Ports the CLI, TUI, and launcher from v1.5 into v2 behind a single
`mcp-inspector` entrypoint (launcher → web/cli/tui). Includes the
`mcp-inspector --web --dev` launcher fix (Vite alias resolution + prod-server
double-start), the root `postinstall` install cascade with simplified CI, and
spec/AGENTS docs (no-workspaces rationale, Development setup).
Closes#1246.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(core): trace dropped fetch body update when entry rotates out (#1390)
FetchRequestLogState.onFetchRequestBodyUpdate silently dropped a deferred
response-body update when the matching entry had already been evicted by
log rotation (>= maxFetchRequests newer requests appended between the
append and the fire-and-forget body read). The user saw an empty Response
Body with no way to distinguish "body never came back" from "body dropped
after eviction".
Plumb an optional pino logger into FetchRequestLogState (defaulting to the
silent logger) and emit a logger.debug at the early-return site so the drop
is traceable. The web client wires the existing remote logger from
createWebEnvironment into the state manager.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(core): emit dropped-body trace at warn level so it is observable (#1390)
Review feedback: the web remote logger (createRemoteLogger) defaults to
level 'info' with no override at the environmentFactory call site, so a
logger.debug at the drop site is filtered out by both the pino level gate
and transmit.level — the diagnostic never reaches /api/log and the drop
stays invisible in the shipped web app, defeating the issue's goal.
Promote the trace to logger.warn (>= info, so it transmits by default). A
response body lost to log rotation is unexpected data loss, not routine
diagnostic noise, so warn is the appropriate severity. Update the comment
to explain the level choice and switch the test stub from debug to warn,
extracting a small typed makeWarnLogger helper per review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(web): configurable Network Log Size per server + body-dropped toast (#1390)
Turn the otherwise-invisible "response body dropped after rotation" case into
an actionable signal:
1. Per-server `maxFetchRequests` setting (default 1000, 0 = unlimited),
editable as "Network Log Size" in the first (Options) accordion section of
the Server Settings form. Plumbed through the full settings pipeline:
InspectorServerSettings + StoredMCPServer types, the serverList disk
converters (read defaults to 1000, write omits the default to keep diffs
minimal — 0 is a meaningful non-default), and the node server's GET-sanitize
+ write-side validateSettings (non-negative number). Applied live to the
active connection on settings-modal close via a new
FetchRequestLogState.setMaxFetchRequests (shrinking trims immediately), and
at connect time for the next session.
2. FetchRequestLogState now emits a `fetchRequestBodyDropped` event, but only
for genuine rotation drops (log at capacity with a finite cap) — not for
benign post-clear stragglers or unlimited logs, which previously also hit
the warn path. App shows a deduped, persistent toast (stable per-server id,
no auto-close) explaining what happened and the likely causes, with a link
that opens this server's settings on the Options section (modal remounts via
key) so the user can raise the limit if it's just a high-traffic server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(web): don't treat a cleared Network Log Size field as unlimited (#1390)
Review feedback: clearing the NumberInput emits "", and `parseInt("") || 0`
coerced that to 0 (unlimited). Since the value applies live on modal close, a
user who cleared the field to retype and then closed the modal would silently
switch the log to unlimited. Fall back to the current value on an empty/NaN
parse and reserve 0 for an explicit numeric entry. Adds a cleared-input test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): inject MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN into served index.html (#1378)
Reloading the web client at the bare URL (no `?MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN=…`
query string) with empty sessionStorage made every `/api/*` request 401 —
the browser had no way to recover the backend's auth token.
Embed the token into `index.html` on every page load so the browser no
longer depends on the query string surviving navigation:
- New shared helper `clients/web/server/inject-auth-token.ts` embeds
`<script>window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__ = "…"</script>` (escaped against
`</script>` injection; no-op when auth is dangerously omitted).
- Dev: the Vite plugin injects via `transformIndexHtml`.
- Prod: the Hono server injects on the `/` route.
