`BaseOAuthClientProvider.saveClientInformation` treated every save without an explicit `registrationKind` as DCR. The SDK reaches it from three places in `auth()` and only one is a dynamic registration, so the issuer-binding write overwrote the `cimd` provenance our own pre-registration had just stored — and Connection Info reported `Dynamic (DCR)` for a connection that never issued a `POST /oauth/register`. Recover the kind instead: a `client_id` equal to the configured `clientMetadataUrl` is CIMD (which also covers the SDK's own CIMD write), and otherwise a stored registration with the same `client_id` carries its recorded kind forward. Matching on `client_id` keeps stale CIMD provenance from leaking onto a later DCR registration for the same server. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lmj6X2epWpPE7ScdSKQmtA Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
502 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript
502 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript
import type {
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OAuthClientProvider,
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OAuthClientInformationContext,
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} from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
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import type {
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OAuthClientInformation,
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OAuthClientMetadata,
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OAuthTokens,
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OAuthMetadata,
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OAuthDiscoveryState,
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} from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
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import type { OAuthStorage, SaveClientInformationOptions } from "./storage.js";
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import { generateOAuthState } from "./utils.js";
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import { applyAuthorizationParams } from "./authorizationParams.js";
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import { scopeForDeclinedRefreshGrant } from "./scopes.js";
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/**
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* Redirect URL provider. Returns the redirect URL for OAuth flows.
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* Caller populates the URL before authenticate() (e.g. from callback server).
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*/
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export interface RedirectUrlProvider {
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getRedirectUrl(): string;
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}
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/**
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* Mutable redirect URL provider for TUI/CLI. Caller sets redirectUrl
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* before authenticate().
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*/
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export class MutableRedirectUrlProvider implements RedirectUrlProvider {
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redirectUrl = "";
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getRedirectUrl(): string {
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return this.redirectUrl;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Navigation handler interface
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* Handles navigation to authorization URLs
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*/
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export interface OAuthNavigation {
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/**
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* Navigate to the authorization URL
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* @param authorizationUrl - The OAuth authorization URL
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*/
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navigateToAuthorization(authorizationUrl: URL): void;
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}
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export type OAuthNavigationCallback = (
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authorizationUrl: URL,
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) => void | Promise<void>;
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/**
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* Callback navigation handler
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* Invokes the provided callback when navigation is requested.
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* The caller always handles navigation.
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*/
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export class CallbackNavigation implements OAuthNavigation {
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private authorizationUrl: URL | null = null;
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private callback: OAuthNavigationCallback;
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constructor(callback: OAuthNavigationCallback) {
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this.callback = callback;
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}
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navigateToAuthorization(authorizationUrl: URL): void {
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this.authorizationUrl = authorizationUrl;
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const result = this.callback(authorizationUrl);
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if (result instanceof Promise) {
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void result;
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}
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}
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getAuthorizationUrl(): URL | null {
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return this.authorizationUrl;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Console navigation handler
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* Prints the authorization URL to console, optionally invokes an extra callback.
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*/
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export class ConsoleNavigation extends CallbackNavigation {
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constructor(callback?: OAuthNavigationCallback) {
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super((url) => {
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console.log(`Please navigate to: ${url.href}`);
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return callback?.(url);
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});
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}
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}
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/**
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* Config passed to BaseOAuthClientProvider. Provider assigns to members and
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* accesses as needed.
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*/
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export type OAuthProviderConfig = {
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storage: OAuthStorage;
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redirectUrlProvider: RedirectUrlProvider;
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navigation: OAuthNavigation;
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clientMetadataUrl?: string;
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/**
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* Per-server custom authorization-request parameters (#2018), merged into the
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* finished authorize URL in {@link BaseOAuthClientProvider.redirectToAuthorization}.
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* Reserved (protocol-critical) keys are dropped with a warning — see
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* `authorizationParams.ts`. Authorization request only; the token request is
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* unaffected.
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*/
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authorizationParams?: Record<string, string>;
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/**
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* Whether to declare the `refresh_token` grant in the registered client
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* metadata (#2068). Defaults to `true`; set `false` to register (and
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* authorize) as an authorization-code-only client.
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*
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* This is not merely cosmetic. The SDK's `determineScope()` appends
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* `offline_access` to the effective scope whenever the authorization server
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* advertises it **and** the client metadata declares `refresh_token`, and
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* `startAuthorization()` then appends `prompt=consent` whenever
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* `offline_access` is in scope. Against Microsoft Entra ID, that forced
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* consent prompt routes a non-admin user into the admin-consent workflow and
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* fails with `AADSTS90094` even after a tenant admin has consented.
