Addresses Copilot's round-7 review on #2035. Two suppressed comments, both
real; each reproduced against this branch before acting.
1. `parseVarSpec` was a "strip the first `*`, trim, split on `:`" pass, so
it accepted shapes RFC 6570's varspec production does not admit --
measured on the previous commit:
x://{*id} name "id" => "x://abcdef" explode is a TRAILING modifier
x://{id*:3} name "id" => "x://abc" the two modifiers are exclusive
x://{ id } name "id" => "x://abcdef" whitespace is not a varchar
x://{a b} name "a b" => "x://1" ditto -- and it emits into the URI
`{id*:3}` is the worst of them: it silently truncated the value through a
combination the grammar forbids. Parsing is now one anchored regex --
a varname, then at most one trailing `*` or `:1-9999`.
The name set is `varchar` widened by `-` and `~`, deliberately. A name is
the one thing expansion emits into the URI WITHOUT encoding it (`;`, `?`
and `&` write `name=value`), so the rule it has to satisfy is "needs no
encoding" -- RFC 3986 unreserved plus pct-encoded, of which the RFC's own
varchar is a subset. Strict varchar would refuse `{user-id}`, which real
servers publish and which the SDK's matcher round-trips; refusing to read
a resource that demonstrably works is a worse outcome for a debugging
tool than a name one character outside the production. Everything now
rejected is a shape we would otherwise have to guess at.
2. The TUI built its "Missing required template variable(s): ..." list with
its own bare `values[name]` filter while gating on `hasRequiredValues`,
which reads own properties only. For a variable legitimately named
`constructor` the two disagreed: `({})["constructor"]` is `Object`, whose
`.length` is 1, so the list came out empty and the error named no field
at all while the submit stayed blocked. Both now come from one exported
`unmetRequiredGroups`, with `hasRequiredValues` defined in terms of it.
Also renames a test whose title still said multi-name query expressions were
left "to the SDK, which handles them" -- expansion has been owned here since
935113d1; the behavior it asserts is naming, not delegation.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Ports the two behaviors PR #2033 (the parallel attempt at #1919, now closed
as a duplicate) got right and this branch did not.
1. An expression declaring no variable is a malformed template, not one
with a member to skip. RFC 6570 requires at least one varspec per
expression and admits no empty member, so `{}`, `{,}`, `{a,}`, `{?}`
and `{*}` (an explode modifier is not a name) now make the template
invalid. Skipping them was the more dangerous reading: `x://{}`
expanded to `x://` while the form rendered no inputs, so its
"everything required is filled" check was vacuously true and it
submitted a URI that is not the template the server published.
2. The read is withheld when expansion fails. `expandUriTemplate`'s
raw-template fallback exists for the preview, which runs during render
-- but the submit path used it too, so an invalid template was read
with its braces intact and the server answered with a confusing "not
found" for a defect that is not the user's. `tryExpandUriTemplate`
returns the URI or the reason as a value the caller cannot mistake for
one; the panel gates Read Resource on it and prints the reason.
This also covers a value that cannot be encoded -- an unpaired
surrogate has no UTF-8 encoding, so `encodeURIComponent` throws
`URIError` on it, and a text input can hold one via paste.
`requiredGroups` now skips an expression naming no variable: an empty
group can never be satisfied, so it would gate the form a second time on
a condition nothing can meet, and the "any one of" hint built from it
would name no fields. The accurate reason is the malformed template,
which the expansion gate reports.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Two suppressed review findings.
With an override configured, the wrapper cloned and parsed every
successful application/json response — every tools/call result and every
resource payload on the direct CLI/TUI transports — only to conclude it
was not a metadata document. It now tests the request URL for the RFC
8414 / OIDC well-known paths first, so ordinary traffic costs one string
test and is returned untouched.
The read path also trusted StoredMCPServer's `string` type for the two
override fields, which a hand-edited mcp.json does not honor: the CLI and
TUI read the file directly and then `.trim()` these, so a number would
crash the server load. Guarded with cleanEndpointOverride, mirroring
cleanAuthorizationParams.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-6 review on #2035.
`toString`, `constructor`, `valueOf` and `__proto__` are all valid RFC
6570 variable names -- `varname` allows ALPHA / DIGIT / `_` / pct-encoded
-- and every lookup here was a bare `values[name]`, which finds
`Object.prototype`'s member for each of them. Measured: `({})["toString"]
!== undefined` is true with typeof "function", and `({}["constructor"] ??
"").length` is 1.
So a *blank* `{?toString}` field read as supplied and expanded a function
body into the URI instead of omitting the expression, and
`hasRequiredValues([["constructor"]], {})` returned true because
`Object.length` is 1 -- a required group satisfied by nothing.
All reads now go through an own-property `readValue`, and the web
preview's filled-check uses `Object.hasOwn`. `expandExpression` carries
the value through its filter rather than re-reading it afterwards, so the
"is it defined" test and the read cannot disagree and nothing needs a
non-null assertion.
The remaining six findings were documentation drifting behind the code,
which matters here because the comments are the argument for why this
module exists:
- The web helper still described the SDK's second-`?`-to-`&` rewrite as
something the preview relies on. That was removed last round.
- Three places still named the CLI as a consumer. It has no template form
and passes an already-expanded `--uri` to `readResource`.
- The PR description still described the superseded architecture
(expansion delegated to the SDK), i.e. the opposite of what now ships.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 2 (PR #2039) surfaced no new visible comments but six
suppressed ones. Four were actionable.
`clients/tui/src/App.tsx` — a stale-completion race in the new banner:
start disconnecting server A, switch to B, then let A's disconnect
reject, and A's failure appears under B. Rapid same-server retries had
the same shape, and the stale attempt is the one most likely to reject.
Claim a monotonic attempt token before awaiting and publish only if it
is still current and the server has not changed; `handleConnect` bumps
the same counter so a connect retires an in-flight disconnect. The
rejection is still owned when superseded — just not published. The
regression test drives a deferred rejection across a server switch, and
fails without the guard.
`tsconfig.lint.json` — the root type-aware block matches
`test-servers/src/**/*.tsx` but the parser project omitted that
extension, so such a file would have failed with "not found in any of
the provided project(s)" instead of being linted. Added, and AGENTS.md
now states the invariant: the include must stay a superset of the lint
globs.
`clients/web/server/{server,vite-hono-plugin}.ts` — the `open()`
rejection branch was untested, and duplicated. Both were fixed by
removing the duplication: `openBrowser` now lives beside
`printServerBanner` in `web-server-config.ts`, with one implementation
to test. Two copies of a one-line `.catch` is two chances for one to
drift back to a bare `open(url)`. The dev plugin is not booted in tests
— it returns early under VITEST by design — but it calls the same
tested helper.
`core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts` — `closeAbortedStream`'s rejecting-close
path, the entire reason the helper exists, had no test. Exported it (as
this file already does for `requestIdForSendWait` / `mcpParamHeadersOnly`)
and covered both legs, asserting no unhandledRejection fires.
Also corrects AGENTS.md, which said each client lists "both" tsconfig
projects — true for cli/tui/launcher, but web lists four leaf projects.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-5 review on #2035 — eight suppressed comments,
all of them real.
The consequential one overturns behavior I copied from the SDK and
defended in two earlier rounds. RFC 6570 expands each expression
independently; it carries no cross-expression state. The SDK tracks
whether a query expression has already emitted and rewrites a later
`{?two}`'s `?` to `&`. That looks friendlier and is wrong, and its own
matcher says so: for `x{?one}{?two}` it expands to `x?one=1&two=2`, and
`match("x?one=1&two=2")` on that same template returns **null**, while
`match("x?one=1?two=2")` returns both variables. So the rewrite emitted a
URI the advertised template cannot match — #1919 one level up. A server
that wants a continuation advertises `{?one}{&two}`, which expands to `&`
and matches; producing that shape is the server's choice to declare, not
ours to infer.