- `App.tsx` `getAuthToken()` now reads the injected global first, then the
query string, then sessionStorage (both fallbacks preserved).
- Shared global name lives in `INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN_GLOBAL`
(`core/mcp/remote/constants.ts`).
Tests: helper unit coverage + an integration test exercising the real
prod server's `/` → `/api/*` flow (injected token authenticates; missing
token 401s). AGENTS.md documents the token-recovery order.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): wire OAuth authorization-code flow into App.tsx (#1379)
OAuth-protected MCP servers could not be connected to from the v2 web
client: the core OAuth pipeline exists, but App.tsx never invoked it, so a
connect attempt 401'd and surfaced "Remote send failed (401): … Missing
Authorization header" as a toast.
Wire the two missing entry points (all core primitives already in place):
- Auto-trigger on 401: in onToggleConnection's catch, detect an upstream
401 (isUnauthorizedError) and call client.authenticate(), which runs
discovery + DCR (backend-proxied) and redirects the page to the auth
server via BrowserNavigation. The initiating server id is persisted to
sessionStorage first, since the OAuth `state` carries only mode+authId
and the full-page redirect wipes React state.
- /oauth/callback handler: a mount effect that, once `servers` hydrate,
parses the callback params, recovers the pending server, rebuilds its
InspectorClient, runs completeOAuthFlow(code) (PKCE verifier + DCR client
info survive in BrowserOAuthStorage), replaceState("/") so a reload can't
replay the single-use code, then connect(). An `error=` callback toasts
instead of retrying.
connect() already attaches the OAuth provider to the transport
(inspectorClient.ts), so once tokens land in BrowserOAuthStorage the
outbound request carries the bearer token.
Extracted the pure pieces (constants + isUnauthorizedError) to
src/utils/oauthFlow.ts with unit tests. Verified end-to-end in a real
browser against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: Connect -> redirect ->
auto-approve -> callback -> Connected, with the access token shown in the
Connection Info modal (#1377).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): persist OAuth pre-redirect Network log across the redirect (#1384)
After #1379, the Network tab showed only the post-redirect auth HTTP
(discovery re-run + POST /token); the pre-redirect discovery and the DCR
POST /register that run during authenticate() were lost when the page
navigated to the auth server.
Root causes:
1. Ordering — BrowserNavigation set `window.location.href` before the
client's `saveSession` event fired (OAuthManager calls onBeforeOAuthRedirect
*after* auth() already navigated), so the save raced the unload and was
dropped. Fix: BrowserNavigation now runs a synchronous `beforeNavigate`
hook immediately before assigning location.href; App wires it through
createWebEnvironment to flush the active fetch log to RemoteInspectorClient
Storage (keyed by the authId parsed from the auth URL) via a keepalive POST
that outlives the unload.
2. Illegal invocation — RemoteInspectorClientStorage defaulted to
`this.fetchFn = globalThis.fetch` and called `this.fetchFn(...)`, which
re-binds `this` and makes native fetch throw "Illegal invocation"
(swallowed by the catch). This silently broke *all* session save/load.
Fix: default to a wrapper that preserves the global receiver.
3. Restore race — hydrateFetchRequests replaced the list, so a load that
resolved after the resuming connect appended live entries would clobber
them. Fix: merge restored (older) entries ahead of live ones, dedupe by id.
saveSession also now uses keepalive: true.
Verified end-to-end against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: the connected
page's Network tab shows the full handshake — pre-redirect discovery + DCR
/register plus post-redirect discovery + /token as `auth`, alongside
`transport`. Added unit tests for the beforeNavigate ordering and the
hydrate merge/dedupe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(network): show auth response bodies with masked secrets + reveal toggle (#1386)
Auth-category Network entries showed request body/headers/status but never
the response body (rendered "(empty)"), because buildEffectiveAuthFetch
deliberately skipped capturing it to avoid surfacing access_token /
refresh_token. That hid the most useful thing to inspect when debugging
OAuth — the token exchange.
