inspector/core/auth
Repository files (latest commit first)
Filename Latest commit message Latest commit date
cliffhall 84a65f28d8 fix(auth): floor the shared revocation budget instead of racing zero
The shared teardown deadline was decided on `remainingMs > 0` against
`Date.now()`. Both halves of that are noise-sensitive: the deadline is
enforced by a `setTimeout`, and a wall clock at millisecond resolution
can still read a hair short of it when the loop comes round, so the next
grant inherits a fractional budget and spends it on a request that cannot
possibly complete. The same run then issues one request or two depending
on scheduling — which is what makes the "shares one deadline across
grants" test intermittent on CI (#2252).

Measure the deadline with `performance.now()` (monotonic, so an NTP step
or a suspend cannot expire or extend the budget, and sub-millisecond, so
none is lost to rounding), and skip any grant reaching the loop with less
than MIN_REVOCATION_REQUEST_BUDGET_MS left. The skipped grant is already
reported as `failed`, so nothing is silently dropped — the needless call
to the authorization server is.

The CLI's outer per-plan budget in `sendPlans` shares both the shape and
the defect, so it gets the same treatment.

One consequence worth naming: a monotonic clock hands `revokeToken` a
fractional budget, and Node's `AbortSignal.timeout` throws
`ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE` on a non-integer delay — before the fetch, so the
request would never be sent and the revocation would report that as its
failure. `revokeToken` now rounds its own budget to whole milliseconds,
which also covers any other caller passing a fractional one.

Tests: the epsilon skip is pinned by a grant that lands inside the floor
but above zero (removing the floor fails it, verified); the fractional
budget by a `revokeToken` call at 19.996ms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017wEXtbs8UEHUMxDEAxbs99
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-05 01:25:25 -04:00
..
browser Removed Zustand storage, cleanup up auth storage IO interfaces, implementations, and usage. 2026-07-04 21:56:45 -07:00
ema fix(oauth): persist the granted scope on every EMA mint 2026-08-25 01:32:40 -04:00
node fix(auth): make the stuck-lock guidance conditional, not an instruction (#2082) 2026-08-23 12:49:06 -04:00
remote Removed Zustand storage, cleanup up auth storage IO interfaces, implementations, and usage. 2026-07-04 21:56:45 -07:00
authorizationParams.ts feat: per-server custom OAuth authorization-request parameters (#2018) 2026-08-15 19:31:41 -04:00
challenge.ts fix(auth): pass the challenge's resource_metadata URL to SDK auth() 2026-08-24 19:48:40 -04:00
cimd.ts fix(oauth): keep the server's path in the fallback authorization-server URL 2026-08-26 00:03:40 -04:00
connection-state.ts fix(auth): require JWT shape before trusting exp as proof of validity 2026-08-24 07:46:10 -04:00
discovery.ts fix(oauth): walk the candidates in the CLI refresh path too 2026-08-26 00:34:27 -04:00
endpointOverrides.ts perf(auth): gate the override wrapper on the discovery request, and guard disk values 2026-08-16 22:11:16 -04:00
index.ts fix(auth): floor the shared revocation budget instead of racing zero 2026-09-05 01:25:25 -04:00
issuerBinding.ts fix(auth): explicit re-authorize when the OAuth callback state was lost (#1808) (#1810) 2026-07-27 18:08:31 -04:00
mcpAuth.ts OAuth: re-key store to (server, issuer) + SEP-837/2350/2352 auth UX (#1694) 2026-07-16 16:52:53 -04:00
oauth-persist.ts fix(auth): keep oauth-persist browser-safe (move Node file backend out) 2026-07-08 16:20:31 -04:00
oauth-storage.ts fix: use Node storage in the revocation e2e, and drop the now-dead storage API (#2144) 2026-08-28 08:36:58 -04:00
oauthUx.ts fix(web): per-attempt snapshot ids, honest recovery copy, connect teardown 2026-08-29 02:32:05 -04:00
oidcDiscoveryCompat.ts fix(auth): release discarded probe bodies, report the redirected source, proxy the CLI refresh 2026-08-28 02:35:27 -04:00
providers.ts fix(oauth): filter the step-up scope union too, not just the provider 2026-08-24 23:05:14 -04:00
revocation.ts fix(auth): floor the shared revocation budget instead of racing zero 2026-09-05 01:25:25 -04:00
scopes.ts fix(oauth): filter the step-up scope union too, not just the provider 2026-08-24 23:05:14 -04:00
secret-fields.ts feat(web,core): enterprise-managed authorization (EMA) (#1509) (#1512) 2026-06-24 22:15:12 -04:00
secret-storage-info.ts fix(auth): stop a config-only PUT deleting stored secrets (#2084) 2026-08-22 23:30:17 -04:00
storage.ts fix: use Node storage in the revocation e2e, and drop the now-dead storage API (#2144) 2026-08-28 08:36:58 -04:00
store.ts OAuth: re-key store to (server, issuer) + SEP-837/2350/2352 auth UX (#1694) 2026-07-16 16:52:53 -04:00
types.ts OAuth: re-key store to (server, issuer) + SEP-837/2350/2352 auth UX (#1694) 2026-07-16 16:52:53 -04:00
utils.ts chore(deps): migrate to eslint 10 to clear the brace-expansion DoS advisory (#1900) 2026-08-01 20:13:30 -04:00