* fix(auth): offer explicit re-authorize when callback state is lost (#1808) A `/oauth/callback` that arrives with no recorded SEP-2352 discovery state made the SDK throw `AuthorizationServerMismatchError` and the Inspector dead-ended, surfacing the raw SDK text with no path forward. The SDK folds two very different failures into that one error class, so `core/auth/issuerBinding.ts` classifies them structurally: a recoverable "lost authorization state" (the SDK puts prose, not an issuer URL, in the `recordedIssuer` slot) versus a genuine cross-AS `issuer_mismatch`. Only the first gets a recovery affordance. Web: the callback failure now raises a dedicated banner ("Authorization state was lost" / "Authorize again") whose action clears the stale OAuth state for that server and starts a fresh authorization. A genuine mismatch stays a red, non-dismissible security notification with both issuers named and no one-click retry. Node runners (CLI/TUI): the same classification rewrites the callback rejection into the shared actionable copy instead of the SDK text. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt * fix(auth): detect the SDK mismatch error via isInstance (#1808) The callback-leg classifier gated on `err.mcpBrand`, but the SDK declares that brand in a `static {}` block, so it lives on the constructor and is never reachable from an instance. The predicate always returned false, so `findIssuerBindingFailure()` never matched and the #1808 recovery banner was inert in production — the callback dead-ended exactly as before. Use the SDK's own `AuthorizationServerMismatchError.isInstance()`, which is cross-copy safe by construction (it consults a `Symbol.for()`-keyed brand set), with a `name` fallback for a serialization boundary. Correct the module doc, which cited cross-bundle safety as the reason to avoid `instanceof` — the very thing the SDK's branded `hasInstance` provides. Every fixture now constructs a real `AuthorizationServerMismatchError` instead of a hand-rolled object with an own `mcpBrand`, which is why a green `npm run ci` hid this. Adds a test pinning the brand's placement so the feature cannot silently go inert again. Review follow-ups: drop the unused `isLostAuthorizationStateError`, remove the duplicated banner title default, resolve the banner title/action label where the banner is raised, keep the clear-failure notification open, and bound remote-supplied issuers in user-facing copy. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
331 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
331 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
import type { AuthChallenge } from "./challenge.js";
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import type { IssuerBindingFailure } from "./issuerBinding.js";
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export type OAuthInteractiveAuthKind = "step_up" | "reauth";
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/** Origin of an interactive OAuth recovery flow (command, ambient, connect, etc.). */
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export type OAuthRecoverySource =
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| "tool"
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| "prompt"
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| "resource"
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| "ambient"
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| "app";
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export function isActionTriggeredOAuthRecovery(
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source: OAuthRecoverySource | undefined,
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): boolean {
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return (
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source === "tool" ||
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source === "prompt" ||
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source === "resource" ||
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source === "app"
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);
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}
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export function oauthResumeSuccessMessage(
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authKind: OAuthInteractiveAuthKind,
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options?: { recoverySource?: OAuthRecoverySource },
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): string {
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const retry = isActionTriggeredOAuthRecovery(options?.recoverySource);
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if (authKind === "step_up") {
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return retry
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? "Step-up authorization succeeded. Retry your action."
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: "Step-up authorization succeeded.";
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}
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return retry
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? "Authentication succeeded. Retry your action."
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: "Authentication succeeded.";
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}
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export function authRecoveryRestoredMessage(options?: {
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recoverySource?: OAuthRecoverySource;
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}): string {
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const retry = isActionTriggeredOAuthRecovery(options?.recoverySource);
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return retry
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? "Session credentials were updated. Retry your action."
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: "Session credentials were updated.";
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}
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export function oauthResumeAbandonedMessage(
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authKind: OAuthInteractiveAuthKind,
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options?: { recoverySource?: OAuthRecoverySource },
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): string {
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if (authKind === "reauth") {
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return "Sign-in was not completed. Re-authenticate to restore access.";
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}
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return isActionTriggeredOAuthRecovery(options?.recoverySource)
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? "Step-up authorization was not completed. Retry your action."