Capture auth response bodies, but mask sensitive OAuth fields by default
behind a click-to-reveal toggle so they aren't exposed at a glance during
a screen-share:
- inspectorClient: wire updateResponseBody on the auth fetcher.
- src/utils/maskSecrets.ts: maskSecretsInBody() masks access_token,
refresh_token, id_token, client_secret (case-insensitive, nested) in JSON
bodies; reports whether anything was masked. Non-JSON / secret-free bodies
pass through untouched.
- NetworkEntry BodyPreview: when a body has masked fields, render it masked
with a Reveal/Hide toggle (copy honors the shown view). Masking is a UI
concern; the raw entry is unchanged so reveal shows the real value.
access_token / refresh_token live in the post-redirect /token response,
which is never written to the session-restore files (#1384); only
pre-redirect bodies (public discovery, DCR /register) persist, so no bearer
token hits disk.
Verified end-to-end: the /token response shows masked by default
(access_token: "••••••••"), Reveal exposes the raw value, and discovery /
the public DCR /register response (no secret) render with no toggle. Added
util + component unit tests and a story play function.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): inject token into prod SPA fallback + prime sessionStorage + no-store (#1378)
Addresses code-review feedback on the token-injection PR:
- Prod `server.ts` SPA deep-link fallback (e.g. `/oauth/callback`) previously
served the raw index.html off disk via serveStatic, bypassing injection — so
a bookmark/reload at a non-`/` route with empty sessionStorage would 401.
Route the SPA fallback through the same `serveIndexHtml` (inject) helper;
real static assets (paths with a dot) still serve verbatim. Dev already
injected on every HTML serve via Vite `transformIndexHtml`.
- `getAuthToken()` now persists the injected `window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__`
to sessionStorage (not just the URL-param branch), priming the backstop for
any later navigation that loses the global.
- Injected HTML responses now send `Cache-Control: no-store`, so a page
carrying a token isn't cached and served stale after a restart regenerates
the token.
Integration tests added: SPA fallback (`/oauth/callback`) carries the token,
`Cache-Control: no-store` on injected HTML, real assets served verbatim, and
unknown `/api` routes 404 rather than falling through to the HTML shell.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): address #1383 review — split OAuth/connect toasts, tighten 401 match (#1379)
Code-review feedback on the OAuth-wiring PR:
- Callback effect: split completeOAuthFlow vs connect() into separate
try/catch blocks. A token-exchange failure now reads "OAuth token exchange
failed … Please try connecting again." (the single-use code is spent and the
URL was cleared, so a reload can't retry); a post-OAuth connect failure reads
"Failed to connect" since OAuth actually succeeded and re-clicking Connect
reuses the persisted tokens.
- isUnauthorizedError: anchor the message fallback on the transport's
`failed …(401)` wording instead of a bare `(401)`, so an unrelated `(401)`
spliced into an error message can't trip the OAuth flow. Added a test.
- Documented that clearing the pending id + URL before the server lookup is
intentional (deleted/renamed server mid-flow → require a fresh Connect).
Also merges the squash-merged #1382 base from v2/main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(auth): address #1385 review — clarify double-save + keepalive cap + test fetch default (#1384)
Code-review feedback on the OAuth Network-log persistence PR:
- Documented the double-save: `FetchRequestLogState`'s `saveSession` listener
is the backstop; `BrowserNavigation`'s `beforeNavigate` hook is the primary
flush for the redirect case. Notes the listener may lose the navigation race
and is harmless when it duplicates (last-writer-wins, identical payload).
- Reworded the keepalive comment in `RemoteInspectorClientStorage.saveSession`:
the 64KB cap is general (the method is also reachable from the listener with
the full session log), so a long session could exceed it and drop silently —
acceptable since the persisted log is best-effort, not load-bearing.
- Added a regression test that constructs `RemoteInspectorClientStorage`
without a `fetchFn`, stubs `globalThis.fetch`, and asserts the default
wrapper calls it (locks in the "Illegal invocation" fix, which callers
otherwise swallow).
