* test(core): backfill coverage on inspectorClient + remote server Resolves #1310. Drops the two TODO(#1310) exclusions from clients/web/vite.config.ts (coverage.exclude); both files now pass the per-file gate (lines >=90, statements >=85, functions >=80, branches >=50). core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts (88.15 / 78.37 -> 97.29 / 100): - Extract createTokenAuthProvider to its own file (core/mcp/remote/node/tokenAuthProvider.ts) so the 7 no-op OAuthClientProvider stubs can be unit-tested directly. - Add focused integration tests covering the remaining gaps: * createTransportNode failure path on POST /api/mcp/connect * /api/mcp/send when transport is dead * /api/log non-JSON body (catch fallback) * forwardLogEvent unknown-level / no-messages / string-first-message fallbacks (lines 232, 240-242, 257-265 in the original) * /api/fetch missing-url + upstream-throw paths * /api/storage POST invalid storeId + invalid JSON body * /api/storage GET when the on-disk store is unparseable core/mcp/inspectorClient.ts (73.48 / 72.09 -> 91.16 / 89.92): Added a single "Coverage backfill (#1310)" describe block to the existing integration test, plus a few unit-style cases: - OAuth getters / setOAuthConfig / authenticate when oauthManager is unset. - Simple session, roots, subscription, and instructions accessors. - subscribe / unsubscribe error paths against a server without the subscribe capability; happy path against one with it. - getPrompt + readResourceFromTemplate happy path + expansion-failure. - setLoggingLevel "Server does not support logging" guard. - getAppRendererClient (null before connect, cached proxy after). - OAuth + stdio: authenticate() throws via getServerUrl()'s stdio check. - listChanged notifications: tools/resources/prompts handlers via the fixture add_tool / add_resource / add_prompt tools. - Misc tiny branches: re-connect no-op, elicit form mode, getTaskCapabilities on a tasks-less server, receiver-task TTL cleanup + cancel via the private surface (the focused-unit pass the issue describes). - defensive `if (!this.client) throw` guards: one nullify-and-call test exercises 16 of them via a single instance, plus the connect() entry guard. The receiver-task internals test uses (instance as unknown as { private fields... }) to drive createReceiverTask / cancelReceiverTask / TTL cleanup directly; per the issue, refactoring private helpers to be testable from a unit test was authorized. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(core): address #1317 PR review feedback - Rename the misnamed "listChanged notifications" describe in inspectorClient.test.ts to "capability detection after connect", since the test asserts only on getCapabilities() round-tripping and never triggers or observes a notification dispatch. Real dispatch coverage lives in the adjacent "list_changed + resourceUpdated notifications" block. Kept the resources/prompts fixtures with a note explaining why they are required for the server to advertise the matching capabilities. - Expand the comment on the 250ms wait in remote-transport.test.ts' /api/mcp/send dead-transport test so it is clear the >= 500 assertion is intentionally permissive across both the dead-transport short- circuit and the downstream send-failure branches. - Add a "keep this in sync" pointer on the nullify() helper so a future cleanup that removes any of the defensive `if (!this.client) throw` guards in inspectorClient.ts is reminded to drop the matching call here rather than silently under-covering. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
596 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript
596 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Hono-based remote server for MCP transports.
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* Hosts /api/config, /api/mcp/connect, send, events, disconnect, /api/fetch, /api/log, /api/storage/:storeId.
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*/
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import { randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
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import type pino from "pino";
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import {
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getDefaultStorageDir,
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getStoreFilePath,
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validateStoreId,
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readStoreFile,
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writeStoreFile,
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deleteStoreFile,
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parseStore,
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serializeStore,
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} from "../../../storage/store-io.js";
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import type { LogEvent } from "pino";
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import { Hono } from "hono";
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import type { Context, Env, Next } from "hono";
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import { streamSSE } from "hono/streaming";
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import { createTransportNode } from "../../node/transport.js";
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import type { RemoteConnectRequest, RemoteSendRequest } from "../types.js";
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import type { MCPServerConfig } from "../../types.js";
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import { RemoteSession } from "./remote-session.js";
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import { createTokenAuthProvider } from "./tokenAuthProvider.js";
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import { API_SERVER_ENV_VARS } from "../constants.js";
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/**
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* Shape of the initial config returned by GET /api/config (defaults for client).