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: "Step-up authorization was not completed.";
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}
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/** Standard-OAuth step-up (not EMA silent re-mint). */
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export function isStandardOAuthStepUp(
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challenge: AuthChallenge,
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options?: { enterpriseManaged?: boolean },
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): boolean {
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return (
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challenge.reason === "insufficient_scope" && !options?.enterpriseManaged
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);
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}
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/** EMA step-up (`insufficient_scope` on an enterprise-managed server). */
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export function isEmaStepUp(
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challenge: AuthChallenge,
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options?: { enterpriseManaged?: boolean },
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): boolean {
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return (
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challenge.reason === "insufficient_scope" &&
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options?.enterpriseManaged === true
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);
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}
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/** Any step-up that should show the Inspector confirmation modal before proceeding. */
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export function isStepUpConfirmation(
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challenge: AuthChallenge,
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options?: { enterpriseManaged?: boolean },
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): boolean {
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return (
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isStandardOAuthStepUp(challenge, options) || isEmaStepUp(challenge, options)
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);
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}
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export function stepUpConfirmMessage(
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challenge: AuthChallenge,
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options?: { enterpriseManaged?: boolean },
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): string {
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const toolName = challenge.context?.toolName?.trim();
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if (toolName) {
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return options?.enterpriseManaged
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? `Tool "${toolName}" needs additional permissions from your organization before it can continue.`
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: `Tool "${toolName}" needs additional OAuth scopes before it can continue.`;
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}
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const additional = challenge.requiredScopes?.filter(Boolean);
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if (additional?.length) {
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const label = additional.length === 1 ? "scope" : "scopes";
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return options?.enterpriseManaged
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? `This operation needs additional organization ${label}: ${additional.join(", ")}.`
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: `This operation needs additional ${label}: ${additional.join(", ")}.`;
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}
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return options?.enterpriseManaged
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? "This operation needs additional permissions from your organization before it can continue."
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: "This operation needs additional OAuth scopes before it can continue.";
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}
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/** Body copy below the step-up summary (what happens on Authorize). */
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export function stepUpFollowUpMessage(options?: {
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enterpriseManaged?: boolean;
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}): string {
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return options?.enterpriseManaged
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? "Inspector will request the additional permissions from your enterprise identity provider. You may be asked to sign in if your organization session expired."
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: "You will be redirected to authorize, then returned to the inspector.";
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}
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/** Step-up confirm action label (e.g. TUI menu item). EMA re-mints in-process when possible. */
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export function stepUpAuthorizeActionLabel(options?: {
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enterpriseManaged?: boolean;
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}): string {
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return options?.enterpriseManaged ? "Authorize" : "Authorize (opens browser)";
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}
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export function stepUpModalTitle(options?: {
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enterpriseManaged?: boolean;
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}): string {
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return options?.enterpriseManaged
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? "Additional organization permissions required"
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: "Additional permissions required";
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}
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/** Toast while EMA step-up is in progress after user confirms. */
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export function emaStepUpInProgressMessage(): string {
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return "Requesting additional permissions from your organization…";
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}
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/** Toast when EMA step-up completes successfully. */
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export function emaStepUpSuccessMessage(options?: {
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recoverySource?: OAuthRecoverySource;
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}): string {
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const retry = isActionTriggeredOAuthRecovery(options?.recoverySource);
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return retry
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? "Organization permissions were updated. Retry your action."
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: "Organization permissions were updated.";
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}
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/** Toast when EMA step-up fails after user confirmation. */
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export function emaStepUpFailureMessage(detail?: string): string {
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return detail?.trim()
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? detail
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: "Could not obtain the additional permissions from your organization.";
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}
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/** Scopes the current operation still lacks (from the resource-server challenge). */
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export function stepUpAdditionalScopes(challenge: AuthChallenge): string[] {
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return challenge.requiredScopes?.filter(Boolean) ?? [];
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}
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export function stepUpInsufficientScopeMessage(
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challenge: AuthChallenge,
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): string {
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const toolName = challenge.context?.toolName?.trim();
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if (toolName) {
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return `Authorization completed, but required permissions for tool "${toolName}" were not granted. Grant the requested scopes on the authorization server, then retry.`;
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}
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const missing =
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challenge.authorizationScopes?.filter(Boolean) ??
