inspector/scripts/dependabot-alerts.mjs
cliffhall 0bf8fbd36b chore(deps): address Copilot review round 15 on #2243
Record each advisory's disposition during the loop instead of deriving
"can this be filed?" from the groups beforehand.

Membership in a group only means an alert exists. Whether an issue
tracks it is decided by the ecosystem check, the manifest read and the
range probe that follow — so if GitHub revised first_patched_version
while that manifest happened to be unparseable, the replacement group
was skipped and the old-key issue was still cleared as "superseded",
claiming an issue that was never filed.

Each advisory is now noted as tracked, not-exposed or indeterminate as
the loop reaches it, and reconciliation refuses to clear while anything
still open is indeterminate or absent. That also splits the clear reason
honestly: a bump whose copies simply left range now says so, rather than
claiming a replacement issue exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-04 09:26:20 -04:00

1424 lines
54 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
// Dependabot alert sweep (#2233), the alert-consuming half of #2229.
//
// Dependabot's SECURITY-update PRs are turned off in repo settings; its alerts
// stay on. This script is what consumes them:
//
// alert -> scheduled sweep -> issue (labeled, milestoned, boarded) -> maintainer PR -> v2/main
//
// A Dependabot-opened PR carries no `Closes #N` and no board card, which is the
// carve-out from "every PR references an issue" that #2229 exists to remove.
// The version-update half was removed outright in #2235 and replaced by
// `dependency-refresh.mjs`; this is the security half, and it files issues
// rather than PRs for the same reason.
//
// Three things shape the design, each verified against this repo before it was
// written:
//
// 1. There is no `dependabot_alert` WORKFLOW trigger — it is a webhook event
// only — so this is a scheduled sweep, not event-driven. Daily is enough;
// alerts are not minute-sensitive.
// 2. `GITHUB_TOKEN` can read alerts with `vulnerability-alerts: read`, so no
// PAT is needed for the sweep itself. Two side steps DO need one, and both
// degrade rather than block: writing the board card (an org project is
// outside `GITHUB_TOKEN`'s reach — an unboarded-but-milestoned issue is
// swept into Todo by the next `/issue-triage` pass), and reading back the
// `automated-security-fixes` setting (`administration: read`, which
// `permissions:` cannot grant at all — so that guard reports UNVERIFIED
// rather than failing when the token cannot see it).
// 3. Alerts are per-ADVISORY but a fix is per-BUMP. Today's seven open alerts
// are three `overrides` entries, so grouping by
// `(package, manifest_path, first_patched_version)` is what keeps this from
// filing seven issues for three pieces of work.
//
// ⚠️ GitHub computes the dependency graph — and therefore every alert — from
// the DEFAULT branch (`main`), while we ship from `v2/main`. So an alert is not
// trusted on its face: the vulnerable range is re-checked against `v2/main`'s
// own lockfile before anything is filed. The blind spot that leaves is stated
// plainly in the workflow header: a vulnerable dependency introduced on
// `v2/main` and not yet merged to `main` produces no alert at all, and no
// approach that consumes GitHub's alerts can see it. The release-time
// `npm audit --audit-level=high` report (#2231) is the partial second signal.
//
// Idempotency key is the marker comment at the top of each issue body, which
// names the package, the manifest and every GHSA the issue covers. A second run
// the same day is a complete no-op; a NEW advisory for a package that already
// has an open issue lands as a comment on it and rewrites the marker, rather
// than filing a second issue.
//
// Everything here is covered by `dependabot-alerts.test.mjs`: the pure halves
// directly, and `main()` through an injected spawn function, the same way
// `dependency-refresh.mjs` does it. `workflow_dispatch` is a production
// trigger, not a test, so the orchestration that handles API failures, lockfile
// filtering, issue idempotency and partial board writes is exercised here
// rather than left to a real run (Copilot).
import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import semver from "semver";
/** Board #28 (v2). The project and field node ids are stable; option ids are not. */
export const PROJECT_ID = "PVT_kwDOCt2Azc4BJVxt";
export const STATUS_FIELD_ID = "PVTSSF_lADOCt2Azc4BJVxtzg5iI8c";
export const PRIORITY_FIELD_ID = "PVTSSF_lADOCt2Azc4BJVxtzg5iJE4";
/**
* Option ids are regenerated whenever a single-select field's option list is
* edited, so they are resolved by NAME at run time rather than hardcoded here —
* a hardcoded id turns an unrelated board edit into a silently mis-set field.
*/
export const BOARD_STATUS = "Todo";
export const BOARD_PRIORITY = "High";
/**
* The branch this repo actually ships from, and whose lockfiles are probed.
*
* The workflow checks this branch out, so manifests are read from the working
* tree rather than through `git show` — the same shape `dependency-refresh.mjs`
* uses to run `npm outdated` against it. Named here only so the issue body can
* say which branch the versions it quotes came from.
*/
export const TARGET_BRANCH = "v2/main";
/**
* The one ecosystem this sweep can act on.
*
* ⚠️ Dependabot alerts are NOT npm-only. This repo has a `Dockerfile` and
* GitHub Actions workflows, and an alert against either arrives in the same
* feed with a `manifest_path` that is not a lockfile — which the JSON parse
* would reject, aborting the whole daily sweep before any npm group was
* processed (Copilot). Everything downstream reads npm lockfiles, so a non-npm
* alert is reported and skipped rather than guessed at: filing it properly
* means knowing how to fix it, which is different work per ecosystem.
*/
export const SUPPORTED_ECOSYSTEM = "npm";
const MARKER_RE =
/^<!-- dependabot-alerts: pkg=(.+?); manifest=(.+?); fixed=(.+?); ghsas=(.+?) -->/;
/** Marker on the comment that announces newly-seen advisories, keyed by GHSA. */
const COMMENT_MARKER_RE = /^<!-- dependabot-alerts:added (.+?) -->/;
/**
* The issue body's first line: the idempotency key.
*
* It carries `fixedIn` as well as the package and manifest because that triple
* IS the grouping key — two advisories on one package needing different patched
* versions are different bumps and get different issues. Keyed on the pair
* alone, a second bump would match the first issue and merge its GHSAs and its
* target version into the wrong one (Copilot).
*
* @param {{package: string, manifestPath: string, fixedIn: string, ghsas: string[]}} group
* @returns {string}
*/
export function buildMarker({ package: pkg, manifestPath, fixedIn, ghsas }) {
return `<!-- dependabot-alerts: pkg=${pkg}; manifest=${manifestPath}; fixed=${fixedIn}; ghsas=${[...ghsas].sort().join(",")} -->`;
}
/**
* Read a marker back off an issue body.