Optional items (logger.warn on swallowed save errors; setupClientForServer dep
churn) acknowledged on the PR, not changed.
Also merges the squash-merged #1383 base from v2/main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(network): address #1387 review — form-encoded masking, cleaner flag, a11y (#1386)
Code-review feedback on the auth-response-body masking PR:
- Extended masking to form-urlencoded bodies (finding #1): the token *request*
is `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` and carries `code` / `code_verifier` /
`client_secret` / `refresh_token`. `maskSecretsInBody` now masks those in
form bodies too (preserving formatting; placeholder not percent-encoded).
`code`/`code_verifier`/`client_assertion` are form-only sensitive keys —
deliberately NOT masked in JSON, where `code` is usually an error/status code.
- Replaced the double-stringify `hasSecrets` heuristic with an explicit
masked-flag propagated out of `maskNode` (finding #2) — robust if the
transform ever grows non-identity behavior, and one fewer serialization.
- Reset reveal state on body change via `key={body}` remount instead of a
setState-in-effect (finding #3; avoids the cascading-render lint rule).
- a11y (finding #4): `aria-label` on the Reveal/Hide button and `aria-live`
on the hidden/revealed status text.
- Security tripwire comment near the `saveSession` listener (finding #6):
captured auth bodies are unmasked at source (masking is UI-only), so any new
post-token-exchange persistence path must redact first.
Tests: form-encoded masking (token + refresh requests), JSON `code` NOT masked,
non-object JSON pass-through, default-fetch wrapper. Story play + NetworkEntry
tests updated for the new aria-labels and the now-masked form request body.
Finding #5 (pretty-print asymmetry) is already handled by ContentViewer's JSON
formatting; #4-aria and #6 are the doc/a11y bits.
Also merges the squash-merged #1385 base from v2/main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(network): address #1387 third-pass review — content-type masking, wholesale mask, dedup (#1386)
Third-pass code-review feedback on the auth-body masking PR:
- maskSecretsInBody now takes the body's content-type (finding #1): `*json*`
→ JSON masking, form-urlencoded → form masking, any other known type
(HTML/plaintext/XML) → no masking; absent/unknown → sniff as before. Removes
the implicit "non-JSON ⇒ form" guess for error pages etc. NetworkEntry passes
the request/response `content-type` header through to BodyPreview.
- Mask any non-empty value under a sensitive key wholesale (finding #2):
a non-standard object/array value under e.g. `access_token` is replaced
rather than recursed into, so it can't leak. Empty-string still not flagged.
- Extracted `isSensitiveKey(set, key)` to dedupe the JSON/form key checks
(finding #3).
- Reworded `MaskResult.masked` doc to cover the form (non-pretty-printed) case
(finding #6).
Tests: non-string-value-under-sensitive-key wholesale mask; repeated form
param; empty form value not flagged; content-type honored (JSON type skips
form masking, text/plain skips masking, explicit form type masks).
Finding #5 (story re-hide) skipped per reviewer — unit test already covers
re-mask. Finding #4 (form edge cases) added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(network): address #1387 fourth-pass nits — content-type contract, key, form test (#1386)
Fourth-pass review (LGTM) — minor, non-blocking items:
- Documented the content-type matching contract on `maskSecretsInBody`:
substring match (`*json*` / `*x-www-form-urlencoded*`), and we trust the
wire's own label (a mislabeled body renders raw — acceptable for the
screen-share threat model) (finding #1).
- Key `<BodyPreview>` by content-type + body (not body alone) so a header-only
change would also reset the reveal state (finding #3; not reachable today).
- Storybook `AuthSuccess`: assert revealed count `>=` reveal-button count to
mirror the `hidden >= 2` check, so adding a non-masked body later can't drift
the assertion silently (finding #4).
- Added a `NetworkEntry` unit test for form-encoded request-body masking
(code/code_verifier) — previously exercised only via the Storybook play.
