Commit graph inspector/clients/web/src/test/integration
Author SHA1 Message Date
cliffhall
3153f0305a fix: key resource list rows by position so duplicate URIs cannot collide
The Resources sidebar keyed every row on its `uri` (and templates on
`uriTemplate`), but nothing in MCP makes those unique — a server may return
the same URI twice, and `ManagedListState.applyItems` replaces the list
wholesale, so a repeat is what the server actually sent. React logged
`Encountered two children with the same key` on every render, and a
filtered-out row survived reconciliation instead of unmounting.

This is the resources counterpart of #1957. The row identity is now the same
`listRowKey(id, sourceIndex)` the Tools sidebar has used since then, extracted
so the two formats cannot drift; `toolRowKey` delegates to it. Applied to all
three Resources lists and to `RootsTable`, whose user-maintained list can
collect a duplicate URI the same way.

Selection stays keyed on the URI, deliberately: unlike a duplicated tool name
(#2001), duplicate rows here denote the same resource — a `resources/read`
takes the URI — so highlighting both is correct. Only the React key needs to
tell them apart.

Adds `ServerConfig.duplicateResourceUris` and the
`duplicate-resource-uris-http.json` showcase config, the `resources/list`
mirror of `duplicateToolNames`, so the defect has a fixture to reproduce it —
appended rather than adjacent, for the reason #1957 documented.

Closes #2206

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018yVgAJz4wpkS4mkGk7DQnp
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-06 19:43:47 -04:00
cliffhall
9b35e530fc fix: send an empty-string pagination cursor verbatim on every list adapter (#2220)
An MCP cursor is an opaque string: the spec constrains neither its content
nor its length, so `""` is a `nextCursor` a server may legitimately return
and the client is required to send back verbatim.

`listPrompts`, `listResources`, `listResourceTemplates` and
`listRequestorTasks` built their request params with `cursor ? { cursor } : {}`,
a truthiness check that cannot distinguish "no cursor" from "the cursor is
the empty string". Against a server that paginates with `""` they dropped it
and re-requested page one — a list that silently stops at the first page, or
a walk that loops on it forever. Nothing surfaced an error, because the
request was well-formed; it just asked the wrong question. `listTools` (and
the later `listSkills`) already used `cursor !== undefined`; this brings the
other four into line.

`getReplayableParams` in `protocolReplay.ts` existed partly to mirror the
asymmetry — its `method === "tools/list" || params.cursor !== ""` special
case collapses to `typeof params.cursor === "string"` now that the adapters
agree, and its long comment is updated rather than left describing a state
that no longer exists.

Coverage:

- `inspectorClient-list-cursor.test.ts` asserts the outbound params of all
  five adapters — `""` carried, an absent cursor sending no `cursor` key,
  a non-empty cursor forwarded unchanged. `listTools` is the control.
- `test-servers/configs/empty-cursor-http.json` (`emptyStringCursor`) hands
  out `""` as the cursor for page two, the shape no other fixture produces,
  and `empty-cursor.test.ts` walks all three of its lists end to end.
- Removing the fix from any one adapter fails exactly its two cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EN2UfrkQZvtrviMtqURRm4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-06 13:28:44 -04:00
cliffhall
1ee958091e feat(skills): address Copilot review round 16 on #2234
Round 16 reported no inline comments and three suppressed findings, all
valid:

- `getSkillsExtension` treated a non-object extension value (`false`,
  `"skills"`) as a declaration. SEP-2133 declares an extension as an
  object of sub-options, so a primitive is not one — now rejected,
  matching `appElicitation.ts`.
- The `onGetSkill` prop doc claimed the two responses "must agree" and
  that a difference means a broken server, contradicting the
  implementation, which reports a difference as a finding rather than a
  fault. Reworded to what the code does.
- No real-transport test exercised the fixture's `skills/*` handlers.
  Added `src/test/integration/mcp/inspectorClient-skills.test.ts`,
  parameterized over both protocol eras: capability advertisement, the
  paged `skills/list` walk (direct and through `ManagedSkillsState`),
  `skills/get`, the `-32602` for an unknown URI, `resources/read` of a
  skill file, and delegation of an ordinary resource through the
  fixture's `resources/read` wrapper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kfrH3uRNUM4JAk1reKtyY
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-05 02:42:47 -04:00
cliffhall
403352357b test(auth): make the revocation fixture a real form-urldecoder
#2222 reported that `core/auth/revocation.ts` breaks a client secret
containing `+`, on the basis that `encodeURIComponent` leaves `+` bare.
It does not — it escapes it as `%2B`. The characters it leaves bare are
exactly `!'()*-._~` and alphanumerics, every one of which a form-
urldecoder passes through unchanged, so its output decodes identically
under both algorithms; verified over every code point up to U+2FFF.

Switching to `URLSearchParams` would be the literal algorithm §2.3.1
names and a small regression: it encodes a space as `+`, which a lenient
server decoding with `decodeURIComponent` alone reads as a literal `+`,
while `%20` is understood by both. The encoder is therefore unchanged
and the reasoning is recorded on it.

The report's second half stands and is the real defect: the fixture
decoded with `decodeURIComponent`, the encoder's own inverse, so the
round trip succeeded for every input by construction and no test could
have failed on an encoding mistake. `/oauth/revoke` now runs a genuine
RFC 6749 Appendix B decode, with unit cases for `+`, a space, `:` and
`%` (asserted on the wire and through an independent decoder), an
end-to-end client whose secret is base64 with a `+` in it, and a guard
that an unencoded credential is refused — the case that separates the
two decoders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BhVaufrEZAfFAXcg6456hK
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-04 19:29:02 -04:00
cliffhall
2eeab05d00 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/v2/main' into v2/fix/2172-oidc-discovery-compat
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>

# Conflicts:
#	README.md
#	core/mcp/inspectorClient.ts
#	test-servers/src/test-server-oauth.ts
2026-08-28 10:10:57 -04:00
cliffhall
c7b18adabf Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/v2/feat/2144-oauth-revocation' into v2/feat/2144-oauth-revocation 2026-08-28 08:37:15 -04:00
cliffhall
eede9c17ba fix: use Node storage in the revocation e2e, and drop the now-dead storage API (#2144)
The CI coverage job failed with `ReferenceError: sessionStorage is not defined`.
`revocation-e2e.test.ts` used `BrowserOAuthStorage`, but the `integration`
vitest project runs in the node environment, not happy-dom. Node 22 gates Web
Storage behind a flag while newer Node exposes it by default, so it passed
locally and failed in CI. It uses `NodeOAuthStorage` with a temp dir now,
matching the other OAuth integration tests, with a comment naming the trap.

Also from Copilot review round 21: `listIssuers` and `getIssuerTokens` became
dead production API when `takeRevocationSnapshot` took over — a grep finds them
only in their own implementations and tests. Keeping them would widen the
exported `OAuthStorage` contract and force every implementation and mock to
carry methods nothing calls. Removed, along with their tests and the mock
entries in four suites.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 08:36:58 -04:00
Cliff Hall
5ba2fadd3b
Merge branch 'v2/main' into v2/feat/2144-oauth-revocation 2026-08-28 08:28:57 -04:00
cliffhall
463227c947 fix(auth): make snapshot-and-clear one atomic storage step (#2144)
Copilot review round 18. Three of its findings were the same check-then-act:
`planOAuthRevocation` is asynchronous, so the gap between its reads and the
following `storage.clear()` is still a window — shorter than the network one
closed in round 13, but the same shape. An OAuth completion landing at any of
those awaits saved a grant the clear then destroyed.

