Round 24 produced no inline comments again. Of the three suppressed items, one
is a pre-existing data-loss bug that predates #1950 entirely.
**Editing a server's config deletes its stored OAuth client secret — from the
keychain, not only from the stores this PR adds.** Filed as #2084 and fixed
here, since the review surfaced it and these lines were already changing.
`useServers.updateServer` deliberately sends `{ id, config }` with no
`settings`, so a config-only save cannot wipe persisted settings. The route
reads that as `preserve` and re-derives settings from the *on-disk* entry —
which by #1356's design no longer holds the secrets. The submitted secret set
is therefore empty, `expectedSecretFields` always lists the OAuth slot, and
the reconcile deleted a value the user never touched. The rename branch was
given `mergeRenameKeychainSecrets` for exactly this reason; the in-place
branch never got the equivalent.
The first fix was too broad — skip obsolete deletion whenever the intent is
`preserve` — and an existing test caught it immediately: stdio `env` is part
of `config`, so a config-only PUT that drops a key really has retired that
secret. Obsolete detection is per-field now:
- **`env:` fields** are implied by the entry's shape, so the new entry no
longer expecting one is proof it was retired.
- **The OAuth slot** is implied by nothing, so absence counts as "cleared"
only when the caller spoke about settings at all.
Both directions are tested, and the pre-existing env-key reconcile test still
passes.
Also:
- `refreshingPersist` moves to `lib/`. The combinator computes nothing, but
what it exists to do is sequence side effects, which is the `lib` half of
the repo's split; I judged it the other way on the grounds that the
function is a pure higher-order one, and the rule is about what a module is
*for*.
- `SecretStorageInfo.plaintext` is documented as file-only and *omitted*
elsewhere rather than "always false", which is what the producer does and
what `usableSecretStorage` enforces — the old wording invited a consumer to
build the exact shape the web client discards.
Full `npm run ci` green, staged tree verified first.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The direct server→client `elicitation/create` handler ignored its request
context, so `notifications/cancelled` aborted `ctx.mcpReq.signal` and nothing
was listening: the modal and its bridge outlived the cancelled request and
could still answer work the server had abandoned.
The handler now threads that signal into `enqueuePendingElicitation`, which
already wires it to both answer surfaces — the native queue entry and the app
renderer. The task-augmented branch deliberately does not use it: that request
is answered immediately with a `CreateTaskResult`, so its lifetime is the
task's, which carries its own abort.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
`tasks/cancel` marked the task cancelled and rejected its payload, but left
whatever was collecting the answer running — the native pending-request entry,
and now an app-rendered elicitation's renderer and bridge. A modal therefore
outlived the task it belonged to, and an answer arriving afterwards re-settled
it, overwriting `cancelled` with `completed`: a task the server had been told
it cancelled.
Each receiver task now owns an `AbortController`, aborted by `tasks/cancel`
and by session teardown. The task-augmented elicitation branch passes its
signal to the app attempt and wires it to the native queue entry, so both
answer routes are torn down the same way. Both settle helpers return early on
a terminal status, so a late answer through either route cannot resurrect the
task.
The overwrite predates the app path — a native answer after a cancel did the
same thing — so the guard fixes both.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Round 20, and almost all of it is fallout from round 19's two changes. Both
were right in direction and wrong in the detail, in the same way: each solved
its case by treating a broad thing as a proxy for a narrow one.
**The durability guard wrote newly entered secrets to disk in plaintext.**
Preserving legacy plaintext for a session-scoped store is correct — stripping
it moves the only durable copy into RAM. Using *the whole submitted entry* as
the proxy for "legacy" was not: it turned
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_STORE=memory` into "write every new secret to
`mcp.json` in the clear", while the footer for that very store says secrets
are written nowhere. A security regression introduced by a data-loss fix, and
the same overshoot in `client.json`.
Provenance decides now. A secret field is kept on disk only when it was
already there, unchanged, in the file being overwritten; a newly entered or
changed value is stripped and lives in the session store, which is exactly
what the footer promises. Where provenance cannot be established — an
unparseable prior file — the value is treated as new, because writing a
secret to disk on a guess is the failure that matters.
**The atomic claim was not as safe as its comments said.** Four ways:
- A crash between the claim and the copy left only
`secrets.json.migrating-<pid>`. The next run checked the canonical path,
found nothing, selected the keychain, and every stored credential vanished
with no warning. Orphans are now adopted at startup.
- Restoring used `rename`, which on POSIX **replaces** its destination — so
the restore path could overwrite a `secrets.json` a concurrent writer had
recreated, destroying the later successful write that claiming exists to
protect. The comment beside it asserted the opposite. `link` + `unlink` is
the no-clobber primitive this needed.
- Every claim failure was read as a lost race. `EACCES`/`EROFS` leave the
file exactly where it is, and returning quietly selected the keychain while
file-backed secrets sat there invisible. Only `ENOENT` is benign now.
- A failed cleanup left a plaintext-capable snapshot on disk with a silent
catch, while the app reported the keychain as the only store. It names the
path now.
**A third secret-entry surface had no disclosure at all.** `ServerConfigModal`
takes stdio `env` values, which are extracted into the store exactly as
Server Settings' are — and the footer's own doc comment claimed there were
only two such dialogs. It has the footer now, and every server write that can
carry a secret (config submit, both import flows) refreshes the descriptor,
not just the settings save.
Full `npm run ci` green, staged tree verified first.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
**The task-augmented inbound branch bypassed the routing.** A server→client
`elicitation/create` carrying `params.task` answers immediately with a
`CreateTaskResult` and settles the TASK when the user answers, so it cannot
ride `enqueuePendingElicitation` — and it was therefore never offered to an
app, even with a valid `_meta.ui.resourceUri`. It now makes the same attempt,
completing the task with the app's result and falling back to the native queue
otherwise; an abort fails the task rather than reopening it natively. The two
task-settling closures are extracted so both answer routes settle it
identically.
**The web client advertised the capability without a sandbox.**
`useInitialConfig` leaves `sandboxUrl` undefined while `/api/config` is in
flight and when the sandbox controller could not start, but the renderer was
supplied unconditionally — so the client claimed it could host an app in
exactly the window where it could not. The option is now gated on a resolved
sandbox URL: such a connection behaves like the CLI/TUI, native queue and no
claim made.
**Concurrent modals each owned the keyboard.** Every open `Modal.Root`
installed its own focus trap, Escape handler and overlay, so the traps fought
and one Escape could dismiss more than one pending request. Only the topmost
owns them now; the rest stay mounted, keeping their bridges and handshakes,
but inert to the keyboard.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Round 19 found real data loss rather than process noise, in two places.
**An unrelated settings edit destroyed the secret the durability gate had
just preserved.** The GET migration withholds its strip for a session-scoped
store, so `mcp.json` stays the durable copy — but the POST/PUT paths always
wrote the stripped shape. The GET also returns the rehydrated secret to the
settings form, which resends the whole object when the user changes anything,
so editing a timeout wrote the stripped entry, moved the only durable copy
into RAM, and lost it at exit. Every operation reported success. The client
config had the identical shape: the read-path guard was there, the write path
had none, and saving a CIMD URL did the same thing to the IdP client secret.
Both write paths now agree with their read paths: while the store cannot
outlive the process, the file stays the durable copy.
**The hand-off's delete is no longer a check-to-delete race.** Re-reading
immediately before `rm` caught writes that had already landed and was blind to
the one arriving between the check and the delete — destroying a *later*,
already-successful write, which is worse than the optimistic-write residual
and, unlike it, fixable without a lock. The file is claimed by an atomic
rename before anything reads it, so the migration operates on a snapshot
nobody else can reach and a writer that recreates `secrets.json` is simply
untouched.
Claiming introduced a failure mode the existing tests caught immediately: a
migration that aborts must not leave the secrets stranded at the staging path.
The snapshot is restored on any incomplete outcome, and when the live path has
been recreated in the meantime it is left in place with its location logged —
an operator-visible orphan is recoverable; clobbering someone's write is not.
Also:
- **`setMany`**, the write-side twin of `getMany`. `set` costs a whole-file
read-decrypt-encrypt-write-verify cycle per call, and the settings form
resends a server's full `env` map on any edit, so a 10-variable stdio server
spent ~30 scrypt derivations saving an unrelated change. One cycle now; the
keychain keeps its parallel individual writes.
