* refactor(web): update OAuth E2E tests to use new authentication method
- Replaced `runGuidedAuth` with `authenticate` in the InspectorClient OAuth end-to-end tests to support quick authentication with CIMD pre-registration.
- Updated comments to reflect the change in authentication method and its support for HTTP test metadata URLs.
- Ensured that the tests continue to validate the expected authorization URL after the change.
Additionally, imported `ensureCimdClientRegistration` in the OAuthManager to streamline client registration during the authentication process.
* Guided-auth removal, OAuth smoke testing, and TUI/CLI support
* Added CLI OAuth runner flags tests
* Added clarifying comment on port 0 binding
* README notes on TUI oauth callback port, prettier fixes for CLI tests
* CIMD validation uses inline like EMA IdP
* Fixed TUI test failures from merge
* test: bring 5 OAuth files over the 90 per-file coverage gate
The guided-auth-removal work added/touched several files that fell below
the repo's >=90 per-file coverage gate (npm run coverage). CI doesn't run
the gate (it's local-only), so validate + test:integration passed while
these gaps slipped through. Bring them all back over the line:
- core/auth/node/runner-oauth-callback.ts: test bad-URL/non-http-scheme
throws, no-port->80 default, and IPv6 hostname bracketing. Annotate the
provably-dead guards (empty host, out-of-range port, String(err)
fallback, pathname "/" fallback) -- all rejected by new URL() upstream --
with justified v8 ignore comments instead of lowering the gate.
- core/auth/cimd.ts: test the AS-doesn't-support-CIMD early return.
- core/react/useClientSettingsDraft.ts: test the functional-updater path,
the stale-onChange-after-close prev===null guard, and the
timer-fires-after-close value===null guard.
- ClientSettingsForm.tsx: test the CIMD checkbox toggle and CIMD URL clear.
- clients/tui/src/utils/oauthDisplay.ts: test static/dcr registration
kinds, the expired IdP session, and the configured-scope/empty-scope
branches of formatScopes.
npm run coverage now passes (exit 0) across web, cli, tui, launcher.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds enterprise-managed authorization (EMA): browser-side IdP login + RFC 8693 token-exchange and JWT-bearer resource-token mint, per-server EMA opt-in in Server Settings, IdP config in Client Settings, and IdP clientSecret keychain storage. Includes the v2/main merge and review follow-ups (400 on malformed client config; normalizeIdpIssuer import consolidation).
* feat(auth): inject MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN into served index.html (#1378)
Reloading the web client at the bare URL (no `?MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN=…`
query string) with empty sessionStorage made every `/api/*` request 401 —
the browser had no way to recover the backend's auth token.
Embed the token into `index.html` on every page load so the browser no
longer depends on the query string surviving navigation:
- New shared helper `clients/web/server/inject-auth-token.ts` embeds
`<script>window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__ = "…"</script>` (escaped against
`</script>` injection; no-op when auth is dangerously omitted).
- Dev: the Vite plugin injects via `transformIndexHtml`.
- Prod: the Hono server injects on the `/` route.
- `App.tsx` `getAuthToken()` now reads the injected global first, then the
query string, then sessionStorage (both fallbacks preserved).
- Shared global name lives in `INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN_GLOBAL`
(`core/mcp/remote/constants.ts`).
Tests: helper unit coverage + an integration test exercising the real
prod server's `/` → `/api/*` flow (injected token authenticates; missing
token 401s). AGENTS.md documents the token-recovery order.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): wire OAuth authorization-code flow into App.tsx (#1379)
OAuth-protected MCP servers could not be connected to from the v2 web
client: the core OAuth pipeline exists, but App.tsx never invoked it, so a
connect attempt 401'd and surfaced "Remote send failed (401): … Missing
Authorization header" as a toast.
Wire the two missing entry points (all core primitives already in place):
- Auto-trigger on 401: in onToggleConnection's catch, detect an upstream
401 (isUnauthorizedError) and call client.authenticate(), which runs
discovery + DCR (backend-proxied) and redirects the page to the auth
server via BrowserNavigation. The initiating server id is persisted to
sessionStorage first, since the OAuth `state` carries only mode+authId
and the full-page redirect wipes React state.
- /oauth/callback handler: a mount effect that, once `servers` hydrate,
parses the callback params, recovers the pending server, rebuilds its
InspectorClient, runs completeOAuthFlow(code) (PKCE verifier + DCR client
info survive in BrowserOAuthStorage), replaceState("/") so a reload can't
replay the single-use code, then connect(). An `error=` callback toasts
instead of retrying.
connect() already attaches the OAuth provider to the transport
(inspectorClient.ts), so once tokens land in BrowserOAuthStorage the
outbound request carries the bearer token.
Extracted the pure pieces (constants + isUnauthorizedError) to
src/utils/oauthFlow.ts with unit tests. Verified end-to-end in a real
browser against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: Connect -> redirect ->
auto-approve -> callback -> Connected, with the access token shown in the
Connection Info modal (#1377).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): inject token into prod SPA fallback + prime sessionStorage + no-store (#1378)
Addresses code-review feedback on the token-injection PR:
- Prod `server.ts` SPA deep-link fallback (e.g. `/oauth/callback`) previously
served the raw index.html off disk via serveStatic, bypassing injection — so
a bookmark/reload at a non-`/` route with empty sessionStorage would 401.
Route the SPA fallback through the same `serveIndexHtml` (inject) helper;
real static assets (paths with a dot) still serve verbatim. Dev already
injected on every HTML serve via Vite `transformIndexHtml`.
- `getAuthToken()` now persists the injected `window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__`
to sessionStorage (not just the URL-param branch), priming the backstop for
any later navigation that loses the global.
- Injected HTML responses now send `Cache-Control: no-store`, so a page
carrying a token isn't cached and served stale after a restart regenerates
the token.
Integration tests added: SPA fallback (`/oauth/callback`) carries the token,
`Cache-Control: no-store` on injected HTML, real assets served verbatim, and
unknown `/api` routes 404 rather than falling through to the HTML shell.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): address #1383 review — split OAuth/connect toasts, tighten 401 match (#1379)
Code-review feedback on the OAuth-wiring PR:
- Callback effect: split completeOAuthFlow vs connect() into separate
try/catch blocks. A token-exchange failure now reads "OAuth token exchange
failed … Please try connecting again." (the single-use code is spent and the
URL was cleared, so a reload can't retry); a post-OAuth connect failure reads
"Failed to connect" since OAuth actually succeeded and re-clicking Connect
reuses the persisted tokens.
- isUnauthorizedError: anchor the message fallback on the transport's
`failed …(401)` wording instead of a bare `(401)`, so an unrelated `(401)`
spliced into an error message can't trip the OAuth flow. Added a test.
- Documented that clearing the pending id + URL before the server lookup is
intentional (deleted/renamed server mid-flow → require a fresh Connect).
Also merges the squash-merged #1382 base from v2/main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bob Dickinson
Cliff Hall