import { Command } from "commander";
type McpResponse = Record<string, unknown>;
import { awaitableLog } from "./utils/awaitable-log.js";
import type {
  InspectorServerSettings,
  MCPServerConfig,
  InspectorClientEnvironment,
} from "@inspector/core/mcp/types.js";
import { eraToVersionNegotiation } from "@inspector/core/mcp/types.js";
import {
  DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS,
  withConnectTimeout,
} from "./handlers/connect-timeout.js";
import { listServerEntries, showServerEntry } from "./handlers/servers-list.js";
import { writeFormattedResult } from "./handlers/format-output.js";
import { clearStoredAuthForRelogin } from "./clear-stored-auth-for-relogin.js";
import { InspectorClient } from "@inspector/core/mcp/index.js";
import { cleanRoots } from "@inspector/core/mcp/serverList.js";
import {
  createProxyFetch,
  createTransportNode,
  loadServerEntries,
  selectServerEntry,
  parseKeyValuePair as parseEnvPair,
  parseHeaderPair,
} from "@inspector/core/mcp/node/index.js";
import type { JsonValue } from "@inspector/core/mcp/index.js";
import type { StrictJsonValue } from "@inspector/core/json/jsonUtils.js";
import { isSerializableJson } from "@inspector/core/json/jsonUtils.js";
import {
  canonicalUrlHost,
  isAllInterfacesHost,
} from "@inspector/core/node/hostUrl.js";
import { getStateFilePath } from "@inspector/core/auth/node/storage-node.js";
import { consumeMethodOutcome } from "./handlers/consume-outcome.js";
import { runMethod } from "./handlers/run-method.js";
import {
  isOneShotMethod,
  ONE_SHOT_METHODS,
  type MethodArgs,
} from "./handlers/method-types.js";
export type { CliAppInfo } from "./handlers/method-types.js";
export { emitResult } from "./handlers/emit-result.js";
export { collectAppInfo } from "./handlers/collect-app-info.js";
import {
  parseOAuthPersistBlob,
  serializeOAuthPersistBlob,
  type OAuthPersistSnapshot,
} from "@inspector/core/auth/oauth-persist.js";
import { getAuthorizationServerUrl } from "@inspector/core/auth/discovery.js";
import { writeStoreFile } from "@inspector/core/storage/store-io.js";
import {
  refreshAuthorization,
  discoverAuthorizationServerMetadata,
} from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
import type {
  OAuthClientInformation,
  OAuthMetadata,
  OAuthTokens,
} from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
import { CliExitCodeError, EXIT_CODES } from "./error-handler.js";
import { MutableRedirectUrlProvider } from "@inspector/core/auth/index.js";
import { NodeOAuthStorage } from "@inspector/core/auth/node/index.js";
import { createCliOAuthNavigation } from "./cli-oauth-navigation.js";
import {
  connectInspectorWithOAuth,
  withCliAuthRecoveryRetry,
} from "./cliOAuth.js";
import {
  DEFAULT_RUNNER_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL,
  formatRunnerOAuthRedirectUrl,
  parseRunnerOAuthCallbackUrl,
  type RunnerOAuthCallbackConfig,
} from "@inspector/core/auth/node/runner-oauth-callback.js";
import type { ClientConfig } from "@inspector/core/client/types.js";
import {
  buildRunnerClientAuthOptions,
  isOAuthCapableServerConfig,
  loadRunnerClientConfig,
  type RunnerClientConfigOverrides,
} from "@inspector/core/client/runner.js";
import { type LoggingLevel } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
import { LoggingLevelSchema } from "@modelcontextprotocol/core";
import { readInspectorVersion } from "@inspector/core/node/version.js";

export const validLogLevels: LoggingLevel[] = Object.values(
  LoggingLevelSchema.enum,
);

/** Client identity name the CLI reports to servers. */
const CLI_CLIENT_NAME = "inspector-cli";

export { DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS, withConnectTimeout };

type OutputFormat = "text" | "json";

async function callMethod(
  serverConfig: MCPServerConfig,
  serverSettings: InspectorServerSettings | undefined,
  args: MethodArgs & { method: string },
  clientConfig: ClientConfig,
  cliAuthOverrides: RunnerClientConfigOverrides,
  callbackUrlConfig: RunnerOAuthCallbackConfig,
  storedAuthOnly: boolean,
  relogin: boolean,
): Promise<void> {
  // Clear after parse-time validation so a bad flag combo never deletes store
  // entries. Deletes the shared URL-keyed OAuth entry (not "ignore for this run").
  if (relogin) {
    if (!("url" in serverConfig && serverConfig.url)) {
      throw new Error(
        "--relogin requires an HTTP/SSE server URL (no OAuth store entry for stdio)",
      );
    }
    await clearStoredAuthForRelogin(serverConfig.url);
  }

