inspector/core/auth/requestTimeout.ts
cliffhall 2710c98681 fix: address Copilot review round 2 on #2319
Both findings are on the caller-signal handling added in round 1:

- `"signal" in init` treated a member present as `undefined` as an
  explicit override. `RequestInit` is a WebIDL dictionary, where such a
  member converts as absent — so `{ ...base, signal: undefined }`, which
  is what a spread over an options object with no signal produces, was
  clearing a Request's embedded signal instead of inheriting it. Only a
  non-`undefined` value overrides now; an explicit `null` is still the
  genuine no-signal case.

- An already-aborted caller signal rejected the race, but
  `Promise.race` still evaluated `fetchFn(...)`, so on the
  signal-dropping proxy path the OAuth request went out anyway. It now
  short-circuits before anything is constructed or sent, and the
  now-unreachable aborted branch inside the race is gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YFnM6RqB4nXqNysgUYmjmq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-11 02:44:43 -04:00

262 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* A bound on every network call the Inspector makes on the OAuth path (#2319).
*
* ## Why this exists
*
* Protected-resource-metadata discovery, authorization-server metadata
* discovery, dynamic client registration, the token exchange and the refresh
* all went out with no `AbortSignal` at all. Token revocation was the single
* exception — `revocation.ts` has carried its own deadline since #2144, and it
* is the pattern this module generalizes.
*
* An unbounded fetch matters more here than it usually would, because of where
* this work runs and what the UI does while it runs:
*
* - It runs **server-side**, in the Inspector's own Node process, proxied
* through the backend. A stall is therefore invisible in browser devtools —
* #2188's reporter correctly observed that no request left the browser at
* all while a Node-side socket sat established and idle.
* - Connect-time auth errors deliberately hold the connection status at
* `"connecting"` rather than moving it to `"error"`
* (`isConnectAuthRecoveryError`, `challenge.ts`), on the theory that a
* redirect is about to end the attempt. A stalled fetch inside that window is
* a silent, unbounded spinner rather than a surfaced failure.
*
* The deadline covers the **whole exchange**, not just the headers: `fetch`
* resolves as soon as response headers arrive, so a server that sends headers
* — or half a JSON document — and then stalls would leave the caller's
* `response.json()` hanging with nothing watching it. Every response on this
* path is a small finite document, so the body is buffered under the same race
* and the response rebuilt around it.
*
* Today the common case is bounded, but only incidentally: a discovery stall
* that happens to sit inside an SDK `initialize` rides that request's own
* timeout and surfaces after 60s as `Request timed out`. This module makes the
* bound deliberate, applies it to the stalls that sit *outside* an SDK request
* too, and — the point of naming the URL in the error — says *which* endpoint
* stalled instead of blaming the handshake.
*
* ## Why a race, and not just the signal
*
* The signal alone cannot enforce this. In the browser the OAuth fetch is
* `createRemoteFetch`, which re-issues the call as a POST to `/api/fetch` and
* does not forward `init.signal`; the backend's outbound fetch gets no signal
* either. So on exactly the path this bound exists for — a browser session
* against a wedged authorization server — aborting the local promise would
* change nothing. The race is what actually enforces the deadline; the signal
* is kept because it does cancel the direct-fetch paths (CLI, TUI, backend)
* rather than merely abandoning them. Same reasoning, same shape, as
* `revokeToken`.
*/
/**
* 30 seconds. Deliberately generous: discovery against a slow or cold-starting
* authorization server is legitimate, and a bound that fires on a server that
* was going to answer is worse than the unbounded wait it replaced. It still
* halves the 60s the SDK handshake incidentally provides, and it is the only
* bound at all on the legs that sit outside an SDK request.
*/
export const DEFAULT_OAUTH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
/**
* Raised when an OAuth-path request outlives its budget.
*
* Carries the URL because "discovery timed out" without one is only marginally
* better than a spinner: the OAuth path makes several requests to several
* hosts, and which of them stalled is the whole diagnostic.
