import type { OAuthClientProvider } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client"; import type { OAuthClientInformationContext, OAuthClientInformationMixed, OAuthClientMetadata, OAuthDiscoveryState, OAuthTokens, } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client"; import type { BaseOAuthClientProvider } from "../providers.js"; import { refreshEmaResourceTokens, startEmaIdpAuthorization, type EmaFlowConfig, } from "./emaFlow.js"; import { isJwtExpired } from "./jwt.js"; function isAccessTokenUsable(tokens: OAuthTokens, skewMs = 60_000): boolean { if (!tokens.access_token) return false; return !isJwtExpired(tokens.access_token, skewMs); } /** * OAuth provider for MCP transport when enterprise-managed authorization is enabled. * * Proactively refreshes resource tokens (EMA legs 2–3) via {@link tokens} before * requests. On 401 when the IdP session is still valid, the SDK {@link auth} * call may still reach {@link redirectToAuthorization}; we ignore the resource-AS * URL and redirect to the IdP instead. */ export class EmaTransportOAuthProvider implements OAuthClientProvider { private readonly inner: BaseOAuthClientProvider; private readonly emaConfig: EmaFlowConfig; constructor(inner: BaseOAuthClientProvider, emaConfig: EmaFlowConfig) { this.inner = inner; this.emaConfig = emaConfig; } get redirectUrl(): string { return this.inner.redirectUrl; } get clientMetadataUrl(): string | undefined { return this.inner.clientMetadataUrl; } get clientMetadata(): OAuthClientMetadata { return this.inner.clientMetadata; } state(): string | Promise { return this.inner.state(); } // SEP-2352: `ctx` carries the authorization-server `issuer` the SDK resolved, // and the inner provider keys registrations by it. Dropping it here made every // EMA read and write land on the unkeyed slot — and, since #2242, left // `resolveSdkRegistrationKind` with no issuer to check, so a CIMD registration // made over an EMA connection was recorded as DCR (Copilot). clientInformation( ctx?: OAuthClientInformationContext, ): | OAuthClientInformationMixed | undefined | Promise { return this.inner.clientInformation(ctx); } saveClientInformation( clientInformation: OAuthClientInformationMixed, ctx?: OAuthClientInformationContext, ): void | Promise { return this.inner.saveClientInformation(clientInformation, ctx); } // Without these the SDK persists no discovery state for an EMA connection, so // it re-discovers on every call, cannot perform its SEP-2352 callback-leg // authorization-server binding check (it warns as much), and — since #2242 — // leaves the registration-kind resolver nothing to read back. saveDiscoveryState(state: OAuthDiscoveryState): void | Promise { return this.inner.saveDiscoveryState(state); } discoveryState(): | OAuthDiscoveryState | undefined | Promise { return this.inner.discoveryState(); } async tokens(): Promise { const stored = await this.inner.tokens(); if (stored && isAccessTokenUsable(stored)) { return stored; } const refreshed = await refreshEmaResourceTokens(this.emaConfig); if (refreshed) { return refreshed; } return undefined; } saveTokens(tokens: OAuthTokens): void | Promise { return this.emaConfig.storage.saveTokens(this.emaConfig.serverUrl, tokens, { enterpriseManaged: true, }); } async redirectToAuthorization(_authorizationUrl: URL): Promise { const idpAuthorizationUrl = await startEmaIdpAuthorization(this.emaConfig); this.inner.clearCapturedAuthUrl(); // The IdP is a different authorization server than the one the inner // provider was configured for, so the per-server custom authorization // parameters (#2018) must not be appended here — hence the "external" // entry point rather than `redirectToAuthorization`. this.inner.redirectToExternalAuthorization(idpAuthorizationUrl); } saveCodeVerifier(codeVerifier: string): void | Promise { return this.inner.saveCodeVerifier(codeVerifier); } codeVerifier(): string | Promise { return this.inner.codeVerifier(); } }