is a live exposure, while "unencrypted" is a
property of a file only its owner can open), rather than living in a
startup log the browser cannot see; and `usableSecretStorage` validates
`pendingEncryption` and `looseMode` as the optional booleans/numbers they
are (`pendingEncryption: "false"` is truthy and would have printed advice
that is the opposite of the truth) and rejects file-only fields on a
keychain or memory descriptor.
Tests: both migrations against a session store with a durable control
alongside, so the guard is visibly the difference; `/api/config` serving a
changing resolver and falling back without one; lock ownership after a
steal, the timeout under a live holder, no-steal from a slow holder, and a
locked first write; `looseMode` through the descriptor, the caveat
ordering, and the tone; and five more rejected payload shapes. Full
`npm run ci` green — 5,704 tests under the coverage gate.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Closes#1950
Before this, a box with no reachable OS keychain — the published
container (no D-Bus session, #1848), Android/Termux (no platform binary,
#1905), a minimal Linux install without libsecret — could not persist an
OAuth client secret or a stdio `env:` value at all. `KeyringSecretStore`
degraded into a store that silently holds nothing: `get` returned null,
`delete` no-opped, and `set` hard-failed with a 503. That is the correct
failure behavior, but it left the documented, supported way to run the
Inspector with no secret persistence whatsoever.
Adds the two missing implementations and, more importantly, the policy
that picks one and the surfaces that say which was picked.
- `FileSecretStore` — one `0600` JSON document at
`~/.mcp-inspector/secrets.json`, encrypted with AES-256-GCM whenever
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY` is set (scrypt, per-file random salt). The
whole map is encrypted as a unit rather than value-by-value so the
account names — `${serverId}:${field}` — are hidden too; a per-value
scheme would leave a readable index of which servers you hold a client
secret for. A file that can no longer be decrypted reads as empty
(matching the interface's read tolerance) but *refuses to be written*,
because replacing a file of still-valid secrets to satisfy an additive
request destroys data.
- `secret-store-selection.ts` — the policy.
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_STORE=keyring|file|memory` wins outright;
otherwise probe the keychain and, if unreachable, fall back loudly. The
fallback is `memory` in a container whose secrets directory is not on a
mount, and `file` otherwise — so mounting the volume the README already
recommends for the catalog flips the same run to durable storage with
no configuration, and an unmounted container gets the honest answer
rather than a file `--rm` will discard. Cached per process so the
banner, `/api/config`, and the store doing the writing cannot disagree.
- Automatic, but never silent. The downgrade prints at startup, rides
`GET /api/config`, and is named in a permanent 32px footer at the
bottom of both dialogs that accept a secret. A startup banner is seen
once by whoever started the process; a toast is seen once; a
dismissible banner is the thing a user dismisses before doing the work
it describes. The plaintext and memory cases render their caveat inline
in a warning tone — a warning you must hover to discover is not one.
- `SecretStoreUnavailableError` is now the base every store's `set`
throws, so the routes translate one condition into a 503 instead of
matching `KeychainUnavailableError` by name.
Docs: the container section of the root README gains a table of which
store you get and how to make secrets survive, plus the
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY` upgrade/mismatch rules.
Tests: the existing interface contract block is extracted to
`secretStoreContract.ts` and run against all three implementations, so
none can drift on the availability contract. `FileSecretStore` is tested
against a real temp filesystem — mode, cross-instance round-trip, that
the ciphertext does not contain the plaintext, the read-modify-write
race, and every refusal path. Full `npm run ci` passes, per-file gate
included.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Adds enterprise-managed authorization (EMA): browser-side IdP login + RFC 8693 token-exchange and JWT-bearer resource-token mint, per-server EMA opt-in in Server Settings, IdP config in Client Settings, and IdP clientSecret keychain storage. Includes the v2/main merge and review follow-ups (400 on malformed client config; normalizeIdpIssuer import consolidation).
cliffhall
Bob Dickinson