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Cliff Hall
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a09f2dcf1d |
fix: load @napi-rs/keyring lazily so an unsupported platform degrades instead of crashing (#1905) (#1948)
* fix: load @napi-rs/keyring lazily so an unsupported platform degrades `@napi-rs/keyring` ships one prebuilt binary per platform triple and throws on import where it has none. On Android / Termux there is no `@napi-rs/keyring-android-arm64`, so the static top-level import in `core/auth/node/secret-store.ts` threw during module evaluation and the Inspector exited at startup with "Cannot find native binding" — before any of the keychain-unavailable handling in that same file could run. Replaces the static import with a cached dynamic one. The outcome is cached, not just the module, so a box without a binary doesn't re-attempt (and re-throw) resolution on every secret operation — `expectedSecretFields` means that would otherwise be once per server per `GET /api/servers` — and so `set` can name the underlying cause in its `KeychainUnavailableError`. An unloadable package now folds into the same degradation contract as an unreachable keychain: `get` returns null, `delete` and `deleteAllForServer` no-op, and `set` throws `KeychainUnavailableError` (not double-wrapped — the load failure is already typed by the time the catch sees it). The class doc comment now enumerates all three ways "unavailable" can arrive, since each escaped the contract at some point. The shared `vi.mock` stub can't express this — it models a keyring that loads — so the new tests build on `vi.resetModules()` + `vi.doMock` with a throwing factory and re-import the module, covering the load failure, each method under it, and the load-once caching. Verified the dynamic import survives bundling in all three clients (cli, tui, and the web runner) rather than being inlined back to a static one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XAR2Nr9kXbrywFNUVoTe9F * fix: steer a missing native binding to a reinstall hint `KeychainUnavailableError` gave the Linux libsecret / gnome-keyring advice for every cause, including the one where the keychain is fine and the @napi-rs/keyring platform package is what's missing — an unsupported triple (#1905) or npm's optional-deps bug dropping it on a supported one (npm/cli#4828, the Windows report on #1852). Detect the loader's "Cannot find native binding" phrasing and point those users at a reinstall / npx-cache clear instead. Ported from the superseded #1943, which fixed this alongside the same lazy-load change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3 * fix: name a bad keyring namespace instead of "is not a constructor" The lazy import accepted whatever the resolution produced. The named exports arrive through CJS interop, so a resolution that stopped yielding them — a default-only export upstream, a bundler changing interop, a platform where named-export detection fails — would hand us `undefined`, and `new mod.AsyncEntry(...)` would throw a TypeError inside the very try that implements graceful degradation. Shape-check the resolved module and treat a bad shape as unavailable. Scope, because it is narrower than it first appears: this does NOT prevent a bad shape from emptying the secret list. `get` returns null either way — that is its read-tolerance contract, and the TypeError lands in the same catch a dead keychain does. What changes is the diagnosis. Without the check the only signal is `set` reporting "keyring.mod.AsyncEntry is not a constructor", which reads like an Inspector bug; with it, `set` names the real problem once, at the load boundary, in the same actionable 503 as every other unavailability. Catching the silent-empty-list case itself would need a round-trip against the unmocked package, which nothing in the suite does today. The member access sits inside the try because reading a missing export is not always a harmless undefined — a Proxy-backed namespace can throw, as vitest's module mocks do — and letting that escape would reject the cached promise, which is otherwise guaranteed to always resolve. Of the four new tests only the cause-message one fails without the guard; the rest pin the surrounding contract. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3 * docs: correct the test header's count of unavailability entry points The shape check added a fourth way "unavailable" can arrive, and the enumeration in secret-store.ts was updated to match, but the test file's header still said three — so it read as an exhaustive list that silently omitted the case a whole describe below it covers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3 * fix: give the wrong-shape cause its own remediation hint The shape check added a cause that fell through to the libsecret advice — so a packaging mismatch told the user to install a keyring daemon, which cannot help, and on Windows or macOS points somewhere that does not exist. That is the same wrong-advice bug the native-binding branch was added to fix, reintroduced by the guard itself. Hint selection moves into `hintFor`, where libsecret is the explicit fallback rather than the default, and the shape failure becomes a distinct `KeyringModuleShapeError` matched by type — it