*
* @param {string | undefined} body
* @returns {{package: string, manifestPath: string, fixedIn: string, ghsas: string[]} | null}
*/
export function parseMarker(body) {
const match = MARKER_RE.exec(body ?? "");
if (!match) return null;
return {
package: match[1],
manifestPath: match[2],
fixedIn: match[3],
ghsas: match[4].split(",").filter(Boolean),
};
}
/**
* The GHSAs a previously-posted "new advisories" comment already announced.
*
* @param {string | undefined} body
* @returns {string[] | null} `null` when the comment carries no marker
*/
export function parseCommentMarker(body) {
const match = COMMENT_MARKER_RE.exec(body ?? "");
if (!match) return null;
return match[1].split(",").filter(Boolean);
}
/**
* Which of `group`'s advisories the existing issue does not already name.
*
* @param {string[]} existing the marker's GHSA list
* @param {string[]} incoming the GHSAs the sweep just saw
* @returns {{merged: string[], added: string[]}} both sorted
*/
export function mergeGhsas(existing, incoming) {
const known = new Set(existing);
const added = [...new Set(incoming.filter((g) => !known.has(g)))].sort();
const merged = [...new Set([...existing, ...incoming])].sort();
return { merged, added };
}
/**
* Translate a GitHub `vulnerable_version_range` into a range npm `semver`
* understands.
*
* ⚠️ GitHub separates conjuncts with a COMMA (`>= 3.1.3, < 3.1.6`); node-semver
* reads a comma as nothing at all and quietly returns `false` for a version
* that is in fact in range. Space is semver's AND, so the fix is a split/join —
* but the failure it prevents is silent, which is why this is its own tested
* function rather than an inline `.replace`.
*
* @param {string} range
* @returns {string}
*/
export function toSemverRange(range) {
return range
.split(",")
.map((part) => part.trim())
.filter(Boolean)
.join(" ");
}
/**
* Every installed copy of `pkg` in an npm lockfile, with its tree path.
*
* A package can legitimately appear more than once — a hoisted
* `node_modules/x` plus one or more nested `node_modules/y/node_modules/x` —
* and the copies can be at DIFFERENT versions. The path is kept rather than
* just the version because it is what distinguishes the copy the manifest
* declares from a copy some dependency dragged in, and the fix for those two
* is not the same (Copilot).
*
* @param {object} lock parsed `package-lock.json` (lockfileVersion 2 or 3)
* @param {string} pkg
* @returns {Array<{path: string, version: string, hoisted: boolean}>} sorted by version
*/
export function lockfileEntries(lock, pkg) {
const hoistedPath = `node_modules/${pkg}`;
const entries = [];
for (const [path, entry] of Object.entries(lock.packages ?? {})) {
if (path !== hoistedPath && !path.endsWith(`/${hoistedPath}`)) continue;
if (!entry?.version) continue;
entries.push({
path,
version: entry.version,
hoisted: path === hoistedPath,
});
}
return entries.sort(
(a, b) =>
semver.compare(a.version, b.version) || a.path.localeCompare(b.path),
);
}
/**
* Every version of `pkg` installed anywhere in an npm lockfile.
*
* @param {object} lock parsed `package-lock.json` (lockfileVersion 2 or 3)
* @param {string} pkg
* @returns {string[]} sorted, deduped
*/
export function lockfileVersions(lock, pkg) {
return [...new Set(lockfileEntries(lock, pkg).map((e) => e.version))].sort(
semver.compare,
);
}
/**
* Is `pkg` declared by the manifest itself, rather than pulled in transitively?
*
* ⚠️ Being declared is NOT by itself the question the issue needs answered —
* see `remediation` below. A manifest can declare a safe `pkg@^4` while some
* dependency drags a vulnerable `pkg@3` into a nested folder, and telling the
* maintainer to raise an already-safe range would leave the vulnerable copy
* exactly where it is (Copilot).
*
* @param {object} lock parsed `package-lock.json`
* @param {string} pkg
* @returns {boolean}
*/
export function isDirectDependency(lock, pkg) {
const root = lock.packages?.[""] ?? {};
return Boolean(
root.dependencies?.[pkg] ??
root.devDependencies?.[pkg] ??
root.optionalDependencies?.[pkg] ??
root.peerDependencies?.[pkg],
);
}
const SEVERITY_RANK = { critical: 4, high: 3, medium: 2, moderate: 2, low: 1 };
/**
* The grouping key: one bump, i.e. one edit to one manifest.
*
* JSON rather than a delimited string, because the three fields are free-form
* and any separator would have to be argued for — the one that was here was a
* literal NUL, which classified the whole source file as binary and made
* repository searches skip it (Copilot). Shared with the end-of-run
* reconciliation, so a key built from a marker and a key built from an alert
* cannot drift apart.
*
* @returns {string}
*/
export function groupKey(pkg, manifestPath, fixedIn) {
return JSON.stringify([pkg, manifestPath, fixedIn]);
}
/**
* One advisory as it applies to one manifest.
*
* ⚠️ A GHSA alone is not enough. Dependabot alerts are per MANIFEST, and this
* repo has five lockfiles — so the same advisory legitimately appears for the
* root install and for a client. Keying reconciliation on the GHSA alone lets
* another manifest's still-filable alert vouch for this one, and an issue whose
* own alert lost its patched version would be cleared on the strength of a
* different lockfile's alert (Copilot).
*
* @returns {string}
*/
export function advisoryKey(pkg, manifestPath, ghsa) {
return JSON.stringify([pkg, manifestPath, ghsa]);
}
/**
* Collapse per-advisory alerts into one entry per BUMP.
*
* Grouped by `(package, manifest_path, first_patched_version)`: that triple is
* one edit to one manifest, which is the unit a maintainer actually acts on.
* Two advisories on the same package with different patched versions are
* different bumps and stay apart.