`OAuthStorage.takeRevocationSnapshot(serverUrl)` reads what revocation needs
and clears the server in ONE synchronous pass over the in-memory state, with
the persist after the mutation. `clearAndPlanRevocation` replaces
`planOAuthRevocation`, and there is no separate `clear` call left in any
caller — the clear cannot be forgotten or reordered.

The snapshot returns values unparsed, deliberately: schema validation is pure
and belongs after the mutation, since running it inside would reintroduce the
`await` this exists to remove.

Two consequences worth naming. A failure of the take-and-clear now REJECTS
rather than returning an outcome, because the state was not cleared and the
caller's contract is that it was; both clients already have a rejection path.
And cross-process atomicity is explicitly not claimed — nothing in this store
takes a lock, every mutation is a read-modify-write over a loaded snapshot, and
`clear` alone always had that property.

Also from round 18:

- The CLI's budget check ran before considering `plan.outcome`, so a key that
  needed no network was reported as budget-exhausted — warning that a grant may
  be live when that key held none.
- A disconnect failure after a successful clear was reported as "could not
  clear OAuth state" in both clients. It now goes to the disconnect channel,
  and the success is still reported.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 07:40:52 -04:00
cliffhall
a4ee263365 fix(auth): refuse a grant whose authorization server cannot be established (#2144)
Copilot review round 15.

The issuer check still failed open for the legacy unkeyed grant. "Unkeyed"
means its authorization server is UNKNOWN, not that the cached endpoint is
proven to own it: server metadata is a single slot a later discovery
overwrites, while a pre-SEP-2352 token survives until the first issuer-stamped
save. So a clear could post an old bearer credential to an authorization server
that never minted it.

Such a grant is now cleared without being revoked, and reported as such with a
message saying re-authorizing makes future clears revocable. The cost is that
a pre-issuer-binding entry gets no revocation — which is exactly the behavior
it had before this feature existed, so nothing regresses — and it earns
revocation back on the next authorization. Not sending is the only answer that
cannot be wrong.

Every seed in the suite is now issuer-bound, which is what a real flow writes;
the two tests that were about the legacy grant now assert the refusal, since
that is the behavior worth pinning.

Also renamed the CLI test that still described the pre-round-13 ordering.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 06:18:58 -04:00
cliffhall
69fcdd364c fix(auth): clear before waiting on the network, not after (#2144)
Copilot review round 13. Three of its four findings were one root cause, and
it is a design flaw in the premise this PR started from.

Revoking *before* the clear meant the clear waited up to five seconds on the
network — and anything that wrote OAuth state in that window was then deleted
by a clear reasoning about the grant it replaced. A same-server reauthorization
in the TUI (whose Disconnect/Connect accelerators stay live), a stored-only web
clear for a server that becomes active mid-flight, and another CLI/TUI process
writing to the shared file-backed store all hit it.

`revokeStoredOAuthTokens` is therefore split into `planOAuthRevocation` and
`executeOAuthRevocation`, and every caller runs plan → `storage.clear()` →
execute. The snapshot still precedes the clear, because the store is where the
token, the credentials and the endpoint live; but the clear no longer waits on
anything. There is deliberately no single-call wrapper left, so no caller can
reintroduce the racy order by accident.

Fourth finding, same file: `handleConnect` now retires `clearOAuthAttemptRef`
alongside `disconnectAttemptRef`. The server-name check does not cover
disconnect/reconnect to the SAME server — the name still matches on the other
side of it — so a clear still in flight could tear down the session the connect
had just established.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 05:38:30 -04:00
cliffhall
781aa69d19 fix(auth): revoke every issuer-bound grant, not just the active one (#2144)
Copilot review round 3.

`clear(serverUrl)` deletes EVERY `byIssuer` slot, but revocation read only the
context-free (active-issuer) token. A server that had authorized against
issuers A and B therefore revoked B, then destroyed the local record of A while
A's grant stayed live at its authorization server — the same leak this feature
exists to close, one level down.

- `OAuthStorage.listIssuers(serverUrl)` is the new seam (one implementation:
  every backend extends `OAuthStorageBase`). `collectGrants` walks it plus the
  ctx-less read, deduping by token, so every grant the clear will delete is
  covered.
- Metadata is cached once per server, not per issuer, so a grant bound to an
  issuer the cached document does not describe cannot be revoked: sending its
  token to that endpoint would hand a credential to a server that never minted
  it. That grant is reported as failed — dropped unrevoked — rather than
  silently discarded or misdirected.
- `aggregateOutcomes` gives a failure precedence over another grant's success,
  so one live grant cannot hide behind another's 200. Exported for its own
  test, since `computeOutcome` returns early on the empty case.

Also from that round:

- The fixture's /oauth/revoke now verifies token ownership (RFC 7009 §2.1).
  Access tokens record their owning `client_id`; a token belonging to another
  client is left alone and still answered 200 (§2.2 — the response must not
  tell one client whether another's token exists). New e2e case proves a
  second registered client cannot revoke the first's grant.
- The TUI rendered the revocation-failure note in cyan, the informational
  tone. It is a partial success — the local clear really happened — so it is
  not an `error` status, but the grant may still be live and cyan understated
  that. `AuthTab` takes an `oauthMessageTone`; the message says so explicitly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 02:40:28 -04:00
cliffhall
28c7a9ff8a fix(auth): cover the transport's own discovery, and only rewrite GETs
Two more review findings, both real.

The shim wrapped `effectiveAuthFetch` only, but the transport is constructed
with the base `this.fetchFn`, and the SDK runs its own discovery from inside
the transport on the 401/refresh leg — so a reconnect with an existing auth
provider could still hit the upstream failure. It now wraps the base fetch,
the same seam `withOAuthEndpointOverrides` uses and the only one that reaches
both paths.

That trades away the previous claim that a captured Network entry shows the
real 404: below the trackers, what they record is the substitution. Rather
than leave that silently misleading, a substituted response now carries
`x-inspector-oauth-metadata-source` naming the URL its body was actually
fetched from — the transport builds its tracker internally, so there is no
seam above it to install into instead. An integration test captures the fetch
the transport is handed and drives it against a real server, since nothing
else proves that wiring.

The wrapper also keyed on URL shape alone, but nothing stops an authorization
or token endpoint from living under `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/`;
a POST there returning an ordinary OAuth 4xx would have had its error replaced
by a metadata document. Metadata discovery is a GET, so anything else is now
left alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UL9retfvAXRgvi6EWk4SY4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 01:39:28 -04:00
cliffhall
cd5dde839c test: drive the cancellation showcase through its checked-in config
The two cancellation tests each built their own `slow_task`, so the
documented showcase — the config file, its preset registration, and the
fixture's own abort loop — was covered by nothing. A misspelt preset name
or a regression in that handler would have surfaced only when someone ran
the repro by hand.

Resolve `cancellation-modern-http.json` through `loadConfig`/`resolveConfig`
and drive the real preset, following the pattern the nullable-fields and
MRTR showcase tests already use.