- **A doc that contradicted its function.** `readOnDiskEncryption` still said
it "never decrypts, so it needs no passphrase" — round 12 made it
authenticate precisely because structure is not access.
Full `npm run ci` green, staged tree verified before running it.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Three findings. The first is the fourth consecutive one in the refresh path,
so it is answered by making that path testable rather than by patching it
again.
**The refresh-after-persist wiring was covered by nothing.** It lived as two
inline `await …; refresh()` pairs in `App.tsx`, which is deliberately outside
the coverage `include` — so the hook's tests and the modals' tests could both
pass while the callback joining them was broken, leaving the security footer
stale after exactly the write that changed it. Three of the last four rounds
found defects in this path; none of them could have been caught by a test,
because there was nowhere for one to live.
Extracted to `utils/refreshingPersist`, which is inside the gate and has its
own tests: refresh runs after the persist resolves (not before — refreshing
first re-reads the descriptor the pending write is about to invalidate),
arguments pass through unchanged (the server-settings caller is
`(id, settings)`, and a transparent wrapper is the difference between saving
the entry and dropping it), and a failed persist refreshes nothing while
propagating the error.
**A tmpfs-style false promise, in the path fallback.** With neither `HOME`
nor `USERPROFILE` set — an ordinary service environment —
`defaultSecretFilePath` returned `.mcp-inspector/secrets.json`, a *relative*
path, while `FileSecretStoreOptions.filePath` and the `SecretStorageInfo.path`
the footer offers to copy both promise an absolute one. Resolved like the two
override branches above it.
**A warning that was usually false.** The session-store notice fired on every
`/api/servers` read whenever the store was in-memory — including for the
default empty catalog, where "plaintext values are left on disk" is not true
of anything, repeated on every list refresh. It is now emitted lazily, at most
once per server instance, and only when the loop actually preserves a
non-empty secrets set. A log line that is usually untrue is one people learn
to skip, which costs it the occasion it matters.
The remaining suppressed comment is the hand-off's check-to-delete race,
tracked in #2082.
Full `npm run ci` green.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Both review findings from round two.
The routing change sits in the funnel BOTH entry points share, but only the
legacy inbound handler was driven by a test — the modern leg, where an
elicitation arrives as an `input_required` result the MRTR driver unpacks and
retries, was covered by construction alone. Adds
`mrtr_app_choose_option` (a modern MRTR tool whose *embedded* elicitation
carries `_meta.ui.resourceUri`) and drives it live over a real transport: the
app answers, the retry carries that answer through `inputResponses`, and the
server echoes it back as the tool's result. A second case cancels the tool
call while the app is up and asserts the request-scoped signal aborts; a third
runs the same tool against a modern server that never advertised the
capability and asserts the native queue takes it.
The cancellation case turned up a real gap: `tryAppElicitation` mounted an app
for an already-aborted signal (the caller cancelled during an earlier MRTR
round), leaving a modal nobody was waiting on and a promise that could never
settle. It now throws the abort straight through.
Also fixes the smoke count in the root README, which still said "two"
headless-Chromium smokes and then introduced a third.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Eight findings from the Copilot review, all accepted.
Ownership across connections was the substantive one, in three parts. A
mid-session transport close reaches teardown only through
`clearAndAnnouncePendingPeerRequests`, whose emptiness check looked at the
native queues alone — so a lone app elicitation survived a dropped connection
with its modal still open; the check now counts the active set too. The web
bridge factory resolves its client at call time, so an entry queued by a
replaced `InspectorClient` could rebuild against the *next* one and answer
through a different server; the host now drops every entry synchronously on
the swap (`AppElicitationController.failAll`) rather than racing core's
awaited teardown. And the request id was only monotonic within one client, so
each replacement client's first request was `app-elicitation-1` — settling
that id could resolve the wrong server's request. It now carries a
per-instance prefix.
Result validation now parses the whole value with `ElicitResultSchema` before
the requested-schema check, instead of inspecting `action` by hand: a
`{ action: "decline", content: { x: {} } }` used to pass, though the standard
result permits only primitives and string arrays in `content`.
The dialog's accessible name now includes the request id and the prompt — two
concurrent elicitations can be for the same app URI, and the previous name
made those indistinguishable, which is what the comment beside it claimed to
prevent.
`observeAppCapabilities` takes a minimal structural `onmessage` contract
(generic over the message type, since a handler typed for a narrower message
is not assignable to one typed for `unknown`), removing the double cast at the
call site.
`smoke:web:elicit` now fails on an uncaught page error after a successful
drive, and captures the async half of that class off the console channel, as
its two sibling smokes do — it could otherwise print OK over a broken bundle.
Adds the tests each fix needs, including the two the review asked for
directly: that `advertiseElicitation` reaches the `AppBridge` constructor, and
that it is absent by default.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
No new inline comments this round, but two of the four suppressed ones were
real defects rather than restatements — both in code I added, both silently
wrong in the safe-looking direction.
**A symlinked secrets directory read as unmounted.** `isOnMountPoint` walks
to the nearest existing ancestor *lexically* and then string-prefixes it
against mountinfo, so `~/.mcp-inspector -> /data/inspector` with `/data`
mounted matched no mount point. The container then selected the session-only
store on a box that had explicitly arranged for persistence, and nothing said
so — the mount was there, the volume was there, the secrets evaporated on
exit. Resolved through symlinks now, tolerantly: a path that cannot be
resolved falls back to the lexical comparison, which is what this did before
and is correct whenever no symlink is involved. The `statSync` fallback branch
already followed links, so this also makes the two paths agree.
**The bulk read did not fix the case it was written for.** `getMany` batched
*one server's* fields, but both rehydration callers iterate servers — so a
catalog of 20 servers holding one secret each still paid 20 serialized scrypt
derivations. The same ~450ms stall the seam was introduced to remove, reached
one server at a time instead of one field at a time. Measuring the wrong unit
and then optimizing it is worse than not optimizing, because the number in the
commit message says it is fixed.
The seam is cross-server now — `getMany(requests: SecretBulkRequest[])` — and
both callers pass the whole catalog in one call. `FileSecretStore` decrypts
once for the entire rehydration; the keychain fallback still issues
independent parallel `get`s, which is what it wants. A test asserts one
derivation for four servers, next to the existing one asserting one for three
fields, so the property is pinned at both axes.
The other two suppressed comments are the cross-process guarantee — `mutate`'s
residual and the hand-off's TOCTOU delete — which remain decided against for
this PR and tracked in #2082.
Full `npm run ci` green.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Let a server hand a form `elicitation/create` to an MCP App and return the
app's ordinary `ElicitResult`, with the native elicitation form as the
fallback on every failure.
No second extension, no custom method, and no custom result shape: the only
new wire surface is a nested `elicitation` flag on the existing
`io.modelcontextprotocol/ui` extension on each side, plus
`_meta.ui.resourceUri` on the request. App rendering is selected only when
all four gates hold — client `elicitation.form`, client MCP Apps MIME type,
the nested `elicitation` setting on BOTH peers, and a valid absolute `ui://`
URI on the request.
Only the web client advertises the nested client-side setting, and only
because it has a sandbox renderer: supplying
`InspectorClientOptions.appElicitation` is what opts a client in, so CLI and
TUI keep advertising the MIME type without ever claiming they can resolve an
elicitation through an app.
Routing lives in the one funnel both entry points already use
(`enqueuePendingElicitation`), so the inbound handler and the MRTR driver
cannot diverge. Ownership is request-scoped — a per-request id keys the
renderer, iframe and bridge — so two concurrent elicitations can never
resolve through each other's bridges. An explicit `decline`/`cancel` is a
completed elicitation and goes back to the server; everything else (absent or
malformed metadata, resource/sandbox/bridge failure, an app with no
elicitation capability, a timeout, an invalid result or one that fails the
requested schema) falls back.