*
* @param {object[]} alerts raw `GET /repos/{o}/{r}/dependabot/alerts` entries
* @returns {Array<{key: string, package: string, manifestPath: string, fixedIn: string, scope: string, severity: string, ghsas: string[], advisories: Array<{ghsa: string, cve: string | null, severity: string, summary: string, range: string, url: string}>}>}
*/
export function groupAlerts(alerts) {
const groups = new Map();
for (const alert of alerts) {
if (alert.state !== "open") continue;
const pkg = alert.dependency?.package?.name;
const ecosystem = alert.dependency?.package?.ecosystem ?? "unknown";
const manifestPath = alert.dependency?.manifest_path;
const fixedIn =
alert.security_vulnerability?.first_patched_version?.identifier;
// No patched version means there is nothing to bump TO — an issue asking
// for an unavailable upgrade is noise, so it waits for one to be published.
if (!pkg || !manifestPath || !fixedIn) continue;
const key = groupKey(pkg, manifestPath, fixedIn);
const advisory = {
ghsa: alert.security_advisory?.ghsa_id ?? "",
cve: alert.security_advisory?.cve_id ?? null,
severity: alert.security_advisory?.severity ?? "unknown",
summary: alert.security_advisory?.summary ?? "",
range: alert.security_vulnerability?.vulnerable_version_range ?? "*",
url: alert.html_url ?? "",
};
const existing = groups.get(key);
if (existing) {
existing.advisories.push(advisory);
if (
(SEVERITY_RANK[advisory.severity] ?? 0) >
(SEVERITY_RANK[existing.severity] ?? 0)
) {
existing.severity = advisory.severity;
}
continue;
}
groups.set(key, {
key,
package: pkg,
ecosystem,
manifestPath,
fixedIn,
scope: alert.dependency?.scope ?? "runtime",
severity: advisory.severity,
advisories: [advisory],
});
}
return [...groups.values()]
.map((group) => {
group.advisories.sort((a, b) => a.ghsa.localeCompare(b.ghsa));
group.ghsas = group.advisories.map((a) => a.ghsa);
return group;
})
.sort(
(a, b) =>
a.package.localeCompare(b.package) ||
a.manifestPath.localeCompare(b.manifestPath) ||
a.fixedIn.localeCompare(b.fixedIn),
);
}
/**
* The milestone a new issue takes: the open one with the NEAREST due date.
*
* ⚠️ Selected here rather than in a `jq` expression because jq sorts `null`
* BEFORE every string, so a `sort_by(.due_on) | .[0]` over the raw list hands
* back an undated milestone in preference to every dated one (Copilot). An
* undated bucket has no due date and so cannot be the nearest; it is dropped
* rather than sorted last, and if nothing dated is open the issue is filed
* unmilestoned and triage places it.
*
* @param {Array<{title: string, state?: string, due_on?: string | null}>} milestones
* @returns {string | null}
*/
export function pickMilestone(milestones) {
const dated = (milestones ?? []).filter(
(m) => (m.state ?? "open") === "open" && m.due_on,
);
if (dated.length === 0) return null;
return dated.sort((a, b) => a.due_on.localeCompare(b.due_on))[0].title;
}
/**
* Narrow a group to the advisories that actually apply to what is installed.
*
* ⚠️ Grouping is by `(package, manifest, first_patched_version)`, and two
* advisories sharing that triple can still have DIFFERENT vulnerable ranges —
* `>= 3.1.3, < 3.1.6` and `>= 3.0.0, < 3.1.6` both patch at 3.1.6, and an
* installed `3.1.0` matches only the second. Validating at the group level
* ("does ANY advisory match?") keeps both, and the issue's marker, title,
* severity, advisory table and later comments then all claim an advisory that
* does not apply on this branch (Copilot).
*
* @param {ReturnType<typeof groupAlerts>[number]} group
* @param {Array<{path: string, version: string, hoisted: boolean}>} entries every installed copy
* @returns {{group: ReturnType<typeof groupAlerts>[number], affected: Array<{path: string, version: string, hoisted: boolean}>} | null}
* `null` when nothing installed is in range of any of the group's advisories
*/
export function narrowToApplicable(group, entries) {
const applies = (advisory, entry) =>
semver.satisfies(entry.version, toSemverRange(advisory.range));
const advisories = group.advisories.filter((a) =>
entries.some((e) => applies(a, e)),
);
if (advisories.length === 0) return null;
const affected = entries.filter((e) => advisories.some((a) => applies(a, e)));
const severity = advisories.reduce(
(worst, a) =>
(SEVERITY_RANK[a.severity] ?? 0) > (SEVERITY_RANK[worst] ?? 0)
? a.severity
: worst,
advisories[0].severity,
);
return {
group: {
...group,
advisories,
ghsas: advisories.map((a) => a.ghsa),
severity,
},
affected,
};
}
/**
* The title counts the advisories that APPLY, which is what the body shows —
* so it tracks an issue that grows a new advisory and one whose exposure
* shrinks alike. The marker's GHSA list is a different thing: it is monotonic,
* because its job is to remember what has already been announced.
*
* @param {ReturnType<typeof groupAlerts>[number]} group narrowed to what applies
* @returns {string}
*/
export function buildIssueTitle(group) {
const n = group.advisories.length;
return `chore(deps): bump \`${group.package}\` to \`${group.fixedIn}\` in \`${group.manifestPath}\` (${n} ${n === 1 ? "advisory" : "advisories"})`;
}
/** Escape a value going into a Markdown table cell. */
const cell = (value) => String(value).replace(/\|/g, "\\|");
const PLACEMENT_DOC =
"https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/blob/v2/main/AGENTS.md#dependency-placement";
/**
* The packages a nested copy sits under, outermost first.
*
* `node_modules/ajv/node_modules/fast-uri` -> `["ajv"]`. Scope-aware, since a
* scoped name contains a slash of its own.
*
* @param {string} path a lockfile `packages` key
* @returns {string[]} empty for the hoisted copy
*/
export function overrideAncestors(path) {
const segments = path.replace(/^node_modules\//, "").split("/node_modules/");
return segments.slice(0, -1);
}
/**
* A concrete parent-scoped `overrides` block for the nested vulnerable copies.
*
* npm rejects a package-wide override that contradicts a direct dependency of
* the same name (`EOVERRIDE`), so when the manifest declares the package the
* nested copies must be reached through their parents instead.
*
* @param {Array<{path: string, hoisted: boolean}>} affected
* @param {{package: string, fixedIn: string}} group
* @returns {string} pretty-printed JSON
*/
export function scopedOverrideExample(affected, group) {
const overrides = {};
for (const entry of affected) {
const ancestors = overrideAncestors(entry.path);
if (ancestors.length === 0) continue;
let node = overrides;
for (const ancestor of ancestors) {
node[ancestor] = node[ancestor] ?? {};
node = node[ancestor];
}
node[group.package] = group.fixedIn;
}
return JSON.stringify({ overrides }, null, 2);
}
/**
* What the maintainer actually has to change, derived from WHICH copies are
* vulnerable rather than from whether the package is declared.
*
* The three cases are genuinely different edits, and the mixed one is why this
* is not a boolean (Copilot):
*
* | vulnerable copies | fix |
* | --- | --- |
* | the declared (hoisted) one | raise the declared range |
* | nested ones only | an `overrides` pin |
* | both | both, and neither alone is enough |
*
* A manifest declaring a safe `pkg@^4` alongside a dependency that drags in a
* vulnerable nested `pkg@3` lands in the middle row: the declared range is
* already correct, and raising it changes nothing.