It asserts on the handler's own return value rather than on progress
notifications. Counting ticks is a false negative here: the SDK drops a
cancelled request's progress handler locally, so the client stops seeing
ticks the moment it cancels whether or not the server ever stopped —
verified, that version passed with the fix reverted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 01:31:58 -04:00
cliffhall
7f27d7e9c7 fix(auth): address Copilot review round 1 on the RFC 7009 revocation (#2144)
- RFC 8414 §2 defaults an omitted `revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported`
  to `client_secret_basic`; it does not inherit the token endpoint's list.
  Inheriting made metadata advertising only `client_secret_post` there send
  POST credentials to an endpoint that never advertised the method.
- The 5s timeout was inert on the web paths: `createRemoteFetch` re-issues the
  call as a POST to `/api/fetch` and drops `init.signal`, and the backend's
  outbound fetch gets none either, so a wedged AS could hold the teardown open
  indefinitely. A wall-clock race now enforces the deadline; the signal is kept
  because it genuinely cancels the direct-fetch paths.
- The settings-modal Clear read `settingsModalTarget`, which comes from the
  persisted `servers` list, while edits live in `settingsDraft` until the save
  debounce. Toggling the checkbox and clearing immediately used the previous
  value. It now merges the draft.
- `--relogin` clears both key spellings, so it now revokes from both rather
  than stopping at the first populated one — a stale entry under the other
  spelling is a live grant. The normalised key goes first, matching
  `findStoredServerState`, and a second key holding the same token is skipped.
- The fixture's /oauth/revoke now ENFORCES RFC 7009 §2.1 client
  authentication (both RFC 6749 §2.3.1 forms), so the e2e's claim that the
  Inspector authenticates correctly is actually tested; two negative cases
  assert a wrong secret and an unidentified client are refused.
- Dropped the `as unknown as` casts from the tests: a typed `InspectorLogger`
  double, and a spy on the real storage instead of a spread-and-cast.
- Added CLI-level tests through `runCli` for `--no-revoke`, the per-server
  `oauth.revokeOnClear`, and the stderr warning, and TUI tests for the
  forwarded opt-out and the rendered failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 01:30:09 -04:00
cliffhall
85c5206895 fix: cancel a Streamable HTTP call by closing its stream (#2140)
The Cancel button POSTed `notifications/cancelled` on every transport. On
a 2026-07-28 Streamable HTTP connection that is the wrong signal — the
spec makes closing the request's SSE response stream the cancellation
signal there and says the notification is neither required nor expected —
so a spec-compliant server acknowledged it 202 and dropped it while the
tool ran to completion.

The SDK already implements the fork, off `transport.hasPerRequestStream`.
Every Inspector connection is wrapped in `MessageTrackingTransport`, which
did not forward that flag, so the SDK read `undefined` and took the stdio
branch on every client — the CLI and TUI included, whose real
`StreamableHTTPClientTransport` advertises it correctly.

The web client needed three more links: its browser transport answers for
the upstream transport that lives on the backend, so it advertises the
flag for `streamable-http` and applies the SDK's `requestSignal` to its
`POST /api/mcp/send`; and `/api/mcp/send`, held open for the whole call,
forwards the browser's disconnect to the upstream `transport.send`.

The test fixture's `toWebRequest` built a Web Request with no `signal`, so
no fixture server could observe a disconnect at all — without that, a test
asserting the cancel reaches the server passes vacuously.

stdio and SSE keep `notifications/cancelled`: they multiplex every request
over one shared channel and have no per-request stream to close. So does
the legacy era, which predates the mechanism.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 00:55:29 -04:00
cliffhall
65fd2b9e35 feat(auth): revoke OAuth tokens at the authorization server on clear (#2144)
Clearing the Inspector's OAuth state deleted the local copy of the tokens
and stopped there. The access token — and the refresh token, which is
long-lived by design — stayed valid at the authorization server until they
expired on their own, so a day of connect/disconnect iteration left it
holding grants for sessions that ended hours ago. RFC 7009 §1 describes
exactly that case, and nothing in the repo constructed a revocation
request, so a server author implementing `revocation_endpoint` had no way
to exercise it with the tool that exists to exercise this.

core/auth/revocation.ts builds and sends the request; the three clear paths
call it, so the behavior is written once — web's "Clear OAuth state and
disconnect" (both the active and stored-only paths), the TUI's Auth tab,
and the CLI's --relogin. It runs BEFORE the local clear, because the token,
the client credentials and the discovered `revocation_endpoint` all live in
the store the clear is about to empty. The request names the refresh token
when there is one: §2.1 asks the AS to also invalidate the access tokens
issued under the same grant, so one request covers both halves.

Best-effort by construction. Every path returns a TokenRevocationOutcome
rather than throwing: no advertised endpoint means nothing is sent and that
authorization server behaves exactly as before, and a network error, a
non-2xx, a 5s timeout or an unreadable store is reported and nothing more.
Forgetting the tokens is what the user asked for. `lost_authorization_state`
recovery deliberately skips it — it clears a half-finished flow to retry it,
and an authorization that never completed has no grant to revoke.

Client authentication resolves the preregistered slot first, mirroring
BaseOAuthClientProvider.clientInformation; reading only the dynamic slot
would send no authentication for a server configured with `oauth.clientId`.
The Basic credential is byte-identical to the SDK's applyBasicAuth so this
request and the token request cannot present the same secret differently.

Opt out per server with `oauth.revokeOnClear` (default on, only `false`
written to disk) or per CLI run with --no-revoke. Read at clear time rather
than connect time, so toggling needs no reconnect. Turning it off is a
testing affordance: a client that walks away still holding live tokens is a
case a server author may want to reproduce.

test-servers now advertises `revocation_endpoint` and serves POST
/oauth/revoke, faithful on §2.2 (an unknown token is a success) and §2.1
(revoking a refresh token invalidates the access tokens under the same
grant), with oauth-revocation-http.json / oauth-no-revocation-http.json as
showcase configs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 00:48:57 -04:00
cliffhall
7ca753bc4c fix(auth): accept RFC 8414 metadata served at the OIDC well-known path
The SDK's `discoverAuthorizationServerMetadata` picks its validation schema
from the well-known filename that resolved rather than from the document that
came back, so anything found at `/.well-known/openid-configuration` is
validated as an OpenID provider document — requiring `jwks_uri`,
`subject_types_supported` and `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported`, three
fields RFC 8414 does not define. RFC 8414 §5 permits that filename for general
OAuth metadata, so a conforming plain OAuth 2.0 authorization server is
rejected; and because the parse throws instead of continuing the candidate
loop, discovery aborts and the connection fails outright.

Filed upstream as modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#2733.

`core/auth/oidcDiscoveryCompat.ts` works around it without fabricating a
field: on a failed RFC 8414 candidate it probes the OIDC candidates the SDK
would try next and, when one returns a document that satisfies
`OAuthMetadataSchema` but fails the OIDC schema, serves that body as the RFC
8414 response so the SDK picks the schema that describes it. A genuine OpenID
provider document is left to the SDK's own OIDC leg. Issuer validation runs
unchanged, since the substituted document is the one the server published.

It wraps `effectiveAuthFetch` — above the fetch tracker, the opposite of
`withOAuthEndpointOverrides` — so the Network tab still records the real 404
and the real probe rather than the substitution.

The candidate derivation mirrors the SDK's `buildDiscoveryUrls`, which a fetch
wrapper cannot call, and a test pins it against that export so the two cannot
drift.

Adds `oauth.asMetadataPath` to the composable test server (mirroring
`oauth.resourceMetadataPath`) and the `oauth-rfc8414-at-oidc-path-http.json`
showcase config that reproduces the failure.

Closes #2172

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UL9retfvAXRgvi6EWk4SY4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 00:40:11 -04:00
cliffhall
9136ab6268 fix(test-servers): describe and test after-first's resource-subscription counting
Copilot review on #2176. All three findings were the same gap seen from
three angles: `"after-first"` counts *resource-subscription* listens, not
listens, and both the README and the option's own doc comment said
"the first listen".

