Three findings. The first is the third consecutive round in which my previous fix introduced the next defect, all in the same ~15 lines of `useInitialConfig`. **The request token did not subsume the unmount guard, and I said it did.** Bumping the generation on effect teardown invalidates loads already *in flight*; a `refresh()` called after unmount claims the next token, is therefore current, and commits into a dead hook. That is a live path — the callers fire `refresh()` from an async settings persist that can outlive `App`. Mounted state is tracked separately again and `stale()` checks both. The test for this was also wrong, in the way that matters: it called `refresh()` after unmount but never settled the fetch, so it could not observe the commit it existed to prevent. It settles the promise now. **A tmpfs mount was reported as durable.** `docker run --tmpfs /home/node/.mcp-inspector` puts a real entry in mountinfo, so a mount-table lookup answered "durable", selected the file store, and published `durable: true` for a file that disappears when the container stops — the exact false promise the in-memory fallback exists to avoid, reached by trusting the mount table over the filesystem type. `tmpfs`/`ramfs` are excluded now, read from the field after the ` - ` separator rather than by position, since the optional fields before it are variable in number. **A malformed envelope was diagnosed as a changed passphrase.** A truncated payload, a wrong-length IV or tag, or an out-of-range KDF parameter all threw `SecretFileKeyMismatchError`, whose 503 tells the user to restore a passphrase that cannot repair a structurally broken file. The read path now runs the same `encryptedEnvelopeProblem` check the descriptor path already ran, and reserves the key-mismatch error for an envelope that is well-formed and fails authentication — which is the case where that advice is right. Two existing tests asserted the old behavior and encoded the bug; both updated, and a new one pins that a well-formed envelope with the wrong key still gets the passphrase advice. The remaining suppressed comment is the hand-off's check-to-delete race, tracked in #2082. Full `npm run ci` green. Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
262 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
262 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* React hook over the `GET /api/config` endpoint — the single fetch of the
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* static `InitialConfigPayload` the dev/prod web backends serve alongside the
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* SPA (see `core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts`). It exposes the three fields the
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* web app reads off that payload:
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*
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* - `sandboxUrl` — the MCP Apps sandbox proxy URL. The backend mounts
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* `sandbox_proxy.html` on a separate controller port and advertises the URL
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* here; the Apps screen embeds it as the trusted outer iframe. `undefined`
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* until the fetch resolves, and whenever the backend omits it (legacy backend,
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* or a build without the sandbox controller) — callers treat that as "Apps
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* unavailable" rather than a blank iframe.
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* - `writable` — whether the session's server list is a writable catalog or a
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* read-only session (`--config` / ad-hoc `--server-url`). Defaults to `true`
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* until the fetch resolves and whenever the field is absent (a legacy backend
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* predating the flag), so the default catalog keeps full CRUD.
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* - `version` — the Inspector version the backend reads from the root
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* `package.json` (the browser can't read it off disk). `undefined` until the
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* fetch resolves, and whenever the backend omits it (legacy backend) — the UI
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* renders nothing then.
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* - `secretStorage` — which store this session's secrets go to (#1950),
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* resolved on the Node side where the keychain probe happens. `undefined`
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* until the fetch resolves and on a backend that omits it; the settings-modal
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* footers render nothing then, because a guessed answer under a secret field
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* is worse than no answer.
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*
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* This consolidates the three former single-field hooks (`useSandboxUrl`,
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* `useServerListWritable`, `useInspectorVersion`), each of which fetched the
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* same static payload separately, into one request (#1643).
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*
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* Fetches on mount, and re-fetches if `baseUrl` or `authToken` changes (rare —
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* effectively a full reload; the GET is idempotent). A response that resolves
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* after unmount or a re-fetch is dropped rather than overwriting current state.