  // Version comes from the single source of truth — the root package.json —
  // via the shared core reader, not the CLI's own manifest.
  const clientIdentity = {
    name: CLI_CLIENT_NAME,
    version: readInspectorVersion(import.meta.url),
  };

  const environment: InspectorClientEnvironment = {
    transport: createTransportNode,
    // Proxy support sits at the bottom of the fetch stack so InspectorClient's
    // wrappers compose over it — and so OAuth discovery/token requests, which
    // also run through `environment.fetch`, are proxied too (#2067). Undefined
    // when no proxy env var is set, which leaves the built-in fetch in place.
    fetch: createProxyFetch(),
  };
  const redirectUrlProvider = new MutableRedirectUrlProvider();
  // Disarmed until the CLI-owned interactive OAuth flow runs — SDK `auth()`
  // during connect must not open a browser before `--stored-auth-only` / gates.
  const autoOpenControl = { armed: false };
  if (isOAuthCapableServerConfig(serverConfig)) {
    redirectUrlProvider.redirectUrl =
      formatRunnerOAuthRedirectUrl(callbackUrlConfig);
    environment.oauth = {
      storage: new NodeOAuthStorage(),
      navigation: createCliOAuthNavigation({
        autoOpenControl,
        disableAutoOpen: storedAuthOnly,
      }),
      redirectUrlProvider,
    };
  }

  const clientAuthOptions = buildRunnerClientAuthOptions(
    clientConfig,
    serverSettings,
    cliAuthOverrides,
  );

  const inspectorClient = new InspectorClient(serverConfig, {
    environment,
    clientIdentity,
    initialLoggingLevel: "debug",
    progress: false,
    sample: false,
    elicit: false,
    // Advertise the roots configured for this server in mcp.json, exactly as
    // web does (`App.tsx`) so both answer `roots/list` with the same content.
    // Passing the option (even empty) is what negotiates `capabilities.roots`
    // at `initialize` and registers the `roots/list` handler. Omitting it meant
    // a server that asks for roots on its own — `server-filesystem` does, at
    // `initialize` — got -32601, and `--method roots/set` could not announce
    // the change at all: the SDK refuses `roots/list_changed` from a client
    // that never declared it, which `setRoots` logged as a send failure (#1797).
    roots: cleanRoots(serverSettings?.roots ?? []),
    // Per-server default `_meta` from mcp.json, exactly as web (`App.tsx`) and
    // the TUI pass it — the setting belongs to the server, not to the client
    // that happens to read it, and `InspectorClient` only reads the option
    // rather than falling back to `serverSettings.metadata` (#2093). Already a
    // JSON object (#1910), so there is no pair-array flattening left to do;
    // `{}` means "no defaults". `--metadata` stays per-invocation and wins on a
    // key collision, since call-time keys override defaults in `mergeMeta`.
    ...(serverSettings?.metadata &&
      Object.keys(serverSettings.metadata).length > 0 && {
        defaultMetadata: serverSettings.metadata,
      }),
    serverSettings,
    // Per-server protocol era (SEP §7.8) from mcp.json → SDK versionNegotiation.
    // Absent era defaults to legacy in the InspectorClient constructor (#1626).
    ...(serverSettings?.protocolEra && {
      versionNegotiation: eraToVersionNegotiation(serverSettings.protocolEra),
    }),
    ...clientAuthOptions,
  });

  try {
    await connectInspectorWithOAuth(
      inspectorClient,
      serverConfig,
      redirectUrlProvider,
      callbackUrlConfig,
      serverSettings,
      { storedAuthOnly, autoOpenControl },
    );

    const outcome = await withCliAuthRecoveryRetry(
      inspectorClient,
      serverConfig,
      redirectUrlProvider,
      callbackUrlConfig,
      serverSettings,
      () => runMethod(inspectorClient, args),
      { storedAuthOnly, autoOpenControl },
    );

    await consumeMethodOutcome(outcome, args);
  } finally {
    await inspectorClient.disconnect();
  }
}

/**
 * Canonicalise a server URL the same way the web inspector does before storing
 * OAuth state (`new URL().href` lowercases the host, normalises the scheme, and
 * adds a trailing `/` for bare-origin URLs). The CLI must look up by the same
 * key the web side wrote, so a trailing-slash or case mismatch doesn't miss a
 * token that's sitting one key over. Falls back to the raw string when the URL
 * can't be parsed (e.g. an ad-hoc non-URL target).
 */
export function normalizeServerUrl(serverUrl: string): string {
  try {
    return new URL(serverUrl).href;
  } catch {
    return serverUrl;
  }
}

/** The subset of a stored server's OAuth state the CLI reads/refreshes. */
type StoredServerState = {
  tokens?: OAuthTokens;
  clientInformation?: OAuthClientInformation;
  serverMetadata?: OAuthMetadata;
};
/** The stored-server map shape the CLI reads out of the OAuth state file. */
type StoredServers = Record<string, StoredServerState>;

/**
 * Read the OAuth state file directly (bypassing the Zustand store cache) so
 * each call sees the current on-disk state — required for `--wait-for-auth`
 * polling. Returns the full snapshot, or an empty one when the file is absent
 * or unreadable. Uses the shared {@link parseOAuthPersistBlob} so both the
 * plain `{servers,idpSessions}` and legacy `{state,version}` layouts are
 * accepted, matching whatever the web backend wrote.
 */
async function readOAuthSnapshot(
  statePath: string,
): Promise<OAuthPersistSnapshot> {
  const { readFile } = await import("node:fs/promises");
  try {
    const text = await readFile(statePath, "utf8");
    const snapshot = parseOAuthPersistBlob(text);
    if (snapshot) return snapshot;
  } catch {
    // Absent/unreadable/malformed → fall through to the empty snapshot below.
  }
  return { servers: {}, idpSessions: {} };
}

/**
 * Read just the `servers` map. Thin wrapper over {@link readOAuthSnapshot} for
 * the read-only lookups (`findStoredToken`, `--wait-for-auth`, key listing).
 */
async function readOAuthServers(statePath: string): Promise<StoredServers> {
  return (await readOAuthSnapshot(statePath)).servers as StoredServers;
}