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*
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* It removes that *automatic* augmentation only. `startAuthorization()` reads
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* the scope, never `grant_types`, so an `offline_access` the caller passed in
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* `scope` — or one the resource advertises when `scope` is unset, which
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* `determineScope` falls back to — still produces the prompt. This is not on
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* its own a guarantee that `prompt=consent` is absent.
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*/
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requestRefreshToken?: boolean;
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/**
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* The scope configured for this server (mcp.json / Server Settings), as
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* distinct from the scope carried in OAuth storage after a previous grant.
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*
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* Used only to decide whether an `offline_access` in the effective scope was
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* *asked for* or merely inherited — see {@link scopeForDeclinedRefreshGrant}.
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* An explicitly configured one is honored; an inherited one is dropped from
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* the request when {@link requestRefreshToken} is false. (#2068)
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*/
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configuredScope?: string;
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};
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/**
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* Base OAuth client provider
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* Implements common OAuth provider functionality.
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* Use with injected storage, redirect URL provider, and navigation.
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*/
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export class BaseOAuthClientProvider implements OAuthClientProvider {
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private capturedAuthUrl: URL | null = null;
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private eventTarget: EventTarget | null = null;
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private suppressAuthorizationNavigation = false;
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/** Cached after {@link prepareForAuth} for sync SDK `clientMetadata.scope`. */
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private cachedScope: string | undefined;
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protected serverUrl: string;
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protected storage: OAuthStorage;
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protected redirectUrlProvider: RedirectUrlProvider;
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protected navigation: OAuthNavigation;
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public clientMetadataUrl?: string;
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/** Custom authorization-request parameters (#2018). Authorize URL only. */
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protected authorizationParams?: Record<string, string>;
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/** Declare the `refresh_token` grant in {@link clientMetadata} (#2068). */
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protected requestRefreshToken: boolean;
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/** Server-configured scope, for the #2068 `offline_access` distinction. */
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protected configuredScope?: string;
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constructor(serverUrl: string, oauthConfig: OAuthProviderConfig) {
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this.serverUrl = serverUrl;
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this.storage = oauthConfig.storage;
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this.redirectUrlProvider = oauthConfig.redirectUrlProvider;
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this.navigation = oauthConfig.navigation;
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this.clientMetadataUrl = oauthConfig.clientMetadataUrl;
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this.authorizationParams = oauthConfig.authorizationParams;
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this.requestRefreshToken = oauthConfig.requestRefreshToken ?? true;
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this.configuredScope = oauthConfig.configuredScope;
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}
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/**
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* Load persisted scope into {@link cachedScope} before SDK `auth()` (which
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* reads {@link clientMetadata.scope} synchronously).
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*/
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async prepareForAuth(): Promise<void> {
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this.cachedScope = await this.storage.getScope(this.serverUrl);
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}
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/**
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* Set the event target for dispatching oauthAuthorizationRequired events
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*/
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setEventTarget(eventTarget: EventTarget): void {
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this.eventTarget = eventTarget;
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}
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/**
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* Get the captured authorization URL (for return value)
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*/
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getCapturedAuthUrl(): URL | null {
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return this.capturedAuthUrl;
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}
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/**
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* Clear the captured authorization URL
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*/
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clearCapturedAuthUrl(): void {
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this.capturedAuthUrl = null;
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}
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/** Capture authorize URL without navigating (step-up confirmation modal). */
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setSuppressAuthorizationNavigation(suppress: boolean): void {
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this.suppressAuthorizationNavigation = suppress;
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}
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get scope(): string | undefined {
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// #2068: filter at the point of *request*, not in storage. Covers the two
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// readers that go through this getter — `clientMetadata.scope` below, and
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// the `scope:` argument `OAuthManager.authenticate` hands to the SDK.
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//
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// It is NOT the only request path: mid-session `insufficient_scope` step-up
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// builds its union from raw storage and passes it to `mcpAuth` directly,
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// never reading this getter. `OAuthManager.handleAuthChallenge` applies the
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// same filter there. Both call `scopeForDeclinedRefreshGrant`, so the rule
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// lives in one place even though it has to be applied twice.
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if (!this.requestRefreshToken) {
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return scopeForDeclinedRefreshGrant(
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this.cachedScope,
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this.configuredScope,
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);
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}
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return this.cachedScope;
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}
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get redirectUrl(): string {
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return this.redirectUrlProvider.getRedirectUrl();
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}
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get redirect_uris(): string[] {
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return [this.redirectUrl];
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}
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get clientMetadata(): OAuthClientMetadata {
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const metadata: OAuthClientMetadata = {
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redirect_uris: this.redirect_uris,
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token_endpoint_auth_method: "none",
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// #2068: `refresh_token` is declared by default, and dropped when the
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// server's "Request refresh token" setting is off — which stops the SDK
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// *adding* `offline_access` (and so the `prompt=consent` it forces). It
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// does not remove an `offline_access` that reaches the scope another way.
