| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
cliffhall
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339aea3729 |
fix(auth): replace the secrets-file lock with optimistic verify-and-retry, and address review round 9
Two changes, interleaved in the same files because both are about the same read-modify-write path. ## The lock is gone (maintainer decision on the round-5/7/8 finding) Three consecutive review rounds found a real race in the `mkdir` lock, and the last one is not patchable with what Node exposes: claiming a stale lock needs compare-and-swap on a directory entry (`renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE)`). Without it, `canSteal` inspects one lock but `rename` acts on whatever is at that path *later*, so a waiter that lost the first race can move the winner's fresh lock aside and enter alongside it. Rather than patch it a fourth time, writers now collide and the loser notices. `mutate` reads `M0`, applies the mutation to get `M1`, writes it, then reads back `M2`; if they differ, someone wrote in between, so it re-applies onto what they left and retries, bounded. The comparison is over the **whole map**, and that is the load-bearing detail. Checking only the entry we touched passes in exactly the case that loses data — ours is present, and it is the *other* writer's that is gone. With A and B from the same `M0`: A writes `MA`, B writes `MB` and clobbers A; B verifies and correctly sees `MB`; A verifies, sees `M2 !== MA`, re-applies onto `MB`, writes again. Both survive, and the writer that was clobbered is the one that repairs it. Two things this deliberately does not claim: - It is **not mutual exclusion**. A process that crashes between its write and its verifying read cannot notice it was clobbered, and nothing else will. That window is strictly narrower than the lock's — which lost updates with every participant alive — and needs no primitive Node lacks. Stated in the code rather than left to be rediscovered in review. - Non-convergence **fails loudly**. After five lost rounds `set` throws rather than returning, because returning would reintroduce the silent loss with extra steps. `delete` stays silent, per the interface contract. `serialize` is now keyed on the resolved path **process-wide** rather than per instance. Two `FileSecretStore`s on one file are ordinary — the resolved store holds one and `absorbFileSecretsIntoKeyring` builds another — and a per-instance queue does not order them against each other at all. The new convergence test caught this on its first run: two instances racing `set` lost an entry. In-process is now correct by construction; the verify covers what it cannot see, a second Inspector process. The hand-off's read → copy → delete was the lock's other user. Its delete is now conditional: the file is re-read immediately before removal and compared against what was copied, and it declines to delete when they differ. Leaving the file costs nothing (keychain-wins makes the next run idempotent) while deleting on a stale read costs a secret. ## Round 9 (two inline, two suppressed) - **`KeyringSecretStore.getStrict` let raw binding errors escape.** Both plaintext migrations keep their source file only when they catch `SecretStoreUnavailableError`, so a transient keychain failure 500'd `GET /api/servers` instead of abandoning the migration. Wrapped, as `set` already does. - **`FileSecretStore` had no strict read at all**, so `secretStoreGetStrict` fell back to the tolerant `get` and mapped every read failure to `null` — leaving the exact inversion the seam was introduced to prevent open on the store it was introduced for. - **`readOnDiskEncryption` reported "encrypted" for an envelope it cannot open.** Naming the cipher is not the same as being openable: a file with no `kdf`/`data`, or a `data` that is not `iv.tag.ciphertext`, produced the quiet reassuring footer for a file whose next save was guaranteed to fail. - **`/api/config` kept a stale descriptor when the resolver returned `undefined`**, because the conditional spread left the startup value standing. Assigned unconditionally now; `c.json` omits the key. Full `npm run ci` green. Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com> |
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cliffhall
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b143dd6cbd |
fix(auth): address Copilot review round 3 on the secret-store PR
Nine findings (six inline, three suppressed), all taken. Two were serious. **The memory fallback made the migrations destructive.** Both migrations — mcp.json in the remote server, client.json in `node-persistence` — lift a plaintext secret off disk, write it to the secret store, and then delete it from the file. That trade is safe only while the store is at least as durable as the disk, which held by construction while `InMemorySecretStore` was a test double. Making it a production fallback broke it: on an unmounted container a plain `GET /api/servers` would have moved a user's existing secrets into RAM and lost them at exit — destroying data on a read. `SecretStore` gains an optional `isDurable()`, absent meaning durable, and both migrations withhold the disk delete when it answers false (the value is still loaded, so the session behaves normally). The production fallback is now a named `SessionSecretStore` rather than the bare `InMemorySecretStore`, so the suite's many doubles keep standing in for a *working keychain* — which is what they are there to be — and only code that deliberately chooses RAM in production says so. **Round 2's per-call descriptor never reached anyone.** Both web servers resolved it once at startup and baked it into `initialConfig`, which `/api/config` serves unchanged — so the freshness fix was inert for its only consumer. The route now takes a `secretStorageResolver` and calls it per request. The lock needed three more fixes, and they compound: - **Release removed whatever directory was at the path.