/**
 * Look up a stored server's OAuth state, trying the URL-normalised key first
 * (how the web store writes it) and the raw string second. Returns the matched
 * key so a write-back updates the same entry.
 */
function findStoredServerState(
  servers: StoredServers,
  serverUrl: string,
): { key: string; state: StoredServerState } | undefined {
  const normalized = normalizeServerUrl(serverUrl);
  if (servers[normalized])
    return { key: normalized, state: servers[normalized] };
  if (servers[serverUrl]) return { key: serverUrl, state: servers[serverUrl] };
  return undefined;
}

/**
 * Look up a stored access token for `serverUrl`, trying the URL-normalised key
 * first (how the web store writes it) and the raw string second.
 */
function findStoredToken(
  servers: StoredServers,
  serverUrl: string,
): string | undefined {
  return findStoredServerState(servers, serverUrl)?.state.tokens?.access_token;
}

/**
 * Injectable dependencies for {@link refreshStoredAuthToken}, so the refresh
 * grant + auth-server discovery can be faked in unit tests without standing up
 * a real OAuth token endpoint. Both default to the SDK implementations.
 */
export interface RefreshStoredAuthDeps {
  refresh?: typeof refreshAuthorization;
  discover?: typeof discoverAuthorizationServerMetadata;
}

/**
 * Run the OAuth `refresh_token` grant for a stored server and persist the
 * rotated tokens back to `statePath` (same `{servers,idpSessions}` shape the
 * web backend writes), returning the fresh access token.
 *
 * Reuses the SDK's {@link refreshAuthorization} (not a hand-rolled token
 * request) with the stored `clientInformation` + `serverMetadata`; when the
 * metadata wasn't persisted it is discovered from the resolved authorization
 * server. A missing refresh token or client information, or a failed grant,
 * throws {@link CliExitCodeError} with {@link EXIT_CODES.AUTH_REQUIRED} so the
 * caller exits with the documented code and a clear message.
 */
export async function refreshStoredAuthToken(
  serverUrl: string,
  statePath: string,
  deps: RefreshStoredAuthDeps = {},
): Promise<string> {
  const refresh = deps.refresh ?? refreshAuthorization;
  const discover = deps.discover ?? discoverAuthorizationServerMetadata;

  const snapshot = await readOAuthSnapshot(statePath);
  const servers = snapshot.servers as StoredServers;
  const found = findStoredServerState(servers, serverUrl);
  const refreshToken = found?.state.tokens?.refresh_token;
  const clientInformation = found?.state.clientInformation;
  if (!found || !refreshToken) {
    throw new CliExitCodeError(
      EXIT_CODES.AUTH_REQUIRED,
      `No stored refresh token for ${normalizeServerUrl(serverUrl)} in ${statePath}. Complete the OAuth flow in the web inspector first.`,
      { code: "no_stored_token", url: serverUrl },
    );
  }
  if (!clientInformation) {
    throw new CliExitCodeError(
      EXIT_CODES.AUTH_REQUIRED,
      `Stored auth for ${normalizeServerUrl(serverUrl)} has a refresh token but no client information; cannot refresh. Re-authorize in the web inspector.`,
      { code: "no_client_information", url: serverUrl },
    );
  }

  const authServerUrl = found.state.serverMetadata?.issuer
    ? new URL(found.state.serverMetadata.issuer)
    : getAuthorizationServerUrl(serverUrl);
  const metadata =
    found.state.serverMetadata ?? (await discover(authServerUrl)) ?? undefined;

  let tokens: OAuthTokens;
  try {
    tokens = await refresh(authServerUrl, {
      metadata,
      clientInformation,
      refreshToken,
      resource: new URL(serverUrl),
    });
  } catch (err) {
    const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
    throw new CliExitCodeError(
      EXIT_CODES.AUTH_REQUIRED,
      `Failed to refresh the stored OAuth token for ${normalizeServerUrl(serverUrl)}: ${message}. Re-authorize in the web inspector.`,
      { code: "refresh_failed", url: serverUrl },
    );
  }

  // Persist the rotated tokens back under the same key, preserving every other
  // server entry and the idpSessions block, so web and CLI stay consistent.
  // Route through the shared `writeStoreFile` (not a raw `writeFile`) so the
  // secrets file keeps its owner-only `0o600` mode + `mkdir -p`, identical to
  // how the web backend's OAuth persist backend writes it.
  servers[found.key] = { ...found.state, tokens };
  await writeStoreFile(statePath, serializeOAuthPersistBlob(snapshot));

  return tokens.access_token;
}

/**
 * Poll the OAuth state file until a token for `serverUrl` appears (or the
 * timeout elapses). Used by `--wait-for-auth` so an automated caller can hand
 * off to a human for the OAuth dance and resume once the token lands. The
 * lookup is normalised, so a trailing-slash mismatch between the URL the human
 * opened and the one the agent passed still resolves.
 */
async function waitForStoredToken(
  serverUrl: string,
  statePath: string,
  timeoutSec: number,
): Promise<string> {
  const key = normalizeServerUrl(serverUrl);
  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutSec * 1000;
  for (;;) {
    const servers = await readOAuthServers(statePath);
    const token = findStoredToken(servers, serverUrl);
    if (token) return token;
    if (Date.now() >= deadline) {
      const stored = Object.keys(servers);
      throw new CliExitCodeError(
        EXIT_CODES.AUTH_REQUIRED,
        `--wait-for-auth timed out after ${timeoutSec}s; no stored OAuth token for ${key} in ${statePath}.` +
          (stored.length > 0
            ? ` Stored keys: ${stored.join(", ")}.`
            : " No tokens stored yet."),
        { code: "auth_wait_timeout", url: serverUrl },
      );
    }
    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 500));
  }
}