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*/
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import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
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import type { SecretStorageInfo } from "../auth/secret-storage-info.js";
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export interface UseInitialConfigOptions {
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/** Base URL of the remote server (typically `window.location.origin`). */
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baseUrl: string;
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/** Optional auth token for the `x-mcp-remote-auth` header. */
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authToken?: string;
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/** Fetch function to use (default: globalThis.fetch). Useful in tests. */
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fetchFn?: typeof fetch;
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}
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export interface UseInitialConfigResult {
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/** The Inspector version, or undefined when unavailable / not yet loaded. */
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version: string | undefined;
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/** The sandbox proxy URL, or undefined when unavailable / not yet loaded. */
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sandboxUrl: string | undefined;
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/** Whether the server list is writable (catalog) or read-only (session). */
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writable: boolean;
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/** Where this session's secrets are stored, or undefined when unknown. */
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secretStorage: SecretStorageInfo | undefined;
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/** True while the initial fetch is in flight. */
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loading: boolean;
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/**
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* Re-fetch the payload.
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*
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* Exists for `secretStorage`, which is the one field here that describes
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* state *this app changes*. Saving a secret under a newly-set passphrase
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* re-encrypts the file, so the descriptor the backend would serve now
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* differs from the one fetched at mount — and without a way to ask again,
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* the footer keeps saying "Plaintext file" for the rest of the session,
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* about a file that is no longer plaintext. The backend already re-derives
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* the descriptor per request; this is the client half of that.
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*
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* Safe to call at any time and safe to overlap: the GET is idempotent, and
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* loads are ordered by a request token *and* gated on the hook still being
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* mounted — so a response arriving after unmount, after a re-fetch, or out
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* of order behind a newer refresh is dropped. Calling it after unmount is a
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* no-op rather than a state update, which matters because the callers fire
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* it from an async persist that can outlive the tree.
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*/
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refresh: () => void;
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}
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/** Minimal shape we read from the `/api/config` payload. */
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interface ConfigPayload {
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version?: unknown;
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sandboxUrl?: unknown;
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writable?: unknown;
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secretStorage?: unknown;
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}
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/**
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* Narrow the payload's `secretStorage` before trusting it.
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*
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* The footer states, in the UI, where a user's secret is about to go, so a
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* malformed or partial descriptor must render as "unknown" rather than as a
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* confident half-answer.
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*
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* Every field the footer reads is checked, not just `kind`. A partial
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* `{ kind: "file" }` would otherwise pass, and because a missing `plaintext`
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* is falsy it would render as the quiet, neutral *encrypted* file — the
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* single most misleading thing this component can say, produced by the
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* absence of information rather than by any claim the backend made. Each
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* kind's own required fields are checked for the same reason: a file store
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* with no `path` cannot answer the question a file store exists to answer.
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*/
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function usableSecretStorage(value: unknown): SecretStorageInfo | undefined {
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if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null) return undefined;
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const v = value as Record<string, unknown>;
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if (v.kind !== "keyring" && v.kind !== "file" && v.kind !== "memory") {
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return undefined;
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}
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if (
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v.reason !== "configured" &&
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v.reason !== "default" &&
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v.reason !== "fallback"
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) {
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return undefined;
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}
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if (typeof v.durable !== "boolean") return undefined;
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if (v.kind === "file") {
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if (typeof v.path !== "string" || v.path === "") return undefined;
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// Exactly one of the two must be present: either we know the encryption
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// state, or we know we could not read it. A descriptor carrying neither
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// (or both) was not built by a backend we understand, and the footer
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// would have to invent the missing half.
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const knowsEncryption = typeof v.plaintext === "boolean";
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const knowsItCannotRead = typeof v.encryptionUnknown === "string";
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if (knowsEncryption === knowsItCannotRead) return undefined;
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if (v.encryptionUnknown !== undefined && !knowsItCannotRead) {
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return undefined;
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}
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// Optional, so absent is fine — but a *present* value must be a real
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// boolean. `pendingEncryption: "false"` is a truthy string, and the
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// footer would read it as "already re-encrypting" and print advice that
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// is the opposite of the truth.
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if (
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v.pendingEncryption !== undefined &&
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typeof v.pendingEncryption !== "boolean"
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) {
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return undefined;
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}
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if (v.looseMode !== undefined && typeof v.looseMode !== "number") {
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return undefined;
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}
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if (
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v.permissionsUnknown !== undefined &&
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typeof v.permissionsUnknown !== "string"
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) {
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return undefined;
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}
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} else if (
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// File-only fields on a keychain or memory descriptor mean the payload
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// was not built by a backend we understand. Rejecting is cheap and the
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// alternative is rendering a mixture of two stores' answers.
