inspector/core/auth/oauthUx.ts
Cliff Hall 7784553674
fix(auth): explicit re-authorize when the OAuth callback state was lost (#1808) (#1810)
* fix(auth): offer explicit re-authorize when callback state is lost (#1808)

A `/oauth/callback` that arrives with no recorded SEP-2352 discovery state
made the SDK throw `AuthorizationServerMismatchError` and the Inspector
dead-ended, surfacing the raw SDK text with no path forward.

The SDK folds two very different failures into that one error class, so
`core/auth/issuerBinding.ts` classifies them structurally: a recoverable
"lost authorization state" (the SDK puts prose, not an issuer URL, in the
`recordedIssuer` slot) versus a genuine cross-AS `issuer_mismatch`. Only
the first gets a recovery affordance.

Web: the callback failure now raises a dedicated banner ("Authorization
state was lost" / "Authorize again") whose action clears the stale OAuth
state for that server and starts a fresh authorization. A genuine
mismatch stays a red, non-dismissible security notification with both
issuers named and no one-click retry.

Node runners (CLI/TUI): the same classification rewrites the callback
rejection into the shared actionable copy instead of the SDK text.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt

* fix(auth): detect the SDK mismatch error via isInstance (#1808)

The callback-leg classifier gated on `err.mcpBrand`, but the SDK declares
that brand in a `static {}` block, so it lives on the constructor and is
never reachable from an instance. The predicate always returned false, so
`findIssuerBindingFailure()` never matched and the #1808 recovery banner
was inert in production — the callback dead-ended exactly as before.

Use the SDK's own `AuthorizationServerMismatchError.isInstance()`, which is
cross-copy safe by construction (it consults a `Symbol.for()`-keyed brand
set), with a `name` fallback for a serialization boundary. Correct the
module doc, which cited cross-bundle safety as the reason to avoid
`instanceof` — the very thing the SDK's branded `hasInstance` provides.

Every fixture now constructs a real `AuthorizationServerMismatchError`
instead of a hand-rolled object with an own `mcpBrand`, which is why a
green `npm run ci` hid this. Adds a test pinning the brand's placement so
the feature cannot silently go inert again.

Review follow-ups: drop the unused `isLostAuthorizationStateError`, remove
the duplicated banner title default, resolve the banner title/action label
where the banner is raised, keep the clear-failure notification open, and
bound remote-supplied issuers in user-facing copy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 18:08:31 -04:00

