Copilot reported "no new comments" again, with four real findings in its
suppressed block.
- The web in-flight lock was global, so a pending clear for server A silently
swallowed a click on server B's — even though the callback explicitly
supports clearing a non-active server. Keyed by server id now.
- `else if (!isActive)` skipped the resume-snapshot cleanup when the target IS
active but has no client yet, which is reachable while a session is being
built or torn down. The clear then emptied storage and left stale OAuth
recovery state pointing at credentials that no longer existed.
- `revocationAuthMethods` returned `[]` for an omitted
`revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported`, which does not enforce RFC
8414's default: an empty list means "the metadata said nothing" to
`selectClientAuthMethod`, which then honors the registration's own
`token_endpoint_auth_method`. The default is named literally now.
- The `v8 ignore` on the CLI budget branch was wrong, and the challenge to it
was right: an injected `budgetMs` of zero reaches it directly, through a seam
I had added myself the round before. Removed, and covered by a test that
asserts no request is made and the unattempted key is reported.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 18. Three of its findings were the same check-then-act:
`planOAuthRevocation` is asynchronous, so the gap between its reads and the
following `storage.clear()` is still a window — shorter than the network one
closed in round 13, but the same shape. An OAuth completion landing at any of
those awaits saved a grant the clear then destroyed.
`OAuthStorage.takeRevocationSnapshot(serverUrl)` reads what revocation needs
and clears the server in ONE synchronous pass over the in-memory state, with
the persist after the mutation. `clearAndPlanRevocation` replaces
`planOAuthRevocation`, and there is no separate `clear` call left in any
caller — the clear cannot be forgotten or reordered.
The snapshot returns values unparsed, deliberately: schema validation is pure
and belongs after the mutation, since running it inside would reintroduce the
`await` this exists to remove.
Two consequences worth naming. A failure of the take-and-clear now REJECTS
rather than returning an outcome, because the state was not cleared and the
caller's contract is that it was; both clients already have a rejection path.
And cross-process atomicity is explicitly not claimed — nothing in this store
takes a lock, every mutation is a read-modify-write over a loaded snapshot, and
`clear` alone always had that property.
Also from round 18:
- The CLI's budget check ran before considering `plan.outcome`, so a key that
needed no network was reported as budget-exhausted — warning that a grant may
be live when that key held none.
- A disconnect failure after a successful clear was reported as "could not
clear OAuth state" in both clients. It now goes to the disconnect channel,
and the success is still reported.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot's round 16 reported "no new comments", but its suppressed block carried
three real findings.
- `AuthTab` released `clearInFlightRef` before checking whether the completion
was still current, so server A settling after the user moved to B and started
a clear there dropped B's lock and let a second B clear run concurrently
against the same store entry. `current()` is now checked before either shared
ref is touched: a stale clear owns nothing.
- Switching servers retired the clear but left `ownClearRef` set. The retired
clear returns before its `oauthRevision` bump, so the marker had no bump to
skip and would swallow the first unrelated revision on the newly selected
server, stranding that server's banner.
- The web session check compared only the server id, which a
disconnect/reconnect to the SAME server passes — that flow builds a
replacement `InspectorClient`, so the old clear would have run its
session-wide cleanup against the new session. The client identity is part of
the check now.
Both new tests were verified to fail with their fix reverted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review rounds 8 and 9.
- A cached metadata document with no `issuer` was letting every issuer-bound
token go to its single revocation endpoint. Absence establishes nothing, so
that is now a mismatch: an issuer-bound grant must match, and only a legacy
unkeyed grant — which nothing binds to a different authorization server —
proceeds without the comparison. This was a credential-disclosure risk, not
just a correctness one.
- The ctx-less grant read was skipped whenever it carried an issuer stamp, on
the assumption that slot had already been enumerated. If `listIssuers` fails
there is no enumerated slot behind the stamp, so the one readable grant went
unrevoked while `clear` deleted it. Both reads now share one issuer+token
key, and the stamped issuer is retained rather than discarded.
- `AuthTab`'s repeat guard read `clearState`, which is not updated until React
re-renders, so two `s` events in one input turn both started a clear against
the same store entry. It is a ref now, set before the call.
- A rejected clear left `ownClearRef` set — `handleClearOAuth` never reached
its `oauthRevision` bump — so the next unrelated revision was swallowed and
the failure banner stranded. Cleared on that path.