Also:
- `{id:abc}` was silently treated as `{id}`, and a test codified it. RFC
6570's max-length is `%x31-39 0*3DIGIT`, so `{id:}`, `{id:0}`,
`{id:abc}` and `{id:10000}` are invalid templates rather than templates
with an ignorable modifier — and the SDK's constructor accepts them all,
so nothing else rejects them. Strict expansion now throws; lenient
returns the raw template. Discovery stays lenient so the panel still
renders rather than going blank.
- The TUI could submit `{a,b}` completely blank while the web panel
blocked the same request: ink-form has no way to express "any one of
these", so its members are left optional and the modal needs its own
group check. Added, with tests — it was also below the coverage gate
without them (functions 76.92%).
- Added the integration test the config never had: it resolves the
checked-in config and drives all four reads over a real transport, so a
misspelt preset fails there rather than only when someone runs the repro
by hand.
- "All three clients" was false. The CLI has no template form and its
`resources/read` passes the already-expanded `--uri` straight to
`readResource`, so nothing here runs for it. Corrected in the README,
AGENTS.md, and the module comment, and dropped a docblock still
describing the SDK-delegation path removed last round.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The overrides are per-server configuration for the *resource* server's
authorization server, but the fetch wrapper that applies them is shared
with the enterprise-managed (EMA) flow, whose IdP OIDC discovery runs
through the same fetch and satisfies the metadata predicate. An
authorization override could therefore redirect the IdP login to the
resource AS, and a token override could send the IdP code or refresh
token there.
OAuthManager.getEndpointOverrides() now returns nothing when the server
is enterprise-managed — the same boundary redirectToExternalAuthorization
draws for the custom authorization parameters (#2018) — with a regression
test, the note surfaced on both form fields, and the rule documented.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-4 review on #2035 — again reported as "no new
comments" while carrying three suppressed ones. All three reproduced.
1. The TUI form still named its fields from the SDK. `uriTemplateToForm`
read `UriTemplate.variableNames`, which mangles a name: `{;id}` yields
";id" and `{id:3}` yields "id:3". The form therefore submitted
`{ ";id": "7" }` while the shared expander looked up `id`, found
nothing, and dropped the expression — the value vanished silently.
This is the finding that mattered most, because it falsified the claim
this change is built on. Moving the expander into core only makes the
clients agree if each client's FORM derives its names from the same
parser: a form submits under the names it rendered. The TUI now reads
`templateVariables`, and the SDK template is constructed only to
validate, preserving the existing malformed-template diagnostic.
Its `required` flag comes from `requiredGroups`, and only a variable
that is the sole member of a non-omittable expression is marked: ink-
form cannot express "any one of these", so marking every member of
`{a,b}` required would refuse input the expander accepts.
2. `encodeURIComponent` is not RFC 3986's unreserved set — it leaves the
sub-delims !'()* bare, which RFC 6570 requires encoded for every
operator except + and #.
Fixing that settled a design question left open in the previous round.
With two encoders, the SAME value encoded differently depending on
whether its expression happened to carry a modifier, since only the
modifier pushed it onto our path. So delegation is gone entirely: one
expander, one set of rules. The SDK's `UriTemplate` is still
constructed, but only to validate a template.
3. The "Any one of: a, b" hint could contradict the disabled submit
button. A name can sit in a singleton required group AND a shared one
(`x://{a}/{a,b}`), where the singleton demands that exact field. The
hint is suppressed in that case.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
A floated promise is invisible at review time — the call reads like an
awaited one minus four characters — and the unhandled rejection it
produces surfaces in a different test, in a different file, as a stack
pointing at SDK internals. In #1947 two un-held `callTool` calls made
`npm run ci` unpassable and took a full investigation to attribute; the
fix was two lines. `@typescript-eslint/no-floating-promises` catches the
class outright, so enable it at `error` everywhere.
The rule is type-aware and `tseslint.configs.recommended` is not, so each
scope's config gains a parser project. The four clients name their own
tsconfig projects (both of them — `src` and `__tests__`/`server` live in
different ones). The root scope has no tsconfig at all, so add
`tsconfig.lint.json`: a lint-only project covering `core/**`,
`test-servers/src/**`, and `vitest.shared.mts`, emitting nothing and
gating nothing. It sets `moduleResolution: bundler` deliberately — under
NodeNext `core/`'s extensionless imports fail to resolve, every import
degrades to `any`, and the rule silently stops seeing promises at all.
Measured surface, and the fixes:
- core (2) — `stream.close()` in two Hono `onAbort` listeners. Hono
invokes subscribers with a bare `subscriber()`, so a promise returned
from the listener is floated one layer up; `closeAbortedStream` owns
the rejection where it can actually be owned.
- tui (5) — `handleDisconnect` had no catch of its own and its only
caller is a key handler that cannot await, so a failing disconnect was
a live unhandled rejection; it now surfaces the message the way
`handleConnect` does. The rest are `void` at callers that genuinely
cannot await, over callees that already own their failures.
- web (92) — 83 are Storybook `expect(...)`, which is instrumented and
returns a promise, now awaited (`scrollAreaStoryAssertions` is async
for the same reason). Two tests were asserting against a provider call
they never awaited. `open(url)` in both web servers now warns instead
of escaping a synchronous callback.
- cli, launcher — already clean.
Type-aware linting costs time: `clients/web`'s `eslint .` goes from ~8s
to ~19s, inside `validate`. Narrowing the loaded projects is the lever if
that needs reducing later; dropping the rule is not.
Closes#1959
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Adds two optional per-server fields — `oauth.authorizationUrl` and
`oauth.tokenUrl` — that override the endpoints authorization-server
metadata discovery resolved, so a server can be pointed at a development
or staging authorization server without changing what it advertises.
SDK v2 routes both endpoints through the discovered metadata document and
neither through OAuthClientProvider, so the override is applied by
wrapping the client's base fetch and patching the metadata document in
flight (core/auth/endpointOverrides.ts). Wrapping the base fetch — rather
than only the auth fetch — also covers the discovery the SDK runs from
inside the transport on the 401/refresh path.
The fields round-trip through mcp.json, the /api/servers routes, the
runner (CLI/TUI), and the Server Settings → Authorization panel, where a
value that is not an absolute http(s) URL is flagged inline; at runtime
such a value is dropped with a single warning rather than failing the
connection.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-3 review on #2035. It again reported "no new
comments" while carrying two suppressed ones; both reproduced.
1. Requiredness could not live on a variable at all. Deduplication kept the
first occurrence's group, so in `x{?a}{?b}{a,b}` both names ended up
required with singleton groups and the form demanded both -- while the
SDK expands that template with only `a` to "x?a=11". Widening the stored
group would not have been enough either: in `{a,b}{a,c}`, filling `b` and
`c` satisfies both expressions, which no per-variable flag can express.
So requiredness is now returned per expression by `requiredGroups`, and
`hasRequiredValues` asks that each group be satisfied by any one of its
names. `TemplateVariable.groupNames` is gone rather than left as a field
that quietly means something narrower than it reads; `required` remains,
documented as driving the "Optional" marker and nothing else.
2. `encodeURI` is not the allow-reserved encoder `+` and `#` call for. It
escapes `[` and `]`, which are reserved and must survive, and it escapes
`%`, so an already-encoded value is double-encoded. Measured:
"[::1]" -> "%5B::1%5D" and "%2F" -> "%252F". Both corrupt the URI rather
than merely over-escaping it -- an IPv6 literal or a pre-encoded path
reaches the server altered, which is the same class of defect #1919 is
about.