is our own error, so there is no reason to re-parse text we wrote (the native-binding branch matches a string only because that message comes from napi-rs). Also retitles the wrong-shape test: it claimed the guard avoids "returning null secrets", but `get` returns null either way by the read-tolerance contract. The title now says what actually differs — `set` hard-fails — matching the correction already made in the comments. Both raised by Copilot review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3 * fix: give both shape-check failure paths the packaging hint The shape check can fail two ways — the members are absent, or reading them throws — and only the first carried KeyringModuleShapeError. The catch path returned the raw error, so a Proxy-backed namespace throwing on access fell through to the libsecret advice: the same wrong-remedy bug as the previous two commits, one branch further along. Both paths now carry the type. KeyringModuleShapeError takes a detail string plus a standard `cause`, so the throwing path reads "its exports could not be read: <original>" and keeps the underlying failure legible while still earning the packaging hint. Three instances of one mistake in a row (a new cause added without deciding which remediation it inherits) says the shape was wrong, not just the branch: making libsecret an explicit fallback in `hintFor` did not stop me adding a second exit that skipped it. The tests now pin the invariant directly — one asserts both construction paths produce the same hint — so the next cause that forgets is a failing test rather than a reviewer's catch. Raised by Copilot review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Cliff Hall
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bb219dc001 |
fix: construct AsyncEntry inside the try so keychain degradation engages (#1848) (#1945)
* fix: construct AsyncEntry inside the try so keychain degradation engages `KeyringSecretStore` built its `AsyncEntry` outside the `try` in `get`, `set`, and `delete`. `AsyncEntry::new` performs the platform-store setup (on Linux, the Secret Service connect with a keyutils fallback) and throws when no backend is reachable, so the documented degradation contract never engaged for a construction-time failure: the raw keyring error escaped, 500ing every `GET /api/servers` on a box without a Secret Service (the published container, which has no D-Bus session). `expectedSecretFields` always includes the OAuth slot, so `rehydrateConfig` constructs an entry for every server — the default seeded catalog was enough to 500 the first list load, before any server was added. And because the escaping error wasn't a `KeychainUnavailableError`, it bypassed both the routes' 503 translation and the `migratePlaintextSecrets` skip branch, yielding a generic 500 instead of the actionable message. Moving construction inside the existing `try` restores the contract for that failure mode: `get` returns null, `delete` no-ops, and `set` is the only operation that throws — as `KeychainUnavailableError`, which is what the 503 translation and the migration skip both match on. The test stub's constructor could not fail, which is why the coverage gate never saw the gap. Adds a `constructorThrows` hook alongside the existing method-level `failures` flags and covers all three methods plus `deleteAllForServer` under it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XAR2Nr9kXbrywFNUVoTe9F * test: pin why the OAuth secret field is unconditional `expectedSecretFields` always includes the OAuth slot, and #1848's report frames that as why the 500 fired so broadly — which invites a follow-up that skips the keychain read for servers with "no OAuth config". That change would lose data. `extractSecretsFromStored` deletes the `oauth` block outright when `clientSecret` was its only property, so such a server carries NO marker on disk that a secret exists — the keychain is the sole record, and the unconditional slot is what finds it again. Gating the read on a disk-visible `oauth` block would silently stop rehydrating exactly that shape. The existing tests do fail if the slot is made conditional (verified by applying the change: 4 red), but only under names that explain nothing about the consequence — `always lists the OAuth slot first` reads like a tautology worth updating rather than a trap. Add a round-trip case that states the consequence, so the next reader sees the field is load-bearing rather than defensive. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Cliff Hall
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373f346e5f |
chore: close quality-gate coverage gaps (#1689) (#1766)
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Closes #1689. Typecheck cli/tui src, add a core/ format+lint gate, and gate core/json + core/client coverage. See PR #1766 for the full review history. |
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Bob Dickinson
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5de4e911e3 |
feat(web,core): enterprise-managed authorization (EMA) (#1509) (#1512)
Adds enterprise-managed authorization (EMA): browser-side IdP login + RFC 8693 token-exchange and JWT-bearer resource-token mint, per-server EMA opt-in in Server Settings, IdP config in Client Settings, and IdP clientSecret keychain storage. Includes the v2/main merge and review follow-ups (400 on malformed client config; normalizeIdpIssuer import consolidation). |