331 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript

import type { AuthChallenge } from "./challenge.js";
import type { IssuerBindingFailure } from "./issuerBinding.js";
export type OAuthInteractiveAuthKind = "step_up" | "reauth";
/** Origin of an interactive OAuth recovery flow (command, ambient, connect, etc.). */
export type OAuthRecoverySource =
| "tool"
| "prompt"
| "resource"
| "ambient"
| "app";
export function isActionTriggeredOAuthRecovery(
source: OAuthRecoverySource | undefined,
): boolean {
return (
source === "tool" ||
source === "prompt" ||
source === "resource" ||
source === "app"
);
}
export function oauthResumeSuccessMessage(
authKind: OAuthInteractiveAuthKind,
options?: { recoverySource?: OAuthRecoverySource },
): string {
const retry = isActionTriggeredOAuthRecovery(options?.recoverySource);
if (authKind === "step_up") {
return retry
? "Step-up authorization succeeded. Retry your action."
: "Step-up authorization succeeded.";
}
return retry
? "Authentication succeeded. Retry your action."
: "Authentication succeeded.";
}
export function authRecoveryRestoredMessage(options?: {
recoverySource?: OAuthRecoverySource;
}): string {
const retry = isActionTriggeredOAuthRecovery(options?.recoverySource);
return retry
? "Session credentials were updated. Retry your action."
: "Session credentials were updated.";
}
export function oauthResumeAbandonedMessage(
authKind: OAuthInteractiveAuthKind,
options?: { recoverySource?: OAuthRecoverySource },
): string {
if (authKind === "reauth") {
return "Sign-in was not completed. Re-authenticate to restore access.";
}
return isActionTriggeredOAuthRecovery(options?.recoverySource)
? "Step-up authorization was not completed. Retry your action."
: "Step-up authorization was not completed.";
}
/** Standard-OAuth step-up (not EMA silent re-mint). */
export function isStandardOAuthStepUp(
challenge: AuthChallenge,
options?: { enterpriseManaged?: boolean },
): boolean {
return (
challenge.reason === "insufficient_scope" && !options?.enterpriseManaged
);
}
/** EMA step-up (`insufficient_scope` on an enterprise-managed server). */
export function isEmaStepUp(
challenge: AuthChallenge,
options?: { enterpriseManaged?: boolean },
): boolean {
return (
challenge.reason === "insufficient_scope" &&
options?.enterpriseManaged === true
);
}
/** Any step-up that should show the Inspector confirmation modal before proceeding. */
export function isStepUpConfirmation(
challenge: AuthChallenge,
options?: { enterpriseManaged?: boolean },
): boolean {
return (
isStandardOAuthStepUp(challenge, options) || isEmaStepUp(challenge, options)
);
}
export function stepUpConfirmMessage(
challenge: AuthChallenge,
options?: { enterpriseManaged?: boolean },
): string {
const toolName = challenge.context?.toolName?.trim();
if (toolName) {
return options?.enterpriseManaged
? `Tool "${toolName}" needs additional permissions from your organization before it can continue.`
: `Tool "${toolName}" needs additional OAuth scopes before it can continue.`;
}
const additional = challenge.requiredScopes?.filter(Boolean);
if (additional?.length) {
const label = additional.length === 1 ? "scope" : "scopes";
return options?.enterpriseManaged
? `This operation needs additional organization ${label}: ${additional.join(", ")}.`
: `This operation needs additional ${label}: ${additional.join(", ")}.`;
}
return options?.enterpriseManaged
? "This operation needs additional permissions from your organization before it can continue."
: "This operation needs additional OAuth scopes before it can continue.";
}
/** Body copy below the step-up summary (what happens on Authorize). */
export function stepUpFollowUpMessage(options?: {
enterpriseManaged?: boolean;
}): string {
return options?.enterpriseManaged
? "Inspector will request the additional permissions from your enterprise identity provider. You may be asked to sign in if your organization session expired."
: "You will be redirected to authorize, then returned to the inspector.";
}
/** Step-up confirm action label (e.g. TUI menu item). EMA re-mints in-process when possible. */
export function stepUpAuthorizeActionLabel(options?: {
enterpriseManaged?: boolean;
}): string {
return options?.enterpriseManaged ? "Authorize" : "Authorize (opens browser)";
}
export function stepUpModalTitle(options?: {
enterpriseManaged?: boolean;
}): string {
return options?.enterpriseManaged
? "Additional organization permissions required"
: "Additional permissions required";
}
/** Toast while EMA step-up is in progress after user confirms. */
export function emaStepUpInProgressMessage(): string {
return "Requesting additional permissions from your organization…";
}
/** Toast when EMA step-up completes successfully. */
export function emaStepUpSuccessMessage(options?: {
recoverySource?: OAuthRecoverySource;
}): string {
const retry = isActionTriggeredOAuthRecovery(options?.recoverySource);
return retry
? "Organization permissions were updated. Retry your action."
: "Organization permissions were updated.";
}
/** Toast when EMA step-up fails after user confirmation. */
export function emaStepUpFailureMessage(detail?: string): string {
return detail?.trim()
? detail
: "Could not obtain the additional permissions from your organization.";
}
/** Scopes the current operation still lacks (from the resource-server challenge). */
export function stepUpAdditionalScopes(challenge: AuthChallenge): string[] {
return challenge.requiredScopes?.filter(Boolean) ?? [];
}
export function stepUpInsufficientScopeMessage(
challenge: AuthChallenge,
): string {
