inspector/core/client/config-parse.ts
Bob Dickinson 13dafe457b
Guided-auth removal, OAuth smoke testing, and TUI/CLI support (#1531)
* refactor(web): update OAuth E2E tests to use new authentication method

- Replaced `runGuidedAuth` with `authenticate` in the InspectorClient OAuth end-to-end tests to support quick authentication with CIMD pre-registration.
- Updated comments to reflect the change in authentication method and its support for HTTP test metadata URLs.
- Ensured that the tests continue to validate the expected authorization URL after the change.

Additionally, imported `ensureCimdClientRegistration` in the OAuthManager to streamline client registration during the authentication process.

* Guided-auth removal, OAuth smoke testing, and TUI/CLI support

* Added CLI OAuth runner flags tests

* Added clarifying comment on port 0 binding

* README notes on TUI oauth callback port, prettier fixes for CLI tests

* CIMD validation uses inline like EMA IdP

* Fixed TUI test failures from merge

* test: bring 5 OAuth files over the 90 per-file coverage gate

The guided-auth-removal work added/touched several files that fell below
the repo's >=90 per-file coverage gate (npm run coverage). CI doesn't run
the gate (it's local-only), so validate + test:integration passed while
these gaps slipped through. Bring them all back over the line:

- core/auth/node/runner-oauth-callback.ts: test bad-URL/non-http-scheme
  throws, no-port->80 default, and IPv6 hostname bracketing. Annotate the
  provably-dead guards (empty host, out-of-range port, String(err)
  fallback, pathname "/" fallback) -- all rejected by new URL() upstream --
  with justified v8 ignore comments instead of lowering the gate.
- core/auth/cimd.ts: test the AS-doesn't-support-CIMD early return.
- core/react/useClientSettingsDraft.ts: test the functional-updater path,
  the stale-onChange-after-close prev===null guard, and the
  timer-fires-after-close value===null guard.
- ClientSettingsForm.tsx: test the CIMD checkbox toggle and CIMD URL clear.
- clients/tui/src/utils/oauthDisplay.ts: test static/dcr registration
  kinds, the expired IdP session, and the configured-scope/empty-scope
  branches of formatScopes.

npm run coverage now passes (exit 0) across web, cli, tui, launcher.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-29 15:35:51 -04:00