Added an RFC 6570 3.2.1 encoder that preserves reserved characters and
existing pct-triplets, splitting on `%XX` so a lone `%` is still encoded
to `%25`, and matching with the `u` flag so an astral character is
encoded whole. `+` and `#` expressions are now taken over even for a
single name, so both expansion paths agree on what those operators mean.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-2 review on #2035. It reported "no new comments"
but carried three *suppressed* ones; all three reproduced against the
pinned SDK.
1. The `;` path-parameter operator is absent from the SDK's operator list,
so `{;id}` parsed as a variable literally named ";id" and expanded to
nothing. Added the operator and its named expansion (`;a=1;b=2`).
2. An RFC 6570 prefix modifier was folded into the variable name: `{id:3}`
yielded a variable called "id:3" and expanded to nothing. Varspecs are
now parsed properly and the value truncated before encoding. Truncation
is by code point, since `String.prototype.slice` counts UTF-16 units and
would split an astral character into a lone surrogate.
For both of these the wrong URI is the lesser problem: a form has to
*name* the variables it asks the user to fill, so the panel was
rendering fields labelled `;id` and `id:3` that nobody could use.
3. Requiredness was applied per variable, but it is a property of the
*expression*: RFC 6570 drops undefined names from a multi-name
expression, so `{a,b}` with only `a` filled expands to `a`'s value --
the SDK does this too. The panel was refusing input the expander would
have accepted. `hasRequiredValues` now encodes "any one name in a
required group suffices", and such a field reads "Any one of: a, b"
rather than falsely claiming each is mandatory.
Two structural consequences, each pinned by a test:
- Takeover is now per TEMPLATE rather than per expression. Splicing
corrected fragments into a template the SDK re-expands would leave its
cross-expression `?`-to-`&` rewrite blind to the fragments already
resolved.
- Expansion is split into a strict variant that throws and a lenient one
that returns the raw template. `readResourceFromTemplate` wraps the
thrown error with the template name -- three pre-existing integration
tests assert that -- while the form must not throw on a server-supplied
template, since that would take out the panel on render. The strict
variant constructs the SDK template unconditionally, because that
construction is what validates syntax: otherwise `x://{;a}{b,c` would
take the own-expansion path and its unclosed tail would pass as literal
text with nothing objecting.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's review on #2035. All three findings reproduced against
the pinned SDK before acting.
1. `#` was misclassified as required. Measured: `x://a{#frag}` with no
`frag` expands to exactly `x://a`, a well-formed URI naming a real
resource -- unlike `{+path}` (`x://a/`) or a simple `{userId}`
(`file:///users//profile`), which leave an empty path segment. Moved `#`
into the omittable set; the required cases now assert what the URI
*becomes* when blank, so the rule is checked rather than asserted.
2. Delegating to the SDK did not actually give RFC 6570 expansion.
`UriTemplate.expandPart` takes an early `names.length > 1` branch that
raw-joins values, skipping both `encodeValue` and the operator prefix:
`x://{a,b}` with `a = "foo/bar"` expands to `x://foo/bar,q` -- the very
unencoded-slash defect this PR is about -- and `x://a{/p,q}` to
`x://ax y,z`. Only `?`/`&` are correct, being dispatched earlier.
Fixing that in the web client alone would have left the TUI and CLI
wrong, since `readResourceFromTemplate` expands through the same class.
So parse/classify/expand now live in `core/mcp/uriTemplate.ts` and both
call sites use it. The correction is surgical: a multi-name non-query
expression is expanded here and spliced in as literal text before the
SDK sees the template (safe -- both encoders escape `{`/`}`), while
every single-name and query expression still goes through the SDK
untouched. The preview applies the same correction, so it cannot
promise a URI that submitting would not send.
3. The showcase promised a blank `{?topic}` read that did not work.
`UriTemplate.match()` compiles `{?topic}` to a *required*
`\?topic=([^&]+)`, so `match("foobar://events")` returns null and the
read 404s. A real server exposes the unfiltered collection as its own
resource; the showcase now registers `foobar://events` so the
documented step resolves. Verified end to end through the CLI.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 5 — three of four findings implemented.
- `cleanAuthorizationParams` validates the field as it comes off disk. Only the
web client's /api/servers route checked the shape; the CLI and TUI read
mcp.json directly, so `authorizationParams: "oops"` enumerated as the
character-indexed pairs 0=o, 1=o, … and `{ audience: 5 }` reached
URLSearchParams.set, which stringifies it — either way the Inspector sent
query parameters the user never wrote. Now validated in shared code so all
three clients enforce the documented string→string contract, warning on each
rejection. Follows `cleanRoots`, which guards the same class for `roots`.
- The form's description now states that these parameters are not sent while
Enterprise-managed authorization is on. The EMA leg authorizes against the
enterprise IdP — a different authorization server — and deliberately sends
none of them, so the copy was presenting a configured-but-inert value as
active.
- The /api/servers malformed-`oauth` warning listed an expected shape omitting
`onInsufficientScope`, which the validator accepts and the docs describe, so
it told users a valid config was malformed.
Ten new cases, all verified to fail against the pre-fix sources.
Declined: recording the authorize URL in the Network tab (repeat of round 2) —
that URL is reached by a top-level browser navigation rather than a tracked
fetch, so it has never appeared there for any authorization request; adding a
synthetic entry changes every OAuth flow and is a product decision for a
maintainer, not a change to make inside this PR.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 4 (one suppressed finding, and a real bug).
`extractSecretsFromStored` rebuilt the stripped `oauth` object from an
allow-list of the non-secret fields. That list had gone stale: it never named
`onInsufficientScope`, so a server carrying both a client secret and a
non-default SEP-2350 policy silently lost the policy on save, falling back to
`reauthorize`. This predates #2018 — the PR only extended the same list with
`authorizationParams` — but the list is the defect, so fix the class rather
than add a third entry to it.
The stripped entry now subtracts the one secret instead of enumerating what to
keep, so any field added to `oauth` later is preserved by construction.
Regression test verified to fail against the allow-list version:
`expected { clientId: 'cid' } to deeply equal { clientId: 'cid', onInsufficientScope: 'throw' }`.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 10.
The scan no longer publishes its malformed entries into the tools/list report
at all. Round 9 only stopped it overwriting the aggregate's; the remaining
case is unsalvageable for a stronger reason than 'two different requests':
- a FAILED strict aggregate runs salvage, which writes the report itself;
- a SUCCESSFUL one means every entry parsed, so the rendered list contains no
malformed entries.
So by the time the scan finds something, either the aggregate already reported
it with indices matching the screen, or the aggregate succeeded and what the
scan found is provably not in the list being displayed. Publishing could only
ever name entries the user cannot see.
Nothing is lost: listToolsForScan still marks its own refused response, so the
finding surfaces on the Protocol entry for the exchange that carried it, where
it is true. The per-page accumulation and raw-entry offset existed only to feed
the removed publish, and go with it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 9.
The exclusion scan is a separate, uncached tools/list exchange, so its entries
need not be the ones rendered — the server can answer differently, and a
cache-served aggregate is a different list version. It was overwriting the
aggregate's report wholesale, replacing accurate indices with indices into a
list nobody is looking at. The aggregate now owns the report; the scan
publishes only when the aggregate left nothing, which is the cache-served case
that made it publish at all (round 2).
A conforming re-fetch no longer swallows the mark: the list can change between
the strict page and the lenient one, and a clean second response says nothing
about the first, which was refused. It is marked with the original decode
error when there is nothing per-item to name.
The scan's fallback re-fetch now goes through invokeMcpClient, like the strict
call beside it and like salvageList's walk, so an auth challenge on that
request can still be recovered instead of being swallowed by listAllTools's
best-effort scan catch.
Also fixes listTools dropping an empty-string cursor (truthiness rather than
!== undefined) — its own fallback leg already preserved it, so the two legs of
one scan page disagreed about which page they had fetched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 8.