/**
 * Derive the web deep-link `transport` value (`http` | `sse`) for a handoff.
 * Mirrors `resolveServerConfigs` (core/mcp/node/config.ts) URL-path
 * auto-detection (`/sse` → sse,
 * everything else → http) but, unlike that resolver, defaults to `http` instead
 * of throwing on an ambiguous path — the handoff is best-effort, and the web
 * {@link parseDeepLink} likewise defaults an unknown/missing transport to http.
 */
export function deepLinkTransport(
  serverUrl: string,
  transport: "sse" | "http" | "stdio" | undefined,
): "http" | "sse" {
  if (transport === "sse") return "sse";
  if (transport === "http") return "http";
  try {
    if (new URL(serverUrl).pathname.endsWith("/sse")) return "sse";
  } catch {
    // Unparseable URL: fall through to the http default. The web parser rejects
    // a non-http(s) serverUrl anyway, so guessing a transport for it is moot.
  }
  return "http";
}

/**
 * Build the JSON `--print-handoff` emits: everything an automated caller needs
 * to relay to a human so they can complete OAuth in a browser and have the
 * token land where the CLI will find it.
 *
 * The `deepLink` is the canonical web format owned by
 * `clients/web/src/utils/deepLink.ts` (#1576): `?serverUrl&transport&autoConnect`,
 * where `autoConnect` is the CSRF gate (must equal `MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN`).
 * `transport` is derived from the resolved server via {@link deepLinkTransport}
 * rather than hardcoded, so an SSE server hands off a `transport=sse` link.
 */
function buildHandoff(
  serverUrl: string,
  statePath: string,
  transport: "sse" | "http" | "stdio" | undefined,
): McpResponse {
  const host = process.env.HOST || "127.0.0.1";
  // The deep link is a URL handed to a human, so advertise localhost for a
  // wildcard bind (like the web banner/sandbox URL) rather than the awkward
  // http://0.0.0.0 / http://[::] — both are allow-listed, but neither is a nice
  // URL to click; otherwise use the canonical host so it matches the allow-list.
  const linkHost = isAllInterfacesHost(host)
    ? "localhost"
    : canonicalUrlHost(host);
  const clientPort = process.env.CLIENT_PORT || "6274";
  const sandboxPort = process.env.MCP_SANDBOX_PORT || "6275";
  // The dedicated app origin (#2056). Forwarded alongside the other two: an App
  // whose UI resource declares `_meta.ui.domain` is served from this port and
  // the browser reaches it DIRECTLY, so a handoff that forwards only 6274/6275
  // renders that app from an unreachable origin.
  const appOriginPort = process.env.MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT || "6278";
  // Treat an empty MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN the same as unset — an empty token
  // can't satisfy the deep-link autoConnect gate.
  const apiToken = process.env.MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN || undefined;
  const normalizedUrl = normalizeServerUrl(serverUrl);
  // Canonical #1576 deep-link shape: the normalized serverUrl (matching the
  // OAuth-store key form the web app reuses) plus the resolved transport, gated
  // by `autoConnect=<token>` — the same per-launch token the web parser
  // requires. Omitted when no token is set; the `note` below flags that the
  // link will be rejected until the web inspector is launched with a token.
  const params = new URLSearchParams({
    serverUrl: normalizedUrl,
    transport: deepLinkTransport(serverUrl, transport),
  });
  if (apiToken) params.set("autoConnect", apiToken);
  return {
    serverUrl: normalizedUrl,
    deepLink: `http://${linkHost}:${clientPort}/?${params.toString()}`,
    portForwardCmd: `coder port-forward <workspace> --tcp ${clientPort}:${clientPort} --tcp ${sandboxPort}:${sandboxPort} --tcp ${appOriginPort}:${appOriginPort}`,
    oauthStatePath: statePath,
    apiToken: apiToken ?? null,
    note:
      apiToken === undefined
        ? "MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN is not set; the deep-link autoConnect gate will reject — launch the web inspector with a known token first."
        : undefined,
  };
}

function parseKeyValuePair(
  value: string,
  previous: Record<string, StrictJsonValue> = {},
): Record<string, StrictJsonValue> {
  const parts = value.split("=");
  const key = parts[0];
  const val = parts.slice(1).join("=");

  if (!key || val === undefined || val === "") {
    throw new Error(
      `Invalid parameter format: ${value}. Use key=value format.`,
    );
  }

  // `StrictJsonValue`: `JSON.parse` cannot produce `undefined`, and these values
  // become `_meta`, which must reach the wire exactly as written (#1910).
  let parsedValue: StrictJsonValue;
  try {
    parsedValue = JSON.parse(val) as StrictJsonValue;
  } catch {
    // Not JSON at all — a bare word or an unquoted string. Sent as a string,
    // which is what the user plainly meant.
    parsedValue = val;
  }

