* feat(auth): inject MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN into served index.html (#1378)
Reloading the web client at the bare URL (no `?MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN=…`
query string) with empty sessionStorage made every `/api/*` request 401 —
the browser had no way to recover the backend's auth token.
Embed the token into `index.html` on every page load so the browser no
longer depends on the query string surviving navigation:
- New shared helper `clients/web/server/inject-auth-token.ts` embeds
`<script>window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__ = "…"</script>` (escaped against
`</script>` injection; no-op when auth is dangerously omitted).
- Dev: the Vite plugin injects via `transformIndexHtml`.
- Prod: the Hono server injects on the `/` route.
- `App.tsx` `getAuthToken()` now reads the injected global first, then the
query string, then sessionStorage (both fallbacks preserved).
- Shared global name lives in `INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN_GLOBAL`
(`core/mcp/remote/constants.ts`).
Tests: helper unit coverage + an integration test exercising the real
prod server's `/` → `/api/*` flow (injected token authenticates; missing
token 401s). AGENTS.md documents the token-recovery order.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): wire OAuth authorization-code flow into App.tsx (#1379)
OAuth-protected MCP servers could not be connected to from the v2 web
client: the core OAuth pipeline exists, but App.tsx never invoked it, so a
connect attempt 401'd and surfaced "Remote send failed (401): … Missing
Authorization header" as a toast.
Wire the two missing entry points (all core primitives already in place):
- Auto-trigger on 401: in onToggleConnection's catch, detect an upstream
401 (isUnauthorizedError) and call client.authenticate(), which runs
discovery + DCR (backend-proxied) and redirects the page to the auth
server via BrowserNavigation. The initiating server id is persisted to
sessionStorage first, since the OAuth `state` carries only mode+authId
and the full-page redirect wipes React state.
- /oauth/callback handler: a mount effect that, once `servers` hydrate,
parses the callback params, recovers the pending server, rebuilds its
InspectorClient, runs completeOAuthFlow(code) (PKCE verifier + DCR client
info survive in BrowserOAuthStorage), replaceState("/") so a reload can't
replay the single-use code, then connect(). An `error=` callback toasts
instead of retrying.
connect() already attaches the OAuth provider to the transport
(inspectorClient.ts), so once tokens land in BrowserOAuthStorage the
outbound request carries the bearer token.
Extracted the pure pieces (constants + isUnauthorizedError) to
src/utils/oauthFlow.ts with unit tests. Verified end-to-end in a real
browser against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: Connect -> redirect ->
auto-approve -> callback -> Connected, with the access token shown in the
Connection Info modal (#1377).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): persist OAuth pre-redirect Network log across the redirect (#1384)
After #1379, the Network tab showed only the post-redirect auth HTTP
(discovery re-run + POST /token); the pre-redirect discovery and the DCR
POST /register that run during authenticate() were lost when the page
navigated to the auth server.
Root causes:
1. Ordering — BrowserNavigation set `window.location.href` before the
client's `saveSession` event fired (OAuthManager calls onBeforeOAuthRedirect
*after* auth() already navigated), so the save raced the unload and was
dropped. Fix: BrowserNavigation now runs a synchronous `beforeNavigate`
hook immediately before assigning location.href; App wires it through
createWebEnvironment to flush the active fetch log to RemoteInspectorClient
Storage (keyed by the authId parsed from the auth URL) via a keepalive POST
that outlives the unload.
2. Illegal invocation — RemoteInspectorClientStorage defaulted to
`this.fetchFn = globalThis.fetch` and called `this.fetchFn(...)`, which
re-binds `this` and makes native fetch throw "Illegal invocation"
(swallowed by the catch). This silently broke *all* session save/load.
Fix: default to a wrapper that preserves the global receiver.
3. Restore race — hydrateFetchRequests replaced the list, so a load that
resolved after the resuming connect appended live entries would clobber
them. Fix: merge restored (older) entries ahead of live ones, dedupe by id.
saveSession also now uses keepalive: true.
Verified end-to-end against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: the connected
page's Network tab shows the full handshake — pre-redirect discovery + DCR
/register plus post-redirect discovery + /token as `auth`, alongside
`transport`. Added unit tests for the beforeNavigate ordering and the
hydrate merge/dedupe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(network): show auth response bodies with masked secrets + reveal toggle (#1386)
Auth-category Network entries showed request body/headers/status but never
the response body (rendered "(empty)"), because buildEffectiveAuthFetch
deliberately skipped capturing it to avoid surfacing access_token /
refresh_token. That hid the most useful thing to inspect when debugging
OAuth — the token exchange.
Capture auth response bodies, but mask sensitive OAuth fields by default
behind a click-to-reveal toggle so they aren't exposed at a glance during
a screen-share:
- inspectorClient: wire updateResponseBody on the auth fetcher.
