| Filename | Latest commit message | Latest commit date |
|---|---|---|
219765efff
The headline is a correction to my own claim rather than a new defect. **The optimistic verify is weaker than the comment said it was.** It described the residual as a crash between the write and the verifying read. The reviewer pointed out that no crash is needed: order two writers as write-A, verify-A, write-B, verify-B and both report success while A's entry is gone — A's verify simply ran before there was anything to see, and B did nothing wrong. A crash is one instance of that shape, not the whole of it. The trace in the old comment quietly assumed A verifies *after* B writes, which nothing guarantees. Corrected in the doc comment, the README and the spec, and the honest summary is now stated rather than implied: this converges in every interleaving where the clobber lands before the verify, it is not mutual exclusion, and a deployment that needs the guarantee wants an OS-backed lock from a dedicated library — not another hand-rolled election. It remains better than what it replaced, which lost updates across a wider set of interleavings and could not be closed at all with what Node exposes. The other findings: - **An envelope naming the cipher still is not an openable one.** Round 9 added a `kdf`/`data` presence check; three dot-separated strings satisfied it while an empty tag, a 4-byte IV or `N: 3` still made every decrypt throw — so the quiet "Encrypted file" footer went to a file whose next save was guaranteed to fail. Now validates part sizes, a non-empty ciphertext, and the scrypt cost parameters (node rejects a non-power-of-two `N` synchronously, out of the derivation rather than the decrypt). A positive control asserts a file we actually wrote still reads as encrypted. - **`encryptionUnknown` + `looseMode` claimed an exposure it had not established.** With both set, `plaintext` is absent, so a `!== false` test landed on "anyone who can read it can read the secrets in it" — about a file that may well hold ciphertext we simply could not classify. Three-way now, in `secretStorageCaveat` and mirrored in the footer's tooltip, with a test on each. - **The README described a lock that no longer exists**, which is the worst kind of stale doc: it stated a durability guarantee the code had stopped providing. Rewritten to describe the actual design, including the residual. - **The private-method access in the concurrency test** now carries the justification the repo's TypeScript rules require: the asserted shape is `writeMap`'s real signature, so a rename breaks the line instead of silently detaching the stub, and a production injection seam would let the real write path drift from the tested one. Also updates `specification/v2_servers_file.md`, which still described #1356's world: one keychain-only store, and unavailability as a hard error. It now covers store selection and the probe, the file format and lazy encryption upgrade, the concurrency design and its residual, the `getStrict`/`getMany` seams and the two traps `getStrict` hit, the durability gate on migration, the keychain hand-off and its conditional delete, and how the active store is surfaced. Full `npm run ci` green. (One unrelated `AppRenderer` theme-flip test failed once under full-suite parallelism and passes in isolation with and without these changes — a flake, not a regression.) Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com> |
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| README.md | ||
| v1_problems.md | ||
| v2_auth.md | ||
| v2_auth_ema.md | ||
| v2_auth_hardening.md | ||
| v2_auth_mid_session.md | ||
| v2_auth_sdk_consolidation.md | ||
| v2_auth_smoke_testing.md | ||
| v2_catalog_launch_config.md | ||
| v2_cli_tui_launcher.md | ||
| v2_new_spec_impact.md | ||
| v2_scope.md | ||
| v2_screenshots.md | ||
| v2_server.md | ||
| v2_servers_file.md | ||
| v2_storage.md | ||
| v2_ux.md | ||
| v2_ux_components.md | ||
| v2_ux_features.md | ||
| v2_ux_handlers.md | ||
| v2_ux_interfaces.md | ||
| v2_ux_interfaces_phase_0_4_inventory.md | ||
| v2_ux_interfaces_plan.md | ||
| v2_ux_storybook.md | ||
| v2_web_client.md | ||
Inspector V2 Brief
Brief | V1 Problems | V2 Scope | V2 Tech Stack | V2 UX | V2 Auth | V2 New Spec Impact
Table of Contents
- Motivation and Context
- Track Protocol Conformance
- Improve Maintainability
- Provide Extensibility
- Proper Documentation
Motivation and Context
The existing Inspector is hard to maintain for a number of reasons. We decided to create a more maintainable Inspector from the ground up, that retains the deterministic boundary of operation, but exposes a plugin architecture.
Track Protocol Conformance
- Identify any gaps in V1 inspector
- Track which features are covered
- Implement to parity and fill gaps
- Provide conformance testing in CI
Improve Maintainability
- Clearer separation of concerns
- Smaller, reusable components
Provide Extensibility
- Plugin SDK / API
- Third parties cand develop/maintain their own plugins for features such as
- LLM usage
- Evals
- Multiple server connections
- Apps playground
- Testing of registry configuration
- Interface with registry
Proper Documentation
- One big README won't cut it anymore
- Published documentation in MDX should
- Render in style of spec
- Kept up to date
- Cover all features
- Discuss troubleshooting strategies
- Provide detailed contribution guidance that explains architecture and expected idioms