const toolName = challenge.context?.toolName?.trim();
if (toolName) {
return `Authorization completed, but required permissions for tool "${toolName}" were not granted. Grant the requested scopes on the authorization server, then retry.`;
}
const missing =
challenge.authorizationScopes?.filter(Boolean) ??
challenge.requiredScopes?.filter(Boolean);
if (missing?.length) {
return `Authorization completed, but required scopes were not granted (${missing.join(", ")}). Grant the requested permissions on the authorization server, then retry your action.`;
}
return "Authorization completed, but the required permissions were not granted. Grant the requested scopes on the authorization server, then retry your action.";
}
export type OAuthPreRedirectContext = "connect" | "session_recovery";
/** Pre-redirect toast copy for interactive OAuth. */
export function oauthPreRedirectToastCopy(
authKind: OAuthInteractiveAuthKind,
options: {
serverName?: string;
enterpriseManaged?: boolean;
/** Fresh connect handshake — no existing session to recover. */
context?: OAuthPreRedirectContext;
},
): { title: string; message: string } | undefined {
if (options.context === "connect") {
return undefined;
}
const name = options.serverName;
if (authKind === "step_up") {
return {
title: name
? `Step-up authorization for "${name}"`
: "Step-up authorization",
message: "Redirecting to authorize additional permissions…",
};
}
if (options.enterpriseManaged) {
return {
title: name ? `Re-authenticating "${name}"` : "Re-authenticating",
message: "Re-authenticating…",
};
}
return {
title: name ? `Session expired for "${name}"` : "Session expired",
message: "Session expired, re-authenticating…",
};
}
/** Challenge reasons that warrant a persistent re-auth banner (degraded session). */
export function isReAuthBannerReason(
reason: AuthChallenge["reason"] | undefined,
): boolean {
return (
reason === "token_expired" ||
reason === "unauthorized" ||
reason === "invalid_token"
);
}
/** Banner/alert heading when the recorded authorization state was lost. */
export function lostAuthorizationStateTitle(): string {
return "Authorization state was lost";
}
/**
* Plain-language explanation for a callback that arrived with no recorded
* discovery state (SEP-2352). Deliberately does not surface the SDK's
* `AuthorizationServerMismatchError` text — that wording reads like a security
* failure, and this case is ordinary bookkeeping loss.
*/
export function lostAuthorizationStateMessage(options?: {
serverName?: string;
}): string {
const target = options?.serverName
? `"${options.serverName}"`
: "this server";
return (
`The stored authorization state for ${target} was lost before the ` +
"authorization server sent you back, so the sign-in could not be " +
"completed. This usually means a new browser session, a different tab, or " +
"authorization state that was cleared while the flow was in progress. " +
"Authorize again to reconnect."
);
}
/** Action label for the lost-authorization-state recovery affordance. */
export function lostAuthorizationStateActionLabel(): string {
return "Authorize again";
}
/** Heading for a genuine cross-authorization-server mismatch (a security signal). */
export function issuerMismatchTitle(): string {
return "Authorization server mismatch";
}
/**
* Longest issuer we will echo back into user-facing copy.
*
* `currentIssuer` is remote-supplied (it comes from the configured server's AS
* metadata), so an overlong value could be used to abuse the notification
* layout. Rendering is escaped, so this is a presentation bound, not an
* injection defence.
*/
const MAX_DISPLAYED_ISSUER_LENGTH = 120;
/** Bound an issuer for display, marking any truncation. */
export function truncateIssuerForDisplay(issuer: string): string {
return issuer.length > MAX_DISPLAYED_ISSUER_LENGTH
? `${issuer.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAYED_ISSUER_LENGTH)}…`
: issuer;
}
/**
* Copy for a genuine SEP-2352 issuer mismatch. This is *not* offered a
* one-click recovery: the authorization code and PKCE verifier are bound to the
* server that minted them, and a different server answering the callback is a
* credential-exfiltration signal the user must investigate.
*/
export function issuerMismatchMessage(options: {
recordedIssuer: string;
currentIssuer: string;
serverName?: string;
}): string {
const target = options.serverName ? `"${options.serverName}"` : "this server";
return (
`Authorization for ${target} was stopped: the flow started at ` +
`${truncateIssuerForDisplay(options.recordedIssuer)} but the callback ` +
`resolved ${truncateIssuerForDisplay(options.currentIssuer)}. ` +
"The authorization code was not exchanged. " +
"Verify the server's authorization configuration before trying again."
);
}
/** Title + message for a callback-leg issuer-binding failure. */
export function issuerBindingFailureCopy(
failure: IssuerBindingFailure,
options?: { serverName?: string },
): { title: string; message: string } {
if (failure.kind === "lost_authorization_state") {
return {
title: lostAuthorizationStateTitle(),
message: lostAuthorizationStateMessage(options),
};
}
return {
title: issuerMismatchTitle(),
message: issuerMismatchMessage({
recordedIssuer: failure.recordedIssuer,
currentIssuer: failure.currentIssuer,
serverName: options?.serverName,
}),
};
}
export function reAuthBannerMessage(options: {
serverName?: string;
detail?: string;
}): string {
const prefix = options.serverName
? `Authentication for "${options.serverName}" needs attention.`
: "Authentication needs attention.";
return options.detail ? `${prefix} ${options.detail}` : prefix;
}