** A holder whose work outran the stale threshold would delete the *next* owner's lock, letting a third writer into a section two processes believed they held. Ownership is now stamped with a random token and release only removes a lock still carrying it. - **The timeout fell through to an unlocked write** — under contention, the one moment another writer is provably active. It now throws `SecretFileLockTimeoutError`, which `set` is allowed to do. - **The first write of every process bypassed the lock**, because the secrets directory does not exist yet and `mkdir` failed ENOENT. The parent is created first. First writes are exactly when two processes are most likely to start together. Fixing the timeout exposed a fourth: with stale (10s) below timeout, a waiter stole from a holder that was merely *slow* rather than dead — reinstating the lost update. A holder now heartbeats its lock, so "stale" means the holder is gone, and the timeout is what a live-but-slow holder produces. Lock timings are injectable so the tests can exercise contention, staleness, and timeout without spending the real intervals. Also: the loose-permission state is carried into `SecretStorageInfo` as `looseMode` and rendered as the caveat (it outranks the encryption caveat — a file others can read is a live exposure, while "unencrypted" is a property of a file only its owner can open), rather than living in a startup log the browser cannot see; and `usableSecretStorage` validates `pendingEncryption` and `looseMode` as the optional booleans/numbers they are (`pendingEncryption: "false"` is truthy and would have printed advice that is the opposite of the truth) and rejects file-only fields on a keychain or memory descriptor. Tests: both migrations against a session store with a durable control alongside, so the guard is visibly the difference; `/api/config` serving a changing resolver and falling back without one; lock ownership after a steal, the timeout under a live holder, no-steal from a slow holder, and a locked first write; `looseMode` through the descriptor, the caveat ordering, and the tone; and five more rejected payload shapes. Full `npm run ci` green — 5,704 tests under the coverage gate. Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com> |
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Cliff Hall
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91f02fd6db |
feat(web): catalog vs read-only session launch model + apply --header (#1481, #1483) (#1496)
* feat(web): catalog vs read-only session launch model + apply --header (#1481, #1483) Per specification/v2_catalog_launch_config.md, `mcp-inspector --web` now selects the backend's server-list source and a session-wide writability, instead of seeding an inert `initialMcpConfig` the UI never read: - `--catalog <path>` (and `MCP_CATALOG_PATH`) → active WRITABLE catalog (seed/CRUD/watch), like the default catalog. - `--config <path>` → READ-ONLY session file: served in the UI but never written, seeded, or plaintext-secret-migrated — safe to point at a foreign config (e.g. claude_desktop_config.json). - ad-hoc `--server-url`/command (+ `--header`) → one server held IN MEMORY (no file written); `--header` is lifted onto the entry so the seeded connection actually uses it (closes the #1483 warn-only no-op). - nothing → default catalog (writable), unchanged. Backend (`createRemoteApp`): new `writable` + `initialServers` options. GET /api/servers branches three ways (in-memory / read-only file with no seed+no migrate / writable catalog); the four mutating routes return 403 when read-only; `/api/config` carries `writable`; the file watcher is skipped for in-memory sessions. `--catalog`/`--config` are mutually exclusive and neither combines with an ad-hoc target or `--header`; `--header` requires an ad-hoc HTTP/SSE server (clear errors otherwise — no silent no-op). UI: `useServerListWritable` reads `writable` from /api/config; the Servers screen hides add/edit/clone/remove/reorder/settings and shows a read-only banner when false. All new props default to writable=true (back-compatible). Docs: spec gaps G2/G3/G4 updated; launcher README documents the flags. Verified end-to-end against the built launcher: --config (writable:false, file byte-stable, mutations 403), ad-hoc --header (in-memory, header lifted), and --catalog (writable:true, POST persists). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(web): address review — Mantine <Code> in read-only banner, clarify watcher comment - Replace raw <code> with Mantine <Code> in the read-only-session Alert (repo convention: prefer Mantine primitives over raw HTML). - Add a comment near `watchable` clarifying that a read-only `--config` file is still watched on purpose (read-only blocks UI writes, not external observation; `writable` does not gate watching). Deferred (per reviewer): consolidating useSandboxUrl + useServerListWritable into one useConfig hook to avoid the duplicate /api/config fetch — optional follow-up. The redundant ad-hoc header type-guard is kept as defensive. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Cliff Hall
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8bb389c8e3 |
test: switch integration project to folder-based manifest (#1314) (#1318)
* test: switch integration project to folder-based manifest (#1314) Replace the `integrationTests` enumeration in vite.config.ts with a folder glob (`src/test/integration/**/*.test.ts`). Files under that folder run in the integration vitest project (node env, 30s timeouts); everything else runs in the unit project (happy-dom). This removes the silent misclassification trap from #1307: a new integration-style test no longer falls into the unit project (and happy-dom) just because someone forgot to add it to the array. The 13 ported v1.5 tests + their helpers move under src/test/integration/ in a strict mirror of core/ source layout (mcp/, auth/, auth/node/, storage/). Renames use git mv so history is preserved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: address PR review on #1318 (glob extensions + AGENTS doc) - vite.config.ts: widen integrationGlob from `*.test.ts` to `*.test.{ts,tsx}` so the integration folder fully owns its contents. Without this, a `.test.tsx` placed under src/test/integration/ would match the unit project's `{ts,tsx}` include, fail the unit `.ts`-only exclude, and silently land under happy-dom — the exact misclassification trap this PR set out to close. - AGENTS.md: update the line describing where integration tests live; it still pointed at the old `src/test/core/` location and the removed `integrationTests` enumeration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
Renamed from clients/web/src/test/core/remote-server-config.test.ts (Previous history)