  // Valid JSON syntax is not the same as sendable JSON: `1e400` parses to
  // `Infinity`, which `JSON.stringify` writes as `null`. Rejecting is better
  // than accepting the flag and silently transmitting a different value —
  // and better than falling back to the literal string, which would also not
  // be what was asked for.
  if (!isSerializableJson(parsedValue)) {
    // Names the key, never the value: the pair can carry a credential
    // (`credentials={"accessToken":"…","n":1e400}`) and this message lands in
    // stderr and CI logs.
    throw new Error(
      `Invalid value for "${key}": numbers must be finite (a literal like 1e400 overflows to Infinity and cannot be sent).`,
    );
  }

  return { ...previous, [key as string]: parsedValue };
}

type ParseResult =
  | {
      shortCircuit?: undefined;
      serverConfig: MCPServerConfig;
      serverSettings: InspectorServerSettings | undefined;
      methodArgs: MethodArgs & { method: string };
      clientConfigPath?: string;
      clientId?: string;
      clientSecret?: string;
      clientMetadataUrl?: string;
      callbackUrl?: string;
      storedAuthOnly?: boolean;
      relogin?: boolean;
    }
  // Short-circuit modes (`--list-stored-auth`, `--print-handoff`) do their own
  // output and need no server connection; runCli returns immediately.
  | { shortCircuit: true };

async function parseArgs(argv?: string[]): Promise<ParseResult> {
  const program = new Command();
  // On a parse/usage ERROR (exitCode !== 0), throw the CommanderError instead
  // of letting commander call process.exit(). The binary entry (index.ts) still
  // routes any thrown error through handleError → process.exit, so external
  // behavior is unchanged — but in-process callers (the test harness in
  // __tests__/helpers/cli-runner.ts) can now catch the error instead of having
  // commander tear down the whole test worker. For --help / --version
  // (exitCode 0) we return without throwing, so commander falls through to its
  // normal clean process.exit(0) after printing — preserving that UX. See #1484.
  program.exitOverride((err) => {
    /* v8 ignore next -- the `exitCode === 0` arm only fires for --help/--version,
       which cannot run through the in-process test runner (it would call the
       real process.exit(0) and tear down the vitest worker). That UX is covered
       out-of-process in e2e.test.ts; here only the throwing arm is exercised. */
    if (err.exitCode !== 0) throw err;
  });
  const rawArgs = argv ?? process.argv;
  const scriptArgs = rawArgs.slice(2);
  const dashDashIndex = scriptArgs.indexOf("--");
  let targetArgs: string[] = [];
  let optionArgs: string[];
  if (dashDashIndex >= 0) {
    targetArgs = scriptArgs.slice(0, dashDashIndex);
    optionArgs = scriptArgs.slice(dashDashIndex + 1);
  } else {
    let i = 0;
    while (i < scriptArgs.length && !scriptArgs[i]!.startsWith("-")) {
      targetArgs.push(scriptArgs[i]!);
      i++;
    }
    optionArgs = scriptArgs.slice(i);
  }
  const preArgs: string[] = [
    rawArgs[0] ?? "node",
    rawArgs[1] ?? "inspector-cli",
    ...optionArgs,
  ];