The Inspector speaks the ext-apps#733 / SEP-3118 wire protocol but cannot yet
consume its helpers — the released `@modelcontextprotocol/ext-apps` (1.7.5)
predates that PR. `core/mcp/appElicitation.ts` and
`AppRenderer/requestAppElicitation.ts` mirror it exactly and are marked for
deletion once a release containing it ships. One consequence needed its own
seam: ext-apps 1.7.5 parses the view's `ui/initialize` through a schema that
strips `elicitation`, so an app that correctly advertises it would look like
one that did not, silently turning every negotiated elicitation into a
fallback. `AppRenderer/appCapabilities.ts` records the raw frame instead, and
prefers the bridge's own value once it carries the key.
`AppRenderer` now takes an `AppRenderSource` union rather than a `Tool`, so
the same renderer and bridge factory serve an App tool and an elicitation
without either faking the other's shape.
Adds the public fixture (`app_choose_option` + a self-contained
`ui://demo/choose-option.html` app covering accept/decline/cancel), its two
showcase configs, and `smoke:web:elicit`, which drives the negotiated path
end to end in headless Chromium and then the same tool against a server that
never advertised the capability, asserting the native form takes it.
Closes#1854
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Two changes, interleaved in the same files because both are about the
same read-modify-write path.
## The lock is gone (maintainer decision on the round-5/7/8 finding)
Three consecutive review rounds found a real race in the `mkdir` lock, and
the last one is not patchable with what Node exposes: claiming a stale lock
needs compare-and-swap on a directory entry (`renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE)`).
Without it, `canSteal` inspects one lock but `rename` acts on whatever is at
that path *later*, so a waiter that lost the first race can move the
winner's fresh lock aside and enter alongside it.
Rather than patch it a fourth time, writers now collide and the loser
notices. `mutate` reads `M0`, applies the mutation to get `M1`, writes it,
then reads back `M2`; if they differ, someone wrote in between, so it
re-applies onto what they left and retries, bounded.
The comparison is over the **whole map**, and that is the load-bearing
detail. Checking only the entry we touched passes in exactly the case that
loses data — ours is present, and it is the *other* writer's that is gone.
With A and B from the same `M0`: A writes `MA`, B writes `MB` and clobbers
A; B verifies and correctly sees `MB`; A verifies, sees `M2 !== MA`,
re-applies onto `MB`, writes again. Both survive, and the writer that was
clobbered is the one that repairs it.
Two things this deliberately does not claim:
- It is **not mutual exclusion**. A process that crashes between its write
and its verifying read cannot notice it was clobbered, and nothing else
will. That window is strictly narrower than the lock's — which lost
updates with every participant alive — and needs no primitive Node lacks.
Stated in the code rather than left to be rediscovered in review.
- Non-convergence **fails loudly**. After five lost rounds `set` throws
rather than returning, because returning would reintroduce the silent
loss with extra steps. `delete` stays silent, per the interface contract.
`serialize` is now keyed on the resolved path **process-wide** rather than
per instance. Two `FileSecretStore`s on one file are ordinary — the resolved
store holds one and `absorbFileSecretsIntoKeyring` builds another — and a
per-instance queue does not order them against each other at all. The new
convergence test caught this on its first run: two instances racing `set`
lost an entry. In-process is now correct by construction; the verify covers
what it cannot see, a second Inspector process.
The hand-off's read → copy → delete was the lock's other user. Its delete is
now conditional: the file is re-read immediately before removal and compared
against what was copied, and it declines to delete when they differ. Leaving
the file costs nothing (keychain-wins makes the next run idempotent) while
deleting on a stale read costs a secret.
## Round 9 (two inline, two suppressed)
- **`KeyringSecretStore.getStrict` let raw binding errors escape.** Both
plaintext migrations keep their source file only when they catch
`SecretStoreUnavailableError`, so a transient keychain failure 500'd
`GET /api/servers` instead of abandoning the migration. Wrapped, as `set`
already does.
- **`FileSecretStore` had no strict read at all**, so `secretStoreGetStrict`
fell back to the tolerant `get` and mapped every read failure to `null` —
leaving the exact inversion the seam was introduced to prevent open on the
store it was introduced for.
- **`readOnDiskEncryption` reported "encrypted" for an envelope it cannot
open.** Naming the cipher is not the same as being openable: a file with no
`kdf`/`data`, or a `data` that is not `iv.tag.ciphertext`, produced the
quiet reassuring footer for a file whose next save was guaranteed to fail.
- **`/api/config` kept a stale descriptor when the resolver returned
`undefined`**, because the conditional spread left the startup value
standing. Assigned unconditionally now; `c.json` omits the key.
Full `npm run ci` green.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The lock finding from this round is deliberately not addressed here — see
below.
- **My round-6 strict-read fix was inert in production.** `DeferredSecretStore`
is what `defaultSecretStore()` returns, and it did not forward `getStrict`
— so `secretStoreGetStrict` fell through to the tolerant `get` for every
real caller, and the strictness existed only in tests that injected a
concrete store. Forwarded now, along with `getMany`.
- **The same tolerant-read bug remained in both pre-existing migrations.**
I added `getStrict` for the new hand-off in round 6 and never applied it to
the mcp.json and client.json migrations, which have the identical
shape: decide from `get`, then write on `null`. A transient keychain read
failure therefore let an older plaintext value overwrite a newer keychain
one — and the disk copy was then stripped, so the newer value was gone. Both
use the strict read now; the throw is a `SecretStoreUnavailableError`, which
both call sites already handle as "abandon the migration, keep the file".
- **The permission check made a false statement on Windows.** `stat` returns
synthetic bits there, and interpreting them yields a confident falsehood
either way — "0666 — not owner-only" about a file the ACL may restrict, or
"owner-only" about one it does not. The ACL is the real answer and this does
not inspect it, so Windows now reports `unknown`.
- **Rehydration cost one full decryption per field.** `get` reads and decrypts
the entire file, and both rehydration paths ask field by field, serialized
behind the store's own queue. Measured on this machine, scrypt at N=16384 is
~23ms per derivation, so a 20-secret encrypted catalog spent **~450ms of
pure key derivation on every `GET /api/servers`** — a visible stall, not a
micro-optimization. Added an optional `getMany` seam: `FileSecretStore`
decrypts once per server, everything else falls back to the parallel
per-field `get` that already suited it. A test counts derivations directly:
1 for a three-field `getMany`, 3 for the three `get`s it replaced.
Also broadens a log message that still said "Keychain unavailable" for a
store that may not be a keychain.
Full `npm run ci` green — 5,762 tests under the coverage gate.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Nine findings (six inline, three suppressed), all taken. Two were serious.
**The memory fallback made the migrations destructive.** Both migrations —
mcp.json in the remote server, client.json in `node-persistence` — lift a
plaintext secret off disk, write it to the secret store, and then delete it
from the file. That trade is safe only while the store is at least as
durable as the disk, which held by construction while `InMemorySecretStore`
was a test double. Making it a production fallback broke it: on an
unmounted container a plain `GET /api/servers` would have moved a user's
existing secrets into RAM and lost them at exit — destroying data on a
read.
`SecretStore` gains an optional `isDurable()`, absent meaning durable, and
both migrations withhold the disk delete when it answers false (the value
is still loaded, so the session behaves normally). The production fallback
is now a named `SessionSecretStore` rather than the bare
`InMemorySecretStore`, so the suite's many doubles keep standing in for a
*working keychain* — which is what they are there to be — and only code
that deliberately chooses RAM in production says so.
**Round 2's per-call descriptor never reached anyone.** Both web servers
resolved it once at startup and baked it into `initialConfig`, which
`/api/config` serves unchanged — so the freshness fix was inert for its
only consumer. The route now takes a `secretStorageResolver` and calls it
per request.
The lock needed three more fixes, and they compound:
- **Release removed whatever directory was at the path.** A holder whose
work outran the stale threshold would delete the *next* owner's lock,
letting a third writer into a section two processes believed they held.
Ownership is now stamped with a random token and release only removes a
lock still carrying it.
- **The timeout fell through to an unlocked write** — under contention,
the one moment another writer is provably active. It now throws
`SecretFileLockTimeoutError`, which `set` is allowed to do.
- **The first write of every process bypassed the lock**, because the
secrets directory does not exist yet and `mkdir` failed ENOENT. The
parent is created first. First writes are exactly when two processes are
most likely to start together.