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*/
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export interface InitialConfigPayload {
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defaultCommand?: string;
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defaultArgs?: string[];
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defaultTransport?: string;
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defaultServerUrl?: string;
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defaultHeaders?: Record<string, string>;
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defaultCwd?: string;
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defaultEnvironment: Record<string, string>;
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}
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export interface RemoteServerOptions {
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/** Optional auth token. If not provided, uses API_SERVER_ENV_VARS.AUTH_TOKEN env var or generates one. Ignored when dangerouslyOmitAuth is true. */
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authToken?: string;
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/**
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* When true, do not require x-mcp-remote-auth on API routes.
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* Origin validation (allowedOrigins) still applies.
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* Set via DANGEROUSLY_OMIT_AUTH env var; not recommended for any exposed deployment.
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*/
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dangerouslyOmitAuth?: boolean;
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/** Optional: validate Origin header against allowed origins (for CORS) */
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allowedOrigins?: string[];
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/** Optional pino file logger. When set, /api/log forwards received events to it. */
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logger?: pino.Logger;
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/** Optional storage directory for /api/storage/:storeId. Default: ~/.mcp-inspector/storage */
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storageDir?: string;
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/** Optional sandbox URL for MCP Apps tab. When set, GET /api/config includes sandboxUrl. */
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sandboxUrl?: string;
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/** Initial config for GET /api/config. Caller must pass this (e.g. from webServerConfigToInitialPayload(config)). */
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initialConfig: InitialConfigPayload;
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}
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export interface CreateRemoteAppResult {
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/** The Hono app */
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app: Hono;
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/** The auth token (from options, env var, or generated). Returned so caller can embed in client. */
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authToken: string;
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}
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/**
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* Hono middleware for origin validation (CORS and DNS rebinding protection).
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* Validates Origin header against allowedOrigins if provided.
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*/
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function createOriginMiddleware(allowedOrigins?: string[]) {
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return async (c: Context, next: Next) => {
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// If no allowedOrigins configured, skip validation (allow all)
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if (!allowedOrigins || allowedOrigins.length === 0) {
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await next();
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return;
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}
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const origin = c.req.header("origin");
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// Handle CORS preflight requests
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if (c.req.method === "OPTIONS") {
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if (origin && allowedOrigins.includes(origin)) {
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c.header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin);
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c.header("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, DELETE, OPTIONS");
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c.header(
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"Access-Control-Allow-Headers",
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"Content-Type, x-mcp-remote-auth",
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);
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c.header("Access-Control-Max-Age", "86400"); // 24 hours
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return c.body(null, 204);
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}
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// Invalid origin for preflight - return 403
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return c.json(
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{
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error: "Forbidden",
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message:
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"Invalid origin. Request blocked to prevent DNS rebinding attacks.",
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},
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403,
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);
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}
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// For actual requests, validate origin if present
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if (origin) {
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if (!allowedOrigins.includes(origin)) {
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return c.json(
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{
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error: "Forbidden",
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message:
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"Invalid origin. Request blocked to prevent DNS rebinding attacks. Configure allowed origins via allowedOrigins option.",
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},
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403,
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);
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}
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// Set CORS header for allowed origin
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c.header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin);
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}
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// If no origin header (same-origin or non-browser client), allow request
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await next();
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};
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}
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/**
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* Hono middleware for auth token validation.