The era contract validated with the wire schema but returned the raw input,
so the wire schema's normalization was discarded — both era schemas are
z.object, which strips unknown top-level fields as the strict codec does, so
salvaged tools could carry fields the strict path drops. The parsed output is
now what gets normalized and returned. This also simplifies the bridge: issues
come straight from the wire parse with their paths intact, so the custom-issue
forwarding (and its early describeIssue application) is gone.
The malformed-entry report is written by the aggregate walk's salvage, but in
paginated mode the tools/prompts/resources panels render the paged stores,
which neither write nor clear it — leaving a stale warning above a freshly
fetched page it does not describe, with indices into an aggregate the user is
no longer looking at. Those reports are now suppressed in paginated mode;
resource templates keep theirs, having no paged store. Suppressing rather than
adding per-page salvage: pointing at the wrong entry costs more than staying
quiet, and per-page salvage is a feature, not a display fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 7.
The era contract was derived from the neutral ToolSchema plus one override,
which diverged from the real wire schemas both ways. Measured against SDK
2.0.0 on a real connection:
- modern accepts `inputSchema.properties: 5` and `required: [1]`; ours
rejected them, so a malformed sibling made salvage DROP a conforming tool
and report it as malformed — a false accusation from the screen whose job
is to say which entry is wrong.
- legacy rejects `outputSchema.properties: 5` / `required: [1]`; ours
accepted them, readmitting entries the strict path refused.
- modern rejects a non-string `inputSchema.$schema`, legacy accepts it;
ours accepted on both.
Each era is now expressed as its own wire schema, bridged to Tool by
`eraToolItemSchema`. The bridge exists because both eras accept values the
exported Tool type cannot describe (the SDK returns them typed as Tool
anyway), so the wire schema's output type is irrelevant and z.custom<Tool>
supplies the caller's type — which is what avoids an `as unknown as` here.
Forwarded issues keep their path so the report still names the field.
The full measured matrix is pinned table-driven in listSalvage-era.test.ts:
each row asserts the SDK's verdict AND that our contract agrees, so a
divergence that closes or widens fails loudly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 6.
Bound both fallback walks with LIST_MAX_PAGES, which is now also passed to
the SDK client as `listMaxPages` so the strict aggregate and its fallback
share one value by construction. A server emitting endlessly UNIQUE cursors
never trips the repeated-cursor guard, so the salvage re-walk and the
SEP-2243 exclusion scan would page and accumulate without bound. Hitting the
cap aborts rather than returning a truncated list as a complete one.
Mark the exclusion scan's refused response on every fallback-failure path.
`salvageList` can rethrow bare because ManagedListState marks from the error
it receives; the scan has no such backstop — listAllTools catches and logs a
failing scan by design — so an unmarked rethrow left a response the client
demonstrably refused rendering as a clean exchange.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Real deployments gate IdP selection, prompt behavior, or audience on a query
parameter the OAuth/OIDC core specs never standardized (Keycloak's
`kc_idp_hint`, OIDC's `login_hint` / `prompt` / `acr_values`, Auth0's
`audience`), and none of them could be driven from the Inspector.
The Inspector never builds the authorize URL — the SDK's `auth()` does, and it
exposes no hook for extra parameters — so the merge happens at the one seam
that sees the finished URL: `BaseOAuthClientProvider.redirectToAuthorization`.
It lives in `core/`, so web, CLI, and TUI all inherit it.
- `core/auth/authorizationParams.ts`: the reserved-key list (`client_id`,
`code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method`, `redirect_uri`, `resource`,
`response_type`, `scope`, `state`), the key validator the form renders
inline, and the merge itself. Reserved keys are dropped with a warning
rather than silently overriding PKCE / the state binding / RFC 8707;
blank-key rows are skipped; the caller's URL is never mutated.
- Applied to the authorization request only — nothing wires it into the token
request.
- Persisted as `oauth.authorizationParams` (a string record) on the per-server
config beside `scopes`, edited as key/value rows in Server Settings ->
Authorization ("Additional authorization parameters"), with an inline error
per offending row plus a section-level warning.
- The enterprise-managed (EMA) leg redirects to a *different* authorization
server (the enterprise IdP), so it goes through the explicit
`redirectToExternalAuthorization` entry point, which skips the merge — a
`kc_idp_hint` or `audience` meant for the MCP server's AS must never be
appended to the IdP's authorize URL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Both findings are the same shape: the fallback accepting what the strict path
would not.
- `ModernResultEnvelopeSchema` typed `ttlMs` as any number, where the codec
requires a non-negative integer. `ttlMs: -1` (or `0.5`) plus one bad entry
would salvage, reporting the entry and hiding the envelope violation. Tightened
to `z.int().min(0)`.
- The item schema was the SDK's era-NEUTRAL `ToolSchema`, and the negotiated
era's wire schema is stricter in ways the SDK does not export. Verified
against SDK 2.0.0 on a real connection: on legacy, a tool with
`outputSchema: { type: "array" }` is refused by the strict aggregate but
accepted by the neutral schema; on modern, `execution` is STRIPPED by the
strict path but kept by the neutral one. Either way a salvaged list could show
— and let the user call — a tool the connection's era says isn't valid.
`toolItemSchemaForEra` closes both. Replicating rules that live in the SDK's
internals is a real cost; `listSalvage-era.test.ts` is what makes it safe to
pay, pinning each rule to the strict path's OBSERVED behavior so a divergence
that closes or widens fails loudly instead of rotting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Two findings, both about the fallback accepting more than it should.
- The lenient page schema validated pagination and nothing else, so a response
carrying a malformed entry AND an unrelated top-level violation salvaged: the
entry was reported and the other violation vanished with the strict error that
caught it. The page schema is now DERIVED from the method's real result schema
with only its item array relaxed (`lenientListPageSchema`), so every other
field — `_meta`, `nextCursor`, anything a future revision adds — is still
validated. The modern era envelope the raw-wire path bypasses (`resultType`,
`ttlMs`, `cacheScope`) is checked explicitly for the same reason.
Salvage is also narrowed to `InvalidResult`: `UnsupportedResultType` means the
codec doesn't recognize what KIND of frame arrived, so it isn't a list with a
bad entry and reporting an item-level reason would hide a protocol failure.
Marking the Protocol entry still applies to both, hence two predicates.
- On every rethrow path the re-walk had already answered the method, so the
caller's own `markResponseRejected` (in `ManagedListState.refresh`) landed on
the lenient page that succeeded and left the refused response clean. The
correlation is restored before rethrowing — deleted when nothing had answered
before, so the outer mark is a no-op rather than a lie.
`nextCursorOf` / `rawItemsOf` narrow the page's fields instead of casting: the
runtime-keyed `extend()` loses the shape, and asserting it back would be exactly
the unjustified cast the last round removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review: the option's doc still promised the level is set "if server
supports logging" — after the era gate that is exactly the case which now
silently does nothing, since a modern server can advertise `logging` and still
ignore the option.
Document it as legacy-only and point modern callers at the per-request
`io.modelcontextprotocol/logLevel` opt-in (`modernLogLevel` /
`setModernLogLevel()`).
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The visible review was clean; all five findings were in the suppressed block,
two of them real defects.
- The exclusion scan's aggregate offset was wrong twice over: `excluded.length`
counts only invalid-header tools, and on page one it also folded in the
current page's valid count. A reported index therefore pointed at a position
that doesn't exist — worst for an unlabeled entry, whose index is all the user
has. Replaced with a raw-entry offset advanced by each page's valid + malformed
counts.
- The scan's own refused response was never marked. It is a distinct exchange
from the aggregate's, and the lenient re-fetch moves the method correlation
off it, so its Protocol entry rendered as a clean success the client had in
fact refused. Marked with the captured id, as `salvageList` already does.