Fixing the timeout exposed a fourth: with stale (10s) below timeout, a
waiter stole from a holder that was merely *slow* rather than dead —
reinstating the lost update. A holder now heartbeats its lock, so
"stale" means the holder is gone, and the timeout is what a live-but-slow
holder produces. Lock timings are injectable so the tests can exercise
contention, staleness, and timeout without spending the real intervals.
Also: the loose-permission state is carried into `SecretStorageInfo` as
`looseMode` and rendered as the caveat (it outranks the encryption caveat —
a file others can read is a live exposure, while "unencrypted" is a
property of a file only its owner can open), rather than living in a
startup log the browser cannot see; and `usableSecretStorage` validates
`pendingEncryption` and `looseMode` as the optional booleans/numbers they
are (`pendingEncryption: "false"` is truthy and would have printed advice
that is the opposite of the truth) and rejects file-only fields on a
keychain or memory descriptor.
Tests: both migrations against a session store with a durable control
alongside, so the guard is visibly the difference; `/api/config` serving a
changing resolver and falling back without one; lock ownership after a
steal, the timeout under a live holder, no-steal from a slow holder, and a
locked first write; `looseMode` through the descriptor, the caveat
ordering, and the tone; and five more rejected payload shapes. Full
`npm run ci` green — 5,704 tests under the coverage gate.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Closes#1950
Before this, a box with no reachable OS keychain — the published
container (no D-Bus session, #1848), Android/Termux (no platform binary,
#1905), a minimal Linux install without libsecret — could not persist an
OAuth client secret or a stdio `env:` value at all. `KeyringSecretStore`
degraded into a store that silently holds nothing: `get` returned null,
`delete` no-opped, and `set` hard-failed with a 503. That is the correct
failure behavior, but it left the documented, supported way to run the
Inspector with no secret persistence whatsoever.
Adds the two missing implementations and, more importantly, the policy
that picks one and the surfaces that say which was picked.
- `FileSecretStore` — one `0600` JSON document at
`~/.mcp-inspector/secrets.json`, encrypted with AES-256-GCM whenever
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY` is set (scrypt, per-file random salt). The
whole map is encrypted as a unit rather than value-by-value so the
account names — `${serverId}:${field}` — are hidden too; a per-value
scheme would leave a readable index of which servers you hold a client
secret for. A file that can no longer be decrypted reads as empty
(matching the interface's read tolerance) but *refuses to be written*,
because replacing a file of still-valid secrets to satisfy an additive
request destroys data.
- `secret-store-selection.ts` — the policy.
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_STORE=keyring|file|memory` wins outright;
otherwise probe the keychain and, if unreachable, fall back loudly. The
fallback is `memory` in a container whose secrets directory is not on a
mount, and `file` otherwise — so mounting the volume the README already
recommends for the catalog flips the same run to durable storage with
no configuration, and an unmounted container gets the honest answer
rather than a file `--rm` will discard. Cached per process so the
banner, `/api/config`, and the store doing the writing cannot disagree.
- Automatic, but never silent. The downgrade prints at startup, rides
`GET /api/config`, and is named in a permanent 32px footer at the
bottom of both dialogs that accept a secret. A startup banner is seen
once by whoever started the process; a toast is seen once; a
dismissible banner is the thing a user dismisses before doing the work
it describes. The plaintext and memory cases render their caveat inline
in a warning tone — a warning you must hover to discover is not one.
- `SecretStoreUnavailableError` is now the base every store's `set`
throws, so the routes translate one condition into a 503 instead of
matching `KeychainUnavailableError` by name.
Docs: the container section of the root README gains a table of which
store you get and how to make secrets survive, plus the
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY` upgrade/mismatch rules.
Tests: the existing interface contract block is extracted to
`secretStoreContract.ts` and run against all three implementations, so
none can drift on the availability contract. `FileSecretStore` is tested
against a real temp filesystem — mode, cross-instance round-trip, that
the ciphertext does not contain the plaintext, the read-modify-write
race, and every refusal path. Full `npm run ci` passes, per-file gate
included.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
#1954 wired the list-load error off the aggregate managed stores only.
With `paginatedLists` on, those stores deliberately skip their all-page
walk, so their error is permanently null — while the paged stores that
actually drive the sidebar had no error state at all and `loadPage` had
a try/finally with no catch. A failing list showed an empty panel with
no alert and no Retry, and the connect-time `void loadPage(undefined)`
left an unhandled rejection.
- Give PagedTools/Prompts/ResourcesState observable error state: an
`errorChange` event plus `getError()`, set in a new catch in
`loadPage`, cleared on the next success and on disconnect. The
rejection is still re-thrown, matching ManagedListState — callers'
auth-recovery wrappers key off it to detect a 401.
- Catch the connect-time load's rejection (`.catch(() => {})`) now that
the failure is recorded as state rather than lost.
- Select the error by mode in `usePaginatedList`, the same way `items`
already is, and read it in App.tsx from the pagination model.
- Rename `useManagedListError` to `useListError`: both store families
expose an identical `errorChange`, so the hook declares that one-event
contract itself instead of importing ManagedListEventMap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 1. The helper's contract is exactly-once teardown
and the test asserted it must not lean on Hono's own re-entry guard, but
neither the implementation nor the test actually enforced that: the
listener had no local guard and the test aborted only once.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Both SSE handlers installed their subscriber, primed the stream so
Firefox's fetch() resolves (#1858), and only then registered onAbort.
Hono's onAbort has no already-aborted replay and abort() fires only the
subscribers registered at that moment, so a client disconnecting while
the priming write was in flight fired nothing: the session event
consumer / server-list subscriber stayed installed, the mcp.json watcher
was never stopped, and the handler parked forever on a promise nothing
would resolve.
Add primeAndHoldSseStream, which registers one listener before the first
await — it both cleans up and releases the hold, collapsing the previous
duplicate onAbort registrations. Priming still happens after the
subscriber is installed, since callers treat the stream's first bytes as
proof they are subscribed.
Closes#1999
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-19 review on #2035 -- a divergence introduced by
my own round-14 guard rather than by the original code.
The SDK validated a value inside `encodeValue`, i.e. only after looking one
up by a DECLARED name. The restored guard checked the caller's whole map, so
an unrelated entry failed a template that never mentions it. Measured on
9caac43d:
tryExpandUriTemplate("x://{id}", { id: "7", stale: "a".repeat(1_000_001) })
=> error: The value for "stale" exceeds the 1000000-character limit
RFC 6570 ignores an extra variable, so this refused a perfectly valid read.
`valueLengthError` now takes the names to consider and both callers pass the
template's declared set.
Copilot's second half is worth taking on its own: strict expansion parsed
the template THREE times -- inside `templateError`, again for the name list,
again to expand -- and the template is server-controlled and may be 1 MB.
It is now parsed once and reused, with validation split into
`sdkTemplateError` (the constructor's unclosed-brace and length/count
limits) and `partsError` (this module's own grammar), so `templateError` and
strict expansion share both halves rather than duplicating either.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-18 review on #2035. Two suppressed comments, both
holes in my own recent fixes rather than in the original code.
1. Round 16's grouping keyed off the length-announcing lead byte alone, so
it accepted sequences RFC 3629 forbids -- and the comment claiming they
fell back to per-triplet counting was simply wrong. Measured on 05bbfe50:
x{+v:1} "%C0%80x" => "x%C0%80" overlong
"%E0%80%80x" => "x%E0%80%80" overlong
"%ED%A0%80x" => "x%ED%A0%80" UTF-16 surrogate
"%F4%90%80%80x" => "x%F4%90%80%80" past U+10FFFF
The lead-byte ranges are now the well-formed ones -- C2-DF, E0 only with
A0-BF, ED only with 80-9F, F0 only with 90-BF, F4 only with 80-8F -- so
each of the above falls back to one triplet, which is what the fallback
was always documented to do. The legal boundary cases (%E0%A0%80,
%ED%9F%BF, %F4%8F%BF%BF) are tested alongside, so tightening the ranges
cannot quietly start splitting valid characters.
2. The preview never ran the read's template validation. It expands
expression by expression, so `x://{a}}/{b}` with both fields filled
previewed `x://1}/2` -- a URI whose stray `}` makes every read refuse.