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v.path !== undefined ||
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v.plaintext !== undefined ||
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v.pendingEncryption !== undefined ||
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v.looseMode !== undefined ||
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v.permissionsUnknown !== undefined ||
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v.encryptionUnknown !== undefined
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) {
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return undefined;
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}
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return value as SecretStorageInfo;
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}
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/** Coerce a payload field to a usable non-empty string, else undefined. */
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function usableString(value: unknown): string | undefined {
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return typeof value === "string" && value ? value : undefined;
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}
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export function useInitialConfig(
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opts: UseInitialConfigOptions,
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): UseInitialConfigResult {
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const { baseUrl, authToken, fetchFn } = opts;
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const doFetch = fetchFn ?? globalThis.fetch;
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const base = baseUrl.replace(/\/$/, "");
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const [version, setVersion] = useState<string | undefined>(undefined);
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const [sandboxUrl, setSandboxUrl] = useState<string | undefined>(undefined);
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// Default writable so the common (catalog) case shows CRUD immediately and a
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// legacy backend that omits the field keeps working.
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const [writable, setWritable] = useState<boolean>(true);
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const [secretStorage, setSecretStorage] = useState<
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SecretStorageInfo | undefined
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>(undefined);
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const [loading, setLoading] = useState<boolean>(true);
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/**
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* Monotonic request token. Every load claims the next value; a load may
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* commit only while it still holds the current one.
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*
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* This replaces a per-caller "am I cancelled" flag, which was enough for
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* the mount fetch and *not* enough once `refresh()` existed. Two overlapping
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* refreshes — two debounced settings saves landing close together — are
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* unordered, so the earlier request could resolve last and put the footer
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* back to the descriptor it had before the write. Stale-response ordering
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* matters more here than in most places precisely because the field it
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* would revert is a security statement.
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*
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* Bumping on effect teardown also covers a `baseUrl`/`authToken` change
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* that re-runs the effect, by invalidating whatever that run started.
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*
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* It does **not** cover unmount on its own, and an earlier version of this
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* comment claimed it did. The teardown bump only invalidates loads already
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* in flight; a `refresh()` called *after* unmount — which happens when an
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* async settings persist resolves after `App` has gone — claims the next
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* token, is therefore current, and commits into a dead hook. Mounted state
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* is tracked separately for that, and `stale()` checks both.
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*/
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const generation = useRef(0);
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const mounted = useRef(true);
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useEffect(() => {
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mounted.current = true;
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return () => {
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mounted.current = false;
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};
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}, []);
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const load = useCallback(async (): Promise<void> => {
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const mine = ++generation.current;
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const stale = () => !mounted.current || generation.current !== mine;
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const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
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if (authToken) headers["x-mcp-remote-auth"] = `Bearer ${authToken}`;
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try {
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const res = await doFetch(`${base}/api/config`, {
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method: "GET",
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headers,
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});
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if (stale() || !res.ok) return;
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const body = (await res.json()) as ConfigPayload;
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if (stale()) return;
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// Tolerate missing/non-usable fields — a legacy backend that omits any
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// of them leaves that value at its "unavailable" default rather than
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// showing a bogus value.
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setVersion(usableString(body.version));
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setSandboxUrl(usableString(body.sandboxUrl));
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// Only an explicit `false` makes the list read-only; a missing field
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// (legacy backend) stays writable.
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setWritable(body.writable !== false);
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setSecretStorage(usableSecretStorage(body.secretStorage));
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} catch {
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// Network error / aborted fetch: leave every field at its default
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// (version/sandboxUrl undefined, writable true).
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} finally {
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if (!stale()) setLoading(false);
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}
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}, [base, authToken, doFetch]);
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useEffect(() => {
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void load();
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return () => {
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// Invalidate whatever is in flight: this fires on unmount and on a
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// `baseUrl`/`authToken` change, and in both cases a response for the
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// old inputs must not commit.
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generation.current++;
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};
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}, [load]);
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const refresh = useCallback(() => {
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void load();
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}, [load]);
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return { version, sandboxUrl, writable, secretStorage, loading, refresh };
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}
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