*
* @param {Array<{path: string, version: string, hoisted: boolean}>} affected
* @param {boolean} declared whether the manifest declares the package
* @returns {{direct: boolean, transitive: boolean}}
*/
export function remediation(affected, declared) {
const isDeclaredCopy = (entry) => declared && entry.hoisted;
return {
direct: affected.some(isDeclaredCopy),
// Everything that is NOT the declared copy needs the override — nested
// copies, and also a hoisted copy of a package this manifest never
// declared, which got there transitively like any other.
transitive: affected.some((entry) => !isDeclaredCopy(entry)),
};
}
/**
* @param {ReturnType<typeof groupAlerts>[number]} group
* @param {{affected: Array<{path: string, version: string, hoisted: boolean}>, declared: boolean, ghsas?: string[]}} probe
* `ghsas` overrides the marker's list when an existing issue is being
* rewritten to cover advisories it did not originally name.
* @returns {string}
*/
export function buildIssueBody(
group,
{ affected, declared, ghsas, securityPrsOff = true },
) {
const covered = ghsas ?? group.ghsas;
const applying = group.advisories.length;
// ⚠️ Every free-form cell is escaped, the RANGE included: a semver range is
// allowed to contain `||`, so a disjoint advisory range like
// `>= 1.0, < 2.0 || >= 3.0, < 3.5` would otherwise inject two extra column
// separators and shear the table apart (Copilot).
const rows = group.advisories
.map(
(a) =>
`| [${a.ghsa}](${a.url}) | ${cell(a.cve ?? "—")} | ${cell(a.severity)} | ${cell(a.range)} | ${cell(a.summary)} |`,
)
.join("\n");
const manifestJson = group.manifestPath.replace(
/package-lock\.json$/,
"package.json",
);
const { direct, transitive } = remediation(affected, declared);
const steps = [];
if (direct) {
steps.push(
`**Raise the declared range in \`${manifestJson}\`** so \`${group.package}\` can no longer resolve below \`${group.fixedIn}\`, keeping the operator the manifest already uses — widening it to a bare \`>=\` would drop the compatibility bound with it.`,
);
}
if (transitive) {
steps.push(
direct
? // ⚠️ A package-wide override cannot be used here: npm rejects an
// override whose spec differs from a direct dependency of the same
// name with EOVERRIDE, and this manifest declares one (Copilot). The
// nested copies have to be reached through their parents.
`**Add a parent-scoped [\`overrides\`](${PLACEMENT_DOC}) entry** for the nested copies below, which the declared range does not reach:\n\n\`\`\`json\n${scopedOverrideExample(affected, group)}\n\`\`\`\n\n A package-wide \`"${group.package}": "${group.fixedIn}"\` would be rejected with \`EOVERRIDE\`, because this manifest also declares \`${group.package}\` directly and npm refuses an override that contradicts a direct dependency. **Not** \`npm audit fix\` either, which "resolves" an advisory with no upward escape by silently downgrading.`
: `**Add an [\`overrides\`](${PLACEMENT_DOC}) entry** pinning \`${group.package}\` to \`${group.fixedIn}\`, for the copies below, which no declared range reaches. **Not** \`npm audit fix\`, which "resolves" an advisory with no upward escape by silently downgrading.`,
);
}
const fix = [
...(steps.length === 2
? [
"Both edits are needed; neither alone clears every vulnerable copy.",
"",
]
: []),
...steps.map((step, i) => (steps.length > 1 ? `${i + 1}. ${step}` : step)),
"",
"| Vulnerable copy | Version |",
"| --- | --- |",
...affected.map((e) => `| \`${e.path}\` | \`${e.version}\` |`),
].join("\n");
return [
buildMarker({ ...group, ghsas: covered }),
// Counts what APPLIES, like the title and the table — `covered` is the
// marker's monotonic history and would keep counting an advisory that has
// since closed (Copilot).
// ⚠️ The security-PR claim is only made when the run actually READ the
// setting. The guard degrades to UNVERIFIED when the token cannot see it,
// and an issue asserting what the run explicitly could not confirm is worse
// than one that says so (Copilot).
`Filed automatically from ${applying} open Dependabot ${applying === 1 ? "alert" : "alerts"} (#2233). ${securityPrsOff ? "Dependabot opens no security-update PRs on this repo; the" : "The"} fix is written by hand against \`${TARGET_BRANCH}\`.`,
"",
"| | |",
"| --- | --- |",
`| Package | \`${group.package}\` |`,
`| Manifest | \`${group.manifestPath}\` |`,
`| Vulnerable on \`${TARGET_BRANCH}\` | ${[...new Set(affected.map((e) => e.version))].map((v) => `\`${v}\``).join(", ") || "—"} |`,
`| Fixed in | \`${group.fixedIn}\` |`,
`| Scope | ${group.scope} |`,
`| Highest severity | ${group.severity} |`,
"",
"## Advisories",
"",
"| GHSA | CVE | Severity | Vulnerable range | Summary |",
"| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |",
rows,
"",
"## Fix",
"",
fix,
"",
"> [!NOTE]",
`> **Priority is a standing rubric override.** A routine bump scores Medium; a security bump is filed **${BOARD_PRIORITY}** so it does not sit.`,
">",
`> **Where each number comes from.** The GHSA, CVE, severity, vulnerable range and summary are the advisory's own, reported by Dependabot. What was verified independently against \`${TARGET_BRANCH}\` is the **installed versions, their paths, and whether each advisory's range still matches** — GitHub computes alerts from the default branch, so an alert is filed here only after that re-check.`,
].join("\n");
}
/**
* The body an issue is rewritten to once its exposure is gone.
*
* The marker is retained, so the sweep still recognises this issue and will not
* file a fresh one if the same advisory comes back into range. The issue is NOT
* closed automatically: whether the exposure went away because a PR fixed it or
* because the dependency was dropped decides whether the board card is moved to
* Done or deleted, and that is a judgement the sweep cannot make.
*
* @param {ReturnType<typeof groupAlerts>[number]} group
* @param {{ghsas: string[], reason: string, today: string}} context
* @returns {string}
*/
/**
* The date an already-cleared body records, or `null` if it is not one.
*
* ⚠️ A cleared issue is deliberately left OPEN, so the sweep sees it again
* tomorrow. With today's date baked into the rendered body, the regenerated
* body would differ by the date alone and every cleared issue would be edited
* once a day, forever (Copilot). Reusing the original date is what makes the
* comparison stable — and it is the more useful date to show anyway: when the
* exposure went away, not when the sweep last looked.