Finding #2 (silent decodeURIComponent fallback on malformed keys) acknowledged
as a known quirk outside the threat model; no change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* perf(network): address #1387 fifth-pass — memoize masking, mask DCR mgmt token (#1386)
Fifth-pass review (LGTM):
- Memoized `maskSecretsInBody` in `BodyPreview` (recommended item #1): a
Reveal/Hide click no longer re-parses + re-walks the body; cost is once per
mount, and the `key` remount re-runs it on body/content-type change. Guarded
so a too-large body is never parsed (the hook runs unconditionally, with the
size check inside the memo).
- Added `registration_access_token` (RFC 7592 DCR management credential, same
bearer class) to the masked key set, and a confidential-client `/register`
response fixture test (#5) asserting client_secret + registration_access_token
masked, client_id/metadata visible.
- Tightened the `isMaskableValue` doc to state the exact contract: non-null,
non-empty-string values are masked wholesale (#3).
Items #2 (transport parse cost — capped by the memo) and #4 (test-only
MASK_PLACEHOLDER export) left as-is per the review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(network): clarify body-update emits list event only (#1387 sixth pass) (#1386)
Sixth-pass review (LGTM, all nits). Added a comment on
`onFetchRequestBodyUpdate` noting it re-emits only `fetchRequestsChange`, not
the per-entry `fetchRequest` event — list-reading consumers pick up the body
on the next render; a future per-entry subscriber would need its own event.
Other items left as-is per the review: full-string `BodyPreview` key (#1,
micro-perf only if profiled), NaN under a sensitive key (#3, consistent with
the mask-non-null-non-empty contract), `&`-only form separator (#4, OAuth
never emits `;`).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): inject MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN into served index.html (#1378)
Reloading the web client at the bare URL (no `?MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN=…`
query string) with empty sessionStorage made every `/api/*` request 401 —
the browser had no way to recover the backend's auth token.
Embed the token into `index.html` on every page load so the browser no
longer depends on the query string surviving navigation:
- New shared helper `clients/web/server/inject-auth-token.ts` embeds
`<script>window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__ = "…"</script>` (escaped against
`</script>` injection; no-op when auth is dangerously omitted).
- Dev: the Vite plugin injects via `transformIndexHtml`.
- Prod: the Hono server injects on the `/` route.
- `App.tsx` `getAuthToken()` now reads the injected global first, then the
query string, then sessionStorage (both fallbacks preserved).
- Shared global name lives in `INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN_GLOBAL`
(`core/mcp/remote/constants.ts`).
Tests: helper unit coverage + an integration test exercising the real
prod server's `/` → `/api/*` flow (injected token authenticates; missing
token 401s). AGENTS.md documents the token-recovery order.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): wire OAuth authorization-code flow into App.tsx (#1379)
OAuth-protected MCP servers could not be connected to from the v2 web
client: the core OAuth pipeline exists, but App.tsx never invoked it, so a
connect attempt 401'd and surfaced "Remote send failed (401): … Missing
Authorization header" as a toast.
Wire the two missing entry points (all core primitives already in place):
- Auto-trigger on 401: in onToggleConnection's catch, detect an upstream
401 (isUnauthorizedError) and call client.authenticate(), which runs
discovery + DCR (backend-proxied) and redirects the page to the auth
server via BrowserNavigation. The initiating server id is persisted to
sessionStorage first, since the OAuth `state` carries only mode+authId
and the full-page redirect wipes React state.
- /oauth/callback handler: a mount effect that, once `servers` hydrate,
parses the callback params, recovers the pending server, rebuilds its
InspectorClient, runs completeOAuthFlow(code) (PKCE verifier + DCR client
info survive in BrowserOAuthStorage), replaceState("/") so a reload can't
replay the single-use code, then connect(). An `error=` callback toasts
instead of retrying.
connect() already attaches the OAuth provider to the transport
(inspectorClient.ts), so once tokens land in BrowserOAuthStorage the
outbound request carries the bearer token.