That distinction is load-bearing rather than incidental — the Inspector
opens a listen at connect time whenever a list-change opt-in is live
(#1920), so counting listens would spend the allowance there and refuse
the user's very first Subscribe, leaving the documented repro describing
a trace nobody sees. It is also what a reader of the option would
otherwise get wrong.

- README: say "the first listen that subscribes to a resource" in both
  places, and name the connect-time listen as the reason.
- `ServerConfig.modern.neverAcknowledgeSubscriptions`: document the
  list-change exemption and contrast it with `true`.
- Integration test for the mode itself, with every list-change opt-in on
  so the connect-time listen really is opened: it must be acknowledged
  without consuming the allowance, the first resource subscription
  acknowledged, the next refused with the stream left `active`.

Closes #2097

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-27 21:14:30 -04:00
cliffhall
8535ae0c2f fix(core): say why a never-acknowledged subscriptions/listen ended
A modern-era `subscriptions/listen` is a long-lived request: the first
message on its stream must be `notifications/subscriptions/acknowledged`,
and the JSON-RPC `result` for the listen id is reserved as the
graceful-closure marker. A server that answers the listen request with a
bare `result` is saying "acknowledged and closed in the same breath" — the
SDK settles the subscription `graceful` and rejects the pending `listen()`.

The Inspector read that rejection as an ordinary drop: eight re-lists over
roughly a minute, the badge flickering `Reconnecting…`, and a final bare
`Stream ended` that said nothing about why. Accepting the message was
never wrong — it is a well-formed graceful-closure response. The silence
was.

- `core/mcp/subscriptionAck.ts` owns the predicate. The SDK gives this
  close no code of its own — it is the same `SdkError(ConnectionClosed)`
  any pre-ack close carries — so the predicate reads the message, since
  the alternative is refusing to retry a genuinely transient drop.
- The condition is deterministic, so the stream ends on the first
  occurrence instead of spending the whole backoff run. Both routes are
  covered: the one a subscribe/unsubscribe reaches, and the one a
  reconnect reaches when an acknowledged stream drops and the server has
  since started refusing.
- A `"never-acknowledged"` status of its own, not `"ended"` — `ended`
  means an expected close. It surfaces as the thrown error's message, an
  orange "Not acknowledged" badge, and a notice in the panel.
- `subscriptions-never-acknowledged-http.json` reproduces it. It
  acknowledges the first listen that subscribes to a resource and refuses
  every one after, which is what makes the badge reachable by hand.

Closes #2097

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-27 20:49:55 -04:00
cliffhall
0b64460097 chore(scripts): rename the local pre-push gate off ci, and guard it out of CI (#2146)
The root `ci` script was never what runs in GitHub CI, and the name worked
against us three ways: it collides with the built-in `npm ci` (which does
something else entirely and is one keystroke away), it invites the
cross-engine passes into a workflow by looking like the thing a workflow
should call, and it blurs "GitHub CI" and "the local gate" in every doc
that names it.

- Rename `ci` → `local:gate` and `ci:storybook` → `local:storybook`, with
  no back-compat alias: `npm run ci` now fails with npm's missing-script
  error, which prints the available scripts.

- Add `scripts/lib/workflow-gate.mjs` + its `test:scripts` suite, which
  runs over the repo's real `.github/workflows/**` and fails on an
  invocation of a `local:*` script, of a non-Chromium engine pass (derived
  from SUPPORTED_BROWSERS), or of `smoke:web:engine`, or on `SMOKE_BROWSER`
  set to anything but a literal `chromium`. It does not forbid
  `npm run smoke`, `smoke:web:chromium` or `smoke:tui` — those belong in CI
  and are there today. Comments are not scanned, so the workflow can still
  explain itself. This is the durable half; the rest is prose.

- Document the two-tier model once, in the root README ("Two tiers: GitHub
  CI and the local gate"), and point the other docs at it rather than
  restating the split.

- Sweep the ~40 stale references across README, AGENTS.md,
  .github/copilot-instructions.md, the client READMEs, the roadmap doc and
  the script headers. AGENTS.md and copilot-instructions.md change
  together, per the mirror rule.

No gate changes what it actually runs.

Signed-off-by: Cliff Hall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 23:56:34 -04:00
cliffhall
2bb0b6245c fix(oauth): walk the candidates in the CLI refresh path too
Copilot review round 1.

`refreshStoredAuthToken` consumes the same fallback and made a single SDK
discovery call, so preserving the path there — without the walk the other two
consumers got — would have regressed exactly the case the walk exists to keep:
a path-hosted MCP server whose authorization metadata is published at the
domain root.

It injects its own discovery function as a test seam, so the walk is now also
exposed as `discoverAuthorizationServerMetadataFromCandidates(candidates,
discover)`, which takes that function and reports *which* candidate answered —
the CLI needs the winning URL, since it is the base the token request is made
against, not just the metadata.

Also drops the `as unknown as typeof fetch` from the new test in favour of
`vi.fn<typeof fetch>()`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 00:34:27 -04:00
cliffhall
afa0ba6eeb fix(oauth): keep the server's path in the fallback authorization-server URL
When RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata names no authorization server, the
MCP server URL stands in as one. `getAuthorizationServerUrl` built that with
`new URL("/", serverUrl)`, which discards the path — exactly the part discovery
needs when the server is not hosted at the domain root. The SDK's
`buildDiscoveryUrls` derives the path-scoped well-known locations from that
pathname, so an origin-only value could only ever probe the domain root, which
404s for a server like `https://example.com/mod/minilesson/mcp.php`.

Keep the path (and strip query/fragment, which an RFC 8414 issuer never
carries). A straight swap would regress the case the origin-only value did
serve — a server that merely lives under a path while publishing its metadata
at the root — so the URL becomes the first of two candidates:
`getAuthorizationServerUrlCandidates` yields the path-scoped form then the bare
origin, and `discoverAuthorizationServerMetadataForServer` walks them, treating
a candidate's failure as non-fatal while another remains and rethrowing the
first error only when all of them fail.

`discoverScopes` and the CIMD pre-registration probe both go through the walk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 00:03:40 -04:00
Cliff Hall
e005055a46
Merge branch 'v2/main' into v2/feat/1005-schema-lint 2026-08-25 08:46:11 -04:00
cliffhall
2cb23a8b21 fix: map the new exit code, keep add runnable, distinguish severity by shape
Copilot review round 4.

- Add `SCHEMA_UNPORTABLE` to `codeForExit`. `CliExitCodeError` lets a
  caller omit the envelope, so without the case an envelope-less throw
  reported the generic `error` — the same silent mislabelling the rename
  was meant to prevent, one layer down. Covered via the envelope-less
  construction that exposed it.

- Keep a local `type` (and the preset's `required`) alongside the remote
  `$ref` in the showcase config. The TUI's `schemaToForm` dispatches on
  `type`, so a `$ref`-only property fell through to a string field that
  `add`'s numeric handler then rejected — making the README's "every
  showcase tool is runnable" claim false there. The `remote-ref` finding
  is unaffected, since that rule reads `$ref` independently.

- Restrict `type-union` to well-formed unions: non-empty, unique, and
  all recognized JSON Schema type names. Its message asserts the
  construct is *legal* JSON Schema, which is false for `[]`, `[3]` or
  `["bananas"]`, and the `anyOf` it suggested for those would be invalid
  too. Malformed schemas stay the SDK parser's business.

- Drop `if`/`then`/`else` from the presence-only allowlist. They only
  constrain as a pair, so `{"if": {"const": 1}}` accepts every value and
  was evading `untyped-schema`; the pairing is now checked explicitly.