  program
    .name("inspector-cli")
    .allowUnknownOption()
    .argument(
      "[target...]",
      "Command and arguments or URL of the MCP server (or use --config and --server)",
    )
    .option(
      "--catalog <path>",
      "Writable catalog file (created if missing; default: ~/.mcp-inspector/mcp.json, or MCP_CATALOG_PATH)",
    )
    .option(
      "--config <path>",
      "Read-only session config file (served as-is, never written or seeded; errors if absent)",
    )
    .option("--server <name>", "Server name from config/catalog file")
    .option(
      "-e <env>",
      "Environment variables for the server (KEY=VALUE)",
      parseEnvPair,
      {},
    )
    .option("--method <method>", "Method to invoke")
    .option("--tool-name <toolName>", "Tool name (for tools/call method)")
    .option(
      "--tool-arg <pairs...>",
      "Tool argument as key=value pair",
      parseKeyValuePair,
      {},
    )
    .option("--uri <uri>", "URI of the resource (for resources/read method)")
    .option(
      "--prompt-name <promptName>",
      "Name of the prompt (for prompts/get method)",
    )
    .option(
      "--prompt-args <pairs...>",
      "Prompt arguments as key=value pairs",
      parseKeyValuePair,
      {},
    )
    .option(
      "--log-level <level>",
      "Logging level (for logging/setLevel method)",
      (value: string) => {
        if (!validLogLevels.includes(value as LoggingLevel)) {
          throw new Error(
            `Invalid log level: ${value}. Valid levels are: ${validLogLevels.join(", ")}`,
          );
        }
        return value as LoggingLevel;
      },
    )
    .option("--cwd <path>", "Working directory for stdio server process")
    .option(
      "--transport <type>",
      "Transport type (sse, http, or stdio). Auto-detected from URL: /mcp → http, /sse → sse, commands → stdio",
      (value: string) => {
        const validTransports = ["sse", "http", "stdio"];
        if (!validTransports.includes(value)) {
          throw new Error(
            `Invalid transport type: ${value}. Valid types are: ${validTransports.join(", ")}`,
          );
        }
        return value as "sse" | "http" | "stdio";
      },
    )
    .option("--server-url <url>", "Server URL for SSE/HTTP transport")
    .option(
      "--header <headers...>",
      'HTTP headers as "HeaderName: Value" pairs (for HTTP/SSE transports)',
      parseHeaderPair,
      {},
    )
    .option(
      "--metadata <pairs...>",
      "General metadata as key=value pairs (applied to all methods)",
      parseKeyValuePair,
      {},
    )
    .option(
      "--tool-metadata <pairs...>",
      "Tool-specific metadata as key=value pairs (for tools/call method only)",
      parseKeyValuePair,
      {},
    )
    .option(
      "--app-info",
      "Probe the tool's MCP App UI metadata (resourceUri, csp, permissions, domain) and emit it as one JSON line; exit 2 when the tool has no app. Use with --method tools/call --tool-name <name> (the tool itself is not invoked) or --method tools/list (one NDJSON line per tool).",
    )
    .option(
      "--strict",
      "Report tool-schema portability problems in full (path, issue, suggested fix) on stderr, and exit 6 if any is error-severity. Use with --method tools/list. Without it, a one-line count is printed instead.",
    )
    .option(
      "--connect-timeout <ms>",
      `Connection timeout in ms (default ${DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS} for ad-hoc --server-url / target invocations; 0 = no timeout).`,
      (v: string) => {
        const n = Number(v);
        if (!Number.isFinite(n) || n < 0) {
          throw new Error(`--connect-timeout must be a non-negative number.`);
        }
        return n;
      },
    )
    .option(
      "--format <format>",
      "Output format: text (default; pretty-printed) or json (one JSON object on stdout, no banners).",
      (v: string): OutputFormat => {
        if (v !== "text" && v !== "json") {
          throw new Error(`--format must be 'text' or 'json'.`);
        }
        return v;
      },
    )
    .option(
      "--tool-args-json <json>",
      'Tool arguments as a single JSON object (e.g. \'{"zip":"10001"}\'). Values are passed verbatim — no key=value coercion. Mutually exclusive with --tool-arg.',
    )
    .option(
      "--client-config <path>",
      "Install-level client config (default: ~/.mcp-inspector/storage/client.json, or MCP_CLIENT_CONFIG_PATH)",
    )
    .option(
      "--client-id <id>",
      "OAuth client ID (static client) for HTTP servers",
    )
    .option(
      "--client-secret <secret>",
      "OAuth client secret (for confidential clients)",
    )
    .option(
      "--client-metadata-url <url>",
      "OAuth Client ID Metadata Document URL (CIMD) for HTTP servers",
    )
    .option(
      "--callback-url <url>",
      `OAuth redirect/callback listener URL; must be loopback (default: ${DEFAULT_RUNNER_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL}, or MCP_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL)`,
    )
    .option(
      "--use-stored-auth",
      "Read the OAuth access token for --server-url from the OAuth state file (written by the web inspector) and inject it as Authorization: Bearer.",
    )
    .option(
      "--stored-auth-only",
      "Never start interactive OAuth; use the shared store if present, otherwise fail with auth_required. Preferred for CI/non-interactive runs. No-op when the server does not require auth.",
    )
    .option(
      "--relogin",
      "Delete stored OAuth for this server URL from the shared store before connect (HTTP/SSE URL keys only); interactive login runs only if the server requires auth. Rejected for stdio (no URL-keyed store entry)",
    )
    .option(
      "--wait-for-auth <sec>",
      "Poll the OAuth state file until a token for --server-url appears (or the timeout elapses), then proceed as if --use-stored-auth were set. Use after handing off to a human to complete OAuth in a browser.",
      (v: string) => {
        const n = Number(v);
        if (!Number.isFinite(n) || n <= 0) {
          throw new Error(
            `--wait-for-auth must be a positive number of seconds.`,
          );
        }
        return n;
      },
    )
    .option(
      "--list-stored-auth",
      "Print the server URLs that have a stored OAuth token (one JSON object on stdout) and exit. No server connection is made.",
    )
    .option(
      "--print-handoff",
      "Print a JSON handoff block (deepLink, portForwardCmd, oauthStatePath, apiToken) for --server-url and exit. No server connection is made.",
    );

  program.parse(preArgs);

  const options = program.opts() as {
    catalog?: string;
    config?: string;
    server?: string;
    e?: Record<string, string>;
    method?: string;
    toolName?: string;
    toolArg?: Record<string, JsonValue>;
    uri?: string;
    promptName?: string;
    promptArgs?: Record<string, JsonValue>;
    logLevel?: LoggingLevel;
    metadata?: Record<string, StrictJsonValue>;
    toolMetadata?: Record<string, StrictJsonValue>;
    cwd?: string;
    transport?: "sse" | "http" | "stdio";
    serverUrl?: string;
    header?: Record<string, string>;
    appInfo?: boolean;
    strict?: boolean;
    connectTimeout?: number;
    format?: OutputFormat;
    toolArgsJson?: string;
    clientConfig?: string;
    clientId?: string;
    clientSecret?: string;
    clientMetadataUrl?: string;
    callbackUrl?: string;
    useStoredAuth?: boolean;
    storedAuthOnly?: boolean;
    relogin?: boolean;
    waitForAuth?: number;
    listStoredAuth?: boolean;
    printHandoff?: boolean;
  };

  if (options.relogin) {
    if (options.storedAuthOnly) {
      throw new Error("--relogin cannot be combined with --stored-auth-only");
    }
    if (options.useStoredAuth || options.waitForAuth !== undefined) {
      throw new Error(
        "--relogin cannot be combined with --use-stored-auth or --wait-for-auth",
      );
    }
    if (options.listStoredAuth || options.printHandoff) {
      throw new Error(
        "--relogin cannot be combined with --list-stored-auth or --print-handoff",
      );
    }
    if (
      options.method === "servers/list" ||
      options.method === "servers/show"
    ) {
      throw new Error(
        "--relogin cannot be combined with --method servers/list or servers/show (no OAuth connect)",
      );
    }
  }

  // `--strict` is checked HERE, ahead of every short-circuit return below
  // (`--list-stored-auth`, `--print-handoff`, `servers/list`, `servers/show`),
  // rather than beside the other method-shaped validations further down. Those
  // returns never reach the lint, so a later check would let
  // `--strict --method servers/list` succeed while silently ignoring a flag
  // documented as tools/list-only — the same "accepted but inert" failure the
  // `--app-info` pairing rejection exists to prevent.
  if (options.strict) {
    if (options.method !== "tools/list") {
      throw new Error("--strict requires --method tools/list.");
    }
    // `tools/list --app-info` returns NDJSON straight from `runMethod` and
    // never reaches `emitResult`, where the lint runs. Accepting the pair
    // would hand a CI caller a gate that can never fail.
    if (options.appInfo) {
      throw new Error(
        "--strict cannot be combined with --app-info; run tools/list twice, once for each.",
      );
    }
  }

