Copilot review round 2. The exemption compares the WHATWG-canonicalized `URL.hostname`, so it covers alternate spellings of three loopback *addresses* rather than three input strings: `127.1`, `2130706433`, `0x7f.0.0.1`, `[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]` and a root-anchored `127.0.0.1.` all pass. The behavior is right — the security argument is about the address the request reaches, and all of these are the loopback interface — but the comment described it as a literal-input match, which it is not. It now states the contract, and six regression cases pin the aliases alongside the existing near-miss cases. This is also still an exact match for the SDK: `assertSecureTokenEndpoint` tests `url.hostname` against the same three values after the same `new URL` canonicalization, so an alias accepted here is one the SDK accepts too. Separately, the smoke guide's fixture recipe left the shell in `clients/web` after the build line, so the repo-root-relative paths on the next line resolved under `clients/web` and the copy-pasted setup failed before the server started. The build now runs in a subshell, and the block notes that the server announces its URL on stderr and walks past a taken port. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GfHQ8vMm5NBgzbUJ6UwxmB Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
227 lines
8.4 KiB
TypeScript
227 lines
8.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Browser-safe client.json parse/validate (no Node file I/O).
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*/
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import { z } from "zod";
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import type { ClientConfig } from "./types.js";
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/**
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* True when `value` (trimmed) is an absolute `http:`/`https:` URL with a real
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* host. An OAuth IdP issuer is always http(s), so other parseable schemes
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* (`mailto:`, `foo:bar`, `javascript:`) are rejected rather than deferred to a
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* later connect failure. Beyond "parses + http(s)", the host must actually look
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* like a host — a dotted domain or IP, or `localhost` — so bare or degenerate
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* values the URL parser still accepts (`https://foo`, `https://.`, `https://..`,
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* `https://example`) are rejected too.
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*/
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export function isAbsoluteHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {
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let url: URL;
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try {
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url = new URL(value.trim());
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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if (url.protocol !== "http:" && url.protocol !== "https:") return false;
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return isRealHost(url.hostname);
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}
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/**
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* A hostname the URL parser produced that we accept as an actual host:
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* - `localhost` (common in dev),
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* - an IPv6 literal (arrives bracketed, e.g. `[::1]`),
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* - otherwise a dotted name / IPv4 with at least two non-empty labels — which
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* rejects single-label (`foo`), bare-dot (`.`, `..`) and empty-label
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* (`a..b`, `.a`, `a.`) hosts. An empty hostname splits to `[""]` and is
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* rejected here too (http(s) URLs can't reach this with an empty host).
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*/
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function isRealHost(hostname: string): boolean {
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if (hostname === "localhost") return true;
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if (hostname.startsWith("[")) return hostname.endsWith("]");
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const labels = hostname.split(".");
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return labels.length >= 2 && labels.every((label) => label !== "");
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}
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const HttpUrlStringSchema = z
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.string()
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.min(1)
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.superRefine((val, ctx) => {
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const trimmed = val.trim();
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if (!isAbsoluteHttpUrl(trimmed)) {
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ctx.addIssue({
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code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
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message: `Invalid URL: "${trimmed}" — must be an http(s) URL (e.g. https://idp.example.com)`,
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});
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}
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});
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/** Field-level error when a CIMD metadata URL is not a parseable http(s) URL. */
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export const CIMD_METADATA_URL_INVALID_ERROR =
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"Must be a valid URL, like https://example.com/oauth/client.json";
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/**
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* Field-level error when a CIMD metadata URL is neither HTTPS nor served from
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* one of the exempt loopback literals. The message names the exemption rather
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* than saying only "must use HTTPS", so a developer pointing the field at a
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* local fixture is told which spellings work instead of concluding that nothing
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* local can (the same phrasing lesson as the token-endpoint notice in
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* `core/auth/oauthUx.ts`).
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*/
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export const CIMD_METADATA_URL_HTTPS_ERROR =
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"CIMD client metadata URL must use HTTPS, except on localhost, 127.0.0.1 or [::1]";
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/**
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* Hosts for which a plain `http:` CIMD metadata URL is accepted.
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*
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* SEP-991 expects HTTPS in production for a real reason: a CIMD `client_id` is
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* a URL the authorization server dereferences, and over plain HTTP the document
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* it gets back is attacker-modifiable in transit. Loopback is the documented
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* exception to exactly that reasoning — there is no network segment to sit on —
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* which is why the SDK exempts these same three literals from its token-endpoint
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* TLS assertion, and why `core/auth/cimd.ts` already notes that an
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* already-stored `client_id` may be an `http://` URL "used by local dev/test
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* metadata servers". Without this, the runtime tolerated a value the config
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* validation would not let anyone enter, and CIMD could not be driven against
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* any fixture in this repo (#2305).
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*
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* ⚠️ This is the SDK's own list, matched member for member — not the broader
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* `isLoopbackHost` in `core/node/hostUrl.ts`, which imports `node:net` and so
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* cannot be reached from this browser-safe module. The SDK's
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* `assertSecureTokenEndpoint` tests `url.hostname` against exactly
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* `localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `[::1]` (plus a `::1` arm `URL.hostname` never
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* produces, since it brackets IPv6 literals). Keeping the two identical is what
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* stops them disagreeing about one URL.