Validation moved into an exported `templateError` that both callers
consult, so they cannot drift. It subsumes the narrower rule round 12
added here ("leave the invalid part standing"), which still let the REST
of such a template expand: the refusal is per template, not per
expression, so the preview now shows the template verbatim -- literals
unencoded included, since half-normalizing an unreadable template invents
a string the server never published. Two existing tests asserted the
weaker behavior and now assert this one.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-16 review on #2035. Two suppressed comments, both
real, and both refinements of fixes from the previous two rounds rather than
defects in the original code.
1. Round 11 settled on "a pct-encoded triplet counts as one character", but
a multi-octet character spans several triplets -- `%C3%A9` is one `é`.
Measured on a3dd8563:
x{+v:1} v = "%C3%A9x" => "x%C3" a lone lead byte, decoding to nothing
`prefixUnits` now recognizes a well-formed pct-encoded UTF-8 sequence from
its lead byte (RFC 3629: C2-DF two octets, E0-EF three, F0-F4 four;
continuations 80-BF), longest alternative first so a four-octet sequence
is not read as a two-octet one followed by loose triplets.
A malformed sequence -- a lead byte with too few continuations, or a stray
continuation -- matches no sequence alternative and falls back to
per-triplet counting. That is the conservative direction: it counts as
MORE units, so truncation keeps less rather than emitting octets that
were never in the value.
2. Round 14's per-value ceiling only covered the read. The panel calls
`previewUriTemplate` on every keystroke, and that path expands expression
by expression, so it reached the allocation-heavy encoders with the same
oversized value -- submission refused while the UI froze on the paste
anyway. Both paths now share one exported `valueLengthError`, checked
before any encoding happens.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-15 review on #2035.
1. `readResourceFromTemplate` had no regression distinguishing this module
from the SDK expander it replaced: the existing test uses `report.txt`
and the transport tests expand separately and call `readResource`, so all
of them pass either way.
Writing that test corrected something I had asserted twice in this PR.
The first version used `foo/bar` -- and verified by reverting the wiring,
it still passed. `encodeURIComponent` DOES encode `/`, so the SDK expands
`foobar://events/{topic}` to `foobar://events/foo%2Fbar` exactly as this
module does. #1919 was the WEB PANEL's own `String.replace`, not the SDK
expander, which the TUI path was using correctly all along.
The test now uses `a!b`. `!` is a sub-delim: RFC 6570 requires it
encoded, `encodeURIComponent` leaves it bare, so the SDK returns
`foobar://events/a!b` and the assertion fails. Re-verified by reverting
the wiring -- 2 of the 10 tests fail (this one and the malformed-template
refusal), where before the change none did.
2. The module summary said "shared by every client" a dozen lines above the
paragraph explaining the CLI is not a consumer. Now says web and TUI.
Also records, on MAX_VALUE_LENGTH, the audit prompted by round 14: the
per-value ceiling was the ONLY guard lost with `UriTemplate.expand`. The
template-length (1e6), expression-count (1e4) and variable-name-length (1e6)
limits all live in the SDK's `parse()`, which runs from the constructor --
and strict expansion still constructs a `UriTemplate`, so they remain
enforced. The restored limit is the SDK's `MAX_VARIABLE_LENGTH`, read from
the pinned dist rather than assumed.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-14 review on #2035. Three suppressed comments,
all real; each measured on 1c595e96 before acting.
1. A brace surviving in a literal is an unmatched one, and not a legal
literal character. The SDK's constructor rejects an unclosed `{` but
reads a stray `}` as text, and this parser did the same:
expandUriTemplateStrict("x://a}", {}) => "x://a}"
-- a "URI" carrying a brace, with the panel enabling the read on it.
Both halves are now refused the same way, so the withhold behavior
covers the whole class rather than the half the SDK happened to catch.
2. Replacing `UriTemplate.expand` also removed its 1,000,000-character
per-value ceiling. Nothing else bounded what reached the
allocation-heavy encoders, so a pasted or programmatically supplied
megabyte-plus value went straight through. Restored at the SDK's own
limit -- the guard it was, not a new policy -- and the error names the
offending variable.
3. `templateVariables` re-scanned an expression's whole varspec list for
every one of its names to compute `conforming`, which is quadratic in a
multi-name expression. Templates are server-controlled and the SDK
admits one up to 1 MB, so a single expression can carry thousands of
short comma-separated names, and this runs on the render thread.
Iterating the varspecs supplies the name and its conformance in one
pass.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-13 review on #2035. Two suppressed comments, both
real, both in the required-group work from round 7 rather than in the recent
preview rework.
1. `{a,a}` is ONE requirement named twice, but `requiredGroups` stored it as
a two-name group, so everything downstream read it as "either of these
will do". The TUI was left with a form it could not submit: its
`length === 1` test marked `a` optional while ResourceTestModal's guard
still refused a blank. The web panel offered the useless hint
"Any one of: a, a". Names are now deduplicated within the expression --
expansion still emits both occurrences (`x://{a,a}` -> `x://1,1`), which
RFC 6570 requires.
2. The per-field hint used `find`, so a variable in several shared groups
advertised only the first. With `{a,b}{b,c}{a,c}`, filling `b` satisfies
the first two and every visible hint then looks met while Read Resource
stays disabled on the unmet `{a,c}` -- a requirement with nothing on
screen pointing at it.
Fields now hint every shared group they sit in. That alone is not enough,
because no per-field hint can say WHICH group is still outstanding, so
the form states it directly: "Still needed: a or c", built from the same
`unmetRequiredGroups` the submit gate uses, so the message and the button
cannot disagree. `hasRequiredValues` is no longer called here -- the
panel derives both from the one list.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-11 review on #2035, which corrects my own round-9
fix rather than the original code.
That fix grouped pct-triplets only under `+` and `#`, on the reasoning that
every other operator escapes a `%` anyway, so `%61` is three characters
rather than one. Wrong, in a way the narrower rule made visible one operator
over -- measured on 2e06b369:
x/{v:1} v = "%61%62" => "x/%25" truncated to a `%` that was never
a character of the value
RFC 6570 2.4.1 counts characters and says a pct-encoded triplet counts as a
single one, without reference to the operator. Grouping per-operator also
made the same input mean two different things: `%61` indivisible under `+`,
three loose characters under `{v}`. What the operator decides is how a
retained unit is *encoded* afterwards -- a simple expansion still escapes
the kept triplet's `%`, so `%61` goes out as `%2561` -- not what counts as
one character.
`prefixUnits` no longer takes an operator, and the test that codified the
old split now asserts the uniform rule across simple, named, and reserved
expansion.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-10 review on #2035. One inline comment, one
suppressed; both real.
1. Literals were copied through verbatim, but RFC 6570 3.1 requires them
pct-encoded on expansion -- the conformance case `café/{var}` expands to
`caf%C3%A9/value`. Measured on ef3f5e74 it produced `café/value`, raw
UTF-8 in the path; since this module replaced the SDK's expander for both
clients, nothing else was going to encode it. (The pinned SDK does not
either -- it returns `café/value` too -- so this is a gap we inherited
rather than introduced.)
`encodeLiteral` keeps reserved delimiters (a literal's `/`, `?` and `#`
are structure) and existing pct-triplets, and encodes the rest. A BRACE
passes through: it can only reach a literal from a malformed template,
where an unclosed `{` becomes trailing text, and `%7B` would leave a
string resembling neither the template nor anything the server can match.
This is also what removed the preview's placeholder machinery. No token
can survive a round trip now that literals are encoded, so the preview
assembles part by part instead -- `encodeLiteral` for literal runs,
`expandTemplateExpression` for filled expressions, `part.source` for the
rest. Both halves still come from the shared expander, so the preview
cannot promise a URI that submitting would not send, and the question of
what token could never collide with a server-supplied template is gone.
2. On the varname set I took the structural point rather than the
conclusion. `VARCHAR` is RFC-exact again; `-` and `~` moved into a
separately named `TOLERATED_VARCHAR` tier, and a name needing it parses
with `conforming: false`, surfaced on `TemplateVariable`.
So the grammar in the code says what the RFC says and the tolerance is
explicit and separately tested -- but the Inspector still expands
`{default-graph-uri}`, because real servers publish hyphenated names and
the SDK's matcher round-trips them. Refusing to read a resource that
demonstrably works is a worse failure for a debugging tool than expanding
a name the conformance suite would reject. A caller wanting RFC-exact
behavior refuses on the flag rather than re-deriving the grammar.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-9 review on #2035.