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// See `OAuthProviderConfig.requestRefreshToken`.
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grant_types: this.requestRefreshToken
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? ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"]
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: ["authorization_code"],
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response_types: ["code"],
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client_name: "MCP Inspector",
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client_uri: "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector",
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scope: this.scope ?? "",
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// SEP-837: the Inspector is a locally-hosted app reached over localhost, so
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// it registers as a native client. OIDC-flavored ASes default an omitted
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// `application_type` to `"web"`, which forbids loopback redirect URIs and
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// rejects DCR. (The SDK also infers `"native"` from loopback `redirect_uris`;
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// declaring it explicitly keeps the value visible and correct even when the
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// redirect host is not itself a loopback literal.)
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application_type: "native",
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};
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// Note: clientMetadataUrl for CIMD mode is passed to registerClient() directly,
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// not as part of clientMetadata. The SDK handles CIMD separately.
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return metadata;
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}
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state(): string | Promise<string> {
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return generateOAuthState();
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}
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async clientInformation(
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ctx?: OAuthClientInformationContext,
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): Promise<OAuthClientInformation | undefined> {
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// Try preregistered (static, issuer-independent) first, then the per-issuer
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// dynamic registration (SEP-2352 — keyed by `ctx.issuer`).
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const preregistered = await this.storage.getClientInformation(
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this.serverUrl,
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true,
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);
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if (preregistered) {
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return preregistered;
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}
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return await this.storage.getClientInformation(
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this.serverUrl,
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false,
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ctx?.issuer,
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);
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}
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async saveClientInformation(
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clientInformation: OAuthClientInformation,
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// SDK v2's `OAuthClientProvider.saveClientInformation` passes an
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// `OAuthClientInformationContext` ({ issuer }); our own DCR/CIMD callers
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// pass `SaveClientInformationOptions` ({ registrationKind }). Accept either
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// and read whichever keys are present: the SDK supplies `issuer` (SEP-2352
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// per-AS keying) and no kind — `resolveSdkRegistrationKind` recovers it —
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// while our callers supply the registration kind and no issuer yet.
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options?: SaveClientInformationOptions | OAuthClientInformationContext,
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): Promise<void> {
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const issuer = options && "issuer" in options ? options.issuer : undefined;
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const registrationKind =
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options && "registrationKind" in options
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? options.registrationKind
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: await this.resolveSdkRegistrationKind(clientInformation, issuer);
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await this.storage.saveClientInformation(
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this.serverUrl,
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clientInformation,
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{
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registrationKind,
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issuer,
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},
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);
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}
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/**
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* Resolve the registration kind for a save that carries no explicit one — that
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* is, one the SDK made. Three SDK call sites reach here: back-stamping an
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* existing registration with its `issuer`, the SDK's own CIMD write (whose
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* `client_id` *is* the metadata-document URL), and a real dynamic
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* registration. Only the last is `"dcr"`, so defaulting every unstamped save
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* to it relabels a CIMD registration `Dynamic (DCR)` in Connection Info the
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* moment the SDK binds it to an issuer — reported as #2242, where no
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* `POST /register` was ever made.
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*
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* `client_id` is what tells the cases apart, so match on it rather than on the
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* stored kind alone: a DCR `client_id` is minted by the authorization server,
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* so a later DCR registration for the same server cannot inherit the earlier
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* CIMD provenance.
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*/
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private async resolveSdkRegistrationKind(
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clientInformation: OAuthClientInformation,
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issuer: string | undefined,
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): Promise<SaveClientInformationOptions["registrationKind"]> {
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const clientMetadataUrl = this.clientMetadataUrl?.trim();
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if (
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clientMetadataUrl &&
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clientInformation.client_id === clientMetadataUrl
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) {
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return "cimd";
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}
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// Falls back to the unkeyed slot our own pre-registration wrote, since the
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// issuer slot does not exist yet on the save that creates it. Reading it
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// covers a CIMD registration whose `clientMetadataUrl` config has since
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// been cleared, so the provenance is not silently demoted.
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const stored = await this.storage.getClientInformation(
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this.serverUrl,
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false,
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issuer,
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);
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if (!stored || stored.client_id !== clientInformation.client_id) {
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return "dcr";
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}
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const storedKind = await this.storage.getClientRegistrationKind(
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this.serverUrl,
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issuer,
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);
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// `"static"` lives in the preregistered slot, never this one, so `"cimd"`
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// is the only kind worth carrying forward.