*/
export class OAuthRequestTimeoutError extends Error {
readonly url: string;
readonly timeoutMs: number;
constructor(url: string, timeoutMs: number) {
super(`OAuth request to ${url} timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`);
this.name = "OAuthRequestTimeoutError";
this.url = url;
this.timeoutMs = timeoutMs;
}
}
/** The request URL, whatever form `fetch`'s first argument took. */
function requestUrlOf(input: RequestInfo | URL): string {
if (typeof input === "string") return input;
if (input instanceof URL) return input.href;
return input.url;
}
/**
* The caller's own `AbortSignal`, if it supplied one.
*
* A `Request` carries its signal on the *input*, not in `init`, and this
* wrapper always passes a `signal` of its own in `init` — so reading `init`
* alone would silently override the embedded one and change ordinary `fetch`
* cancellation semantics for `withOAuthRequestTimeout(new Request(url, { signal }))`
* (Copilot).
*
* An `init.signal` still wins, but only when it is not `undefined`. `RequestInit`
* is a WebIDL dictionary, where a member present with the value `undefined` is
* converted as *absent* — so `{ ...base, signal: undefined }`, which is what a
* spread over an options object that had no signal produces, must inherit the
* `Request`'s signal rather than clear it (Copilot). An explicit `null` is the
* genuine "no signal" override and is honoured as one.
*/
function callerSignalOf(
input: RequestInfo | URL,
init: RequestInit | undefined,
): AbortSignal | undefined {
const explicit = init?.signal;
if (explicit !== undefined) return explicit ?? undefined;
if (typeof input !== "string" && !(input instanceof URL)) return input.signal;
return undefined;
}
/**
* Statuses the Fetch Standard defines as null-body. Handing the `Response`
* constructor a body with one of these throws a `TypeError`, so the rebuilt
* response below must pass `null` instead.
*/
const NULL_BODY_STATUSES = new Set([101, 103, 204, 205, 304]);
/**
* Rebuild a `Response` around an already-buffered body.
*
* `url`, `redirected` and `type` are getters with no constructor option, and
* callers do read them — the RFC 8414/OIDC compat wrapper stamps a header
* naming the URL a body came from, and the SDK's discovery reports the
* responding URL in its errors. So they are copied across explicitly rather
* than silently reset to `""` / `false` / `"default"`.
*/
function rebuildResponse(response: Response, body: ArrayBuffer): Response {
const rebuilt = new Response(
NULL_BODY_STATUSES.has(response.status) ? null : body,
{
status: response.status,
statusText: response.statusText,
headers: response.headers,
},
);
for (const key of ["url", "redirected", "type"] as const) {
Object.defineProperty(rebuilt, key, {
value: response[key],
enumerable: true,
configurable: true,
});
}
return rebuilt;
}
/**
* Wrap a `fetch` so every call through it is bounded by `timeoutMs`.
*
* Apply this to an **OAuth-path** fetch only. It must never wrap the transport
* fetch: a Streamable HTTP or SSE response is a long-lived stream that is
* *supposed* to stay open, and a deadline there would sever every connection
* after the budget. `InspectorClient` keeps the two apart by wrapping inside
* `buildEffectiveAuthFetch` rather than wrapping `this.fetchFn`, which the
* transport is handed directly.
*
* A caller's own signal is preserved — whether it arrived in `init` or embedded
* in a `Request` — and is both forwarded to the inner fetch (composed with
* `AbortSignal.any`) and raced here, so an outer cancellation still wins even on
* a fetch that drops the signal. This wrapper only ever *adds* a reason to give
* up; it never removes the caller's.
*
* The response **body** is buffered under the same deadline, because `fetch`
* resolves on headers and a stalled body would otherwise be unbounded.