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Cliff Hall
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037225a9fb |
feat(servers): move oauthClientSecret and stdio env values to OS keychain (#1356) (#1360)
* feat(servers): move oauthClientSecret and stdio env values to OS keychain (#1356) mcp.json is designed to be tool-shareable (symlinked from Claude Desktop's config, pasted into bug reports, synced via dotfiles), so storing OAuth client secrets and stdio env values in plaintext there meant any of those flows could leak them. Lift both into the OS keychain via @napi-rs/keyring (active replacement for the archived keytar). The wire shape is unchanged: the GET /api/servers handler rehydrates from the keychain so browser code sees the same JSON; the on-disk file no longer contains the secret material. Includes an idempotent migration that lifts plaintext from older mcp.json files (or hand-edited ones) into the keychain on first read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(servers): tolerate keychain unavailability on non-set ops (#1356) CI on Linux failed because `@napi-rs/keyring` hard-errors without libsecret, and the route handlers were touching the keychain even for no-secret flows (defensive `deleteAllForServer` on POST/DELETE, sweep on PUT). The user's intent for the Linux fallback was "hard fail when a secret is actually involved" — not on every keychain touch. Make `KeyringSecretStore.get / delete / deleteAllForServer` silently degrade when the keychain is unavailable (return null / no-op); `set` remains the one operation that hard-fails with `KeychainUnavailableError`. The migration path catches the error and preserves the disk plaintext rather than losing the secret. Also inject `InMemorySecretStore` in `useServers.test.tsx` and `servers-events.test.ts` so tests never touch a developer's real keychain even when libsecret is present. Adds `KeyringSecretStore` tests (vi.mock'd native bindings) and an integration suite that simulates Linux-without-libsecret to verify the tolerance contract end-to-end. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(servers): close GET migration race; reverse keychain/disk order (#1356) Addresses code review: 1. **Concurrency**: GET /api/servers was reading + migrating outside the write lock, then writing inside it — a concurrent POST/PUT/DELETE between the read and the lock acquisition could be clobbered by the migration write. Also affected the first-launch seed write. Fix: take a fast unlocked peek; if the file is absent (seed branch) or carries plaintext to migrate (migration branch), re-read inside the write lock and decide there. Added `hasPlaintextSecrets()` as a pure predicate so the common no-migration path stays lock-free. 2. **Write ordering**: POST and PUT wrote disk first, then keychain. A keychain `set` failure mid-write left a half-configured entry on disk and trapped retries at 409. Reversed to keychain-first so a 503 leaves both stores in their pre-write state. PUT in-place now sets new fields, writes disk, then deletes obsolete fields (a failed disk write leaves orphan keychain entries — recoverable — rather than premature deletions of fields the user still expects to see). 3. **Tolerance simplification**: dropped the no-entry regex in `KeyringSecretStore.delete` — both "no entry" and "keychain unavailable" collapse to the same desired outcome (the entry isn't there anymore), so a uniform swallow is clearer. 4. **Parallelism**: `readKeychainEntriesFor` now `Promise.all`s the per-field `get` calls. macOS Keychain round-trips are 10-50ms; serializing 5+ env vars per server × N servers is a meaningful wall-clock cost on GET. 5. **Spec doc**: reflects the tolerance contract (only `set` hard-fails) and the keychain-before-disk write ordering rationale. New regression test in servers-route.test.ts covers the retry-after-503 contract directly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(servers): parallel keychain writes + migration partial-state comment (#1356) Two nice-to-have observations from the re-review: - `writeKeychainEntriesFor` now `Promise.all`s its per-field sets, matching the read side. No ordering requirement among distinct (id, field) keys; on unavailability every set rejects and Promise.all surfaces the first rejection (still 503 from the route handler). - `migratePlaintextSecrets` catch block now spells out the partial-migration semantics: we return the original config so the disk plaintext stays intact, and the next successful GET retries with the keychain-wins branch absorbing already-set entries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(servers): parallel keychain deletes for symmetry (#1356) Picks up the symmetry observation from the third review: `deleteKeychainFields` now uses `Promise.all` like its read and write siblings. Distinct (id, field) deletes have no ordering requirement, and `secretStore.delete` is already a silent no-op on unavailability so Promise.all has no failure-mode surprise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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