RFC 6570 2.4.1 counts the prefix in *characters* and is explicit that a
pct-encoded triplet counts as a single one. Truncation went by code point,
so it cut a triplet in half -- measured on 6acaff70:
x{+v:5} v = "%61%62%63%64%65%66" => "x%61%256"
The orphaned "%6" is not a triplet, so encodeAllowReserved then (correctly)
escaped its `%`, and the value went out carrying a byte the caller never
asked for. Now "x%61%62%63%64%65".
Triplets are units only under `+` and `#`. Under every other operator the
encoder escapes a `%` anyway (`%61` -> `%2561`), so the three characters
really are three and grouping them would mis-count the prefix -- asserted
both ways. Astral code points remain single units under both, which is what
`Array.from` was there for.
Also corrects the comment on `readResourceFromTemplate`, which still said
the shared helper drops blank values. It has not since 6acaff70: `params`
passes through as given, so only an absent key omits its expression and a
direct API caller can request `?q=` deliberately. A caller whose values come
from a form drops its own blanks first.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-8 review on #2035 (one inline comment, one
suppressed). Both real.
1. RFC 6570 distinguishes an UNDEFINED variable, which omits its whole
expression, from one defined as the empty string, which expands. The
expander was calling `definedValues` on the way in, collapsing the two --
so `x{?q}` with `{ q: "" }` gave `x` instead of `x?q=`, and there was no
way for any caller, `readResourceFromTemplate` included, to request
either that or `x;q`. Key presence is now honored, including §3.2.7's
rule that the matrix operator drops the `=` for an empty value (`x{;q}`
-> `x;q`, while `?`/`&` keep it).
Dropping blanks is a FORM concern, so it moved to the two form
boundaries: the web panel seeds every declared variable with "" and the
TUI's ink-form returns "" for every untouched field, so neither can tell
"never touched" from "deliberately empty" -- but that is a fact about a
text input, not about the template, and it has no business deciding what
a template means for every other caller.
Six unit tests and one integration test encoded the old collapse and now
assert the corrected meaning. The prototype-collision cases get stronger
rather than weaker: a blank `{?toString}` expands to `?toString=` -- its
OWN empty value -- where the original bug expanded the inherited
function's body.
2. The expansion error is now `role="alert"`. It can appear while typing (a
pasted value that cannot be encoded), and plain text is not announced, so
a screen-reader user met a disabled Read Resource with no stated reason.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-7 review on #2035. Two suppressed comments, both
real; each reproduced against this branch before acting.
1. `parseVarSpec` was a "strip the first `*`, trim, split on `:`" pass, so
it accepted shapes RFC 6570's varspec production does not admit --
measured on the previous commit:
x://{*id} name "id" => "x://abcdef" explode is a TRAILING modifier
x://{id*:3} name "id" => "x://abc" the two modifiers are exclusive
x://{ id } name "id" => "x://abcdef" whitespace is not a varchar
x://{a b} name "a b" => "x://1" ditto -- and it emits into the URI
`{id*:3}` is the worst of them: it silently truncated the value through a
combination the grammar forbids. Parsing is now one anchored regex --
a varname, then at most one trailing `*` or `:1-9999`.
The name set is `varchar` widened by `-` and `~`, deliberately. A name is
the one thing expansion emits into the URI WITHOUT encoding it (`;`, `?`
and `&` write `name=value`), so the rule it has to satisfy is "needs no
encoding" -- RFC 3986 unreserved plus pct-encoded, of which the RFC's own
varchar is a subset. Strict varchar would refuse `{user-id}`, which real
servers publish and which the SDK's matcher round-trips; refusing to read
a resource that demonstrably works is a worse outcome for a debugging
tool than a name one character outside the production. Everything now
rejected is a shape we would otherwise have to guess at.
2. The TUI built its "Missing required template variable(s): ..." list with
its own bare `values[name]` filter while gating on `hasRequiredValues`,
which reads own properties only. For a variable legitimately named
`constructor` the two disagreed: `({})["constructor"]` is `Object`, whose
`.length` is 1, so the list came out empty and the error named no field
at all while the submit stayed blocked. Both now come from one exported
`unmetRequiredGroups`, with `hasRequiredValues` defined in terms of it.
Also renames a test whose title still said multi-name query expressions were
left "to the SDK, which handles them" -- expansion has been owned here since
935113d1; the behavior it asserts is naming, not delegation.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Ports the two behaviors PR #2033 (the parallel attempt at #1919, now closed
as a duplicate) got right and this branch did not.
1. An expression declaring no variable is a malformed template, not one
with a member to skip. RFC 6570 requires at least one varspec per
expression and admits no empty member, so `{}`, `{,}`, `{a,}`, `{?}`
and `{*}` (an explode modifier is not a name) now make the template
invalid. Skipping them was the more dangerous reading: `x://{}`
expanded to `x://` while the form rendered no inputs, so its
"everything required is filled" check was vacuously true and it
submitted a URI that is not the template the server published.
2. The read is withheld when expansion fails. `expandUriTemplate`'s
raw-template fallback exists for the preview, which runs during render
-- but the submit path used it too, so an invalid template was read
with its braces intact and the server answered with a confusing "not
found" for a defect that is not the user's. `tryExpandUriTemplate`
returns the URI or the reason as a value the caller cannot mistake for
one; the panel gates Read Resource on it and prints the reason.
This also covers a value that cannot be encoded -- an unpaired
surrogate has no UTF-8 encoding, so `encodeURIComponent` throws
`URIError` on it, and a text input can hold one via paste.
`requiredGroups` now skips an expression naming no variable: an empty
group can never be satisfied, so it would gate the form a second time on
a condition nothing can meet, and the "any one of" hint built from it
would name no fields. The accurate reason is the malformed template,
which the expansion gate reports.
npm run ci passes.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Two suppressed review findings.
With an override configured, the wrapper cloned and parsed every
successful application/json response — every tools/call result and every
resource payload on the direct CLI/TUI transports — only to conclude it
was not a metadata document. It now tests the request URL for the RFC
8414 / OIDC well-known paths first, so ordinary traffic costs one string
test and is returned untouched.
The read path also trusted StoredMCPServer's `string` type for the two
override fields, which a hand-edited mcp.json does not honor: the CLI and
TUI read the file directly and then `.trim()` these, so a number would
crash the server load. Guarded with cleanEndpointOverride, mirroring
cleanAuthorizationParams.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-6 review on #2035.
`toString`, `constructor`, `valueOf` and `__proto__` are all valid RFC
6570 variable names -- `varname` allows ALPHA / DIGIT / `_` / pct-encoded
-- and every lookup here was a bare `values[name]`, which finds
`Object.prototype`'s member for each of them. Measured: `({})["toString"]
!== undefined` is true with typeof "function", and `({}["constructor"] ??
"").length` is 1.
So a *blank* `{?toString}` field read as supplied and expanded a function
body into the URI instead of omitting the expression, and
`hasRequiredValues([["constructor"]], {})` returned true because
`Object.length` is 1 -- a required group satisfied by nothing.
All reads now go through an own-property `readValue`, and the web
preview's filled-check uses `Object.hasOwn`. `expandExpression` carries
the value through its filter rather than re-reading it afterwards, so the
"is it defined" test and the read cannot disagree and nothing needs a
non-null assertion.
The remaining six findings were documentation drifting behind the code,
which matters here because the comments are the argument for why this
module exists:
- The web helper still described the SDK's second-`?`-to-`&` rewrite as
something the preview relies on. That was removed last round.
- Three places still named the CLI as a consumer. It has no template form
and passes an already-expanded `--uri` to `readResource`.
- The PR description still described the superseded architecture
(expansion delegated to the SDK), i.e. the opposite of what now ships.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 2 (PR #2039) surfaced no new visible comments but six
suppressed ones. Four were actionable.
`clients/tui/src/App.tsx` — a stale-completion race in the new banner:
start disconnecting server A, switch to B, then let A's disconnect
reject, and A's failure appears under B. Rapid same-server retries had
the same shape, and the stale attempt is the one most likely to reject.
Claim a monotonic attempt token before awaiting and publish only if it
is still current and the server has not changed; `handleConnect` bumps
the same counter so a connect retires an in-flight disconnect. The
rejection is still owned when superseded — just not published. The
regression test drives a deferred rejection across a server switch, and
fails without the guard.