- Distinguish the web sidebar severities by SHAPE, not just colour — a
  circle for an error, a triangle for a warning — and name the severity
  in the tooltip. Colour alone left a colour-blind reader unable to tell
  them apart.

- Fix the stale "across 2 tools" count in the CLI README's hint sample.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UL9retfvAXRgvi6EWk4SY4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-25 02:37:10 -04:00
cliffhall
a3d864ed6e fix: rename the strict exit code, cover the config path, refresh the docs
Copilot review round 3.

- Rename the `--strict` failure from "invalid" to "unportable"
  (`EXIT_CODES.SCHEMA_UNPORTABLE`, envelope `schema_unportable`, and the
  message text). The module argues at length that these schemas ARE
  valid JSON Schema and are merely refused by some clients, so a
  machine-readable code of `schema_invalid` told automated callers the
  opposite. Done now, while nothing depends on it.

- Add a fixture-path integration case. Every other test built a
  `ServerConfig` by hand, so `resolveConfig`'s `rawToolSchemas`
  forwarding was uncovered and `unportable-schemas-http.json` was loaded
  by nothing — the shipped fixture could have lost its overrides with
  the suite still green. It now goes through loadConfig/resolveConfig
  and asserts the exact per-tool verdict the README claims.

- Refresh the CLI README's sample output, which still showed the
  pre-round-2 wording and fixture, and so dropped the contract warning
  that rewording existed to add. Captured from a real run rather than
  written by hand, plus a paragraph making the suggestion pattern
  explicit.

- Drop the self-referential "[Try it](#unportable-tool-schemas)" link in
  the root README, which pointed back at its own section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UL9retfvAXRgvi6EWk4SY4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-25 02:17:58 -04:00
cliffhall
cac97c142c fix: drop the unreachable root rule, correct the always-false suggestion
Copilot review round 2.

- Remove `non-object-root` entirely. It could never fire: the SDK types
  `inputSchema` with `type: literal("object")`, so a tool with any other
  root fails `ListToolsResultSchema` and `salvageListItems` drops it
  before any client sees it. Verified against a live server advertising
  `inputSchema: {type: "array"}` — `listAllTools()` returns []. A rule
  that cannot fire is worse than none, because the docs then claim a
  check the tool does not perform; the condition is already reported
  through the malformed-items surface. Pinned by an integration test so
  a change in that behavior is a signal rather than a silent gap.

- Fix the bare-`false` suggestion. `properties: {a: false}` forbids the
  property; deleting the entry *permits* it with any value under the
  default `additionalProperties`, so the advice inverted the schema it
  replaced. Now recommends `{"not": {}}` and says why deletion differs.

- Exempt `not`-parented schemas from `untyped-schema`, so the `{"not":
  {}}` above does not trip this module's own rule — under negation an
  always-accepting subschema means always-reject, making "accepts any
  value" the exact opposite of what it does. Scoped to that position,
  not inherited by its subtree.

- Say plainly, in the `true` and untyped suggestions, that they narrow
  the schema deliberately rather than implying an equivalent rewrite.
  `true` has no portable object-form equivalent — `{}` is the very shape
  this lint flags.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UL9retfvAXRgvi6EWk4SY4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-25 02:02:26 -04:00
cliffhall
c389565783 fix: address Copilot review on the schema portability lint
- Scope `non-object-root` to `inputSchema`. The pinned SDK types
  `inputSchema` with `type: literal("object")` but `outputSchema` as a
  bare `looseObject`, so a `{"type":"string"}` output is conforming; the
  rule was claiming a requirement MCP does not make, at error severity.

- Decide `untyped-schema` from an allowlist of constraining keywords
  rather than a denylist of annotations. JSON Schema ignores keywords it
  does not recognize, so `{"vendorHint": true}` accepts every value and a
  denylist passed it as constrained. `$defs`-only schemas now flag too.

- Walk `dependentSchemas` and draft-07 `dependencies`, with a test
  pinning that the property-name-array form is not a schema position.

- Suggest `anyOf` branches for an array-form `type`, never "drop it from
  `required`" — accepting `null` and permitting absence are independent
  contracts, so the old suggestion silently changed the schema's meaning.

- Reject `--strict` alongside `--app-info`. That path returns NDJSON from
  `runMethod` and never reaches the lint, so the flag was a no-op gate
  that could never fail.

- Colour the web sidebar flag from the `--inspector-*` severity tokens,
  matching the detail panel and avoiding the default yellow that failed
  the a11y check.

- Add a live integration test for `rawToolSchemas`. It caught that an
  `outputSchema` override on a preset returning no structured content
  makes every call to that tool fail client-side validation — the
  showcase config did exactly that, so the flagged tool could not be
  run. Moved the bare `true` onto `get_temp`, documented the caveat, and
  pinned both halves.

- Drop the double cast from the lint test fixture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UL9retfvAXRgvi6EWk4SY4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-25 01:41:12 -04:00
Cliff Hall
6968738f24
Merge branch 'v2/main' into v2/feat/2068-refresh-token-toggle 2026-08-24 22:55:00 -04:00
cliffhall
89dedd8dea fix(oauth): drop an inherited offline_access when the grant is declined
Copilot review round 4 on #2114 — a real gap, not a wording one.

Declining the grant stops the SDK *adding* `offline_access`, but the
Inspector's own storage puts it back. A successful default-on
authorization persists the scope the AS granted
(`resolvePersistedScopeAfterGrant`), `offline_access` included;
`prepareForAuth` reloads it and `authenticate` hands it to the SDK as
`scope`, which sees the token in scope and appends `prompt=consent`
again. So any server that had authorized once could uncheck the box and
still hit AADSTS90094 — the users most likely to reach for the setting
were the ones it did not help.

`scopeForDeclinedRefreshGrant` filters it out of the *request* only,
applied in the provider's `scope` getter — the one seam both
`clientMetadata.scope` and `authenticate`'s `scope:` argument read
through. An `offline_access` the user configured is honored; storage is
never rewritten, so re-checking the box restores the old behavior
instead of finding the value destroyed, and scope-satisfaction checks
still see the real grant. Verified by reverting the filter: the new e2e
regression fails.

Also from that round, both previously suppressed:

The checkbox looked effective under enterprise-managed authorization,
which never builds this provider at all — it authorizes against the
enterprise IdP with a fixed `openid offline_access`
(`ema/constants.ts:16`). It now annotates itself the way the endpoint
overrides do. The existing count assertion covered two such notices and
was named for the overrides alone; it is renamed and expects three, with
a dedicated case pinning the notice to this control so the count cannot
be met by three copies elsewhere.

And "obtains no new refresh token" was another overstatement — the AS
decides issuance, and a preconfigured client is reused with whatever its
registration already permits. Replaced with what the setting actually
controls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 21:30:29 -04:00
cliffhall
baf4fe954f Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/v2/main' into v2/fix/2071-oauth-resource-metadata
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>

# Conflicts:
#	core/mcp/node/transport.ts
2026-08-24 21:26:59 -04:00
cliffhall
48b393014a fix(auth): address review — observe SSE explicit fetch, isolate test state
- The SSE branch selects a caller-supplied `eventSourceInit.fetch` as-is, so
  it bypassed the challenge observer and a first-time legacy SSE
  authorization lost the advertised URL the same way. Observing is passive,
  so it is applied to that fetch too while the deliberate no-proxy-wrap rule
  stays. Covered behaviorally against a 401-serving server.

- Dropped an `as unknown as typeof fetch` from the new integration test
  (banned by AGENTS.md, and it erased the signature); the spy is typed as
  `typeof fetch` directly. The `as MCPServerConfig` beside it was
  unnecessary too.