- Three double casts in the test fixture are gone: `ListPage` now models raw
wire data (`items: unknown`, `nextCursor?: unknown`), which is what a server
built to emit spec-forbidden shapes actually serves. Declaring the validated
type and casting malformed values through it asserted the opposite of what
these tests exist to check. The cursor map narrows to `string` at the one
place a cursor addresses a page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
All four findings taken (one visible, three in the suppressed block), plus the
`excludedTools` sibling leak the round-1 reply had deferred:
- `rawItemsOf` read a missing or non-array list member as an empty page, so a
top-level violation (`{ tools: "invalid" }`) on a later page was discarded
and the call returned a silently truncated list. It now returns `undefined`
for "not a list at all", and the walk rethrows the original strict error.
- A failure of the re-walk ITSELF (a malformed `nextCursor`, a connection lost
mid-walk) escaped in place of the original error, whose response is the one
`rejectedResponseId` was captured for. The walk is now wrapped: the original
surfaces, the secondary is logged so it stays diagnosable.
- The exclusion scan's lenient fallback discarded its malformed entries despite
the comment claiming they were reported. Observable when the aggregate is
served from cache: the salvage never runs, so nothing else reports them. The
scan now returns them and `refreshExcludedTools` reports them — only ever
adding, so a clean scan can't clear what the salvage path just wrote.
- An empty-string cursor is a valid cursor, and `cursor ? {cursor} : {}` dropped
it, re-requesting page one and duplicating its entries until the
repeated-cursor guard fired. Both walks now test `!== undefined`.
- `excludedTools` had the same session leak fixed for `malformedListItems` last
round: cleared only on an explicit `disconnect()`, so the `onerror`-with-no-
`onclose` route carried the previous server's set into the next connection.
Cleared on the start-clean path too — safe because every `listAllTools`
recomputes it, so this can only drop a stale set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
`logging/setLevel` is a legacy-era method, but connect() called it on any
server advertising the `logging` capability, era regardless. The modern wire
era rejects it outright, and because the call sits in the post-handshake
sequence that rejection failed the *connection* — so the CLI (the one caller
passing `initialLoggingLevel`, hardcoded to "debug") could not run any method
at all against a modern server that advertised logging.
Gate it on `protocolEra !== "modern"`. Modern has no session-scoped level to
set: the equivalent is the per-request `io.modelcontextprotocol/logLevel`
`_meta` opt-in, already driven by `modernLogLevel` from the server settings.
So modern skips the call rather than translating it. Legacy is unchanged.
The guard lives next to the capability check in inspectorClient.ts rather
than in the CLI, so any future caller passing `initialLoggingLevel` is
covered too.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Three real defects it caught, plus the tests it asked for:
- The strict `tools/list` aggregate is filtered by the SDK for invalid
`x-mcp-header` annotations (SEP-2243), but the salvage path was not: one
ordinary malformed tool would trip the fallback and readmit every
invalid-header tool beside it. Salvaged tools now go through the same scan.
- `markResponseRejected` resolves "the last response received for this method",
and the re-walk answers that same method — so the mark landed on a salvage
page that succeeded while the actually-invalid response rendered clean. The
correlation id is now captured before the re-walk.
- The report was cleared only on an explicit `disconnect()`. The route out that
tears down nothing (`onerror` with no `onclose`) carried it into the next
connection, so it is now cleared on the start-clean `resetSessionState()` path
as well.
Fixing the first exposed two more, both found by the new test:
- The modern (2026-07-28) codec validates a result against the spec schema
before the caller's, so a lenient `client.request` is rejected exactly as the
strict one was — there was no salvage on the modern leg at all. It now goes
through the raw-wire channel that exists for the modern `tasks/*` methods.
`withModernEnvelope` is split out of `withModernTaskEnvelope` so a list
request doesn't claim the tasks extension the user may have disabled.
- A malformed tool also blanked the SEP-2243 excluded set, leaving a tool that
vanished for an invalid header with no explanation — #1909's own complaint one
level down. The scan walk now tolerates a malformed sibling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The SDK validates a list result as a whole, so a single non-conforming entry
rejected the entire response and the panel showed "Couldn't load resources"
with zero items — the exact opposite of what a debugging tool should do with a
server that is 90% right. Reported against a PHP server whose empty
`annotations` object reaches the wire as `[]` rather than `{}`.
`listAll*` now falls back to a lenient re-walk when — and only when — the SDK
rejects a result it received (`InvalidResult` / `UnsupportedResultType`), keeps
the entries that validate, and reports the rest. A conforming server takes the
strict, cache-aware path exactly as before.
Salvaging is not accepting: the dropped entries are named with their reason in
a warning above the list, and the Protocol entry is still marked rejected, so
the wire truth survives. When every entry validates, the original error is
rethrown rather than swallowed — the rejection was about something the
per-item pass cannot explain.
`isClientDecodeRejection` moves to the new module and is now shared with
managedListState, which had the only copy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 4: every await before the `connect` dispatch is a window
for a `disconnect()` or a transport close to overtake the connect, and the
listen round-trip widened it. Announcing anyway restarts every managed list
refresh against a session being torn down or already dead.
The dispatch is now gated on `status === "connected" && !disconnecting` — the
second because an explicit teardown claims ownership before it awaits
`client.close()`, leaving the status untouched until that block finishes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Copilot review round 3 (no new code findings, three stale-comment ones):
- `openModernListenStreamOnConnect`'s generation guard was justified by a
`connect` listener racing it — which the previous commit made impossible by
dispatching `connect` after this call. The guard is still right, for reasons
that survive the reorder: `statusChange` has already fired, and a concurrent
`subscribeToResource` or `disconnect()` (whose `resetSubscriptionStream` bumps
the generation) can supersede it.
- `reconcileModernStreamStateAfterFailedRefresh`'s JSDoc still described its
branches as "nothing subscribed" vs "URIs live"; they are the empty vs
non-empty *filter* now, which differ exactly on the listChanged-only path.
- The superseded-failure test carried the same stale `connect` rationale.
Comments only; no behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Copilot review round 2: opening the stream after `dispatchTypedEvent("connect")`
left a real gap. The managed list states start their initial `refresh()` from
that event, so `tools/list` could go out ahead of `subscriptions/listen` — and a
list the server changed in that window would notify nobody, leaving the UI
stale with no way to notice.
The handler registration, the initial logging level, and the stream open now all
run before the `connect` dispatch, so no consumer can act on the connection
until the notification channel is established (or its retry armed). Costs one
listen round-trip on a modern connect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Copilot review: `openModernListenStreamOnConnect`'s catch reconciled
unconditionally, unlike the subscribe/unsubscribe call sites. The `connect`
event is dispatched before the stream opens, so a listener subscribing to a
resource can start and acknowledge a newer refresh while this one is still
awaiting its `listen()` — and reconciling anyway would arm a reconnect that
tears down a healthy stream. Apply the same generation test.
Also consolidates the tests' private-member access onto the file's existing
`internals()` helper (one justified double cast, hoisted and documented) and
makes the failure stub bump the generation the way the real method does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
On the modern (2026-07-28) era every server→client notification rides the
`subscriptions/listen` stream, but the Inspector only ever opened that stream
from a resource-subscribe click. A tools-only server advertising
`tools.listChanged` therefore had no path to an open stream, so
`notifications/tools/list_changed` could never arrive — even though
`buildSubscriptionFilter()` already modelled the opt-in.
The trigger now matches the filter it builds: the stream opens (and stays open,
and reconnects) whenever the built filter carries anything — subscribed URIs or
an enabled list-change opt-in the server advertises. That mirrors the SDK's own
`ClientOptions.listChanged` auto-open, which opens on a non-empty config ∩
capability intersection. `connect()` opens it once the handlers are registered;
a failure there is handed to the reconnect machinery rather than failing the
connect.