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* Expects Bearer token format: x-mcp-remote-auth: Bearer <token>
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*/
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function createAuthMiddleware(authToken: string) {
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return async (c: Context, next: Next) => {
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const authHeader = c.req.header("x-mcp-remote-auth");
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if (!authHeader || !authHeader.startsWith("Bearer ")) {
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return c.json(
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{
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error: "Unauthorized",
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message:
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"Authentication required. Use the x-mcp-remote-auth header with Bearer token.",
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},
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401,
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);
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}
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const providedToken = authHeader.substring(7); // Remove 'Bearer ' prefix
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const expectedToken = authToken;
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// Convert to buffers for timing-safe comparison
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const providedBuffer = Buffer.from(providedToken);
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const expectedBuffer = Buffer.from(expectedToken);
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// Check length first to prevent timing attacks
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if (providedBuffer.length !== expectedBuffer.length) {
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return c.json(
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{
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error: "Unauthorized",
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message:
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"Authentication required. Use the x-mcp-remote-auth header with Bearer token.",
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},
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401,
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);
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}
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// Perform timing-safe comparison
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if (!timingSafeEqual(providedBuffer, expectedBuffer)) {
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return c.json(
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{
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error: "Unauthorized",
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message:
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"Authentication required. Use the x-mcp-remote-auth header with Bearer token.",
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},
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401,
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);
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}
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await next();
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};
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}
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function forwardLogEvent(
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logger: pino.Logger,
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logEvent: Partial<LogEvent>,
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): void {
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const levelLabel = (logEvent?.level?.label ?? "info").toLowerCase();
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const method = (logger as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)[levelLabel];
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if (typeof method !== "function") return;
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const bindings = Object.assign(
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{},
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...(Array.isArray(logEvent.bindings) ? logEvent.bindings : []),
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);
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const messages = Array.isArray(logEvent.messages) ? logEvent.messages : [];
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if (messages.length === 0) {
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(method as (obj: object) => void).call(logger, bindings);
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return;
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}
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const first = messages[0];
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if (typeof first === "object" && first !== null && !Array.isArray(first)) {
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const obj = { ...bindings, ...(first as Record<string, unknown>) };
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const msg = messages[1];
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const args = messages.slice(2);
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(method as (obj: object, msg?: unknown, ...args: unknown[]) => void).call(
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logger,
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obj,
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msg,
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...args,
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);
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} else {
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const msg = messages[0];
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const args = messages.slice(1);
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(method as (obj: object, msg?: unknown, ...args: unknown[]) => void).call(
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logger,
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bindings,
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msg,
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...args,
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);
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}
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}
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export function createRemoteApp(
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options: RemoteServerOptions,
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): CreateRemoteAppResult {
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const dangerouslyOmitAuth = !!options.dangerouslyOmitAuth;
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// Determine auth token when auth is enabled: options > env var > generate
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const authToken = dangerouslyOmitAuth
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? ""
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: options.authToken ||
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process.env[API_SERVER_ENV_VARS.AUTH_TOKEN] ||
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randomBytes(32).toString("hex");
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const app = new Hono<Env>();
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const sessions = new Map<string, RemoteSession>();
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const { logger: fileLogger, allowedOrigins } = options;
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const storageDir = options.storageDir ?? getDefaultStorageDir();
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// Apply origin validation middleware first (before auth)
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// This prevents DNS rebinding attacks by validating Origin header
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app.use("*", createOriginMiddleware(allowedOrigins));
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// Apply auth middleware unless dangerously omitted
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if (!dangerouslyOmitAuth) {
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app.use("*", createAuthMiddleware(authToken));
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}
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app.get("/api/config", (c) => {
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const payload = options.sandboxUrl
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? { ...options.initialConfig, sandboxUrl: options.sandboxUrl }
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: options.initialConfig;
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return c.json(payload);
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});
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app.post("/api/mcp/connect", async (c) => {
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let body: RemoteConnectRequest;
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try {
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body = (await c.req.json()) as RemoteConnectRequest;
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} catch {
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return c.json({ error: "Invalid JSON body" }, 400);
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}
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const config = body.config as MCPServerConfig;
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if (!config) {
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return c.json({ error: "Missing config" }, 400);
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}
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const sessionId = crypto.randomUUID();
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const session = new RemoteSession(sessionId);
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let transport: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createTransportNode>>["transport"];
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try {
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// Create authProvider from tokens if provided
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const authProvider = createTokenAuthProvider(body.oauthTokens);
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const result = createTransportNode(config, {
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pipeStderr: true,
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onStderr: (entry) => session.onStderr(entry),
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onFetchRequest: (entry) => session.onFetchRequest(entry),
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authProvider,
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});
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transport = result.transport;
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} catch (err) {
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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return c.json({ error: `Failed to create transport: ${msg}` }, 500);
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}
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session.setTransport(transport);
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transport.onmessage = (msg) => session.onMessage(msg);
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// Track if transport closes/errors during start - this matches local behavior
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// If transport.start() throws, we catch it. If it resolves but transport closes immediately,
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// we detect that too (process failure after spawn).