*/
export function withOAuthRequestTimeout(
fetchFn: typeof fetch,
timeoutMs: number = DEFAULT_OAUTH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS,
): typeof fetch {
// Whole milliseconds, because `setTimeout` and `AbortSignal.timeout` both
// take an integer: Node throws `ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE` on a fractional delay —
// before the fetch, so the request is never sent and the caller sees a failed
// operation rather than a timeout. A budget derived from `performance.now()`
// is fractional, so this is reachable. `revocation.ts:253` carries the same
// note for the same reason.
const budget = Math.max(0, Math.round(timeoutMs));
return async (input, init) => {
const url = requestUrlOf(input);
const controller = new AbortController();
const callerSignal = callerSignalOf(input, init);
// Before anything is constructed or sent. Racing an already-aborted signal
// would still evaluate `fetchFn(...)`, and on the signal-dropping
// `createRemoteFetch` path that means the OAuth request goes out even
// though the caller cancelled before the call (Copilot).
if (callerSignal?.aborted) throw callerSignal.reason;
const signal = callerSignal
? AbortSignal.any([controller.signal, callerSignal])
: controller.signal;
let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
let timedOut = false;
let onCallerAbort: (() => void) | undefined;
// The losing side of every race below: it rejects when the budget runs out,
// and when the caller cancels.
const abandoned = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {
timer = setTimeout(() => {
timedOut = true;
// Abort first so a direct fetch is actually cancelled rather than left
// running detached, then reject so the proxied fetch — which never saw
// the signal — is abandoned on schedule too.
controller.abort(new OAuthRequestTimeoutError(url, budget));
reject(new OAuthRequestTimeoutError(url, budget));
}, budget);
// The caller's cancellation is raced too, not merely forwarded. Forwarding
// it is enough on a direct fetch, but on the browser's `createRemoteFetch`
// path — the one this wrapper exists for — the signal is dropped in
// flight, so an abort would otherwise leave this promise pending for the
// whole budget instead of the outer cancellation winning as documented
// (Copilot). The caller's own `reason` is preserved, so it still sees its
// abort rather than a substituted error.
// Not aborted — the short-circuit above returned for that case.
if (callerSignal) {
onCallerAbort = () => reject(callerSignal.reason);
callerSignal.addEventListener("abort", onCallerAbort, { once: true });
}
});
try {
const response = await Promise.race([
fetchFn(input, { ...init, signal }),
abandoned,
]);
// `fetch` resolves once the response *headers* arrive, so stopping here
// would leave the body unbounded: an authorization server can send
// headers, or half a JSON document, and then stall, and the caller's
// `response.json()` would hang with nothing watching it (Copilot). Every
// response on this path is a small, finite document — metadata,
// a registration, a token — so buffering it under the same deadline
// bounds the whole exchange. This is the other reason the wrapper must
// never be applied to the transport fetch, whose bodies are streams that
// are supposed to stay open.
const body = await Promise.race([response.arrayBuffer(), abandoned]);
return rebuildResponse(response, body);
} catch (err) {
// `controller.abort()` above can reject the underlying fetch *before*
// `reject` runs, in which case the race settles with undici's
// `AbortError` instead of ours. Which of the two wins is an ordering
// detail of the fetch implementation, so normalize on the flag rather
// than on the error that surfaced: a timeout must always be reported as
// one, naming the endpoint. A caller-driven abort leaves the flag false
// and so passes through with its own reason intact.
if (timedOut) throw new OAuthRequestTimeoutError(url, budget);
throw err;
} finally {
/* v8 ignore next -- the Promise executor runs synchronously, so `timer`
is always assigned by the time this runs; the guard exists only because
TypeScript cannot see that. */
if (timer !== undefined) clearTimeout(timer);
// Drop the listener even though it is `once`: a caller signal can outlive
// this request (one `AbortController` per connect attempt, several
// requests through it), and a listener per request would accumulate on it.
if (onCallerAbort && callerSignal) {
callerSignal.removeEventListener("abort", onCallerAbort);
}
}
};
}