Extracted the pure pieces (constants + isUnauthorizedError) to
src/utils/oauthFlow.ts with unit tests. Verified end-to-end in a real
browser against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: Connect -> redirect ->
auto-approve -> callback -> Connected, with the access token shown in the
Connection Info modal (#1377).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): persist OAuth pre-redirect Network log across the redirect (#1384)
After #1379, the Network tab showed only the post-redirect auth HTTP
(discovery re-run + POST /token); the pre-redirect discovery and the DCR
POST /register that run during authenticate() were lost when the page
navigated to the auth server.
Root causes:
1. Ordering — BrowserNavigation set `window.location.href` before the
client's `saveSession` event fired (OAuthManager calls onBeforeOAuthRedirect
*after* auth() already navigated), so the save raced the unload and was
dropped. Fix: BrowserNavigation now runs a synchronous `beforeNavigate`
hook immediately before assigning location.href; App wires it through
createWebEnvironment to flush the active fetch log to RemoteInspectorClient
Storage (keyed by the authId parsed from the auth URL) via a keepalive POST
that outlives the unload.
2. Illegal invocation — RemoteInspectorClientStorage defaulted to
`this.fetchFn = globalThis.fetch` and called `this.fetchFn(...)`, which
re-binds `this` and makes native fetch throw "Illegal invocation"
(swallowed by the catch). This silently broke *all* session save/load.
Fix: default to a wrapper that preserves the global receiver.
3. Restore race — hydrateFetchRequests replaced the list, so a load that
resolved after the resuming connect appended live entries would clobber
them. Fix: merge restored (older) entries ahead of live ones, dedupe by id.
saveSession also now uses keepalive: true.
Verified end-to-end against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: the connected
page's Network tab shows the full handshake — pre-redirect discovery + DCR
/register plus post-redirect discovery + /token as `auth`, alongside
`transport`. Added unit tests for the beforeNavigate ordering and the
hydrate merge/dedupe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): inject token into prod SPA fallback + prime sessionStorage + no-store (#1378)
Addresses code-review feedback on the token-injection PR:
- Prod `server.ts` SPA deep-link fallback (e.g. `/oauth/callback`) previously
served the raw index.html off disk via serveStatic, bypassing injection — so
a bookmark/reload at a non-`/` route with empty sessionStorage would 401.
Route the SPA fallback through the same `serveIndexHtml` (inject) helper;
real static assets (paths with a dot) still serve verbatim. Dev already
injected on every HTML serve via Vite `transformIndexHtml`.
- `getAuthToken()` now persists the injected `window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__`
to sessionStorage (not just the URL-param branch), priming the backstop for
any later navigation that loses the global.
- Injected HTML responses now send `Cache-Control: no-store`, so a page
carrying a token isn't cached and served stale after a restart regenerates
the token.
Integration tests added: SPA fallback (`/oauth/callback`) carries the token,
`Cache-Control: no-store` on injected HTML, real assets served verbatim, and
unknown `/api` routes 404 rather than falling through to the HTML shell.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): address #1383 review — split OAuth/connect toasts, tighten 401 match (#1379)
Code-review feedback on the OAuth-wiring PR:
- Callback effect: split completeOAuthFlow vs connect() into separate
try/catch blocks. A token-exchange failure now reads "OAuth token exchange
failed … Please try connecting again." (the single-use code is spent and the
URL was cleared, so a reload can't retry); a post-OAuth connect failure reads
"Failed to connect" since OAuth actually succeeded and re-clicking Connect
reuses the persisted tokens.
- isUnauthorizedError: anchor the message fallback on the transport's
`failed …(401)` wording instead of a bare `(401)`, so an unrelated `(401)`
spliced into an error message can't trip the OAuth flow. Added a test.
- Documented that clearing the pending id + URL before the server lookup is
intentional (deleted/renamed server mid-flow → require a fresh Connect).