- The web `clearServerOAuthAndDisconnect` had the staleness the TUI path was
already fixed for: `isActive`/`inspectorClient` are captured before a
five-second await, so a switch during it disconnected the session the user
had just moved to and ran the session-wide cleanup against it. Revalidated
against `sessionRef` after each await.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Clearing the Inspector's OAuth state deleted the local copy of the tokens
and stopped there. The access token — and the refresh token, which is
long-lived by design — stayed valid at the authorization server until they
expired on their own, so a day of connect/disconnect iteration left it
holding grants for sessions that ended hours ago. RFC 7009 §1 describes
exactly that case, and nothing in the repo constructed a revocation
request, so a server author implementing `revocation_endpoint` had no way
to exercise it with the tool that exists to exercise this.
core/auth/revocation.ts builds and sends the request; the three clear paths
call it, so the behavior is written once — web's "Clear OAuth state and
disconnect" (both the active and stored-only paths), the TUI's Auth tab,
and the CLI's --relogin. It runs BEFORE the local clear, because the token,
the client credentials and the discovered `revocation_endpoint` all live in
the store the clear is about to empty. The request names the refresh token
when there is one: §2.1 asks the AS to also invalidate the access tokens
issued under the same grant, so one request covers both halves.
Best-effort by construction. Every path returns a TokenRevocationOutcome
rather than throwing: no advertised endpoint means nothing is sent and that
authorization server behaves exactly as before, and a network error, a
non-2xx, a 5s timeout or an unreadable store is reported and nothing more.
Forgetting the tokens is what the user asked for. `lost_authorization_state`
recovery deliberately skips it — it clears a half-finished flow to retry it,
and an authorization that never completed has no grant to revoke.
Client authentication resolves the preregistered slot first, mirroring
BaseOAuthClientProvider.clientInformation; reading only the dynamic slot
would send no authentication for a server configured with `oauth.clientId`.
The Basic credential is byte-identical to the SDK's applyBasicAuth so this
request and the token request cannot present the same secret differently.
Opt out per server with `oauth.revokeOnClear` (default on, only `false`
written to disk) or per CLI run with --no-revoke. Read at clear time rather
than connect time, so toggling needs no reconnect. Turning it off is a
testing affordance: a client that walks away still holding live tokens is a
case a server author may want to reproduce.
test-servers now advertises `revocation_endpoint` and serves POST
/oauth/revoke, faithful on §2.2 (an unknown token is a success) and §2.1
(revoking a refresh token invalidates the access tokens under the same
grant), with oauth-revocation-http.json / oauth-no-revocation-http.json as
showcase configs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
- Publish `setupClientForServerRef` from a layout effect rather than during
render. React runs every layout effect before any passive effect of the same
commit, and the /oauth/callback effect is passive, so the seam is still
published before its first read — without the render-phase ref mutation the
compiler rule rejects. This was the one `react-hooks/refs` finding the PR
introduced, so its suppression is gone rather than deferred to #2161 under a
justification that did not describe it.
- Narrow the hook's `fetchLogRef` option to `FetchRequestSource`, the
`getFetchRequests` slice it actually consumes, mirroring
`InspectorClientEventSource` in useProgressToasts. That removes the test
harness's `as unknown as` cast, and the narrowed contract is real: it
immediately rejected the loosely-typed fixture, which is now a properly typed
`FetchRequestEntry`.
- Make the test harness hold both refs across renders and publish them from a
layout effect, as App.tsx does. The deferred-publication test previously
passed because `Probe` built a fresh ref each render and the rerender also
changed `servers`; it now asserts what the guard is actually for — a run that
cannot exchange must not spend the single-use code — and re-triggers on the
`servers` change that carries it in production.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Phase 2 step 2 of the App.tsx decomposition (#2129, under #2126). App.tsx goes
from 4,267 to 3,178 lines; no behaviour change.
The new hook owns the step-up slot and its retry operation, the re-auth banner,
the deferred background-tab recovery, the redirect plumbing (webOAuthStorage,
sessionStorageAdapter, onBeforeOAuthRedirect, prepareOAuthRedirect), the
command-scoped recovery wrappers, the four OAuth effects, the abandoned-redirect
check, the /oauth/callback completion, the Connection Info OAuth details, and
the clear/finalize paths. All five once-only latches move with it unchanged.
Three seams could not be a straight move:
- useSessionRef no longer takes pendingStepUp/pendingReauth. They are this
hook's own state, so App.tsx would have had to hold them purely to hand them
back; instead the owner mirrors them into the ref in an effect of its own,
following the shape activeServerName already had.
- setupClientForServer is injected through a ref, because it reads
onBeforeOAuthRedirect and sessionStorageAdapter out of this hook and so
cannot be declared before it. The callback effect reads the ref before
burning its one-shot latch.
- The two clear-OAuth modal adapters and onReauthenticateFromBanner stay in
App.tsx: they bind App-owned state, and the latter drives a reconnect, which
step 3 owns.
Dropping ~1,100 lines took App.tsx under the React Compiler's bail-out, so the
compiler-backed react-hooks rules now analyse it and report nine pre-existing
findings that were previously invisible. Each is suppressed with a narrow
justified disable naming #2161, which is filed to resolve them; the one new
finding (exhaustive-deps on setReAuthBanner) is fixed rather than suppressed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