`ResourceSubscriptionStreamState.active` deliberately keeps its narrower
meaning — "at least one URI is subscribed" — because it drives the Subscriptions
section's badge, which has nothing to report for a listChanged-only stream. That
also preserves the invariant the rest of the file is written against: an empty
subscribed set is never announced alongside an `active` stream.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Copilot review follow-ups:
- `applyProtocolVersion` took the value straight from an unvalidated JSON
body and went to `RegExp.test`, which coerces — `123` and `true` both
matched the token pattern and reached `Transport.setProtocolVersion` with
the wrong type. It now takes `unknown` and checks `typeof === "string"`
first, with cases for the coercible values.
- Replace `as unknown as Transport` in the new session fixtures with a
`makeTransport()` helper returning a structurally valid `Transport`, so an
interface change stays visible to the tests.
- Drop `as unknown as typeof fetch` in the new transport test —
`vi.fn<typeof fetch>()` is already the right type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0119LaPQ3v4NyBK3ZTdM9j84
The web client's SDK Client owns the `initialize` handshake, so the
`setProtocolVersion()` call it makes after initialize lands on
RemoteClientTransport — a pass-through to the Node backend, not the real
HTTP transport. The backend's StreamableHTTPClientTransport therefore never
learned the negotiated version and stamped no `Mcp-Protocol-Version` on any
request after initialize, starting with `notifications/initialized`. A
stateful server that requires the header rejects that notification with
HTTP 400.
RemoteClientTransport now records the version and rides it on every
`/api/mcp/send`; the backend applies it to its transport before the send, so
that request and everything the transport issues afterwards (the standalone
SSE GET, the session DELETE) carry the header. The version is validated
against a token pattern on the backend so a client can't push arbitrary
bytes into an upstream header.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0119LaPQ3v4NyBK3ZTdM9j84
Two fixes from Copilot's review of #1953.
useManagedListError re-synced React state from the `state` prop inside a
useEffect, which renders one frame carrying the PREVIOUS store's error
after `state` changes (switching servers) before the effect corrects it —
the pattern AGENTS.md forbids. useSyncExternalStore reads the snapshot
during render, so a store swap lands in the same frame, and it also
closes the window where an error recorded between render and subscribe
was missed. The snapshot returns the stored Error instance (or null), so
it is referentially stable as the API requires.
The `markResponseRejected` correlation maps were never cleared. Ids of
requests that never got a response — a timeout, a dropped connection —
are the only entries trackResponse can't remove, so they accumulated
across reconnects. Cleared on the start-clean connect path, per the
convention documented on resetSessionState (one route out, `onerror`
with no `onclose`, tears down nothing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SW1p8E2uiyyLx4RKwrwSrt
markResponseRejected was called for ANY refresh failure. The id it
recovers is "the last response received for this method", which is the
failing exchange only when a response actually arrived and was refused
while decoding. A transport drop, a timeout, or an abort produces no
response frame at all — the last-answered id then still points at an
EARLIER successful call, so marking it stamped "Rejected by the
Inspector" onto an exchange that worked. That is the same class of lie
this issue exists to remove.
A server-sent JSON-RPC error is excluded for a different reason: the id
would be right, but the failure is the server's and its entry already
renders as an error from the error frame.
Gated on SdkErrorCode.InvalidResult / UnsupportedResultType — decisions
the client made about a frame in hand. The failure is still recorded as
list state either way; only the Protocol attribution is gated.
Caught in Copilot's review of #1953.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SW1p8E2uiyyLx4RKwrwSrt
A list load that failed — a transport error, or a result the SDK's era
codec rejects as invalid — reported nothing. The connect-time refresh is
fired with no caller to await it (`void this.refresh()`), so its rejection
became an unhandled rejection: the header said "Connected", the panel
rendered an empty list indistinguishable from a server that has none, and
the failed exchange showed in the Protocol panel as a clean success.
Two surfaces now tell the truth:
- ManagedListState records the failure as observable state (`getError` +
an `errorChange` event) and still re-throws, so App's auth-recovery
wrapper keeps working. The four `useManaged*` hooks expose it via a
shared `useManagedListError`, and the Tools/Prompts/Resources sidebars
render a `ListLoadError` alert with the reason and a Retry.
- A response the client refused is attributed back to its Protocol entry
(`markResponseRejected` → `responseRejected` → `MessageEntry.clientError`),
which now renders an Error status and a "Rejected by the Inspector"
alert rather than the green resultType badge alone. The SDK gives no
request id with a decode failure, so the id is recovered by correlation;
see the comment on `markResponseRejected` for why that is exact.
Also stops `listAllTools` from dropping a failing excluded-tools walk on
the floor — it stays non-fatal but is logged.
Closes#1953
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SW1p8E2uiyyLx4RKwrwSrt
Firefox does not hand a streaming `fetch()` response to JS until the
first *body* byte arrives; Chromium resolves the promise as soon as the
headers do. Both SSE endpoints flushed headers immediately and then
stayed silent until there was something to report, which deadlocked
`/api/mcp/events`: `RemoteClientTransport.openEventStream()` awaits that
fetch *before* the MCP client sends `initialize`, so no `initialize` ->
no event to report -> no body byte -> the fetch never resolves. The web
UI hung on "Connecting..." forever with nothing in the UI, the console,
or the node logs.
Write an inert `:` SSE comment the instant each stream opens. Conforming
parsers ignore a comment line, so this unblocks the read without
inventing a wire event and needs no client-side protocol change.
`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` was also proposed on the issue but does
not fix it -- verified against Firefox 153, the fetch still never
resolves with the header set and no body byte. The delay is not MIME
sniffing.
The priming write is deliberately ordered *after* each handler registers
its consumer (the session event consumer; the file-watch subscriber plus
`ensureWatcher()`). Callers treat the arrival of the stream's first bytes
as proof they are subscribed, so priming first would hand out that proof
across an `await` and drop an edit made in the gap.
`/api/servers/events` gets the same treatment: its fetch was equally
stuck on Firefox until the first real change event, which for an unedited
`mcp.json` never comes. Its client-side reader counted any `\n\n` as a
change, so the inert frame would have fired a spurious background
re-fetch on every connection -- it now skips frames carrying no
`event:`/`data:` field. The transport's own `parseSSE` already drops
comment frames correctly and needed no change.
Verified end to end in real Firefox against a live streamable-HTTP test
server: before, stuck on "Connecting..." past 25s; after, initialize ->
notifications/initialized -> tools/list, connected.
Closes#1858
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU
* chore(deps): migrate to eslint 10 to clear the brace-expansion DoS advisory (#1838)
eslint 9 pulled `minimatch@3` → `brace-expansion@1.1.16`, which carries
GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg (high, DoS via unbounded expansion length). It appeared in
all five lockfiles — the root plus each of the four clients, none of which is an
npm workspace, so all five had to move together.
Deferred from the pre-2.0.0 sweep because it is dev-scope, not attacker-
controlled, and a major bump across five packages was the wrong thing to attempt
immediately before an irreversible publish. This is that work.
## What moved
- `eslint` `^9.39.4/5` → `^10.8.0` and `@eslint/js` → `^10.0.1`, in all five
manifests.
- `eslint-plugin-react-hooks` `^7.0.1` → `^7.1.1` in web and tui. Required, not
cosmetic: 7.0.1's peer range stops at `^9.0.0`, so installing it alongside
eslint 10 fails `ERESOLVE`.
- Everything else already declared eslint 10 support and stayed put:
`typescript-eslint@^8.56.1` (`^8.57 || ^9 || ^10`),
`eslint-plugin-react-refresh@^0.5.2` (`^9 || ^10`),
`eslint-plugin-storybook@^10.2.19` (`>=8`).