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*
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* ⚠️ **The comparison is against the WHATWG-canonicalized `URL.hostname`, so it
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* covers alternate spellings of these three *addresses*, not three input
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* strings.** `http://127.1/…`, `http://2130706433/…`, `http://0x7f.0.0.1/…` and
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* `http://[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]/…` all canonicalize into the set and are accepted;
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* so is a root-anchored `http://127.0.0.1./…`, which WHATWG strips the dot from
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* for IP literals but *not* for `localhost.`. That is deliberate on both counts:
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* the security argument is about the address the request actually reaches, and
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* every one of these is the loopback interface. It is also exactly what the SDK
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* does — it canonicalizes through `new URL` the same way — so an alias accepted
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* here is an alias the SDK accepts too.
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*/
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const CIMD_HTTP_EXEMPT_HOSTS = new Set(["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "[::1]"]);
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/**
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* True when a plain-`http:` CIMD metadata URL on this host is acceptable. Takes
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* the already-canonicalized `URL.hostname`, never a raw authority or a
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* `host:port` — passing an unparsed string would compare the wrong thing and
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* silently reject every alias above. Not exported: the only caller is the
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* validator below, and the exemption is exercised through it rather than
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* through a second public surface that could drift from it.
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*/
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function isCimdHttpExemptHost(hostname: string): boolean {
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return CIMD_HTTP_EXEMPT_HOSTS.has(hostname);
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}
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/** Field-level error when a CIMD metadata URL has no path segment. */
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export const CIMD_METADATA_URL_PATH_ERROR =
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"Must include a path (not the site root), like https://example.com/oauth/client.json";
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/**
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* Inline / form validation for a non-empty CIMD client metadata URL.
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* Returns undefined when the value is valid; empty strings are not flagged here
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* (required-field gating lives in {@link canPersistClientSettingsDraft}).
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*/
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export function getCimdClientMetadataUrlError(
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value: string,
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): string | undefined {
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const trimmed = value.trim();
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if (trimmed === "") return undefined;
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if (!isAbsoluteHttpUrl(trimmed)) {
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return CIMD_METADATA_URL_INVALID_ERROR;
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}
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try {
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const url = new URL(trimmed);
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if (url.protocol !== "https:" && !isCimdHttpExemptHost(url.hostname)) {
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return CIMD_METADATA_URL_HTTPS_ERROR;
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}
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if (url.pathname === "/" || url.pathname === "") {
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return CIMD_METADATA_URL_PATH_ERROR;
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}
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} catch {
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return CIMD_METADATA_URL_INVALID_ERROR;
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}
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return undefined;
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}
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function refineCimdMetadataUrl(
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val: string,
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ctx: z.RefinementCtx,
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required: boolean,
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): void {
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const trimmed = val.trim();
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if (trimmed === "") {
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if (required) {
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ctx.addIssue({
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code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
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message: "CIMD client metadata URL is required when CIMD is enabled",
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});
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}
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return;
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}
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const error = getCimdClientMetadataUrlError(trimmed);
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if (error) {
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ctx.addIssue({
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code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
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message: error,
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});
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}
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}
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const CimdConfigSchema = z
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.object({
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enabled: z.boolean(),
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clientMetadataUrl: z.string(),
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})
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.superRefine((data, ctx) => {
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refineCimdMetadataUrl(data.clientMetadataUrl, ctx, data.enabled === true);
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});
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const EnterpriseManagedAuthIdpConfigSchema = z.object({
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issuer: HttpUrlStringSchema,
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clientId: z.string().min(1),
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clientSecret: z.string().optional(),
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});
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const ClientConfigSchema = z.object({
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enterpriseManagedAuth: z
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.object({
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enabled: z.boolean().optional(),
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idp: EnterpriseManagedAuthIdpConfigSchema,
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})
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.optional(),
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cimd: CimdConfigSchema.optional(),
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});
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/**
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* Parse and validate unknown JSON into {@link ClientConfig}.
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* @throws {z.ZodError} when shape is invalid
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*/
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export function parseClientConfig(raw: unknown): ClientConfig {
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return ClientConfigSchema.parse(raw);
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}
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/** Canonical JSON serialization for client.json (matches backend store-io format). */
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export function serializeClientConfig(config: ClientConfig): string {
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return JSON.stringify(config, null, 2);
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}
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/** Human-readable message for a failed client.json load (parse or transport). */
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export function formatClientConfigLoadError(error: unknown): string {
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if (error instanceof z.ZodError) {
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const issue = error.issues[0];
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if (issue) {
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const field =
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issue.path.length > 0 ? issue.path.map(String).join(".") : "config";
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return `${field}: ${issue.message}`;
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}
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return "Invalid client.json shape";
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}
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if (error instanceof Error) {
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return error.message;
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}
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return String(error);
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}
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