`tsconfig.lint.json` — the root type-aware block matches
`test-servers/src/**/*.tsx` but the parser project omitted that
extension, so such a file would have failed with "not found in any of
the provided project(s)" instead of being linted. Added, and AGENTS.md
now states the invariant: the include must stay a superset of the lint
globs.
`clients/web/server/{server,vite-hono-plugin}.ts` — the `open()`
rejection branch was untested, and duplicated. Both were fixed by
removing the duplication: `openBrowser` now lives beside
`printServerBanner` in `web-server-config.ts`, with one implementation
to test. Two copies of a one-line `.catch` is two chances for one to
drift back to a bare `open(url)`. The dev plugin is not booted in tests
— it returns early under VITEST by design — but it calls the same
tested helper.
`core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts` — `closeAbortedStream`'s rejecting-close
path, the entire reason the helper exists, had no test. Exported it (as
this file already does for `requestIdForSendWait` / `mcpParamHeadersOnly`)
and covered both legs, asserting no unhandledRejection fires.
Also corrects AGENTS.md, which said each client lists "both" tsconfig
projects — true for cli/tui/launcher, but web lists four leaf projects.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-5 review on #2035 — eight suppressed comments,
all of them real.
The consequential one overturns behavior I copied from the SDK and
defended in two earlier rounds. RFC 6570 expands each expression
independently; it carries no cross-expression state. The SDK tracks
whether a query expression has already emitted and rewrites a later
`{?two}`'s `?` to `&`. That looks friendlier and is wrong, and its own
matcher says so: for `x{?one}{?two}` it expands to `x?one=1&two=2`, and
`match("x?one=1&two=2")` on that same template returns **null**, while
`match("x?one=1?two=2")` returns both variables. So the rewrite emitted a
URI the advertised template cannot match — #1919 one level up. A server
that wants a continuation advertises `{?one}{&two}`, which expands to `&`
and matches; producing that shape is the server's choice to declare, not
ours to infer.
Also:
- `{id:abc}` was silently treated as `{id}`, and a test codified it. RFC
6570's max-length is `%x31-39 0*3DIGIT`, so `{id:}`, `{id:0}`,
`{id:abc}` and `{id:10000}` are invalid templates rather than templates
with an ignorable modifier — and the SDK's constructor accepts them all,
so nothing else rejects them. Strict expansion now throws; lenient
returns the raw template. Discovery stays lenient so the panel still
renders rather than going blank.
- The TUI could submit `{a,b}` completely blank while the web panel
blocked the same request: ink-form has no way to express "any one of
these", so its members are left optional and the modal needs its own
group check. Added, with tests — it was also below the coverage gate
without them (functions 76.92%).
- Added the integration test the config never had: it resolves the
checked-in config and drives all four reads over a real transport, so a
misspelt preset fails there rather than only when someone runs the repro
by hand.
- "All three clients" was false. The CLI has no template form and its
`resources/read` passes the already-expanded `--uri` straight to
`readResource`, so nothing here runs for it. Corrected in the README,
AGENTS.md, and the module comment, and dropped a docblock still
describing the SDK-delegation path removed last round.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The overrides are per-server configuration for the *resource* server's
authorization server, but the fetch wrapper that applies them is shared
with the enterprise-managed (EMA) flow, whose IdP OIDC discovery runs
through the same fetch and satisfies the metadata predicate. An
authorization override could therefore redirect the IdP login to the
resource AS, and a token override could send the IdP code or refresh
token there.
OAuthManager.getEndpointOverrides() now returns nothing when the server
is enterprise-managed — the same boundary redirectToExternalAuthorization
draws for the custom authorization parameters (#2018) — with a regression
test, the note surfaced on both form fields, and the rule documented.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-4 review on #2035 — again reported as "no new
comments" while carrying three suppressed ones. All three reproduced.
1. The TUI form still named its fields from the SDK. `uriTemplateToForm`
read `UriTemplate.variableNames`, which mangles a name: `{;id}` yields
";id" and `{id:3}` yields "id:3". The form therefore submitted
`{ ";id": "7" }` while the shared expander looked up `id`, found
nothing, and dropped the expression — the value vanished silently.
This is the finding that mattered most, because it falsified the claim
this change is built on. Moving the expander into core only makes the
clients agree if each client's FORM derives its names from the same
parser: a form submits under the names it rendered. The TUI now reads
`templateVariables`, and the SDK template is constructed only to
validate, preserving the existing malformed-template diagnostic.
Its `required` flag comes from `requiredGroups`, and only a variable
that is the sole member of a non-omittable expression is marked: ink-
form cannot express "any one of these", so marking every member of
`{a,b}` required would refuse input the expander accepts.
2. `encodeURIComponent` is not RFC 3986's unreserved set — it leaves the
sub-delims !'()* bare, which RFC 6570 requires encoded for every
operator except + and #.
Fixing that settled a design question left open in the previous round.
With two encoders, the SAME value encoded differently depending on
whether its expression happened to carry a modifier, since only the
modifier pushed it onto our path. So delegation is gone entirely: one
expander, one set of rules. The SDK's `UriTemplate` is still
constructed, but only to validate a template.
3. The "Any one of: a, b" hint could contradict the disabled submit
button. A name can sit in a singleton required group AND a shared one
(`x://{a}/{a,b}`), where the singleton demands that exact field. The
hint is suppressed in that case.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
A floated promise is invisible at review time — the call reads like an
awaited one minus four characters — and the unhandled rejection it
produces surfaces in a different test, in a different file, as a stack
pointing at SDK internals. In #1947 two un-held `callTool` calls made
`npm run ci` unpassable and took a full investigation to attribute; the
fix was two lines. `@typescript-eslint/no-floating-promises` catches the
class outright, so enable it at `error` everywhere.
The rule is type-aware and `tseslint.configs.recommended` is not, so each
scope's config gains a parser project. The four clients name their own
tsconfig projects (both of them — `src` and `__tests__`/`server` live in
different ones). The root scope has no tsconfig at all, so add
`tsconfig.lint.json`: a lint-only project covering `core/**`,
`test-servers/src/**`, and `vitest.shared.mts`, emitting nothing and
gating nothing. It sets `moduleResolution: bundler` deliberately — under
NodeNext `core/`'s extensionless imports fail to resolve, every import
degrades to `any`, and the rule silently stops seeing promises at all.
Measured surface, and the fixes:
- core (2) — `stream.close()` in two Hono `onAbort` listeners. Hono
invokes subscribers with a bare `subscriber()`, so a promise returned
from the listener is floated one layer up; `closeAbortedStream` owns
the rejection where it can actually be owned.
- tui (5) — `handleDisconnect` had no catch of its own and its only
caller is a key handler that cannot await, so a failing disconnect was
a live unhandled rejection; it now surfaces the message the way
`handleConnect` does. The rest are `void` at callers that genuinely
cannot await, over callees that already own their failures.
- web (92) — 83 are Storybook `expect(...)`, which is instrumented and
returns a promise, now awaited (`scrollAreaStoryAssertions` is async
for the same reason). Two tests were asserting against a provider call
they never awaited. `open(url)` in both web servers now warns instead
of escaping a synchronous callback.
- cli, launcher — already clean.
Type-aware linting costs time: `clients/web`'s `eslint .` goes from ~8s
to ~19s, inside `validate`. Narrowing the loaded projects is the lever if
that needs reducing later; dropping the rule is not.
Closes#1959
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Adds two optional per-server fields — `oauth.authorizationUrl` and
`oauth.tokenUrl` — that override the endpoints authorization-server
metadata discovery resolved, so a server can be pointed at a development
or staging authorization server without changing what it advertises.
SDK v2 routes both endpoints through the discovered metadata document and
neither through OAuthClientProvider, so the override is applied by
wrapping the client's base fetch and patching the metadata document in
flight (core/auth/endpointOverrides.ts). Wrapping the base fetch — rather
than only the auth fetch — also covers the discovery the SDK runs from
inside the transport on the 401/refresh path.