## Config migration
None was needed. All five configs were already flat (`eslint.config.js` with
`defineConfig`/`globalIgnores` from `eslint/config`), which is the format v10
keeps and the only one it still supports. The root config's `core/` and shared-
surface blocks — including the `_`-prefix `argsIgnorePattern` /
`varsIgnorePattern` / `caughtErrorsIgnorePattern` — are unchanged and still gate
`lint:core` and `lint:shared`.
No rule was disabled, downgraded, or scoped away to make the new eslint pass.
v10 surfaced 21 real violations across three rules; all 21 are fixed in the code.
### `preserve-caught-error` (new in `eslint:recommended`) — 15 sites
A `throw new Error(msg)` inside a `catch` silently drops the original error.
Each now passes `{ cause }`, so the underlying failure survives into the chain.
Messages are unchanged, so nothing that asserts on them moves. 12 in `core/`,
2 in `clients/cli`, 1 in `test-servers/src`.
### `no-useless-assignment` (new in `eslint:recommended`) — 2 sites
`clients/cli/src/cli.ts`'s `optionArgs` and `test-servers/src/test-server-oauth`
's `valid` were initialized and then unconditionally overwritten on every path.
Both are now declared without the dead initializer; TypeScript's definite-
assignment analysis covers the remaining paths.
### `react-hooks/set-state-in-effect` — 8 sites (web)
These were false negatives the plugin fixed in 7.1.0, not a rule we newly opted
into: `set-state-in-effect` has been `error` in `flat/recommended` since 7.0.1,
and the web config has always extended it. Every one was the same anti-pattern —
resetting or re-syncing local state from a prop inside a `useEffect`, which
paints the stale value for one frame and then renders again to correct it.
All eight now use a new `useValueChange(value, onChange)` hook
(`clients/web/src/hooks/useValueChange.ts`), which is React's documented
"adjusting state during render": compare against the previous render's value
with `Object.is` and call back *during* render, so React discards the
in-progress output before it reaches the DOM.
- `MrtrConversation`, `ProtocolEntry`, `TaskCard` — mirror `isListExpanded`.
- `NetworkEntry` — same mirror, plus the "Reveal in Network" force-open. The
reveal's rAF scroll stays an effect (real external-system work); only the
`setIsExpanded(true)` moved. `isExpanded` is now seeded from
`isListExpanded || revealed`, since a render-time sync fires on change and so
cannot cover an entry that mounts already revealed.
- `PromptArgumentsForm`, `ResourceTemplatePanel` — reset on template/prompt
switch.
- `ServerConfigModal` — reset on open. Keyed on `opened ? initial : undefined`,
which collapses "opened flipped" and "initial changed while open" into one
value; `initial` is already memoized, so it cannot thrash.
`useValueChange` has its own test file, and `ServerConfigModal` gains an
open→edit→close→reopen test (the close leg was previously untested, which is
what left the new guard uncovered).
## Advisory delta
`npm audit`, per package, before → after:
| Package | before | after |
| ------------------- | -------------------------- | -------------------------- |
| root | 9 (1 low, 6 mod, 2 high) | 8 (1 low, 6 mod, 1 high) |
| `clients/web` | 19 (3 low, 6 mod, 6 high, 4 crit) | 17 (3 low, 6 mod, 4 high, 4 crit) |
| `clients/cli` | 6 (2 low, 4 high) | 4 (2 low, 2 high) |
| `clients/tui` | 4 (1 low, 3 high) | 2 (1 low, 1 high) |
| `clients/launcher` | 3 (3 high) | 1 (1 high) |
`brace-expansion` is gone from all five — `eslint@10` resolves `minimatch@10` →
`brace-expansion@5.0.9`. Dropping `@eslint/eslintrc` (removed in v10) also took
`js-yaml` with it, clearing GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m (high) from all four clients as
a bonus. The remainder are unrelated and tracked separately.
`npm run ci` passes end to end — validate, the per-file ≥90 coverage gate, the
build gate, all five smokes (including `smoke:tui`, run locally on a real TTY),
and 462 Storybook tests.
Also documents the effect rule in AGENTS.md and mirrors it into
`.github/copilot-instructions.md`, since it is now something a reviewer cites.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: state useValueChange's referential-stability requirement (#1838)
Copilot review on #1900: the hook compares with `Object.is`, so an object or
array literal rebuilt in the component body compares unequal every render.
Because the callback is what updates state, that is not merely a wasted render —
it is an infinite loop.
Every current caller passes a primitive (`boolean`, `string`) or an already-
memoized value, so nothing changes behaviorally. But the hazard was implicit,
and the next caller is the one it would bite.
Documented on the hook itself, and one clause added to the AGENTS.md rule with
its mirror in `.github/copilot-instructions.md`. No runtime guard: the
requirement is the same one a `useEffect` dependency array carries, and here the
failure is loud and immediate rather than silent.
`npm run ci` passes.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(cli): stop asserting the --tool-args-json catch binding is an Error (#1838)
Copilot review round 2 on #1900: the `--tool-args-json` parse handler formatted
its message with `(e as Error).message`. A `catch` binding is `unknown`, so that
cast is an assertion rather than a check — a thrown non-Error would render
`--tool-args-json is not valid JSON: undefined`, which points the user at
nothing.
`JSON.parse` does only throw `SyntaxError` today, so this is not a live bug. But
the cast is the kind AGENTS.md asks us not to leave unjustified, the same
handler was already being touched here to add `{ cause: e }`, and every other
site in this PR uses the guarded form. Now it does too.
`npm run ci` passes.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: require useValueChange's onChange to be render-pure (#1838)
Copilot review round 3 on #1900: `onChange` is called during render, so it is
bound by render-phase purity — and the web client mounts under `StrictMode`,
which deliberately double-renders in development. A callback doing anything
external would run an unpredictable number of times, and concurrent React can
abandon an in-progress render entirely.
Every current caller already passes a callback that only calls `setState`, so
nothing changes. But "runs during render" is the whole point of the hook and the
constraint that follows from it was left implicit.
Stated on the hook, with the same clause in the AGENTS.md rule and its
`.github/copilot-instructions.md` mirror. All three now point at `NetworkEntry`
as the worked example of the split: the reveal's force-open is a state update
and lives in `useValueChange`, while its `requestAnimationFrame` scroll stays a
`useEffect`.
`npm run ci` passes.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(core): mirror SEP-2243 x-mcp-header args to Mcp-Param-* on tools/call (#1846)
A strict modern (2026-07-28) HTTP server (e.g. the GitHub MCP Server)
rejects a tools/call whose argument carries an `x-mcp-header` annotation
when the matching `Mcp-Param-*` request header is missing (-32020
"header mismatch"). The Inspector never sent that header.
The SDK only mirrors inside `client.callTool()` (and skips it entirely in
a browser environment), but the Inspector routes tools/call through
`client.request()` for manual MRTR driving (#1704), so the SDK never
mirrors for us — on any transport. On top of that, the remote (web)
transport dropped per-request headers before they reached the backend's
upstream fetch.
- core/json/xMcpHeader.ts: port the SDK's non-public `buildMcpParamHeaders`
+ value encoding (Base64 sentinel for non-ASCII/whitespace/empty values)
and add `mcpParamHeadersForTool`.
- InspectorClient.attemptToolCall: on a modern connection, build the
headers from the tool's declarations + call arguments and attach them to
the tools/call request options. `Protocol.request` forwards `headers`
to the transport and preserves them across MRTR retry legs, so the
direct StreamableHTTP transport applies them. Fixes CLI/TUI.
- RemoteClientTransport.requestSend + /api/mcp/send + RemoteSendRequest:
forward per-send headers and apply them to the backend's upstream
transport.send. The browser can't set cross-origin headers, but the
Node backend can — where the Inspector's real request is issued. Fixes web.
Verified end-to-end against the live GitHub MCP Server (modern HTTP).
