Commit graph inspector/core/react/useEmaIdpLoginState.ts
Author SHA1 Message Date
cliffhall
546dacffe2 chore: address Copilot review round 2 (#2192)
- `useEmaIdpLoginState` attributed a read to the wrong issuer. A bare
  `EmaIdpLoginState` carries the previous issuer's answer over to a new one
  until a fresh read lands — and if that read fails, indefinitely, so the
  settings surface reports "logged in" for an IdP nobody authenticated
  against. Round 1's `.catch()` made that worse by design, and the test
  added with it asserted the wrong behaviour outright.

  State is now the pair (issuer, value) and `loginState` derives from it, so
  a mismatch reports "none". A monotonic read token — the device
  `useInitialConfig` already uses — drops completions that were overtaken,
  including a read still in flight when `logout` clears the session; issuer
  keying cannot catch those, since both carry the same issuer. Both guards
  are pinned by tests verified to fail without them.

  Deriving the value also removed the last synchronous commit on that path,
  so the `set-state-in-effect` suppression is gone — one fewer than the PR
  started with.

- The draft-seeding change had no test that could tell it from the effect
  it replaced: the regression is a committed frame, and RTL flushes passive
  effects before any assertion on `result.current`. Both hooks now have a
  commit-level trace recorded from inside the tree, asserting the previous
  target's (or session's) draft is never committed for the new one. Both
  were verified to fail against the effect implementation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-30 00:22:28 -04:00
cliffhall
7e6d6c0bc1 chore: address Copilot review round 1 (#2192)
- `useEmaIdpLoginState`: the effect-triggered `refresh()` was discarded with
  `void`, but it does not own its failures — `getEmaIdpLoginState` awaits
  `storage.getIdpSession`, which rejects when the backend is unreachable.
  Terminate with `.catch()` and leave `loginState` untouched, as `logout`
  already does. Covered by a new test that also asserts no unhandled
  rejection escapes.
- Correct the history: the plugin was *client-local*, declared by both
  `clients/web` and `clients/tui`. The root could reach neither, since Node
  resolution walks up rather than down — that, not web-exclusivity, is why
  `core/react/` went unlinted.
- Correct the enforcement claim: `clients/tui` registers the plugin but
  deliberately enables only `rules-of-hooks` and `exhaustive-deps`, so
  `set-state-in-effect` and `refs` hold for `clients/web` and `core/react/`
  only. Says so in AGENTS.md and in the Copilot mirror, which would
  otherwise have reviewers cite rules the TUI gate does not run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-29 23:50:18 -04:00
cliffhall
9ced0fd150 chore: lint core/react with eslint-plugin-react-hooks (#2192)
`eslint-plugin-react-hooks` was a `clients/web` devDependency only, and each
client's `eslint .` is scoped to its own directory — so the whole hook rule
set had never looked at `core/react/`, a directory of nothing but React
hooks. "Neither surface has JSX" was the stated reason and was never a good
one: the rules judge hooks, not JSX.

Add the plugin at the root and apply it in a `core/react/**` block (scoped
there rather than to all of `core/**`, since the rules key off the `use`
prefix), with `exhaustive-deps` promoted to `error` as `clients/web` does.

Resolve the 15 findings it then reports:

- `useSettingsDraft` / `useClientSettingsDraft` seed their draft during
  render instead of in a `targetId`/`opened`-keyed effect, so the previous
  target's values never reach the DOM — the same rule `clients/web` spells
  `useValueChange`. Their "latest value" refs move from render-time writes
  into an effect; every reader (the debounce timer, `flush`, `onChange`)
  runs after a commit, so a post-commit write is what they need.
- The three async loaders keep their effects behind justified inline
  disables: `set-state-in-effect` follows a call into an async function
  without modelling the `await`, verified against a minimal hook whose only
  setState is in a continuation.
- `useInitialConfig`'s cleanup bump keeps reading `generation.current` at
  teardown — the rule's "copy it into a variable" advice would restore a
  stale request token and let a superseded response commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-29 23:17:45 -04:00
cliffhall
ba48e06ffd fix(auth): guard OAuth-storage async paths against unhandled rejections
Review follow-ups on the RemoteOAuthStorage web migration:

- useEmaIdpLoginState.logout(): add a .catch to the now-async
  clearEmaIdpSession call so a storage failure no longer surfaces as an
  unhandled rejection; leave loginState unchanged on failure (the session
  was not actually cleared). Add a test asserting no unhandled rejection.
- createOAuthStore: attach a no-op catch to the eager persistLoadPromise
  so a hydration read that fails before any load() awaits it does not
  become an unhandled rejection; real awaiters still observe the rejection
  via the shared reference.
- storage-remote.test: replace `as unknown as typeof fetch` double-casts
  with the typed vi.fn<typeof fetch>() pattern the same PR established.
- remoteOAuthStorage: correct the doc comment to describe the cache-of-one
  accurately instead of implying a keyed map.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 10:59:40 -04:00
Bob Dickinson
a24091484c fix(auth): await OAuth storage load() to fix remote OAuth races 2026-07-03 14:18:00 -07:00
Bob Dickinson
5de4e911e3
feat(web,core): enterprise-managed authorization (EMA) (#1509) (#1512)
Adds enterprise-managed authorization (EMA): browser-side IdP login + RFC 8693 token-exchange and JWT-bearer resource-token mint, per-server EMA opt-in in Server Settings, IdP config in Client Settings, and IdP clientSecret keychain storage. Includes the v2/main merge and review follow-ups (400 on malformed client config; normalizeIdpIssuer import consolidation).
2026-06-24 22:15:12 -04:00