The fields round-trip through mcp.json, the /api/servers routes, the
runner (CLI/TUI), and the Server Settings → Authorization panel, where a
value that is not an absolute http(s) URL is flagged inline; at runtime
such a value is dropped with a single warning rather than failing the
connection.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-3 review on #2035. It again reported "no new
comments" while carrying two suppressed ones; both reproduced.
1. Requiredness could not live on a variable at all. Deduplication kept the
first occurrence's group, so in `x{?a}{?b}{a,b}` both names ended up
required with singleton groups and the form demanded both -- while the
SDK expands that template with only `a` to "x?a=11". Widening the stored
group would not have been enough either: in `{a,b}{a,c}`, filling `b` and
`c` satisfies both expressions, which no per-variable flag can express.
So requiredness is now returned per expression by `requiredGroups`, and
`hasRequiredValues` asks that each group be satisfied by any one of its
names. `TemplateVariable.groupNames` is gone rather than left as a field
that quietly means something narrower than it reads; `required` remains,
documented as driving the "Optional" marker and nothing else.
2. `encodeURI` is not the allow-reserved encoder `+` and `#` call for. It
escapes `[` and `]`, which are reserved and must survive, and it escapes
`%`, so an already-encoded value is double-encoded. Measured:
"[::1]" -> "%5B::1%5D" and "%2F" -> "%252F". Both corrupt the URI rather
than merely over-escaping it -- an IPv6 literal or a pre-encoded path
reaches the server altered, which is the same class of defect #1919 is
about.
Added an RFC 6570 3.2.1 encoder that preserves reserved characters and
existing pct-triplets, splitting on `%XX` so a lone `%` is still encoded
to `%25`, and matching with the `u` flag so an astral character is
encoded whole. `+` and `#` expressions are now taken over even for a
single name, so both expansion paths agree on what those operators mean.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's round-2 review on #2035. It reported "no new comments"
but carried three *suppressed* ones; all three reproduced against the
pinned SDK.
1. The `;` path-parameter operator is absent from the SDK's operator list,
so `{;id}` parsed as a variable literally named ";id" and expanded to
nothing. Added the operator and its named expansion (`;a=1;b=2`).
2. An RFC 6570 prefix modifier was folded into the variable name: `{id:3}`
yielded a variable called "id:3" and expanded to nothing. Varspecs are
now parsed properly and the value truncated before encoding. Truncation
is by code point, since `String.prototype.slice` counts UTF-16 units and
would split an astral character into a lone surrogate.
For both of these the wrong URI is the lesser problem: a form has to
*name* the variables it asks the user to fill, so the panel was
rendering fields labelled `;id` and `id:3` that nobody could use.
3. Requiredness was applied per variable, but it is a property of the
*expression*: RFC 6570 drops undefined names from a multi-name
expression, so `{a,b}` with only `a` filled expands to `a`'s value --
the SDK does this too. The panel was refusing input the expander would
have accepted. `hasRequiredValues` now encodes "any one name in a
required group suffices", and such a field reads "Any one of: a, b"
rather than falsely claiming each is mandatory.
Two structural consequences, each pinned by a test:
- Takeover is now per TEMPLATE rather than per expression. Splicing
corrected fragments into a template the SDK re-expands would leave its
cross-expression `?`-to-`&` rewrite blind to the fragments already
resolved.
- Expansion is split into a strict variant that throws and a lenient one
that returns the raw template. `readResourceFromTemplate` wraps the
thrown error with the template name -- three pre-existing integration
tests assert that -- while the form must not throw on a server-supplied
template, since that would take out the panel on render. The strict
variant constructs the SDK template unconditionally, because that
construction is what validates syntax: otherwise `x://{;a}{b,c` would
take the own-expansion path and its unclosed tail would pass as literal
text with nothing objecting.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot's review on #2035. All three findings reproduced against
the pinned SDK before acting.
1. `#` was misclassified as required. Measured: `x://a{#frag}` with no
`frag` expands to exactly `x://a`, a well-formed URI naming a real
resource -- unlike `{+path}` (`x://a/`) or a simple `{userId}`
(`file:///users//profile`), which leave an empty path segment. Moved `#`
into the omittable set; the required cases now assert what the URI
*becomes* when blank, so the rule is checked rather than asserted.
2. Delegating to the SDK did not actually give RFC 6570 expansion.
`UriTemplate.expandPart` takes an early `names.length > 1` branch that
raw-joins values, skipping both `encodeValue` and the operator prefix:
`x://{a,b}` with `a = "foo/bar"` expands to `x://foo/bar,q` -- the very
unencoded-slash defect this PR is about -- and `x://a{/p,q}` to
`x://ax y,z`. Only `?`/`&` are correct, being dispatched earlier.
Fixing that in the web client alone would have left the TUI and CLI
wrong, since `readResourceFromTemplate` expands through the same class.
So parse/classify/expand now live in `core/mcp/uriTemplate.ts` and both
call sites use it. The correction is surgical: a multi-name non-query
expression is expanded here and spliced in as literal text before the
SDK sees the template (safe -- both encoders escape `{`/`}`), while
every single-name and query expression still goes through the SDK
untouched. The preview applies the same correction, so it cannot
promise a URI that submitting would not send.
3. The showcase promised a blank `{?topic}` read that did not work.
`UriTemplate.match()` compiles `{?topic}` to a *required*
`\?topic=([^&]+)`, so `match("foobar://events")` returns null and the
read 404s. A real server exposes the unfiltered collection as its own
resource; the showcase now registers `foobar://events` so the
documented step resolves. Verified end to end through the CLI.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 5 — three of four findings implemented.
- `cleanAuthorizationParams` validates the field as it comes off disk. Only the
web client's /api/servers route checked the shape; the CLI and TUI read
mcp.json directly, so `authorizationParams: "oops"` enumerated as the
character-indexed pairs 0=o, 1=o, … and `{ audience: 5 }` reached
URLSearchParams.set, which stringifies it — either way the Inspector sent
query parameters the user never wrote. Now validated in shared code so all
three clients enforce the documented string→string contract, warning on each
rejection. Follows `cleanRoots`, which guards the same class for `roots`.
- The form's description now states that these parameters are not sent while
Enterprise-managed authorization is on. The EMA leg authorizes against the
enterprise IdP — a different authorization server — and deliberately sends
none of them, so the copy was presenting a configured-but-inert value as
active.
- The /api/servers malformed-`oauth` warning listed an expected shape omitting
`onInsufficientScope`, which the validator accepts and the docs describe, so
it told users a valid config was malformed.
Ten new cases, all verified to fail against the pre-fix sources.
Declined: recording the authorize URL in the Network tab (repeat of round 2) —
that URL is reached by a top-level browser navigation rather than a tracked
fetch, so it has never appeared there for any authorization request; adding a
synthetic entry changes every OAuth flow and is a product decision for a
maintainer, not a change to make inside this PR.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 4 (one suppressed finding, and a real bug).
`extractSecretsFromStored` rebuilt the stripped `oauth` object from an
allow-list of the non-secret fields. That list had gone stale: it never named
`onInsufficientScope`, so a server carrying both a client secret and a
non-default SEP-2350 policy silently lost the policy on save, falling back to
`reauthorize`. This predates #2018 — the PR only extended the same list with
`authorizationParams` — but the list is the defect, so fix the class rather
than add a third entry to it.
The stripped entry now subtracts the one secret instead of enumerating what to
keep, so any field added to `oauth` later is preserved by construction.
Regression test verified to fail against the allow-list version:
`expected { clientId: 'cid' } to deeply equal { clientId: 'cid', onInsufficientScope: 'throw' }`.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 10.
The scan no longer publishes its malformed entries into the tools/list report
at all. Round 9 only stopped it overwriting the aggregate's; the remaining
case is unsalvageable for a stronger reason than 'two different requests':
- a FAILED strict aggregate runs salvage, which writes the report itself;
- a SUCCESSFUL one means every entry parsed, so the rendered list contains no
malformed entries.
So by the time the scan finds something, either the aggregate already reported
it with indices matching the screen, or the aggregate succeeded and what the
scan found is provably not in the list being displayed. Publishing could only
ever name entries the user cannot see.
Nothing is lost: listToolsForScan still marks its own refused response, so the
finding surfaces on the Protocol entry for the exchange that carried it, where
it is true. The per-page accumulation and raw-entry offset existed only to feed
the removed publish, and go with it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
