import { discoverOAuthProtectedResourceMetadata } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client"; import { discoverAuthorizationServerMetadataForServer } from "./discovery.js"; import type { BaseOAuthClientProvider } from "./providers.js"; /** * When the authorization server supports URL-based client IDs (SEP-991 / CIMD), * pre-register `{ client_id: clientMetadataUrl }` before SDK `auth()`. * * SDK `auth()` rejects non-HTTPS `clientMetadataUrl` during registration, but * accepts an already-stored `client_id` (including `http://` URLs used by local * dev/test metadata servers). Production CIMD metadata documents should still * use HTTPS per SEP-991. * * `resourceMetadataUrl` is the RFC 9728 document advertised by the * `WWW-Authenticate` challenge, when the caller has one. It matters here and * not only in `auth()`: this runs *before* SDK `auth()`, so without it the * pre-registration probe would do its own default-location discovery and miss * a document served from a non-default path (#2071). */ export async function ensureCimdClientRegistration(params: { serverUrl: string; provider: BaseOAuthClientProvider; fetchFn?: typeof fetch; resourceMetadataUrl?: URL; }): Promise { const clientMetadataUrl = params.provider.clientMetadataUrl?.trim(); if (!clientMetadataUrl) return; // Prefer the discovery state SDK `auth()` itself persists and reuses. Without // this, moving the existing-client check after discovery would turn a // temporary well-known outage into a failed reconnect, even where the SDK // could have proceeded from cache (Copilot). let metadata = (await params.provider.discoveryState()) ?.authorizationServerMetadata; if (!metadata) { let resourceMetadata; try { resourceMetadata = await discoverOAuthProtectedResourceMetadata( params.serverUrl, { resourceMetadataUrl: params.resourceMetadataUrl }, // The same fetch the AS-metadata leg below uses. On web that is // `createRemoteFetch`, which proxies through the backend to sidestep // CORS — on the global `fetch` this leg would fail in the browser, be // swallowed by the catch, and leave CIMD probing the wrong // authorization server (Copilot). params.fetchFn, ); } catch { resourceMetadata = undefined; } try { // Walks the path-scoped authorization-server URL before the bare origin, so // a server hosted under a path is probed where it actually publishes its // metadata rather than only at the domain root (#2110). metadata = await discoverAuthorizationServerMetadataForServer( params.serverUrl, resourceMetadata, params.fetchFn, ); } catch { // Pre-registration is an optimization over what SDK `auth()` does for // itself, so a discovery failure here must never fail the connection: bail // out and let `auth()` run its own discovery and error handling. return; } } const issuer = metadata?.issuer; const supportsCimd = metadata?.client_id_metadata_document_supported === true; /** * The marker records that *this* AS accepts this URL as a `client_id` **and** * that the registration standing for it got there through CIMD. It is written * only where both are established, and actively withdrawn otherwise, so it * cannot go stale: discovery runs on every connect. */ const setMarker = async (url: string | undefined) => { if (issuer) await params.provider.saveCimdClientMetadataUrl(issuer, url); }; if (!supportsCimd) { // Withdrawn, not merely left alone — an AS that stops advertising CIMD // stops being treated as one. await setMarker(undefined); return; } // ⚠️ Keyed by the issuer just resolved, not read ctx-less. A ctx-less read // resolves through the *active* issuer, so it early-returns for every // subsequent issuer and leaves them with no CIMD record at all. It answers the // static case first, since `clientInformation` checks the preregistered slot // before any issuer slot. const existing = await params.provider.clientInformation( issuer ? { issuer } : undefined, ); if (existing?.client_id) { // Something is already registered for this AS, so this call establishes // nothing — and AS support for CIMD is not on its own evidence that *that* // registration is a CIMD one. RFC 7591 §3.2 leaves a dynamically issued // `client_id` opaque, so an existing DCR may carry this very URL; marking it // would relabel a real dynamic registration (Copilot). Reaffirm the marker // only for a registration already recorded as `cimd` under this exact URL, // and withdraw it otherwise — which also covers a static client. const existingKind = await params.provider.clientRegistrationKind(issuer); const isCimdRegistration = existingKind === "cimd" && existing.client_id === clientMetadataUrl; await setMarker(isCimdRegistration ? clientMetadataUrl : undefined); return; } // From here this call *is* the CIMD registration, so the marker is earned. await setMarker(clientMetadataUrl); await params.provider.saveClientInformation( { client_id: clientMetadataUrl }, { registrationKind: "cimd", // An AS metadata document without an `issuer` is malformed (RFC 8414 §2), // but the type allows it; fall back to the unkeyed slot rather than // inventing a key. ...(issuer && { issuer }), }, ); }