Closes#1846
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Copilot-Session: 36dbeb09-12b0-4c19-af36-2573772a7dbd
* review: harden backend header allowlist, fix breadcrumbs, trim comments
Address Copilot review on #1847:
- server.ts: restrict client-supplied per-send headers to the `Mcp-Param-`
prefix (string values only) via `mcpParamHeadersOnly` before applying them
upstream, so the per-send channel can't inject arbitrary headers (e.g.
Authorization). `settings.headers` remains the channel for configured
upstream headers. Covered by new unit tests.
- Fix stale `#1810` breadcrumbs → `#1846` in the two new tests.
- Trim the verbose mirroring comments in inspectorClient/types/remote transport.
- Drop the redundant base64-on-the-wire integration test (encoding is unit-
tested; wire delivery is proven by the verbatim test), remove two unneeded
test casts, and cover the boolean `true` branch.
Not changed (declined with reason on the PR): buildMcpParamHeaders remains a
faithful port of the SDK's helper and does not re-validate values against the
declared JSON Schema type — arg types are enforced by schema validation on
both sides, and matching the SDK's conforming wire output is the module's goal.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Copilot-Session: 36dbeb09-12b0-4c19-af36-2573772a7dbd
* review: mirror Mcp-Param-* on the task-augmented tools/call too
Address the maintainer review on #1847:
- `callToolStream` (the "Run as task" path) built its own request options and
never mirrored, so a task-augmented `tools/call` on an annotated tool was
still rejected by a strict modern server with -32020. It now mirrors like the
plain path.
- Extract the two blocks both `tools/call` entry points had duplicated —
`convertStringToolArgs` (the string-arg coercion) and
`applyMirroredParamHeaders` (the SEP-2243 mirroring) — so the paths can't
drift again. That duplication is why the task path was missed.
- Regression test: `callToolStream` against the modern `get_weather` server
asserts the POST carries `Mcp-Param-City` (verified failing without the fix).
- README: the modern-network showcase claimed mirroring is skipped in the
browser so the web client gets -32020, and that CLI/TUI mirror. Both are now
wrong — the Inspector mirrors itself, on every client. AGENTS: note that
xMcpHeader.ts now also builds the wire headers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UkhhCHryVp5H3dqEnhwZ7t
* docs: correct the stale "browser omits Mcp-Param-*" copy
Both statements predate this PR and are now the opposite of true, per the
wire capture on #1847 (proxy-observed upstream headers, web leg included).
- ToolDetailPanel: the mirrored-headers note claimed the browser omits
`Mcp-Param-*`. It now says the web client's headers are applied by the Node
backend that issues the upstream request.
- createRemoteFetch: the header comment claimed an `x-mcp-header`-annotated
tool is "uncallable from the web client against a strict modern server" —
the exact wrong conclusion to reach while debugging a -32020. It now records
that the Inspector builds the headers itself, and that they do NOT travel
this `/api/fetch` proxy path: they ride the transport's per-send `headers`
through `/api/mcp/send`.
Copy only — no test asserted the old note text (ToolDetailPanel.test.tsx
matches the section title only).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UkhhCHryVp5H3dqEnhwZ7t
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Copilot-Session: 36dbeb09-12b0-4c19-af36-2573772a7dbd
* fix(core): start OAuth on a modern/auto-era connect (#1805)
The SDK's `server/discover` negotiation probe runs before anything else on
`protocolEra: "auto" | "modern"`, and its classifier reports whatever the
transport threw as `SdkError(ERA_NEGOTIATION_FAILED)` with the real error moved
to `data.cause`. That buried both connect-time auth signals: the remote path's
`AuthRecoveryRequiredError` (matched with `instanceof`, and carrying the
authorization URL) and a direct transport's `AuthChallengeError`. An
OAuth-protected server that authorized fine on the legacy era instead produced a
dead-end "Version negotiation probe failed" — no redirect, and the connection
status flipped to `error` despite `isConnectAuthRecoveryError` existing to
prevent exactly that.
- `findNestedAuthError()` walks `cause` / `data.cause` for either typed error.
Not gated on the SDK's error code or message, so it survives rewording.
- `connect()` unwraps the rejection at the earliest point, ahead of
`withDirectAuthRecovery` (whose `isAuthChallengeError` check is shallow), the
outer status guard, and every client's connect error handling — so web, CLI,
and TUI are all fixed without a client-side change.
- On the direct path, enable `interceptAuthChallenges` for the probing eras even
with no stored tokens. Without an authProvider the 401 reaches the SDK as a raw
`SdkHttpError`, and the classifier ignores the HTTP status (it only looks for a
JSON-RPC error body) — so pin mode rethrew it with the 401 discarded entirely,
no status and not even a cause for the walk to find.
Verified against a live dual-era server that answers 401 on both `initialize`
and `server/discover`: `auto` and `modern` now reject with
`AuthRecoveryRequiredError` carrying a real authorization URL. Each half of the
fix is load-bearing — reverting either fails the new integration tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013SNjAqoEhUVVkr3UStR6om
* docs(core): mark the era-probe challenge interception as a removable workaround
Per review on #1806: the `|| this.probesProtocolEra()` clause compensates for
an upstream SDK gap (modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#2561, tracked as
#1807). Make its lifespan explicit so whoever picks up #1807 knows this block
is the thing to delete, rather than having to re-derive it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt
* fix(core): resolve connect() when auth recovery is satisfied silently
Review findings on #1809:
- connect() built its handshake promise once, outside the runConnect closure
withDirectAuthRecovery retries. On a "satisfied" outcome the recovery runs a
complete nested connect() via reconnectAfterAuthRecovery(), so the retry leg
re-awaited the already-rejected promise and rejected a connect() whose client
was in fact connected. Short-circuit the retry when already connected, and
skip the post-connect block the nested connect already ran (a duplicate
`connect` event re-triggers every list-state manager's refresh).
- Document the accepted 403 side effect of enabling interceptAuthChallenges
with no stored tokens, and why every `{ pin }` counts as probing.
- Replace the private-method double cast in the era-probe test with an
observable assertion on the transport options, and split the non-auth
failure case per era instead of a message alternation that passed either way.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt
* fix(core): key the connect retry leg off attempt, bound nested recoveries
Second-pass review findings on #1809:
- The satisfied-recovery short-circuit keyed off live connection status, so an
onclose landing between the nested connect() and the retry leg fell through
to the rejected handshake promise and reported the stale 401 as the reason
the session died. withDirectAuthRecovery now passes `attempt` to its
operation, so connect() identifies the retry leg structurally and reports the
teardown when the recovered session is already gone.
- Bound nested silent recoveries. The `attempt >= 1` guard is per-call and a
satisfied outcome recovers via a nested connect() with a fresh counter, so a
server that keeps rejecting freshly refreshed tokens recursed without bound.
Counted across the nesting boundary, capped at 3.
- Strengthen the regression test (server info populated by the nested connect,
no duplicate statusChange) and add the two missing cases: a failed reconnect
still rejects, and the recursion bound terminates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt
* test(core): cover the recovery teardown branch; fix a duplicated case
Third-pass review findings on #1809, both about tests added in the previous
commit:
- The retry leg's teardown error had no coverage, so a regression to the old
status fall-through would have stayed green. Covered deterministically: the
nested connect dispatches `connect` after setting "connected", so closing the
live transport from that listener flips the status before the retry leg runs.
Asserts the error identity, which is the point of the change.
- "still rejects when the reconnect underneath the recovery fails" used a
challenging transport for every connect, so it walked the same bounded chain
as the recursion-bound test rather than covering a non-auth reconnect
failure, and its comment claimed an "error" status the auth path never
reaches. Now fails the reconnect with a plain error and asserts both.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt
---------
Co-authored-by: rinormaloku <rinormaloku37@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