  // State-path precedence (getStateFilePath): MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH →
  // <MCP_STORAGE_DIR>/oauth.json → ~/.mcp-inspector/storage/oauth.json — the
  // same file the web backend writes, so tokens are shared across surfaces.
  const oauthStatePath = getStateFilePath();

  // Short-circuit modes that need no server connection.
  if (options.listStoredAuth) {
    const servers = await readOAuthServers(oauthStatePath);
    const withToken = Object.entries(servers)
      .filter(([, v]) => Boolean(v.tokens?.access_token))
      .map(([k]) => k);
    await awaitableLog(
      JSON.stringify({ oauthStatePath, storedServerUrls: withToken }) + "\n",
    );
    return { shortCircuit: true };
  }
  if (options.printHandoff) {
    if (!options.serverUrl) {
      throw new Error("--print-handoff requires --server-url");
    }
    await awaitableLog(
      JSON.stringify(
        buildHandoff(options.serverUrl, oauthStatePath, options.transport),
      ) + "\n",
    );
    return { shortCircuit: true };
  }

  // Validate --method before stored-auth network work (refresh / wait) so a
  // typo or stream method fails locally without burning a token round-trip.
  if (!options.method) {
    throw new Error(
      "Method is required. Use --method to specify the method to invoke.",
    );
  }
  const isCatalogMethod =
    options.method === "servers/list" || options.method === "servers/show";
  if (!isCatalogMethod && !isOneShotMethod(options.method)) {
    throw new Error(
      `Unsupported method: ${options.method}. Supported --cli methods: ${ONE_SHOT_METHODS.join(", ")}, servers/list, servers/show.`,
    );
  }

  // Honour MCP_CATALOG_PATH only when no ad-hoc target is given. Applying it
  // unconditionally meant a homespace that exports the env var could never run
  // `--server-url …` (serverSourceConflict rejects catalog + ad-hoc).
  const adHoc =
    targetArgs.length > 0 ||
    Boolean(options.transport) ||
    Boolean(options.serverUrl?.trim());
  const envCatalog = adHoc ? undefined : process.env.MCP_CATALOG_PATH;

  const serverOptions = {
    // `?.trim() ||` (not `??`) so an explicit empty `--catalog ""` still falls
    // back to MCP_CATALOG_PATH — keeps CLI and TUI flag resolution identical.
    catalogPath: options.catalog?.trim() || envCatalog,
    configPath: options.config?.trim() || undefined,
    target: targetArgs.length > 0 ? targetArgs : undefined,
    transport: options.transport,
    serverUrl: options.serverUrl,
    cwd: options.cwd,
    env: options.e,
    // `--header` is merged into the resolved server's settings (overriding any
    // file-level headers); file timeouts/OAuth are preserved. See #1482.
    headers: options.header as Record<string, string> | undefined,
  };

  // Catalog list / show — no MCP connection. Run before stored-auth refresh so
  // a catalog-only command never triggers a token round-trip it won't use.
  if (options.method === "servers/list") {
    const servers = await listServerEntries(serverOptions);
    await writeFormattedResult(
      { servers },
      options.format === "json" ? "json" : "text",
    );
    return { shortCircuit: true };
  }
  if (options.method === "servers/show") {
    if (!options.server?.trim()) {
      throw new Error(
        "servers/show requires --server <name> to select a catalog entry.",
      );
    }
    const server = await showServerEntry(options.server, serverOptions);
    await writeFormattedResult(
      server,
      options.format === "json" ? "json" : "text",
    );
    return { shortCircuit: true };
  }

  if (options.waitForAuth !== undefined || options.useStoredAuth) {
    if (!options.serverUrl) {
      throw new Error(
        `${options.waitForAuth !== undefined ? "--wait-for-auth" : "--use-stored-auth"} requires --server-url`,
      );
    }
    // Read the OAuth state file directly so the lookup is normalised the same
    // way the web inspector wrote it (`new URL().href`), and so `--wait-for-
    // auth` sees fresh on-disk state on each poll. When a `refresh_token` is
    // stored, the CLI runs the SDK refresh grant and injects the fresh access
    // token (persisting the rotation) rather than blindly injecting a possibly-
    // stale stored access token (#1665) — the stored blob carries no expiry, so
    // the refresh token is the durable credential. Without a refresh token it
    // falls back to injecting the stored access token; a stale one surfaces as
    // HTTP 401 → exit 3 (auth_required).
    let token: string;
    if (options.waitForAuth !== undefined) {
      token = await waitForStoredToken(
        options.serverUrl,
        oauthStatePath,
        options.waitForAuth,
      );
    } else {
      const servers = await readOAuthServers(oauthStatePath);
      const stored = findStoredServerState(servers, options.serverUrl);
      if (stored?.state.tokens?.refresh_token) {
        const storedAccess = stored.state.tokens.access_token;
        try {
          token = await refreshStoredAuthToken(
            options.serverUrl,
            oauthStatePath,
          );
        } catch (err) {
          // A failed refresh (transient auth-server hiccup, missing client
          // info) shouldn't turn a previously-working invocation into a hard
          // failure when a still-usable access token is also on disk — fall
          // back to injecting it (a genuinely stale one surfaces as HTTP 401 →
          // exit 3, the same as without a refresh token). With no stored access
          // token to fall back on, the refresh error stands.
          if (!storedAccess) throw err;
          token = storedAccess;
        }
      } else {
        const found = findStoredToken(servers, options.serverUrl);
        if (!found) {
          const key = normalizeServerUrl(options.serverUrl);
          const storedKeys = Object.keys(servers);
          throw new CliExitCodeError(
            EXIT_CODES.AUTH_REQUIRED,
            `No stored OAuth token for ${key} in ${oauthStatePath}. Complete the OAuth flow in the web inspector first.` +
              (storedKeys.length > 0
                ? ` Stored keys: ${storedKeys.join(", ")}.`
                : ""),
            { code: "no_stored_token", url: options.serverUrl },
          );
        }
        token = found;
      }
    }
    serverOptions.headers = {
      ...(serverOptions.headers ?? {}),
      Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
    };
  }