171 lines
5.3 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Browser-safe client.json parse/validate (no Node file I/O).
*/
import { z } from "zod";
import type { ClientConfig } from "./types.js";
/**
* True when `value` (trimmed) is an absolute `http:`/`https:` URL with a real
* host. An OAuth IdP issuer is always http(s), so other parseable schemes
* (`mailto:`, `foo:bar`, `javascript:`) are rejected rather than deferred to a
* later connect failure. Beyond "parses + http(s)", the host must actually look
* like a host — a dotted domain or IP, or `localhost` — so bare or degenerate
* values the URL parser still accepts (`https://foo`, `https://.`, `https://..`,
* `https://example`) are rejected too.
*/
export function isAbsoluteHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {
let url: URL;
try {
url = new URL(value.trim());
} catch {
return false;
}
if (url.protocol !== "http:" && url.protocol !== "https:") return false;
return isRealHost(url.hostname);
}
/**
* A hostname the URL parser produced that we accept as an actual host:
* - `localhost` (common in dev),
* - an IPv6 literal (arrives bracketed, e.g. `[::1]`),
* - otherwise a dotted name / IPv4 with at least two non-empty labels — which
* rejects single-label (`foo`), bare-dot (`.`, `..`) and empty-label
* (`a..b`, `.a`, `a.`) hosts. An empty hostname splits to `[""]` and is
* rejected here too (http(s) URLs can't reach this with an empty host).
*/
function isRealHost(hostname: string): boolean {
if (hostname === "localhost") return true;
if (hostname.startsWith("[")) return hostname.endsWith("]");
const labels = hostname.split(".");
return labels.length >= 2 && labels.every((label) => label !== "");
}
const HttpUrlStringSchema = z
.string()
.min(1)
.superRefine((val, ctx) => {
const trimmed = val.trim();
if (!isAbsoluteHttpUrl(trimmed)) {
ctx.addIssue({
code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
message: `Invalid URL: "${trimmed}" — must be an http(s) URL (e.g. https://idp.example.com)`,
});
}
});
/** Field-level error when a CIMD metadata URL is not a parseable http(s) URL. */
export const CIMD_METADATA_URL_INVALID_ERROR =
"Must be a valid URL, like https://example.com/oauth/client.json";
/** Field-level error when a CIMD metadata URL is not HTTPS. */
export const CIMD_METADATA_URL_HTTPS_ERROR =
"CIMD client metadata URL must use HTTPS";
/** Field-level error when a CIMD metadata URL has no path segment. */
export const CIMD_METADATA_URL_PATH_ERROR =
"Must include a path (not the site root), like https://example.com/oauth/client.json";
/**
* Inline / form validation for a non-empty CIMD client metadata URL.
* Returns undefined when the value is valid; empty strings are not flagged here
* (required-field gating lives in {@link canPersistClientSettingsDraft}).
*/
export function getCimdClientMetadataUrlError(value: string): string | undefined {
const trimmed = value.trim();
if (trimmed === "") return undefined;
if (!isAbsoluteHttpUrl(trimmed)) {
return CIMD_METADATA_URL_INVALID_ERROR;
}
try {
const url = new URL(trimmed);
if (url.protocol !== "https:") {
return CIMD_METADATA_URL_HTTPS_ERROR;
}
if (url.pathname === "/" || url.pathname === "") {
return CIMD_METADATA_URL_PATH_ERROR;
}
} catch {
return CIMD_METADATA_URL_INVALID_ERROR;
}
return undefined;
}
function refineCimdMetadataUrl(
val: string,
ctx: z.RefinementCtx,
required: boolean,
): void {
const trimmed = val.trim();
if (trimmed === "") {
if (required) {
ctx.addIssue({
code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
message: "CIMD client metadata URL is required when CIMD is enabled",
});
}
return;
}
const error = getCimdClientMetadataUrlError(trimmed);
if (error) {
ctx.addIssue({
code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
message: error,
});
}
}
const CimdConfigSchema = z
.object({
enabled: z.boolean(),
clientMetadataUrl: z.string(),
})
.superRefine((data, ctx) => {
refineCimdMetadataUrl(data.clientMetadataUrl, ctx, data.enabled === true);
});
const EnterpriseManagedAuthIdpConfigSchema = z.object({
issuer: HttpUrlStringSchema,
clientId: z.string().min(1),
clientSecret: z.string().optional(),
});
const ClientConfigSchema = z.object({
enterpriseManagedAuth: z
.object({
enabled: z.boolean().optional(),
idp: EnterpriseManagedAuthIdpConfigSchema,
})
.optional(),
cimd: CimdConfigSchema.optional(),
});
/**
* Parse and validate unknown JSON into {@link ClientConfig}.
* @throws {z.ZodError} when shape is invalid
*/
export function parseClientConfig(raw: unknown): ClientConfig {
return ClientConfigSchema.parse(raw);
}
/** Canonical JSON serialization for client.json (matches backend store-io format). */
export function serializeClientConfig(config: ClientConfig): string {
return JSON.stringify(config, null, 2);
}
/** Human-readable message for a failed client.json load (parse or transport). */
export function formatClientConfigLoadError(error: unknown): string {
if (error instanceof z.ZodError) {
const issue = error.issues[0];
if (issue) {
const field =
issue.path.length > 0 ? issue.path.map(String).join(".") : "config";
return `${field}: ${issue.message}`;
}
return "Invalid client.json shape";
}
if (error instanceof Error) {
return error.message;
}
return String(error);
}