inspector/clients/cli/src/error-handler.ts
cliffhall e641edeeab feat: bound connect attempts with a 30 s default connectionTimeout (#2320)
connectionTimeout defaulted to 0, which InspectorClient.connect() read as
"no bound at all" — so out of the box nothing the Inspector owns bounded a
connect attempt, and the only thing ending a hung handshake was the SDK's
60 s per-request timeout on initialize, reporting "Request timed out".

- Add DEFAULT_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_MS (30000) to core/mcp/types.ts. An absent
  value resolves to it on the client, on disk read, in the web form draft,
  and in the CLI's header-only settings shell. An explicit 0 keeps its
  documented meaning (no timeout; --connect-timeout 0) and is now persisted
  so the opt-out round-trips; the default is the omit-sentinel, as for
  taskTtl.
- Key the post-timeout transport teardown to the timer actually firing, not
  to connectionTimeout > 0 — otherwise a non-zero default would tear down
  every failed connect, including a recoverable 401 whose transport the
  auth recovery holds open.
- The timeout message names the bound and where to raise it: "Connection
  timed out after N ms. To accommodate a slower server, you may increase
  the timeout value in Server Settings."
- The CLI's UNREACHABLE classifier now matches that message.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M4h8Xa6Ed9zwtv5ojX35MT
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-13 20:54:23 -04:00