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let transportFailed = false;
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let transportError: string | null = null;
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const originalOnclose = transport.onclose;
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const originalOnerror = transport.onerror;
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// Set up error handlers BEFORE calling start() so we catch failures during start
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transport.onerror = (err) => {
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transportFailed = true;
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transportError = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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originalOnerror?.(err);
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};
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transport.onclose = () => {
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const session = sessions.get(sessionId);
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if (session) {
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// Mark transport as dead but don't delete session yet
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// We'll notify client via SSE and cleanup when client disconnects
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const errorMsg =
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transportError || "Transport closed - process may have exited";
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session.markTransportDead(errorMsg);
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// If no client connected, can cleanup immediately
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if (!session.hasEventConsumer()) {
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sessions.delete(sessionId);
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}
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} else {
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// Session not created yet - failed during start
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transportFailed = true;
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transportError =
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transportError ||
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"Transport closed during start - process may have failed";
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}
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originalOnclose?.();
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};
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try {
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// transport.start() should throw if process fails to start
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// If it resolves, the process should be running
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await transport.start();
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// Check if transport failed during start (onerror/onclose fired synchronously)
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if (transportFailed) {
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const errorMsg = transportError || "Transport failed during start";
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return c.json({ error: `Failed to start transport: ${errorMsg}` }, 500);
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}
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} catch (err) {
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// transport.start() threw - this is the expected failure path
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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// Preserve 401 only when the transport/SDK reports it (no message guessing)
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const status =
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(err as { code?: number; status?: number }).code ??
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(err as { code?: number; status?: number }).status;
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const is401 = status === 401;
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return c.json(
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{ error: `Failed to start transport: ${msg}` },
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is401 ? 401 : 500,
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);
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}
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// Transport started successfully - add to sessions
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sessions.set(sessionId, session);
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return c.json({ sessionId });
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});
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app.post("/api/mcp/send", async (c) => {
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let body: RemoteSendRequest & { sessionId?: string };
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try {
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body = (await c.req.json()) as RemoteSendRequest & { sessionId?: string };
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} catch {
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return c.json({ error: "Invalid JSON body" }, 400);
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}
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const { sessionId, message, relatedRequestId } = body;
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if (!sessionId || !message) {
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return c.json({ error: "Missing sessionId or message" }, 400);
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}
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const session = sessions.get(sessionId);
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if (!session) {
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return c.json({ error: "Session not found" }, 404);
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}
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// Check if transport is dead - return error immediately (matches local behavior)
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if (session.isTransportDead()) {
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const errorMsg = session.getTransportError() || "Transport closed";
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return c.json({ error: errorMsg }, 500);
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}
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try {
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await session.transport.send(message, {
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relatedRequestId: relatedRequestId as string | number | undefined,
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});
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return c.json({ ok: true });
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} catch (err) {
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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// Preserve 401 only when the transport/SDK reports it (no message guessing)
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const status =
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(err as { code?: number; status?: number }).code ??
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(err as { code?: number; status?: number }).status;
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const is401 = status === 401;
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return c.json({ error: msg }, is401 ? 401 : 500);
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}
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});
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app.get("/api/mcp/events", async (c) => {
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const sessionId = c.req.query("sessionId");
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if (!sessionId) {
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return c.json({ error: "Missing sessionId query" }, 400);
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}
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const session = sessions.get(sessionId);
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if (!session) {
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return c.json({ error: "Session not found" }, 404);
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}
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return streamSSE(c, async (stream) => {
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session.setEventConsumer((event) => {
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const data = JSON.stringify(event);
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void stream.writeSSE({
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event: event.type,
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data,
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});
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});
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stream.onAbort(() => {
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// Client disconnected - clear event consumer
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const shouldCleanup = session.clearEventConsumer();
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stream.close();
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// If transport is dead and no client connected, cleanup session
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if (shouldCleanup || session.isTransportDead()) {
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sessions.delete(sessionId);
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}
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});
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// Keep the stream open until the client disconnects. Hono's streamSSE
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// closes the stream when this callback returns, so we must not return
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// until the connection is aborted.