- The integration test reused a per-pid OAuth storage file. SDK `auth()`
  persists the advertised URL in its discovery state, so a rerun could
  satisfy discovery from that cache and pass with the plumbing removed —
  which would have quietly falsified the regression check. Fresh mkdtemp
  per run, removed in teardown.

Adds observer unit tests (challenge reported, body untouched, 403 included,
silent on success).

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 21:21:38 -04:00
cliffhall
597e1bd25f fix(auth): carry resource_metadata into first-time legacy authorization
The challenge-driven plumbing did not reach the default CLI/TUI flow. With
no stored token in the legacy era, InspectorClient deliberately builds the
transport with no authProvider (so the SDK cannot open a browser before the
callback server is listening), which also leaves challenge interception off;
the 401 then surfaces as the SDK's headerless UnauthorizedError and the
runner calls authenticate() with no challenge in hand. So a server serving
metadata only at the advertised path still failed there — including for the
legacy showcase the README instructs.

Add a passive counterpart to the challenge interceptor: an observer fetch
that reports every 401/403 without touching control flow or the body. The
OAuthManager records the advertised URL from it and uses it in
authenticate() and its CIMD pre-registration. Latest-wins, including
clearing when a later challenge advertises none.

Also: the fixture helper dropped an explicitly supplied empty
resourceMetadataPath by truthiness, bypassing validation and silently
reverting to the well-known route.

Covered by a direct-client integration test that drives connect ->
authenticate() against the real server and asserts the advertised path was
requested and the well-known one never was; verified failing without the
fix.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 21:04:34 -04:00
cliffhall
6303f8a6ce test(oauth): prove the opt-out against a real authorization server
Copilot review round 3 on #2114.

The unit tests asserted our own `grant_types` array and stopped there.
What actually unblocks an Entra tenant is what the SDK puts in the
authorize URL, and nothing covered that — so an SDK change that stopped
keying its augmentation off `grant_types` would leave AADSTS90094
intact with every test green.

Adds the complementary case to the existing e2e suite, against a real
AS advertising `offline_access`: with the grant declined, the authorize
URL carries neither `offline_access` nor `prompt=consent`, while the
configured scope still goes out. Verified non-vacuous by reverting the
provider conditional — it fails. The positive test alongside it now
also asserts `prompt=consent` is present, which was unasserted despite
being the literal failure in the issue.

Drops an unjustified `as unknown as ServerEntry` I added in the App
test — AGENTS.md forbids it, and it hid a real mismatch (a partial
settings object against a complete one). Typed `ServerEntry` /
`InspectorServerSettings` fixtures instead, so a field added to that
interface later is a compile error rather than a missing value at
runtime. The `constructedOAuth` helper reads through the constructor's
own parameter type and needs no cast at all now.

Scopes the two doc comments that still claimed the flag removes every
`offline_access` — `StoredMCPServer.oauth` and `OAuthProviderConfig`,
both contradicting the caveat already stated elsewhere.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 21:03:41 -04:00
cliffhall
8beba25b58 fix(auth): address review — reject a query or fragment in the metadata path
`isOriginRelativePath` compared the resolved href against the literal, which
`URL` preserves a query and fragment in — so `/doc?version=1` and `/doc#section`
passed. Express matches on the path alone (and treats `?` as a pattern
character), and a fragment never reaches the server, so the advertised URL
could not resolve to the registered route. Reject both, with cases added to
the table-driven test.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 20:36:39 -04:00
cliffhall
fca3f1ce67 fix(oauth): stop claiming the opt-out removes every offline_access
Copilot review round 2 on #2114. The setting was described as
guaranteeing "no offline_access, no forced prompt", which is not what
the SDK does.

`startAuthorization` appends `prompt=consent` for any `offline_access`
in the effective scope and never consults `grant_types`, and
`determineScope` skips its augmentation when the scope already carries
it. So the prompt still goes out when the user configured
`offline_access` in Scopes, or left Scopes blank and the resource
advertises it in `scopes_supported`. The flag removes the SDK's
*automatic* augmentation and nothing more; the docs, the help text and
the type say that now.

The form also flags the case a user can act on: opted out while
`offline_access` is still listed in Scopes. Whole-token match, so
`offline_access_extra` does not trip it.

Corrects the Clear stored OAuth state claim too. It clears the local
tokens and client information — it is not a revocation and cannot
reach the AS. A dynamically registered client re-registers on the next
connect (the new registration declaring only `authorization_code`); a
preconfigured `oauth.clientId` is reused unchanged.

Adds the two missing seam tests, both confirmed to fail without the
code they cover: App's connect wiring (deleting the spread fails two of
the three) and an /api/servers POST followed by a read-back, since a
200 alone never proved the opt-out persisted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 20:35:14 -04:00
cliffhall
2a0290df26 fix(auth): address review — proxy CIMD discovery fetch, validate metadata path
Two findings from review:

- `ensureCimdClientRegistration` ran protected-resource discovery on the
  global fetch while its AS-metadata leg used the configured one. On web
  that is `createRemoteFetch`, which proxies through the backend to sidestep
  CORS — so the discovery this PR routes to a challenge-advertised URL would
  fail in the browser, be swallowed by the catch, and leave CIMD probing the
  wrong authorization server. Forward `params.fetchFn`, and assert in the
  test that nothing reaches the global.

- `oauth.resourceMetadataPath` accepted `//other-host/doc`. Resolved against
  the request base that re-points the origin in the advertised
  `resource_metadata` while Express still registers the route locally, so the
  server would advertise a document it does not serve. `/\\host` does the
  same, since the URL parser folds a backslash into a slash for special
  schemes — a leading-slash check misses both. Validate origin-relativity
  with a shared predicate, used by the JSON-config validator and again at
  server setup for a programmatically built ServerConfig.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 20:20:55 -04:00
cliffhall
e2fb78d999 feat(oauth): make the refresh_token grant opt-out per server
The Inspector always declared `refresh_token` in its OAuth client
metadata. The SDK's `determineScope()` then appends `offline_access`
whenever the authorization server advertises it and the client declares
that grant, and `startAuthorization()` appends `prompt=consent` whenever
`offline_access` is in scope. Against Microsoft Entra ID that forced
consent prompt routes a non-admin user into the admin-consent workflow
and fails with AADSTS90094 — even after a tenant admin has consented.

Adds a per-server "Request refresh token" setting (default on) that
drops the grant from the client metadata, breaking that chain at its
source. Persisted as `oauth.requestRefreshToken` and written only when
off, so entries that never touch it keep a byte-stable round-trip. Web
edits it in Server Settings → Authorization; the CLI and TUI pick it up
from the same per-server settings via `buildRunnerClientAuthOptions`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 19:50:57 -04:00
cliffhall
f8a46726b7 fix(auth): pass the challenge's resource_metadata URL to SDK auth()
An RFC 9728 `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="…"` challenge was
parsed and then dropped by the normalized `AuthChallenge`, so every
challenge-driven `mcpAuth()` call ran discovery without it and probed
locations derived from the MCP server URL instead. OAuth failed outright
against any server whose metadata document lives off the well-known path.

The SDK handles this correctly inside its own transports, but the Inspector
never reaches that path — it intercepts the 401 and drives `auth()` itself
to capture the authorization URL and run the step-up scope union.

Carry the advertised URL on `AuthChallenge` as a string (it crosses the web
client's remote-backend boundary as JSON), convert it at the OAuth boundary,
and pass it to the standard challenge leg, the forced step-up leg, and CIMD
pre-registration — which runs before `auth()` and did its own discovery. A
malformed value is ignored rather than surfaced, matching the SDK's parser.
The callback leg needs nothing: SDK `auth()` persists the URL in its
discovery state.

