inspector/clients/cli/__tests__/relogin-revocation.test.ts
cliffhall 7f27d7e9c7 fix(auth): address Copilot review round 1 on the RFC 7009 revocation (#2144)
- RFC 8414 §2 defaults an omitted `revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported`
  to `client_secret_basic`; it does not inherit the token endpoint's list.
  Inheriting made metadata advertising only `client_secret_post` there send
  POST credentials to an endpoint that never advertised the method.
- The 5s timeout was inert on the web paths: `createRemoteFetch` re-issues the
  call as a POST to `/api/fetch` and drops `init.signal`, and the backend's
  outbound fetch gets none either, so a wedged AS could hold the teardown open
  indefinitely. A wall-clock race now enforces the deadline; the signal is kept
  because it genuinely cancels the direct-fetch paths.
- The settings-modal Clear read `settingsModalTarget`, which comes from the
  persisted `servers` list, while edits live in `settingsDraft` until the save
  debounce. Toggling the checkbox and clearing immediately used the previous
  value. It now merges the draft.
- `--relogin` clears both key spellings, so it now revokes from both rather
  than stopping at the first populated one — a stale entry under the other
  spelling is a live grant. The normalised key goes first, matching
  `findStoredServerState`, and a second key holding the same token is skipped.
- The fixture's /oauth/revoke now ENFORCES RFC 7009 §2.1 client
  authentication (both RFC 6749 §2.3.1 forms), so the e2e's claim that the
  Inspector authenticates correctly is actually tested; two negative cases
  assert a wrong secret and an unidentified client are refused.
- Dropped the `as unknown as` casts from the tests: a typed `InspectorLogger`
  double, and a spy on the real storage instead of a spread-and-cast.
- Added CLI-level tests through `runCli` for `--no-revoke`, the per-server
  `oauth.revokeOnClear`, and the stderr warning, and TUI tests for the
  forwarded opt-out and the rendered failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 01:30:09 -04:00

205 lines
6.1 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* `--relogin` token revocation, driven through `runCli` (#2144).
*
* The helper's own tests cover `clearStoredAuthForRelogin({ revoke })`. What
* they cannot cover is the wiring above it: that Commander maps `--no-revoke`,
* that the per-server `oauth.revokeOnClear` reaches the call, and that a failed
* revocation is reported without changing what `--relogin` does. A regression
* in any of those turns revocation silently back on or off, which is precisely
* the class of bug the opt-out exists to make controllable.
*
* Every case here fails to connect on purpose — the fetch double refuses
* everything but the revocation endpoint. That is fine: revocation runs before
* the connect, so the assertions are about the requests made and the warnings
* printed, not about the exit code.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, afterEach, vi } from "vitest";
import * as fs from "node:fs";
import * as os from "node:os";
import * as path from "node:path";
import { resetNodeOAuthStorageCache } from "@inspector/core/auth/node/storage-node.js";
import { runCli } from "./helpers/cli-runner.js";
const SERVER_URL = "https://example.com/mcp";
const REVOKE_URL = "https://as.example.com/revoke";
let dir: string | undefined;
let prevPath: string | undefined;
afterEach(() => {
if (prevPath === undefined) delete process.env.MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH;
else process.env.MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH = prevPath;
prevPath = undefined;
resetNodeOAuthStorageCache();
vi.restoreAllMocks();
if (dir) {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
dir = undefined;
}
});
/** Seed an OAuth store holding a revocable grant for {@link SERVER_URL}. */
function seedStore(): void {
dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "cli-relogin-revoke-e2e-"));
const file = path.join(dir, "oauth.json");
fs.writeFileSync(
file,
JSON.stringify({
servers: {
[SERVER_URL]: {
tokens: {
access_token: "a",
token_type: "Bearer",
refresh_token: "r",
},
serverMetadata: {
issuer: "https://as.example.com",
authorization_endpoint: "https://as.example.com/authorize",
token_endpoint: "https://as.example.com/token",
revocation_endpoint: REVOKE_URL,
response_types_supported: ["code"],
},
},
},
idpSessions: {},
}),
"utf8",
);
prevPath = process.env.MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH;
process.env.MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH = file;
resetNodeOAuthStorageCache();
}
/**
* Answer the revocation endpoint with `status` and refuse everything else, so
* the run stops at the connect instead of reaching the network.
*/
function stubFetch(status = 200): ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn> {
return vi.spyOn(globalThis, "fetch").mockImplementation((input) => {
if (String(input instanceof Request ? input.url : input) === REVOKE_URL) {
return Promise.resolve(new Response(null, { status }));
}
return Promise.reject(new Error("network blocked in test"));
}) as ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn>;
}
function revocationCalls(spy: { mock: { calls: unknown[][] } }): unknown[][] {
return spy.mock.calls.filter(
(call) => String(call[0] as string) === REVOKE_URL,
);
}
/** A catalog holding one HTTP server, optionally opting out of revocation. */
function writeCatalog(revokeOnClear?: boolean): string {
const catalogDir = fs.mkdtempSync(
path.join(os.tmpdir(), "cli-relogin-catalog-"),
);
const catalogPath = path.join(catalogDir, "mcp.json");
fs.writeFileSync(
catalogPath,
JSON.stringify({
mcpServers: {
remote: {
type: "streamable-http",
url: SERVER_URL,
...(revokeOnClear !== undefined && { oauth: { revokeOnClear } }),
},
},
}),
"utf8",
);
return catalogPath;
}
describe("--relogin token revocation", () => {
it("revokes the stored grant by default", async () => {
seedStore();
const fetchSpy = stubFetch();
await runCli([
"--relogin",
"--server-url",
SERVER_URL,
"--method",
"tools/list",
]);
expect(revocationCalls(fetchSpy)).toHaveLength(1);
});
// Commander turns `--no-revoke` into `options.revoke === false`; nothing else
// proves that mapping survives a refactor of the flag.
it("--no-revoke skips the request", async () => {
seedStore();
const fetchSpy = stubFetch();
await runCli([
"--relogin",
"--no-revoke",
"--server-url",
SERVER_URL,
"--method",
"tools/list",
]);
expect(revocationCalls(fetchSpy)).toHaveLength(0);
});
it("honors the per-server oauth.revokeOnClear opt-out", async () => {
seedStore();
const catalogPath = writeCatalog(false);
const fetchSpy = stubFetch();
try {
await runCli([
"--catalog",
catalogPath,
"--server",
"remote",
"--relogin",
"--method",
"tools/list",
]);
expect(revocationCalls(fetchSpy)).toHaveLength(0);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(catalogPath), { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it("revokes for a catalog server that did not opt out", async () => {
seedStore();
const catalogPath = writeCatalog();
const fetchSpy = stubFetch();
try {
await runCli([
"--catalog",
catalogPath,
"--server",
"remote",
"--relogin",
"--method",
"tools/list",
]);
expect(revocationCalls(fetchSpy)).toHaveLength(1);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(catalogPath), { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
// A failed revocation must be visible — the grant is still live at the
// authorization server — without turning `--relogin` into a failure, which
// is a local delete the user still gets.
it("warns on stderr when the authorization server refuses", async () => {
seedStore();
stubFetch(500);
const result = await runCli([
"--relogin",
"--server-url",
SERVER_URL,
"--method",
"tools/list",
]);
expect(result.stderr).toMatch(/could not revoke the OAuth grant/i);
});
});