261 lines
9 KiB
TypeScript

import { awaitableError } from "./utils/awaitable-log.js";
/**
* Exit-code map. Non-zero codes let an automated caller (CI, an agent) branch
* on the failure class without regex-scraping stderr:
*
* - 0: success
* - 1: usage / unexpected error (the catch-all; same as before this map)
* - 2: `--app-info` probe found no MCP App on the tool
* - 3: server requires authentication (401 / WWW-Authenticate / OAuth)
* - 4: server unreachable (DNS, connect refused, timeout, fetch failure)
* - 5: tool error (`tools/call` returned `isError:true`, or tool not found)
* - 6: `--strict` found an error-severity tool-schema portability finding
*
* Note 6 is `SCHEMA_UNPORTABLE`, not "invalid": the whole premise of the lint
* is that these schemas ARE valid JSON Schema and are merely refused by some
* clients. Calling the outcome "invalid" would misreport it to the automated
* callers this map exists for.
*/
export const EXIT_CODES = {
OK: 0,
USAGE: 1,
NO_APP: 2,
AUTH_REQUIRED: 3,
UNREACHABLE: 4,
TOOL_ERROR: 5,
SCHEMA_UNPORTABLE: 6,
/**
* `--verify` found a SEP-2640 violation: a conformance error, a digest or
* size mismatch, or a manifest file that could not be read (#2248).
*
* Its own code rather than reusing `SCHEMA_UNPORTABLE`, for the reason that
* one exists at all: a CI job that fails on an unportable tool schema and a
* CI job that fails on a tampered skill digest are different jobs, and
* collapsing them would make `if [ $? -eq 6 ]` ambiguous.
*/
SKILL_NONCONFORMANT: 7,
/**
* `--verify` could not check the whole catalog: the read bounds stopped the
* walk before it finished (#2248).
*
* Distinct from `SKILL_NONCONFORMANT` because the server has broken no
* **MUST** — SEP-2640 states the 512-entry and 16 MiB limits as SHOULD NOT,
* with hosts free to support more — so exiting 7 would call a conforming
* server nonconformant. It is still non-zero, because reporting success for
* a manifest whose unread entries were never fetched is a false pass. A CI
* job that wants to tolerate oversized catalogs can allow 8 and still fail
* on 7.
*/
SKILL_INCOMPLETE: 8,
} as const;
/** Machine-readable error envelope written as one JSON line on stderr. */
export interface ErrorEnvelope {
/** Stable identifier for the failure class (e.g. "auth_required"). */
code: string;
/** Human-readable message. */
message: string;
/** The underlying error's `cause` (e.g. undici's ENOTFOUND), if any. */
cause?: string;
/** HTTP status when the failure was an HTTP-level response. */
status?: number;
/** The server URL the failure was against, when known. */
url?: string;
}
/**
* Thrown by the CLI to request a specific non-zero exit code without routing
* through the generic error path. {@link formatErrorOutput} reads `exitCode`
* and `envelope`; the in-process test runner does the same so tests observe
* the real code and stderr.
*/
export class CliExitCodeError extends Error {
constructor(
public readonly exitCode: number,
message: string,
public readonly envelope?: Partial<ErrorEnvelope>,
) {
super(message);
this.name = "CliExitCodeError";
}
}
/** Depth cap for {@link causeOf} — bounds a pathological/self-referential
* `error.cause` chain so a cycle can never recurse infinitely. */
const MAX_CAUSE_DEPTH = 16;
/** Read an `Error.cause` chain into a single readable string, if present. */
function causeOf(error: unknown, depth = 0): string | undefined {
if (depth >= MAX_CAUSE_DEPTH) return undefined;
if (!(error instanceof Error)) return undefined;
const cause = (error as { cause?: unknown }).cause;
if (cause === undefined || cause === null) return undefined;
if (cause instanceof Error) {
const nested = causeOf(cause, depth + 1);
return nested ? `${cause.message}: ${nested}` : cause.message;
}
return String(cause);
}
/** Best-effort HTTP status from common error shapes (undici, MCP SDK, fetch). */
function statusOf(error: unknown): number | undefined {
if (error == null || typeof error !== "object") return undefined;
const e = error as {
status?: unknown;
code?: unknown;
response?: { status?: unknown };
};
if (typeof e.status === "number") return e.status;
if (typeof e.response?.status === "number") return e.response.status;
// SDK SseError / StreamableHTTPError expose `.code` as the HTTP status. Guard
// to the HTTP range (100-599) so a JSON-RPC ProtocolError code (e.g. -32601
// MethodNotFound) is not mistaken for an HTTP status and leaked into the
// envelope or misclassified as AUTH_REQUIRED. String node codes like
// "ENOTFOUND" are already excluded by the numeric check.
if (typeof e.code === "number" && e.code >= 100 && e.code <= 599) {
return e.code;
}
return undefined;
}
const UNREACHABLE_PATTERN =
/ENOTFOUND|ECONNREFUSED|ECONNRESET|EAI_AGAIN|ETIMEDOUT|fetch failed|getaddrinfo|connect(?:ion)? timed out|aborted/i;
/**
* Classify an arbitrary error into an exit code and envelope. Used both by the
* binary's {@link handleError} and by callers that want to throw a
* {@link CliExitCodeError} with the right code up front.
*/
export function classifyError(
error: unknown,
context?: { url?: string },
): { exitCode: number; envelope: ErrorEnvelope } {
const message =
error instanceof Error
? error.message
: typeof error === "string"
? error
: "Unknown error";
const cause = causeOf(error);
const status = statusOf(error);
const url = context?.url;
// A pre-classified error carries its own exit code; fill in any envelope
// fields the thrower didn't supply.
if (error instanceof CliExitCodeError) {
return {
exitCode: error.exitCode,
envelope: {
code: error.envelope?.code ?? codeForExit(error.exitCode),
message,
...(cause !== undefined && { cause }),
...(error.envelope?.status !== undefined && {
status: error.envelope.status,
}),
...((error.envelope?.url ?? url) !== undefined && {
url: error.envelope?.url ?? url,
}),
},
};
}
// 401 / OAuth-required → AUTH_REQUIRED so the caller can kick the auth flow.
if (
status === 401 ||
status === 403 ||
/WWW-Authenticate|Unauthorized|invalid_token|OAuth/i.test(
message + " " + (cause ?? ""),
)
) {
return {
exitCode: EXIT_CODES.AUTH_REQUIRED,
envelope: {
code: "auth_required",
message,
...(cause !== undefined && { cause }),
...(status !== undefined && { status }),
...(url !== undefined && { url }),
},
};
}
// Network-layer failure → UNREACHABLE so the caller can retry via a proxy.
if (UNREACHABLE_PATTERN.test(message + " " + (cause ?? ""))) {
return {
exitCode: EXIT_CODES.UNREACHABLE,
envelope: {
code: "unreachable",
message,
...(cause !== undefined && { cause }),
...(status !== undefined && { status }),
...(url !== undefined && { url }),
},
};
}
return {
exitCode: EXIT_CODES.USAGE,
envelope: {
code: "error",
message,
...(cause !== undefined && { cause }),
...(status !== undefined && { status }),
...(url !== undefined && { url }),
},
};
}
function codeForExit(exitCode: number): string {
switch (exitCode) {
case EXIT_CODES.NO_APP:
return "no_app";
case EXIT_CODES.AUTH_REQUIRED:
return "auth_required";
case EXIT_CODES.UNREACHABLE:
return "unreachable";
case EXIT_CODES.TOOL_ERROR:
return "tool_error";
case EXIT_CODES.SCHEMA_UNPORTABLE:
return "schema_unportable";
default:
return "error";
}
}
/**
* Single source of truth for mapping a thrown error to the CLI's exit code and
* stderr text. The binary entry ({@link handleError}) and the in-process test
* runner both call this, so tests observe exactly what the binary would emit.
*
* stderr is one JSON line `{"error":{...}}` so a caller can `2>&1 | tail -1 |
* jq .error`; the message is inside the envelope so nothing is lost vs. the
* previous bare-message behaviour.
*/
export function formatErrorOutput(
error: unknown,
context?: { url?: string },
): { exitCode: number; stderr: string } {
const { exitCode, envelope } = classifyError(error, context);
return {
exitCode,
stderr: JSON.stringify({ error: envelope }) + "\n",
};
}
/**
* The binary's last-resort error sink: write the envelope, then exit.
*
* **Async, and the await is load-bearing.** On a pipe or a file — as opposed
* to a TTY — `process.stderr.write` is asynchronous, and `process.exit()`
* discards whatever is still queued. Size is not the safeguard it looks like:
* the envelope being small enough for the pipe buffer says nothing about
* whether the write has been *performed* by the time the process goes away.
* So this settles on the write callback first, exactly as the `--strict`
* schema report does.
*/
export async function handleError(error: unknown): Promise<never> {
const { exitCode, stderr } = formatErrorOutput(error);
await awaitableError(stderr);
process.exit(exitCode);
}