- src/utils/maskSecrets.ts: maskSecretsInBody() masks access_token,
refresh_token, id_token, client_secret (case-insensitive, nested) in JSON
bodies; reports whether anything was masked. Non-JSON / secret-free bodies
pass through untouched.
- NetworkEntry BodyPreview: when a body has masked fields, render it masked
with a Reveal/Hide toggle (copy honors the shown view). Masking is a UI
concern; the raw entry is unchanged so reveal shows the real value.
access_token / refresh_token live in the post-redirect /token response,
which is never written to the session-restore files (#1384); only
pre-redirect bodies (public discovery, DCR /register) persist, so no bearer
token hits disk.
Verified end-to-end: the /token response shows masked by default
(access_token: "••••••••"), Reveal exposes the raw value, and discovery /
the public DCR /register response (no secret) render with no toggle. Added
util + component unit tests and a story play function.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): inject token into prod SPA fallback + prime sessionStorage + no-store (#1378)
Addresses code-review feedback on the token-injection PR:
- Prod `server.ts` SPA deep-link fallback (e.g. `/oauth/callback`) previously
served the raw index.html off disk via serveStatic, bypassing injection — so
a bookmark/reload at a non-`/` route with empty sessionStorage would 401.
Route the SPA fallback through the same `serveIndexHtml` (inject) helper;
real static assets (paths with a dot) still serve verbatim. Dev already
injected on every HTML serve via Vite `transformIndexHtml`.
- `getAuthToken()` now persists the injected `window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__`
to sessionStorage (not just the URL-param branch), priming the backstop for
any later navigation that loses the global.
- Injected HTML responses now send `Cache-Control: no-store`, so a page
carrying a token isn't cached and served stale after a restart regenerates
the token.
Integration tests added: SPA fallback (`/oauth/callback`) carries the token,
`Cache-Control: no-store` on injected HTML, real assets served verbatim, and
unknown `/api` routes 404 rather than falling through to the HTML shell.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): address #1383 review — split OAuth/connect toasts, tighten 401 match (#1379)
Code-review feedback on the OAuth-wiring PR:
- Callback effect: split completeOAuthFlow vs connect() into separate
try/catch blocks. A token-exchange failure now reads "OAuth token exchange
failed … Please try connecting again." (the single-use code is spent and the
URL was cleared, so a reload can't retry); a post-OAuth connect failure reads
"Failed to connect" since OAuth actually succeeded and re-clicking Connect
reuses the persisted tokens.
- isUnauthorizedError: anchor the message fallback on the transport's
`failed …(401)` wording instead of a bare `(401)`, so an unrelated `(401)`
spliced into an error message can't trip the OAuth flow. Added a test.
- Documented that clearing the pending id + URL before the server lookup is
intentional (deleted/renamed server mid-flow → require a fresh Connect).
Also merges the squash-merged #1382 base from v2/main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(auth): address #1385 review — clarify double-save + keepalive cap + test fetch default (#1384)
Code-review feedback on the OAuth Network-log persistence PR:
- Documented the double-save: `FetchRequestLogState`'s `saveSession` listener
is the backstop; `BrowserNavigation`'s `beforeNavigate` hook is the primary
flush for the redirect case. Notes the listener may lose the navigation race
and is harmless when it duplicates (last-writer-wins, identical payload).
- Reworded the keepalive comment in `RemoteInspectorClientStorage.saveSession`:
the 64KB cap is general (the method is also reachable from the listener with
the full session log), so a long session could exceed it and drop silently —
acceptable since the persisted log is best-effort, not load-bearing.
- Added a regression test that constructs `RemoteInspectorClientStorage`
without a `fetchFn`, stubs `globalThis.fetch`, and asserts the default
wrapper calls it (locks in the "Illegal invocation" fix, which callers
otherwise swallow).
Optional items (logger.warn on swallowed save errors; setupClientForServer dep
churn) acknowledged on the PR, not changed.
Also merges the squash-merged #1383 base from v2/main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(network): address #1387 review — form-encoded masking, cleaner flag, a11y (#1386)
Code-review feedback on the auth-response-body masking PR:
- Extended masking to form-urlencoded bodies (finding #1): the token *request*
is `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` and carries `code` / `code_verifier` /
`client_secret` / `refresh_token`. `maskSecretsInBody` now masks those in
form bodies too (preserving formatting; placeholder not percent-encoded).
`code`/`code_verifier`/`client_assertion` are form-only sensitive keys —
deliberately NOT masked in JSON, where `code` is usually an error/status code.
- Replaced the double-stringify `hasSecrets` heuristic with an explicit
masked-flag propagated out of `maskNode` (finding #2) — robust if the
transform ever grows non-identity behavior, and one fewer serialization.