Adds an `oauth.resourceMetadataPath` test-server mode that moves the
document off the well-known path entirely, so the integration test proves
discovery genuinely fails without the fix.

Closes #2071

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 19:48:40 -04:00
cliffhall
6011d4de03
fix(web): bound retained app documents by size; correct the cookie claim
Copilot review round 5 on #2100.

- The store bounded entry COUNT only, and the route admits 8Mi code units per
  document with a one-hour TTL — ~256Mi retainable on documents a server
  under test chooses the size of. Added a 64Mi retained-size budget evicted
  oldest-first alongside the count bound, with a running total kept in step
  with the map through a single `drop` seam so it cannot drift.
- The isolation claim was wrong about cookies. A separate port makes a
  separate ORIGIN, so DOM access, localStorage, sessionStorage and IndexedDB
  are isolated — but cookies are keyed by host and path, ignoring port, so an
  app served here shares the 127.0.0.1 jar with the Inspector and every other
  loopback service. Not a hole in the Inspector's own auth (the API token is
  a header plus a window global and sessionStorage, none of them cookies) and
  not closable without a distinct host this listener cannot mint, so it is
  stated plainly in both the module header and clients/web/README.md rather
  than left as a claim that is false for one of the three surfaces it names.
- Removed a shell-escaping artifact I left in the migration guide.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 08:45:40 -04:00
cliffhall
bb3ba91b8a
fix(web): guard the app-origin port and the trusted-origin grant
Copilot review round 3 on #2100.

- MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT could equal CLIENT_PORT or MCP_SANDBOX_PORT. The
  app-origin listener starts BEFORE the web server binds, so that is not a
  race it loses — it wins the port and the Inspector dies with EADDRINUSE.
  `CLIENT_PORT=6278` was a valid config before this feature existed. It now
  resolves to a dynamic port with a warning: of the three listeners this is
  the only one that can move, and refusing to boot would cost the user the
  whole Inspector over a feature they may not be using.
- The proxy's same-origin refusal covered only its own origin. An app served
  from the INSPECTOR's origin is no safer: same-origin with the top document
  means direct access to window.top, its DOM and its storage, and the
  cross-origin frame in between buys nothing. Both trusted origins are now
  refused before allow-same-origin is granted.
- Replaced the `as unknown as number` on `server.address()` with a real
  narrowing of the string/null members of its return type.
- MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT added to the v1→v2 migration guide's env table, its
  Docker recipe, and a troubleshooting entry for the symptom this actually
  produces (the app renders, but its own backend rejects `Origin: null`).
- clients/web/README.md now states which failure is outside the fallback
  guarantee — a published document the browser cannot reach — and why there
  is no honest signal to fall back on. Docs and code no longer disagree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 08:45:40 -04:00
cliffhall
fafc8367b8
fix(web): move the app origin off 6276, bound the publish route
Copilot review round 2 on #2100, plus a collision the review did not find.

The default app-origin port was 6276 — which is already
RUNNER_OAUTH_CALLBACK_DEFAULT_PORT, the CLI/TUI loopback OAuth callback.
That port is fixed precisely so an OAuth app can pre-register
http://127.0.0.1:6276/oauth/callback, which makes it the one listener here
that cannot move when something takes it first. A running --web would hold
it and break a later --cli/--tui OAuth flow at its registered redirect URI,
and docs/mcp-app-review.md has those two running side by side. This
listener has a documented dynamic fallback, so this listener yields: the
default is now 6278 (6277 skipped — v1's retired proxy port, which the
migration guide tells people to stop forwarding). A test asserts the two
defaults stay distinct.

Review comments:

- POST /api/app-document now applies hono's bodyLimit BEFORE parsing. The
  8MiB check ran after c.req.json() had buffered and parsed the whole
  request, and bounded only `html` — so bulk in `csp`, or in keys the route
  never reads, was fully materialized before the 413.
- `csp` is validated as an HTTP header value and length-bounded. The
  controller hands it to res.writeHead() verbatim, where Node throws
  ERR_INVALID_CHAR synchronously — inside the handler for a later,
  unrelated request, outside this route's error handling.
- The app-origin port now propagates everywhere the other two do: the CLI
  --print-handoff port-forward command (and its test), the Dockerfile's ENV
  and EXPOSE, and the remote-review SSH recipe in docs/mcp-app-review.md.
  Without it an app declaring _meta.ui.domain is unreachable through every
  documented remote workflow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 08:45:40 -04:00
cliffhall
fa441da85f
fix(web): harden the app-origin paths and correct three docs
Copilot review round 1 on #2100.

- POST /api/app-document: `null` and `[1,2]` are valid JSON, so the
  destructure that followed threw OUTSIDE the parse try/catch and turned a
  malformed body into a 500 instead of the documented 400.
- app-origin controller: the error handler cleared `server` but not
  `origin`, and `publish` gates on `origin` — so an error after a successful
  listen kept minting URLs on a dead port and the browser never took the
  srcdoc fallback. Clear both, and drop the now-unfetchable documents.
- sandbox proxy: drop a stale `srcdoc` before navigating to a dedicated
  origin (srcdoc wins over src), and restore the opaque-origin posture —
  strip `allow-same-origin`, reset `innerOrigin` — before assigning `srcdoc`
  on the fallback path. Not reachable today (each render remounts the
  iframe), but the cost of being wrong about that later is an isolation
  boundary.
- publishAppDocument tests: replace two `as unknown as Response` casts with
  real `Response`s.
- docs: `frame-ancestors` admits the proxy AND the Inspector page (every
  ancestor is checked); the shared helper falls back to loopback, not
  `'none'`; the showcase origin is `127.0.0.1`, the default bind address.
- tests: null/array body, post-listen error, and both factories receiving a
  working `publishAppDocument`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 08:45:40 -04:00
cliffhall
8e8c1bbad9
test(web): prove the dedicated app origin end to end
`frame-ancestors` is checked against every ancestor, not just the parent.
A published app document is framed by the sandbox proxy, which is framed
by the Inspector page — so admitting only the proxy's origin blocked the
frame outright (it rendered as a chrome-error frame that never reached
the bridge). `appDocumentEmbedders` now admits both.

That failure was invisible to every unit test, so `smoke:web:app` grows a
second phase: the same demo app declaring `_meta.ui.domain`, driven
through the same connect → open → ready chain, then asserting the two
facts that only hold on the dedicated path — the inner frame was
navigated to a published document, and its own `location.origin` is a
real http origin rather than "null". Both phases end at
`data-app-status="ready"`, so nothing short of reading the frame's origin
can tell them apart.

Adds `test-servers/configs/mcp-app-domain-http.json` (and a `domain`
param on the `mcp_app_demo_widget` preset) as the showcase server for
both the smoke and hand testing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 08:45:40 -04:00
cliffhall
ec40cf5531
feat(web): honor _meta.ui.domain with a dedicated app origin
An MCP App is rendered by handing its HTML to the sandbox proxy as
`srcdoc`, in a frame sandboxed without `allow-same-origin` — the #1565
isolation model. That gives the app document an opaque origin, so every
request it makes carries `Origin: null` and no CORS / OAuth-callback /
API-key allowlist can admit it. `_meta.ui.domain` is the spec field a
server uses to ask its host for a stable, dedicated origin, and it was
being dropped on the floor.

