inspector/clients/web/server
Repository files (latest commit first)
Filename Latest commit message Latest commit date
cliffhall bb3ba91b8a
fix(web): guard the app-origin port and the trusted-origin grant
Copilot review round 3 on #2100.

- MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT could equal CLIENT_PORT or MCP_SANDBOX_PORT. The
  app-origin listener starts BEFORE the web server binds, so that is not a
  race it loses — it wins the port and the Inspector dies with EADDRINUSE.
  `CLIENT_PORT=6278` was a valid config before this feature existed. It now
  resolves to a dynamic port with a warning: of the three listeners this is
  the only one that can move, and refusing to boot would cost the user the
  whole Inspector over a feature they may not be using.
- The proxy's same-origin refusal covered only its own origin. An app served
  from the INSPECTOR's origin is no safer: same-origin with the top document
  means direct access to window.top, its DOM and its storage, and the
  cross-origin frame in between buys nothing. Both trusted origins are now
  refused before allow-same-origin is granted.
- Replaced the `as unknown as number` on `server.address()` with a real
  narrowing of the string/null members of its return type.
- MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT added to the v1→v2 migration guide's env table, its
  Docker recipe, and a troubleshooting entry for the symptom this actually
  produces (the app renders, but its own backend rejects `Origin: null`).
- clients/web/README.md now states which failure is outside the fallback
  guarantee — a published document the browser cannot reach — and why there
  is no honest signal to fall back on. Docs and code no longer disagree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-24 08:45:40 -04:00
..
app-origin-controller.ts fix(web): guard the app-origin port and the trusted-origin grant 2026-08-24 08:45:40 -04:00
browser-externalized-builtin-gate.ts build(web): fail vite build on a browser-externalized Node built-in (#1769) (#1777) 2026-07-25 19:45:11 -04:00
ensure-web-build.ts feat(web): build dist on demand for prod --web + end-to-end CI smoke (#1486) (#1497) 2026-06-16 18:34:52 -04:00
inject-auth-token.ts feat(auth): inject MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN into served index.html (#1378) (#1382) 2026-05-30 20:10:27 -04:00
resolve-bind-host.ts fix: bind loopback by address and pin the sandbox port so containers work 2026-08-15 12:33:27 -04:00
run-web.ts feat(web): enforce localhost-only binding; expand loopback origin allow-list (#1796) 2026-07-26 22:15:10 -04:00
sandbox-controller.ts fix(web): harden the app-origin paths and correct three docs 2026-08-24 08:45:40 -04:00
server.ts test(web): prove the dedicated app origin end to end 2026-08-24 08:45:40 -04:00
start-vite-dev-server.ts feat(web): enforce localhost-only binding; expand loopback origin allow-list (#1796) 2026-07-26 22:15:10 -04:00
types.ts Port v1.5 web dev backend (vite-hono-plugin + remote-server bootstrap) (#1321) 2026-05-18 19:22:14 -04:00
vite-base-config.ts fix(auth): refuse on a stuck lock, capture identity at the mkdir seam (#2082) 2026-08-23 11:31:37 -04:00
vite-hono-plugin.ts test(web): prove the dedicated app origin end to end 2026-08-24 08:45:40 -04:00
web-server-config.ts fix(web): guard the app-origin port and the trusted-origin grant 2026-08-24 08:45:40 -04:00