*
* @param {string | undefined} body
* @returns {string | null}
*/
export function parseClearedDate(body) {
const match =
/\*\*No longer applicable on `[^`]+` as of (\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2})\*\*/.exec(
body ?? "",
);
return match ? match[1] : null;
}
export function buildClearedBody(group, { ghsas, reason, today }) {
return [
buildMarker({ ...group, ghsas }),
`**No longer applicable on \`${TARGET_BRANCH}\` as of ${today}** — ${reason}.`,
"",
`Nothing here needs bumping any more: \`${group.package}\` is no longer exposed to ${ghsas.length === 1 ? "the advisory" : "the advisories"} below on the branch we ship from. This body is rewritten in place rather than the issue being closed, because whether the card belongs in **Done** or should be **deleted** depends on why the exposure went away — a merged fix shipped something, a dropped dependency did not.`,
"",
`Previously covered: ${ghsas.map((g) => `\`${g}\``).join(", ")}.`,
"",
"If the same advisory comes back into range, this issue is reused rather than a new one filed.",
].join("\n");
}
/**
* The marker that makes a "new advisories" comment idempotent on its own.
*
* @param {string[]} added
* @returns {string}
*/
export function buildCommentMarker(added) {
return `<!-- dependabot-alerts:added ${[...added].sort().join(",")} -->`;
}
/**
* The comment a NEW advisory for an already-open issue gets, instead of a
* second issue.
*
* @param {ReturnType<typeof groupAlerts>[number]} group
* @param {string[]} added the GHSAs not previously covered
* @returns {string}
*/
export function buildNewAdvisoryComment(group, added) {
const rows = group.advisories
.filter((a) => added.includes(a.ghsa))
.map(
(a) =>
`| [${a.ghsa}](${a.url}) | ${a.severity} | ${a.summary.replace(/\|/g, "\\|")} |`,
)
.join("\n");
return [
buildCommentMarker(added),
// ⚠️ Posted BEFORE the body edit, so it must not assert anything about the
// body's current state — the edit may not have happened yet, and may fail
// (Copilot). It speaks for the comment's own marker, which is true the
// moment this is posted.
`${added.length} new Dependabot ${added.length === 1 ? "advisory" : "advisories"} for \`${group.package}\`, cleared by the same bump to \`${group.fixedIn}\`. This comment's own marker records ${added.length === 1 ? "it" : "them"} as announced, so a later run will not repeat this even if the issue body has yet to catch up.`,
"",
"| GHSA | Severity | Summary |",
"| --- | --- | --- |",
rows,
].join("\n");
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Impure half: everything below shells out to `gh`. Each takes its spawn
// function as a parameter, defaulted to `spawnSync`, so `main()` is testable
// with an injected fake rather than left to `workflow_dispatch` — the same
// shape `dependency-refresh.mjs` uses.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function gh(spawn, args, { token } = {}) {
const env = token ? { ...process.env, GH_TOKEN: token } : process.env;
const result = spawn("gh", args, { encoding: "utf8", env });
if (result.error) throw result.error;
return result;
}
function ghJson(spawn, args) {
const result = gh(spawn, args);
if (result.status !== 0) {
throw new Error(`gh ${args[0]} failed: ${(result.stderr ?? "").trim()}`);
}
return JSON.parse(result.stdout || "null");
}
/**
* Is this failed lookup the "this token may not read that" answer, rather than
* a real API failure?
*
* The distinction is what keeps the security-PR guard honest: a bad token, a
* rate limit or a transient 5xx must NOT be waved through as "unverified", or
* the sweep exits green having silently skipped its own precondition.
*
* ⚠️ Status alone is not enough, which is what the first version got wrong
* (Copilot). GitHub answers BOTH "you lack `administration: read`" and "you
* have exhausted your quota" with **403**, and the second is a real failure —
* so the rate-limit wording is excluded explicitly. **401** is a bad or expired
* token, never a scope question, and is a real failure too. **404** stays
* tolerated because GitHub hides resources a token cannot see behind one rather
* than admitting they exist.
*
* @param {string} stderr stderr from a non-zero `gh api` call
* @returns {boolean}
*/
export function isPermissionDenied(stderr) {
if (/rate limit/i.test(stderr)) return false;
return /HTTP (403|404)\b/.test(stderr);
}
/**
* Detect whether Dependabot's security-update PRs have been switched back on.
*
* `automated-security-fixes` is a repo SETTING, so it can be re-enabled from
* the UI without a commit and nothing in this repo would record it. This check
* is this design's analogue of the merge guard #2060 needed: one API call
* standing in for a required status check plus a ruleset change.
*
* ⚠️ **The endpoint needs `administration: read`, which `GITHUB_TOKEN` cannot
* be granted** — `permissions:` has no such key. So with the default token the
* call 403s, and treating that as failure would make every scheduled run red
* for a reason unrelated to the alerts. An authorization-shaped failure is
* therefore reported and skipped; every other failure throws, and an explicit
* `enabled: true` throws. Give `PROJECT_TOKEN` the extra `administration: read`
* scope and the guard becomes a real assertion; without it the sweep still does
* its job, it just cannot see that setting.
*
* @returns {boolean} whether the setting was actually read
*/
function checkSecurityPrsStillDisabled(repo, spawn) {
const result = gh(spawn, ["api", `repos/${repo}/automated-security-fixes`], {
token: process.env.PROJECT_TOKEN,
});
if (result.status !== 0) {
const stderr = (result.stderr ?? "").trim();
if (!isPermissionDenied(stderr)) {
throw new Error(`automated-security-fixes lookup failed: ${stderr}`);
}
console.log(
`dependabot-alerts: cannot read automated-security-fixes (${stderr}) — ` +
"the token lacks `administration: read`, so whether Dependabot security " +
"PRs are still off is UNVERIFIED this run",
);
return false;
}
const state = JSON.parse(result.stdout || "{}");
if (state.enabled === true) {
throw new Error(
"Dependabot security-update PRs are ENABLED again. This sweep exists to replace them; " +
"an enabled setting means both flows are running and Dependabot is opening PRs with no " +
"issue and no board card. Disable it (Settings -> Code security, or " +
`DELETE /repos/${repo}/automated-security-fixes) and re-run.`,
);
}
return true;
}
/**
* Every open Dependabot alert.
*
* ⚠️ `--slurp` is load-bearing. Without it `gh api --paginate` concatenates one
* top-level JSON array PER PAGE, which `JSON.parse` rejects outright the moment
* open alerts exceed the 100-per-page limit (Copilot). With it the pages arrive
* as an array of arrays, flattened here.