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return storedKind === "cimd" ? "cimd" : "dcr";
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}
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async saveScope(scope: string | undefined): Promise<void> {
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await this.storage.saveScope(this.serverUrl, scope);
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this.cachedScope = scope;
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}
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async savePreregisteredClientInformation(
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clientInformation: OAuthClientInformation,
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): Promise<void> {
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await this.storage.savePreregisteredClientInformation(
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this.serverUrl,
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clientInformation,
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);
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}
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async tokens(
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ctx?: OAuthClientInformationContext,
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): Promise<OAuthTokens | undefined> {
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return await this.storage.getTokens(this.serverUrl, ctx?.issuer);
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}
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async saveTokens(
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tokens: OAuthTokens,
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ctx?: OAuthClientInformationContext,
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): Promise<void> {
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await this.storage.saveTokens(this.serverUrl, tokens, {
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issuer: ctx?.issuer,
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});
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}
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redirectToAuthorization(authorizationUrl: URL): void {
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// #2018: the SDK builds the authorize URL and offers no hook for extra
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// parameters, so the per-server ones are merged here — the one seam that
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// sees the finished URL before navigation. Everything downstream (the
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// captured URL used by the step-up modal, the event, the navigation) uses
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// the merged URL so all three agree on what was actually requested.
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this.performAuthorizationRedirect(
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applyAuthorizationParams(authorizationUrl, this.authorizationParams),
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);
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}
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/**
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* Redirect to an authorize URL belonging to a **different** authorization
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* server than the one this provider was configured for, so the per-server
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* custom parameters (#2018) MUST NOT be applied.
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*
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* The only caller is the enterprise-managed (EMA) transport provider, which
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* discards the resource AS URL and sends the user to the enterprise IdP
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* instead. Parameters a user configured for their MCP server's authorization
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* server — a `kc_idp_hint`, an `audience` — are meaningless and potentially
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* flow-breaking on the IdP's, and appending them there would leak per-server
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* config across an authorization-server boundary.
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*/
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redirectToExternalAuthorization(authorizationUrl: URL): void {
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this.performAuthorizationRedirect(authorizationUrl);
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}
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/** Capture, announce, and navigate to a finished authorize URL. */
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private performAuthorizationRedirect(authorizationUrl: URL): void {
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// Capture URL for return value
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this.capturedAuthUrl = authorizationUrl;
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if (!this.suppressAuthorizationNavigation) {
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if (this.eventTarget) {
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this.eventTarget.dispatchEvent(
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new CustomEvent("oauthAuthorizationRequired", {
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detail: { url: authorizationUrl },
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}),
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);
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}
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this.navigation.navigateToAuthorization(authorizationUrl);
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}
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}
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async saveCodeVerifier(codeVerifier: string): Promise<void> {
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await this.storage.saveCodeVerifier(this.serverUrl, codeVerifier);
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}
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async codeVerifier(): Promise<string> {
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const verifier = await this.storage.getCodeVerifier(this.serverUrl);
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if (!verifier) {
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throw new Error("No code verifier saved for session");
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}
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return verifier;
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}
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async clear(): Promise<void> {
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await this.storage.clear(this.serverUrl);
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}
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async getServerMetadata(): Promise<OAuthMetadata | null> {
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return this.storage.getServerMetadata(this.serverUrl);
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}
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async saveServerMetadata(metadata: OAuthMetadata): Promise<void> {
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await this.storage.saveServerMetadata(this.serverUrl, metadata);
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}
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/**
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* SEP-2352 discovery-state round-trip. The SDK persists RFC 9728/8414 discovery
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* here (alongside the code verifier) so that on the authorization-code callback
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* leg it can compare the resolved AS `issuer` against the one recorded at
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* redirect time and reject a mismatch (`AuthorizationServerMismatchError`).
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* Without these two methods the SDK only `console.warn`s and the binding check
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* is inactive.
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*/
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async saveDiscoveryState(state: OAuthDiscoveryState): Promise<void> {
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await this.storage.saveDiscoveryState(this.serverUrl, state);
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}
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async discoveryState(): Promise<OAuthDiscoveryState | undefined> {
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return this.storage.getDiscoveryState(this.serverUrl);
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}
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/**
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* SEP-2352 credential invalidation. The SDK calls this to drop credentials the
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* server has rejected; hosts also call `'discovery'` on repeated 401s so a
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* changed `authorization_servers` list is re-fetched.
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*/
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async invalidateCredentials(
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scope: "all" | "client" | "tokens" | "verifier" | "discovery",
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): Promise<void> {
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switch (scope) {
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case "all":
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await this.storage.clear(this.serverUrl);
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return;
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case "client":
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await this.storage.clearClientInformation(this.serverUrl);
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return;
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case "tokens":
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await this.storage.clearTokens(this.serverUrl);
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return;
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case "verifier":
|
|
await this.storage.clearCodeVerifier(this.serverUrl);
|
|
return;
|
|
case "discovery":
|
|
await this.storage.clearDiscoveryState(this.serverUrl);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|