The field is explicitly host-dependent and the Inspector owns no domain
infrastructure, so it treats any non-empty value as a request rather than
an address, and answers with a real loopback origin on its own listener
(MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT, default 6276). One shared origin, path-keyed per
document: that delivers what the field is for without minting a port or
DNS name per app, and is therefore not a per-app isolation boundary.

The inner frame is granted `allow-same-origin` on this path only, which
is what makes the origin real. It is not a #1565 regression: the listener
is on its own port, so the app stays cross-origin to both the proxy and
the Inspector. The proxy refuses the grant if the URL's origin equals its
own, and the grant is never reachable from the server-supplied `sandbox`
string, which is still stripped. The per-app CSP is delivered as a real
response header there rather than only as a <meta>.

Every failure path falls back to the default srcdoc render with a console
warning naming the field, rather than blanking the app.

Also fixes a pre-existing `tsc -b` break on v2/main (useServers.test.tsx
passed `metadata: []` where `RequestMetadata` is expected), which has had
CI red since #2087 and blocks the pre-push gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 08:45:40 -04:00
cliffhall
531cf84e60 Merge branch 'v2/main' into v2/fix/2067-proxy-undici
One conflict, in `clients/tui/__tests__/App.test.tsx`: both sides added an
`opts` capture to the test harness's `FakeClient` for different fields —
`defaultMetadata` on v2/main (#1910), `environment.fetch` here (#2067) — so the
resolution is the union of the two, keeping both rationales and both tests.

Everything else auto-merged. `npm run ci` passes on the result.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-23 23:34:07 -04:00
cliffhall
e31a20eec7 test(proxy): isolate proxy env per file; word the guard failure by candidate source
Addresses review round 7 on #2099 (three suppressed comments).

- Proxy variables are now cleared for the WHOLE of `transport.test.ts` and
  `cli.test.ts`, not just around the proxy tests. Measured: undici's
  `EnvHttpProxyAgent` captures its proxy URLs when it is CONSTRUCTED and re-reads
  only NO_PROXY per request, so with the process-wide memo, any earlier test that
  connects on a machine with an ambient proxy would pin the agent to it and a
  later test setting HTTP_PROXY would be talking to an agent that is not
  listening. Clearing up front means nothing can build the singleton before the
  proxy tests do, and restoring only in the file-level afterAll means the memo
  cannot be left bound to a closed test proxy.

  Both suites verified green under a hostile ambient env
  (`HTTP_PROXY`/`http_proxy`/`HTTPS_PROXY` pointed at a dead port). In fairness
  this is hardening rather than a fixed failure: the concrete cross-test break
  did not reproduce with the current test order — but it depends on test order
  and on the developer's environment, which is exactly what this removes.

- The guard's failure message said a package "is declared external but was
  inlined" even for a candidate that came only from the root dependencies —
  i.e. #2067's own shape, where the missing `external` entry IS the bug, so the
  message contradicted the config it was asking the reader to check. It now
  words the failure by candidate source, and says to add the entry.

The capture-at-construction behavior is documented on `createProxyFetch`, since
it is the reason the suites are structured this way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTHVxSu8AUgHRLvo1ntZ8H
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-23 23:00:28 -04:00
cliffhall
96f96aad41 fix(proxy): preserve fetch semantics through the proxy adapter
Addresses review round 4 on #2099 — three posted comments and three suppressed
ones, all valid.

- A rebuilt Response reported `url: ""`, `redirected: false`, and
  `type: "default"` even after undici followed a redirect: a fetch-contract
  regression visible only to proxy users, and one `core/auth/endpointOverrides.ts`
  explicitly guards against by declining to rebuild at all. This adapter has no
  such choice — the response arrives from the wrong realm — so it now reinstates
  the three with `defineProperty`.

- Normalizing a `Request` input dropped every option the Request itself carried
  beyond method/headers/body/signal. Most visibly `redirect`: a
  `new Request(url, { redirect: "manual" })` started following redirects instead
  of surfacing them. All of them are now carried through, with an explicit
  `init` still winning per the fetch contract.

  Both are covered by tests driving a real redirect through a real proxy, and
  both were confirmed to fail without the fix.

- `@modelcontextprotocol/ext-apps` was added only to the CLI's `external` list.
  AGENTS.md requires every root-declared runtime dependency in all three, since
  which client reaches it is a function of what `core/` imports rather than of
  the client's own code. Added to the web runner and TUI lists too.

- The `BUNDLED_CLIENTS` test compared the hard-coded list against a hard-coded
  copy of itself, so a new tsup-bundled client would have left it green while
  going unchecked. It now discovers clients from disk (a client is tsup-bundled
  iff it ships a tsup config) and compares. Verified it fails when a stub client
  is added.

- AGENTS.md's project tree still described `core/mcp/node/` as only the stdio
  transport factory; it now carries `proxyFetch.ts` and its role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTHVxSu8AUgHRLvo1ntZ8H
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-23 22:18:43 -04:00
cliffhall
2f83549bc3 test(proxy): isolate proxy env per suite; fail the bundle guard closed
Addresses review round 2 on #2099.

- The /api/fetch proxy test set only uppercase HTTP_PROXY, so an ambient
  lowercase `http_proxy` (which undici's EnvHttpProxyAgent prefers) or a NO_PROXY
  could route the request elsewhere and fail the assertion. All six proxy vars
  are now saved and cleared for the whole /api/fetch suite and restored in
  afterAll — suite-level rather than per-test because the agent is memoized
  process-wide once built. Verified the test still passes under a deliberately
  hostile ambient env (`http_proxy=http://127.0.0.1:9 NO_PROXY='*'`).

- `verify:bundle-externals` reported success when `parseExternals` returned
  nothing, so an ordinary tsup refactor — hoisting the array to a constant, or a
  line break after `external:` — would silently disable the guard. It now fails
  closed: every bundled client has externals, so "none parsed" means the parser
  lost track of the config. Verified against exactly that refactor. The
  per-client verdict moved into a pure `evaluateClient()` so all three failure
  modes are unit-tested, and the failure epilogue is now printed only for a real
  inlining, since "add the package to `external`" is the wrong instruction for
  the other two.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTHVxSu8AUgHRLvo1ntZ8H
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-23 21:48:06 -04:00
cliffhall
9a084f49e5 fix(proxy): proxy /api/fetch, and detect entry-inlined externals
Addresses the Copilot review on #2099.

- `/api/fetch` used the bare global `fetch`. That route is the browser's only
  way out to the network — the web client's `environment.fetch` is
  `createRemoteFetch()`, which forwards OAuth discovery and token requests
  there — so a corporate-proxy user could connect to a server but never
  authorize against it, and the PR's "OAuth is proxied now" claim held for the
  CLI and TUI but not for web. It now uses the same proxy-aware base fetch, with
  an integration test driving a real forwarding proxy (confirmed failing without
  the fix).

- `verify:bundle-externals` only recognized an inlining that produced a
  `<pkg>-HASH.js` chunk. A *statically* imported package is folded into
  `index.js` and emits no chunk, so it would have passed. Detection now keys off
  esbuild's `// <path>` module banners, covering both shapes. Because that
  depends on unminified output, a bundle with no banners now fails as such
  rather than reporting clean — enabling `minify` cannot silently retire the
  check. Tests cover the entry-inlined case, the same-prefix case
  (`undici-types` must not read as `undici`), and the no-banner case.

- The pre-push pipeline summaries in AGENTS.md, README.md, and
  .github/copilot-instructions.md still described `verify:build-gate → smoke`
  and omitted the new gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTHVxSu8AUgHRLvo1ntZ8H
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-23 21:33:31 -04:00