*/
function openAlerts(repo, spawn) {
const pages = ghJson(spawn, [
"api",
"--paginate",
"--slurp",
`repos/${repo}/dependabot/alerts?state=open&per_page=100`,
]);
return (pages ?? []).flat();
}
/**
* A manifest's contents in the checkout, or `null` when it is absent — an alert
* against a manifest this branch does not have is not actionable.
*/
/**
* Read a manifest, distinguishing the two ways it can fail to produce a lock.
*
* ⚠️ These must NOT collapse into one `null` (Copilot). "Absent" means the
* manifest is genuinely gone from the branch, which is real evidence that the
* exposure went away and is grounds for clearing the issue. "Unparseable" is
* evidence of nothing at all — a malformed or truncated lockfile, or a
* non-npm manifest — and clearing on it would stand down a live alert on the
* strength of a read error.
*
* @returns {{lock: object} | {absent: true} | {unparseable: true}}
*/
function readManifest(manifestPath) {
let raw;
try {
raw = readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8");
} catch (error) {
if (error.code === "ENOENT") return { absent: true };
throw error;
}
try {
return { lock: JSON.parse(raw) };
} catch {
// One unreadable manifest must not abort the sweep either.
return { unparseable: true };
}
}
/**
* Every open `dependabot`-labeled issue.
*
* Paginated rather than capped: the marker lookup is what makes this sweep
* idempotent, so a truncated list files a duplicate for every issue it could
* not see — at exactly the scale the `--slurp`ed alert fetch is built to handle
* (Copilot). `/issues` also returns pull requests, which carry no marker and
* are dropped.
*/
function openDependabotIssues(repo, spawn) {
const pages = ghJson(spawn, [
"api",
"--paginate",
"--slurp",
`repos/${repo}/issues?state=open&labels=dependabot&per_page=100`,
]);
return (pages ?? [])
.flat()
.filter((issue) => !issue.pull_request)
.map((issue) => ({
number: issue.number,
title: issue.title,
body: issue.body,
}));
}
/**
* Every GHSA already announced by a comment on an issue, unioned.
*
* Unioned per ADVISORY, not compared per comment. Comparing whole sets looks
* equivalent and is not: a run that posts `[B]` and then fails before rewriting
* the marker leaves the next run computing `[B, C]`, which matches no existing
* comment, and `B` is announced a second time (Copilot). Individual GHSAs are
* what a comment actually claims to have announced.
*/
function announcedAdvisories(repo, number, spawn) {
const issue = ghJson(spawn, [
"issue",
"view",
String(number),
"--repo",
repo,
"--json",
"comments",
]);
const announced = new Set();
for (const comment of issue?.comments ?? []) {
for (const ghsa of parseCommentMarker(comment.body) ?? []) {
announced.add(ghsa);
}
}
return announced;
}
function currentMilestone(repo, spawn) {
const result = gh(spawn, ["api", `repos/${repo}/milestones?state=open`]);
if (result.status !== 0) {
throw new Error(`milestone lookup failed: ${(result.stderr ?? "").trim()}`);
}
return pickMilestone(JSON.parse(result.stdout || "[]"));
}
/**
* Resolve a single-select option id by NAME.
*
* Option ids are regenerated whenever the field's option list is edited, so
* looking them up each run is what keeps an unrelated board edit from turning
* into a silently mis-set field here.
*/
function optionId(fieldName, optionName, token, spawn) {
const result = gh(
spawn,
[
"project",
"field-list",
"28",
"--owner",
"modelcontextprotocol",
"--format",
"json",
],
{ token },
);
if (result.status !== 0) {
throw new Error(`field-list failed: ${(result.stderr ?? "").trim()}`);
}
const field = JSON.parse(result.stdout).fields.find(
(f) => f.name === fieldName,
);
const option = field?.options?.find((o) => o.name === optionName);
if (!option) {
throw new Error(
`no ${fieldName} option named "${optionName}" on board #28`,
);
}
return option.id;
}
/**
* Put the issue on board #28 at Todo / High.
*
* Failing to add the card at all is benign — the issue is already labeled and
* milestoned, which is enough for the next `/issue-triage` sweep to board it
* (its documented exception moves an unboarded-but-milestoned issue straight
* into Todo). That is why an org-project PAT is an optimization here rather
* than a prerequisite.
*
* ⚠️ **Failing PART WAY through is not benign**, and the two cases must not be
* reported the same way (Copilot). Once `item-add` succeeds the issue IS
* boarded, so no later triage sweep will look at it — a failed field edit
* leaves a card sitting on the board with no Status or no Priority, in exactly
* the state nothing else will fix. So a partial placement is returned to the
* caller, which finishes every remaining group and then fails the run.
*
* Todo rather than Incoming: arriving through this pipeline IS the approval.
*
* @returns {string | null} a description of a PARTIAL placement, else `null`
*/
function addToBoard(issueUrl, spawn) {
const token = process.env.PROJECT_TOKEN;
if (!token) {
console.log(
"dependabot-alerts: PROJECT_TOKEN unset — issue left unboarded for the next triage sweep",
);
return null;
}
let itemId;
try {
const added = gh(
spawn,
[
"project",
"item-add",
"28",
"--owner",
"modelcontextprotocol",
"--url",
issueUrl,
"--format",
"json",
],
{ token },
);
if (added.status !== 0) throw new Error((added.stderr ?? "").trim());
itemId = JSON.parse(added.stdout).id;
} catch (error) {
// Nothing was added, so the issue is simply unboarded — recoverable.
console.log(
`dependabot-alerts: board add failed (${error.message}) — issue is labeled and milestoned, next triage sweep will board it`,
);
return null;
}
// Each item-edit sets exactly one field, so Status and Priority are two calls.
for (const [fieldId, fieldName, optionName] of [
[STATUS_FIELD_ID, "Status", BOARD_STATUS],
[PRIORITY_FIELD_ID, "Priority", BOARD_PRIORITY],
]) {
try {
const edit = gh(
spawn,
[
"project",
"item-edit",
"--project-id",
PROJECT_ID,
"--id",
itemId,
"--field-id",
fieldId,
"--single-select-option-id",
optionId(fieldName, optionName, token, spawn),
],
{ token },
);
if (edit.status !== 0) throw new Error((edit.stderr ?? "").trim());
} catch (error) {
return `${issueUrl} is on board #28 but its ${fieldName} was not set (${error.message}) — no triage sweep will fix this, set it by hand`;
}
}
console.log(
`dependabot-alerts: boarded ${issueUrl} at ${BOARD_STATUS}/${BOARD_PRIORITY}`,
);
return null;
}
/**
* @returns {{url: string, milestone: string | null}}
*/
function createIssue(repo, group, body, spawn) {
const milestone = currentMilestone(repo, spawn);
const args = [
"issue",
"create",
"--repo",
repo,
"--title",
buildIssueTitle(group),
"--label",
"v2",
"--label",
"chore",
"--label",
"dependabot",
"--body",
body,
];
if (milestone) args.push("--milestone", milestone);
const result = gh(spawn, args);
if (result.status !== 0) {
throw new Error(`gh issue create failed: ${(result.stderr ?? "").trim()}`);
}
const url = result.stdout.trim();
console.log(`dependabot-alerts: filed ${url}`);
return { url, milestone };
}
export function main(
repo = process.env.GITHUB_REPOSITORY,
spawn = spawnSync,
today = new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10),
) {
if (!repo) throw new Error("repo not specified (GITHUB_REPOSITORY unset)");
const securityPrsOff = checkSecurityPrsStillDisabled(repo, spawn);
const alerts = openAlerts(repo, spawn);
const groups = groupAlerts(alerts);
// ⚠️ Loaded BEFORE the zero-group early return, and reconciled after the loop.