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await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
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stream.onAbort(() => {
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// Cleanup happens in onAbort handler above
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resolve();
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});
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});
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});
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});
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app.post("/api/mcp/disconnect", async (c) => {
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let body: { sessionId?: string };
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try {
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body = (await c.req.json()) as { sessionId?: string };
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} catch {
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return c.json({ error: "Invalid JSON body" }, 400);
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}
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const sessionId = body.sessionId;
|
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if (!sessionId) {
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return c.json({ error: "Missing sessionId" }, 400);
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}
|
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|
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const session = sessions.get(sessionId);
|
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if (session) {
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session.clearEventConsumer();
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await session.transport.close();
|
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sessions.delete(sessionId);
|
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}
|
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return c.json({ ok: true });
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});
|
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|
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app.post("/api/fetch", async (c) => {
|
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let body: {
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url: string;
|
|
method?: string;
|
|
headers?: Record<string, string>;
|
|
body?: string;
|
|
};
|
|
try {
|
|
body = (await c.req.json()) as typeof body;
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return c.json({ error: "Invalid JSON body" }, 400);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const { url, method = "GET", headers = {}, body: reqBody } = body;
|
|
if (!url) {
|
|
return c.json({ error: "Missing url" }, 400);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
const res = await fetch(url, {
|
|
method,
|
|
headers: new Headers(headers),
|
|
body: reqBody,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const resHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};
|
|
res.headers.forEach((v, k) => {
|
|
resHeaders[k] = v;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const contentType = res.headers.get("content-type");
|
|
const isStream =
|
|
contentType?.includes("text/event-stream") ||
|
|
contentType?.includes("application/x-ndjson");
|
|
let resBody: string | undefined;
|
|
if (!isStream && res.body) {
|
|
resBody = await res.text();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return c.json({
|
|
ok: res.ok,
|
|
status: res.status,
|
|
statusText: res.statusText,
|
|
headers: resHeaders,
|
|
body: resBody,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
return c.json({ error: msg }, 500);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
app.post("/api/log", async (c) => {
|
|
const body = (await c.req.json().catch(() => ({}))) as Partial<LogEvent>;
|
|
if (fileLogger) {
|
|
forwardLogEvent(fileLogger, body);
|
|
}
|
|
return c.json({ ok: true });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
app.get("/api/storage/:storeId", async (c) => {
|
|
const storeId = c.req.param("storeId");
|
|
if (!storeId || !validateStoreId(storeId)) {
|
|
return c.json({ error: "Invalid storeId" }, 400);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const filePath = getStoreFilePath(storageDir, storeId);
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
const raw = await readStoreFile(filePath);
|
|
if (raw === null) {
|
|
return c.json({}, 200);
|
|
}
|
|
const store = parseStore(raw);
|
|
return c.json(store);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
const msg = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
|
|
return c.json({ error: `Failed to read store: ${msg}` }, 500);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
app.post("/api/storage/:storeId", async (c) => {
|
|
const storeId = c.req.param("storeId");
|
|
if (!storeId || !validateStoreId(storeId)) {
|
|
return c.json({ error: "Invalid storeId" }, 400);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let body: unknown;
|
|
try {
|
|
body = await c.req.json();
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return c.json({ error: "Invalid JSON body" }, 400);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const filePath = getStoreFilePath(storageDir, storeId);
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
const jsonData = serializeStore(body);
|
|
await writeStoreFile(filePath, jsonData);
|
|
return c.json({ ok: true });
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
const msg = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
|
|
return c.json({ error: `Failed to write store: ${msg}` }, 500);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
app.delete("/api/storage/:storeId", async (c) => {
|
|
const storeId = c.req.param("storeId");
|
|
if (!storeId || !validateStoreId(storeId)) {
|
|
return c.json({ error: "Invalid storeId" }, 400);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const filePath = getStoreFilePath(storageDir, storeId);
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
await deleteStoreFile(filePath);
|
|
return c.json({ ok: true });
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
const msg = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
|
|
return c.json({ error: `Failed to delete store: ${msg}` }, 500);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
return { app, authToken };
|
|
}
|