  // Shared with the TUI: resolves the catalog/config source (or ad-hoc target),
  // enforces the conflict matrix, and lifts disk headers/timeouts/OAuth into
  // per-server settings. `--server` selects one when the file has several.
  const entries = await loadServerEntries(serverOptions);
  const selected = selectServerEntry(entries, options.server);
  const serverConfig = selected.config;
  // Ad-hoc invocations get a default connect timeout so a black-holed host
  // fails fast; catalog/config runs keep their file-level timeout unless
  // `--connect-timeout` is passed explicitly.
  const serverSettings = withConnectTimeout(
    selected.settings,
    options.connectTimeout ?? (adHoc ? DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS : undefined),
  );

  if (
    options.appInfo &&
    options.method !== "tools/call" &&
    options.method !== "tools/list"
  ) {
    throw new Error(
      "--app-info requires --method tools/call (with --tool-name) or --method tools/list.",
    );
  }

  // NOTE: `--strict`'s validations are deliberately NOT here — they run before
  // the short-circuit returns further up, so a `servers/*` invocation cannot
  // accept the flag and ignore it.

  // --tool-args-json passes arguments verbatim with no key=value coercion (so
  // `"012"` stays a string and nested objects work without shell escaping).
  let toolArg = options.toolArg;
  if (options.toolArgsJson !== undefined) {
    if (toolArg && Object.keys(toolArg).length > 0) {
      throw new Error(
        "--tool-args-json cannot be combined with --tool-arg; pick one.",
      );
    }
    let parsed: unknown;
    try {
      parsed = JSON.parse(options.toolArgsJson);
    } catch (e) {
      throw new Error(
        `--tool-args-json is not valid JSON: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`,
        { cause: e },
      );
    }
    if (
      parsed === null ||
      typeof parsed !== "object" ||
      Array.isArray(parsed)
    ) {
      throw new Error("--tool-args-json must be a JSON object.");
    }
    toolArg = parsed as Record<string, JsonValue>;
  }

  const methodArgs: MethodArgs & { method: string } = {
    method: options.method,
    toolName: options.toolName,
    toolArg,
    uri: options.uri,
    promptName: options.promptName,
    promptArgs: options.promptArgs,
    logLevel: options.logLevel,
    // `--metadata`/`--tool-metadata` values are parsed as JSON, and `_meta`
    // takes any JSON — so they go through unflattened (#1910). They used to be
    // squeezed through `metaValueToString`, which sent `{"a":1}` as the
    // *string* `'{"a":1}'`.
    metadata: options.metadata,
    toolMeta: options.toolMetadata,
    appInfo: options.appInfo === true,
    strict: options.strict === true,
    format: options.format,
  };

  return {
    serverConfig,
    serverSettings,
    methodArgs,
    clientConfigPath: options.clientConfig,
    clientId: options.clientId,
    clientSecret: options.clientSecret,
    clientMetadataUrl: options.clientMetadataUrl,
    callbackUrl: options.callbackUrl,
    storedAuthOnly: options.storedAuthOnly === true,
    relogin: options.relogin === true,
  };
}

export async function runCli(argv?: string[]): Promise<void> {
  const parsed = await parseArgs(argv ?? process.argv);
  // `--list-stored-auth` / `--print-handoff` already wrote their output.
  if (parsed.shortCircuit) return;
  const {
    serverConfig,
    serverSettings,
    methodArgs,
    clientConfigPath,
    clientId,
    clientSecret,
    clientMetadataUrl,
    callbackUrl,
    storedAuthOnly,
    relogin,
  } = parsed;
  const clientConfig = await loadRunnerClientConfig({ clientConfigPath });
  // A bad --callback-url / MCP_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL is a *usage* error, but its
  // messages contain "OAuth", which the exit-code heuristic (error-handler.ts)
  // would otherwise classify as AUTH_REQUIRED (exit 3) — telling an automated
  // caller to kick the auth flow instead of fixing the flag. `core/` can't
  // import CliExitCodeError, so pin the class here.
  let callbackUrlConfig: RunnerOAuthCallbackConfig;
  try {
    callbackUrlConfig = parseRunnerOAuthCallbackUrl(callbackUrl);
  } catch (err) {
    throw new CliExitCodeError(
      EXIT_CODES.USAGE,
      err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
    );
  }
  await callMethod(
    serverConfig,
    serverSettings,
    methodArgs,
    clientConfig,
    {
      clientId,
      clientSecret,
      clientMetadataUrl,
    },
    callbackUrlConfig,
    storedAuthOnly === true,
    relogin === true,
  );
}