// `openAlerts` asks for `state=open`, so an alert that is FIXED or DISMISSED
// simply vanishes from the feed — its group is never built, the loop never
// visits it, and the issue it produced would keep asserting a vulnerability
// with a live Todo/High card forever (Copilot). The disappearance is the
// signal, so it has to be read from the issues rather than from the alerts.
const existingIssues = openDependabotIssues(repo, spawn).map((issue) => ({
...issue,
marker: parseMarker(issue.body),
}));
const manifests = new Map();
const boardProblems = [];
/**
* Rewrite an issue to its cleared state, at most once.
*
* The date is taken from the body already there when there is one, so a
* cleared issue — which stays open, and so is seen again tomorrow — does not
* get re-edited every day for a date change alone.
*/
const writeCleared = (issue, group, reason) => {
const priorDate = parseClearedDate(issue.body);
const ghsas = issue.marker.ghsas;
if (
priorDate &&
issue.body ===
buildClearedBody(group, { ghsas, reason, today: priorDate })
) {
return;
}
const body = buildClearedBody(group, { ghsas, reason, today });
const edit = gh(spawn, [
"issue",
"edit",
String(issue.number),
"--repo",
repo,
"--body",
body,
]);
if (edit.status !== 0) {
throw new Error(`gh issue edit failed: ${(edit.stderr ?? "").trim()}`);
}
console.log(`dependabot-alerts: cleared #${issue.number} — ${reason}`);
};
/** Grouping keys this run actually saw in the open feed. */
const seenKeys = new Set();
/**
* Every open `(package, manifest, GHSA)`, taken from the RAW feed rather
* than from `groups`.
*
* ⚠️ `groupAlerts` deliberately drops an alert with no `first_patched_version`
* — there is nothing to bump to, so nothing to file. Building this set from
* the groups would inherit that filter, so an advisory that stays open but
* LOSES its patched version would vanish from both the keys and this set, and
* reconciliation would call it "fixed or dismissed" (Copilot). Same wrong
* direction as the superseded case, reached a different way: what a still-open
* advisory must never do is stand itself down.
*/
/**
* What this run actually established about each `(package, manifest, GHSA)`.
*
* ⚠️ Recorded DURING the loop, not derived from `groups` beforehand. Being in
* a group only means an alert exists; whether an issue tracks it is decided
* by the ecosystem check, the manifest read and the range probe that follow
* (Copilot). Reading "is it in a group?" as "does it have an issue?" would
* clear an old issue as superseded while its replacement was skipped.
*
* - `tracked` — an issue for it exists after this run.
* - `not-exposed` — probed, and nothing installed is in range.
* - `indeterminate` — could not be probed at all this run.
*
* Absent means no group carried it, i.e. no bump is available for it.
*
* @type {Map<string, "tracked" | "not-exposed" | "indeterminate">}
*/
const disposition = new Map();
const note = (group, ghsas, value) => {
for (const ghsa of ghsas) {
disposition.set(
advisoryKey(group.package, group.manifestPath, ghsa),
value,
);
}
};
const openAdvisories = new Set(
alerts
.filter((a) => a.state === "open")
.map((a) =>
a.dependency?.package?.name &&
a.dependency?.manifest_path &&
a.security_advisory?.ghsa_id
? advisoryKey(
a.dependency.package.name,
a.dependency.manifest_path,
a.security_advisory.ghsa_id,
)
: null,
)
.filter(Boolean),
);
for (const rawGroup of groups) {
seenKeys.add(rawGroup.key);
if (rawGroup.ecosystem !== SUPPORTED_ECOSYSTEM) {
// Loud, not silent: nothing else will file this, so a human has to.
console.log(
`dependabot-alerts: ${rawGroup.package} (${rawGroup.ecosystem}, ${rawGroup.manifestPath}) is not an npm dependency — this sweep cannot file it, raise it by hand: ${rawGroup.ghsas.join(", ")}`,
);
note(rawGroup, rawGroup.ghsas, "indeterminate");
continue;
}
// ⚠️ Resolved BEFORE the skips below, not after. An issue filed yesterday
// is still open today, and if the manifest has since gone or every copy has
// moved out of range, skipping straight past it leaves its body asserting a
// vulnerability that no longer exists and its Todo/High card live forever
// (Copilot). Matched on the full grouping key, `fixedIn` included: a second
// bump of the same package is a different issue, not an update to this one.
const existing = existingIssues.find(
(i) =>
i.marker?.package === rawGroup.package &&
i.marker?.manifestPath === rawGroup.manifestPath &&
i.marker?.fixedIn === rawGroup.fixedIn,
);
/** Rewrite an open issue to its cleared state, once. */
const clear = (reason) => {
if (!existing) return;
writeCleared(existing, rawGroup, reason);
};
if (!manifests.has(rawGroup.manifestPath)) {
manifests.set(rawGroup.manifestPath, readManifest(rawGroup.manifestPath));
}
const manifest = manifests.get(rawGroup.manifestPath);
if (manifest.unparseable) {
// Deliberately does NOT clear: a read error is not evidence that the
// exposure went away, and treating it as such stands down a live alert.