- Reset reveal state on body change via `key={body}` remount instead of a
setState-in-effect (finding #3; avoids the cascading-render lint rule).
- a11y (finding #4): `aria-label` on the Reveal/Hide button and `aria-live`
on the hidden/revealed status text.
- Security tripwire comment near the `saveSession` listener (finding #6):
captured auth bodies are unmasked at source (masking is UI-only), so any new
post-token-exchange persistence path must redact first.
Tests: form-encoded masking (token + refresh requests), JSON `code` NOT masked,
non-object JSON pass-through, default-fetch wrapper. Story play + NetworkEntry
tests updated for the new aria-labels and the now-masked form request body.
Finding #5 (pretty-print asymmetry) is already handled by ContentViewer's JSON
formatting; #4-aria and #6 are the doc/a11y bits.
Also merges the squash-merged #1385 base from v2/main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(network): address #1387 third-pass review — content-type masking, wholesale mask, dedup (#1386)
Third-pass code-review feedback on the auth-body masking PR:
- maskSecretsInBody now takes the body's content-type (finding #1): `*json*`
→ JSON masking, form-urlencoded → form masking, any other known type
(HTML/plaintext/XML) → no masking; absent/unknown → sniff as before. Removes
the implicit "non-JSON ⇒ form" guess for error pages etc. NetworkEntry passes
the request/response `content-type` header through to BodyPreview.
- Mask any non-empty value under a sensitive key wholesale (finding #2):
a non-standard object/array value under e.g. `access_token` is replaced
rather than recursed into, so it can't leak. Empty-string still not flagged.
- Extracted `isSensitiveKey(set, key)` to dedupe the JSON/form key checks
(finding #3).
- Reworded `MaskResult.masked` doc to cover the form (non-pretty-printed) case
(finding #6).
Tests: non-string-value-under-sensitive-key wholesale mask; repeated form
param; empty form value not flagged; content-type honored (JSON type skips
form masking, text/plain skips masking, explicit form type masks).
Finding #5 (story re-hide) skipped per reviewer — unit test already covers
re-mask. Finding #4 (form edge cases) added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(network): address #1387 fourth-pass nits — content-type contract, key, form test (#1386)
Fourth-pass review (LGTM) — minor, non-blocking items:
- Documented the content-type matching contract on `maskSecretsInBody`:
substring match (`*json*` / `*x-www-form-urlencoded*`), and we trust the
wire's own label (a mislabeled body renders raw — acceptable for the
screen-share threat model) (finding #1).
- Key `<BodyPreview>` by content-type + body (not body alone) so a header-only
change would also reset the reveal state (finding #3; not reachable today).
- Storybook `AuthSuccess`: assert revealed count `>=` reveal-button count to
mirror the `hidden >= 2` check, so adding a non-masked body later can't drift
the assertion silently (finding #4).
- Added a `NetworkEntry` unit test for form-encoded request-body masking
(code/code_verifier) — previously exercised only via the Storybook play.
Finding #2 (silent decodeURIComponent fallback on malformed keys) acknowledged
as a known quirk outside the threat model; no change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* perf(network): address #1387 fifth-pass — memoize masking, mask DCR mgmt token (#1386)
Fifth-pass review (LGTM):
- Memoized `maskSecretsInBody` in `BodyPreview` (recommended item #1): a
Reveal/Hide click no longer re-parses + re-walks the body; cost is once per
mount, and the `key` remount re-runs it on body/content-type change. Guarded
so a too-large body is never parsed (the hook runs unconditionally, with the
size check inside the memo).
- Added `registration_access_token` (RFC 7592 DCR management credential, same
bearer class) to the masked key set, and a confidential-client `/register`
response fixture test (#5) asserting client_secret + registration_access_token
masked, client_id/metadata visible.
- Tightened the `isMaskableValue` doc to state the exact contract: non-null,
non-empty-string values are masked wholesale (#3).
Items #2 (transport parse cost — capped by the memo) and #4 (test-only
MASK_PLACEHOLDER export) left as-is per the review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(network): clarify body-update emits list event only (#1387 sixth pass) (#1386)
Sixth-pass review (LGTM, all nits). Added a comment on
`onFetchRequestBodyUpdate` noting it re-emits only `fetchRequestsChange`, not
the per-entry `fetchRequest` event — list-reading consumers pick up the body
on the next render; a future per-entry subscriber would need its own event.
Other items left as-is per the review: full-string `BodyPreview` key (#1,
micro-perf only if profiled), NaN under a sensitive key (#3, consistent with
the mask-non-null-non-empty contract), `&`-only form separator (#4, OAuth
never emits `;`).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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