Also merges the squash-merged #1382 base from v2/main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(auth): address #1385 review — clarify double-save + keepalive cap + test fetch default (#1384)
Code-review feedback on the OAuth Network-log persistence PR:
- Documented the double-save: `FetchRequestLogState`'s `saveSession` listener
is the backstop; `BrowserNavigation`'s `beforeNavigate` hook is the primary
flush for the redirect case. Notes the listener may lose the navigation race
and is harmless when it duplicates (last-writer-wins, identical payload).
- Reworded the keepalive comment in `RemoteInspectorClientStorage.saveSession`:
the 64KB cap is general (the method is also reachable from the listener with
the full session log), so a long session could exceed it and drop silently —
acceptable since the persisted log is best-effort, not load-bearing.
- Added a regression test that constructs `RemoteInspectorClientStorage`
without a `fetchFn`, stubs `globalThis.fetch`, and asserts the default
wrapper calls it (locks in the "Illegal invocation" fix, which callers
otherwise swallow).
Optional items (logger.warn on swallowed save errors; setupClientForServer dep
churn) acknowledged on the PR, not changed.
Also merges the squash-merged #1383 base from v2/main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(network): add Network screen surfacing backend fetch log (#1355)
Routes `FetchRequestLogState` to a new Network tab so users can inspect
HTTP-layer request/response headers, status, duration, and category
(auth vs transport) of every fetch the backend makes for an active
session. Adds `NetworkControls` + `NetworkStreamPanel` + `NetworkEntry`
groups, a `monoBreak` Text theme variant for long header values, and
wires onClearNetwork / onExportNetwork (JSON download) from `App.tsx`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(network): include request / response bodies in search filter
Headers were already covered but bodies were not, so searches for
strings that live inside the JSON-RPC payload (e.g. "jsonrpc",
"initialize", a tool name) silently returned no matches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(network): always render Response Body section, note streaming
Streaming responses (text/event-stream, application/x-ndjson, POST to
/mcp) are intentionally not body-captured by the fetch tracker, so the
section was silently omitted. Now whenever a response was received we
render the section, with either the body, a "(empty)" note, or a
"Streaming response — body not captured" note keyed off content-type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(network): capture response bodies via async body-update events
Two related fixes:
1. The fetch tracker was marking every streamable-HTTP POST /mcp call as
"not captured" because the response content-type is text/event-stream.
In practice those streams are bounded — the server sends the
JSON-RPC reply (sometimes preceded by progress events) and closes —
so we can clone the body and read it. Only GET + SSE / ndjson is the
unbounded long-lived channel that has to stay uncaptured.
2. Reading the body inline blocked the transport from processing
progress notifications until the entire stream finished, breaking the
`resetTimeoutOnProgress` integration test. The body is now read in
the background and dispatched via a new `fetchRequestBodyUpdate`
event that the FetchRequestLogState patches into the matching entry
by id. Plumbing wires through node/transport, the remote SSE channel
(RemoteSession, RemoteClientTransport), and the remote event types.
Also hides the Network tab when the active server is stdio (no HTTP
traffic to surface) and bumps the inline body preview limit to 100 KB
so typical tools/list responses render rather than tripping the "too
large" notice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(network): show orange SSE badge for long-lived stream entries
Adds a small "SSE" badge to the right side of the NetworkEntry header
(left of the HTTP status badge) when the response is a long-lived
streaming channel (GET + text/event-stream or application/x-ndjson) —
the only case where the body genuinely isn't captured. Makes the
"not captured" placeholder less surprising at a glance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(network): address PR review findings
- Stop capturing OAuth response bodies (drop updateResponseBody from the
effectiveAuthFetch tracker). Restores pre-PR behavior for auth-category
entries so live access_token / refresh_token values can't leak into the
Network tab body preview during a screen-share. Headers + status are
still tracked.
- Extract `isLongLivedStreamResponse(method, contentType)` to
core/mcp/fetchTracking so the rule lives in one place; consumed by the
tracker and the NetworkEntry UI placeholder.
- Document the intent of NetworkEntry's `useEffect` (the list-level
toggle is authoritative; per-entry overrides are intentionally
discarded on each list toggle).