console.log(
`dependabot-alerts: ${rawGroup.manifestPath} could not be parsed as an npm lockfile — skipping ${rawGroup.package} WITHOUT clearing its issue`,
);
note(rawGroup, rawGroup.ghsas, "indeterminate");
continue;
}
if (manifest.absent) {
console.log(
`dependabot-alerts: ${rawGroup.manifestPath} absent on ${TARGET_BRANCH} — skipping ${rawGroup.package}`,
);
note(rawGroup, rawGroup.ghsas, "not-exposed");
clear(`\`${rawGroup.manifestPath}\` is no longer part of this repo`);
continue;
}
const { lock } = manifest;
const entries = lockfileEntries(lock, rawGroup.package);
const applicable = narrowToApplicable(rawGroup, entries);
if (applicable === null) {
const seen = [...new Set(entries.map((e) => e.version))];
console.log(
`dependabot-alerts: ${rawGroup.package}@${seen.join("/") || "(absent)"} is already out of range on ${TARGET_BRANCH} — skipping`,
);
note(rawGroup, rawGroup.ghsas, "not-exposed");
clear(
seen.length > 0
? `every installed copy is out of range (${seen.map((v) => `\`${v}\``).join(", ")})`
: "the package is no longer installed at all",
);
continue;
}
// From here on `group` carries only the advisories that apply to this
// branch, so the marker, title, severity and table cannot overstate it.
const { group, affected } = applicable;
// The narrowing dropped advisories whose range no longer matches: those are
// probed-and-clear, the survivors get an issue.
note(
rawGroup,
rawGroup.ghsas.filter((g) => !group.ghsas.includes(g)),
"not-exposed",
);
note(group, group.ghsas, "tracked");
const declared = isDirectDependency(lock, group.package);
if (!existing) {
const { url, milestone } = createIssue(
repo,
group,
buildIssueBody(group, { affected, declared, securityPrsOff }),
spawn,
);
// `Incoming` <=> no milestone, everything past it <=> milestoned. With no
// open milestone to assign there is nothing to put the card past Incoming
// WITH, so boarding it at Todo would assert an approval the invariant
// reads off the milestone (Copilot). Leave it for triage instead.
if (!milestone) {
console.log(
"dependabot-alerts: no open milestone — issue filed unmilestoned and unboarded, next triage sweep places it",
);
continue;
}
const problem = addToBoard(url, spawn);
if (problem) boardProblems.push(problem);
continue;
}
const { merged, added } = mergeGhsas(existing.marker.ghsas, group.ghsas);
const title = buildIssueTitle(group);
const body = buildIssueBody(group, {
affected,
declared,
ghsas: merged,
securityPrsOff,
});
// ⚠️ "Nothing NEW" is not the same as "nothing CHANGED" (Copilot). An issue
// filed for A+B whose branch has since moved so only B applies has no added
// GHSAs, yet its table, severity, affected copies and remediation are all
// stale. So the no-op is decided by comparing the rendered issue, not by
// counting additions — while a COMMENT stays reserved for advisories that
// are genuinely new.
if (
added.length === 0 &&
existing.title === title &&
existing.body === body
) {
console.log(
`dependabot-alerts: #${existing.number} is up to date for ${group.package} — no-op`,
);
continue;
}
// ⚠️ Comment FIRST, then rewrite the marker. The marker is the idempotency
// key, so editing it first and failing on the comment would make the next
// run take the no-op branch above and skip the comment permanently
// (Copilot). In this order the worst case is a repeat, and the comment's
// own marker rules that out too.
const announced = announcedAdvisories(repo, existing.number, spawn);
const unannounced = added.filter((ghsa) => !announced.has(ghsa));
if (unannounced.length > 0) {
const comment = gh(spawn, [
"issue",
"comment",
String(existing.number),
"--repo",
repo,
"--body",
buildNewAdvisoryComment(group, unannounced),
]);
if (comment.status !== 0) {
throw new Error(
`gh issue comment failed: ${(comment.stderr ?? "").trim()}`,
);
}
}
const edit = gh(spawn, [
"issue",
"edit",
String(existing.number),
"--repo",
repo,
"--title",
title,
"--body",
body,
]);
if (edit.status !== 0) {
throw new Error(`gh issue edit failed: ${(edit.stderr ?? "").trim()}`);
}
console.log(
added.length > 0
? `dependabot-alerts: added ${added.join(", ")} to #${existing.number}`
: `dependabot-alerts: refreshed #${existing.number} for ${group.package}`,
);
}
// Any marked issue whose bump is no longer in the open feed at all: its last
// alert was fixed or dismissed, so there is nothing left to bump.
for (const issue of existingIssues) {
if (!issue.marker) continue;
const key = groupKey(
issue.marker.package,
issue.marker.manifestPath,
issue.marker.fixedIn,
);
if (seenKeys.has(key)) continue;
// ⚠️ A vanished KEY is not the same as a closed ADVISORY. GitHub can revise
// an alert's `first_patched_version`, which moves it to a different key
// while the GHSA stays open — reporting that as "fixed or dismissed" would
// stand down a live exposure (Copilot). So the reason is decided by whether
// the GHSAs are still in the open feed, not by the key's absence.
const key3 = (ghsa) =>
advisoryKey(issue.marker.package, issue.marker.manifestPath, ghsa);
const stillOpen = issue.marker.ghsas.filter((g) =>
openAdvisories.has(key3(g)),
);
// ⚠️ Clearing needs positive evidence about every advisory still open here.
// Two things deny it, and both mean "leave the issue alone" (Copilot):
// an advisory this run could not probe (`indeterminate` — a non-npm
// manifest, or one that would not parse), and one no group carried at all
// (absent — `groupAlerts` drops an alert with no `first_patched_version`,
// so there is nothing to bump to and no replacement issue).
const unresolved = stillOpen.filter((g) => {
const state = disposition.get(key3(g));
return state === undefined || state === "indeterminate";
});
if (unresolved.length > 0) {
console.log(
`dependabot-alerts: #${issue.number} left as is — ${unresolved.join(", ")} ${unresolved.length === 1 ? "is" : "are"} still open and this run could not establish a replacement`,
);
continue;
}
const tracked = stillOpen.filter(
(g) => disposition.get(key3(g)) === "tracked",
);
const reason =
stillOpen.length === 0
? "every alert it tracked has been fixed or dismissed"
: tracked.length > 0
? `this bump was superseded — ${tracked.map((g) => `\`${g}\``).join(", ")} ${tracked.length === 1 ? "is" : "are"} still open under a different patched version, and ${tracked.length === 1 ? "has" : "have"} their own issue`
: "no installed copy is in range of its advisories any more";
writeCleared(
issue,
{
package: issue.marker.package,
manifestPath: issue.marker.manifestPath,
fixedIn: issue.marker.fixedIn,
},
reason,
);
}
if (groups.length === 0) {
console.log("dependabot-alerts: no open alerts");
}
// Every group is processed before this throws: a half-placed card is worth
// failing the run over, but not at the cost of the issues still unfiled.
if (boardProblems.length > 0) {
throw new Error(
`dependabot-alerts: incomplete board placement —\n ${boardProblems.join("\n ")}`,
);
}
}
if (import.meta.url === `file://${process.argv[1]}`) {
main();
}