- Rename MAX_INLINE_BODY_BYTES → MAX_INLINE_BODY_CHARS (`.length` is
UTF-16 code units, not bytes) and update the user-facing notice.
- Switch NetworkStreamPanel's search from joined-string `.includes` to
per-field `.some(.includes)` so a term can't span field boundaries.
Regression test added.
- Add aria-label to ListToggle ("Expand all" / "Collapse all") — both an
a11y improvement and a stable selector that lets the panel test stop
fishing the button out by text-content negation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(network): use ListToggle aria-label in panel + modal tests
Cleanup spotted in PR review follow-up:
- HistoryListPanel + ServerSettingsModal previously fished the ListToggle
out by empty text content because the toggle had no accessible name.
Now that ListToggle exposes "Expand all" / "Collapse all", both tests
can use getByRole + name and the stale comments go away.
- ListToggle's own tests now assert the aria-label contract so a future
refactor can't silently drop it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(network): expose category toggle state via aria-pressed
The category UnstyledButtons in NetworkControls previously communicated
their toggled state only via background color. Adds aria-pressed={active}
so assistive tech can discover the on/off state without visuals, with a
test that asserts the attribute tracks the visibleCategories prop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(core): port v1.5 hook layer (useInspectorClient + useManaged*/usePaged* + log hooks)
Wholesale port of v1.5's React hook layer and the EventTarget-based state machinery the hooks subscribe to (#1243). Hooks decouple from the concrete InspectorClient via a new `InspectorClientProtocol` interface so this layer can land before the runtime class is ported.
Added under `core/`:
- `core/react/` — useInspectorClient + 5 useManaged* + 5 usePaged* + 3 log hooks
- `core/mcp/state/` — 5 managed*State + 5 paged*State + messageLogState + stderrLogState + fetchRequestLogState
- `core/mcp/inspectorClientProtocol.ts`, `inspectorClientEventTarget.ts`, `typedEventTarget.ts`, `samplingCreateMessage.ts`, `sessionStorage.ts`
- v2-only wrapper types in `core/mcp/types.ts`: InspectorUrlElicitRequest, InspectorPendingRequest, InspectorRequestHistoryItem
Tests live under `clients/web/src/test/core/` (28 new test files, 264 new tests). Test fake: `core/mcp/__tests__/fakeInspectorClient.ts`.
Build wiring:
- `vite.config.ts`: dedupe react/react-dom so core/ files resolve them via clients/web/node_modules.
- `tsconfig.app.json` / `tsconfig.test.json`: paths map react/react-dom/vitest to clients/web/node_modules so `tsc -b` resolves bare imports from core/ source files (which sit above the package's node_modules). Exclude core/__tests__ from app config; include in test config.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* review: address PR #1300 review findings
Bugs:
- fetchRequestLogState: add .catch() on sessionStorage.loadSession so a corrupt
or unreadable session doesn't surface as an unhandled rejection (matches the
saveSession swallow pattern).
- messageLogState: sync pendingRequestEntries when clearMessages() evicts a
pending request entry, so a later response with the same id falls through
to the append branch instead of mutating an unreachable map entry. Add tests
for both predicate and no-predicate paths.
Cleanups:
- Extract mergeTaskIntoList helper to core/mcp/state/mergeTaskIntoList.ts so
managed/paged RequestorTasks state classes share one definition.
- Add a one-line JSDoc note on each PagedTools/Prompts/Resources/Templates
state explaining why they deliberately do not subscribe to *ListChanged
(cursor invalidation mid-pagination).
- Document on useInspectorClient that appRendererClient is read lazily on
every render and is not subscribed (changes once at connect time).
Carry-overs from v1.5 deliberately left for the follow-up InspectorClient
runtime port:
- Refresh/status-change race in Managed*State.refresh() (status check is only
at entry; a disconnect during await can re-clear before refresh resumes).
- nextCursor exposure asymmetry across usePaged* (only usePagedRequestorTasks
surfaces it via state field; others return it from loadPage() only).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>