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challenge.requiredScopes?.filter(Boolean);
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if (missing?.length) {
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return `Authorization completed, but required scopes were not granted (${missing.join(", ")}). Grant the requested permissions on the authorization server, then retry your action.`;
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}
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return "Authorization completed, but the required permissions were not granted. Grant the requested scopes on the authorization server, then retry your action.";
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}
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export type OAuthPreRedirectContext = "connect" | "session_recovery";
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/** Pre-redirect toast copy for interactive OAuth. */
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export function oauthPreRedirectToastCopy(
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authKind: OAuthInteractiveAuthKind,
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options: {
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serverName?: string;
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enterpriseManaged?: boolean;
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/** Fresh connect handshake — no existing session to recover. */
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context?: OAuthPreRedirectContext;
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},
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): { title: string; message: string } | undefined {
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if (options.context === "connect") {
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return undefined;
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}
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const name = options.serverName;
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if (authKind === "step_up") {
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return {
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title: name
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? `Step-up authorization for "${name}"`
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: "Step-up authorization",
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message: "Redirecting to authorize additional permissions…",
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};
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}
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if (options.enterpriseManaged) {
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return {
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title: name ? `Re-authenticating "${name}"` : "Re-authenticating",
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message: "Re-authenticating…",
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};
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}
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return {
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title: name ? `Session expired for "${name}"` : "Session expired",
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message: "Session expired, re-authenticating…",
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};
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}
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/** Challenge reasons that warrant a persistent re-auth banner (degraded session). */
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export function isReAuthBannerReason(
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reason: AuthChallenge["reason"] | undefined,
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): boolean {
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return (
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reason === "token_expired" ||
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reason === "unauthorized" ||
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reason === "invalid_token"
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);
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}
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/** Banner/alert heading when the recorded authorization state was lost. */
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export function lostAuthorizationStateTitle(): string {
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return "Authorization state was lost";
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}
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/**
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* Plain-language explanation for a callback that arrived with no recorded
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* discovery state (SEP-2352). Deliberately does not surface the SDK's
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* `AuthorizationServerMismatchError` text — that wording reads like a security
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* failure, and this case is ordinary bookkeeping loss.
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*/
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export function lostAuthorizationStateMessage(options?: {
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serverName?: string;
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}): string {
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const target = options?.serverName
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? `"${options.serverName}"`
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: "this server";
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return (
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`The stored authorization state for ${target} was lost before the ` +
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"authorization server sent you back, so the sign-in could not be " +
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"completed. This usually means a new browser session, a different tab, or " +
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"authorization state that was cleared while the flow was in progress. " +
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"Authorize again to reconnect."
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);
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}
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/** Action label for the lost-authorization-state recovery affordance. */
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export function lostAuthorizationStateActionLabel(): string {
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return "Authorize again";
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}
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/** Heading for a genuine cross-authorization-server mismatch (a security signal). */
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export function issuerMismatchTitle(): string {
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return "Authorization server mismatch";
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}
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/**
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* Longest issuer we will echo back into user-facing copy.
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*
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* `currentIssuer` is remote-supplied (it comes from the configured server's AS
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* metadata), so an overlong value could be used to abuse the notification
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* layout. Rendering is escaped, so this is a presentation bound, not an
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* injection defence.
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*/
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const MAX_DISPLAYED_ISSUER_LENGTH = 120;
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/** Bound an issuer for display, marking any truncation. */
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export function truncateIssuerForDisplay(issuer: string): string {
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return issuer.length > MAX_DISPLAYED_ISSUER_LENGTH
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? `${issuer.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAYED_ISSUER_LENGTH)}…`
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: issuer;
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}
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/**
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* Copy for a genuine SEP-2352 issuer mismatch. This is *not* offered a
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* one-click recovery: the authorization code and PKCE verifier are bound to the
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* server that minted them, and a different server answering the callback is a
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* credential-exfiltration signal the user must investigate.
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*/
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export function issuerMismatchMessage(options: {
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recordedIssuer: string;
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currentIssuer: string;
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serverName?: string;
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}): string {
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const target = options.serverName ? `"${options.serverName}"` : "this server";
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return (
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`Authorization for ${target} was stopped: the flow started at ` +
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`${truncateIssuerForDisplay(options.recordedIssuer)} but the callback ` +
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`resolved ${truncateIssuerForDisplay(options.currentIssuer)}. ` +
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"The authorization code was not exchanged. " +
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"Verify the server's authorization configuration before trying again."
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);
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}
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/** Title + message for a callback-leg issuer-binding failure. */
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export function issuerBindingFailureCopy(
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failure: IssuerBindingFailure,
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options?: { serverName?: string },
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): { title: string; message: string } {
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if (failure.kind === "lost_authorization_state") {
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return {
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title: lostAuthorizationStateTitle(),
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message: lostAuthorizationStateMessage(options),
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};
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}
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return {
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title: issuerMismatchTitle(),
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message: issuerMismatchMessage({
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recordedIssuer: failure.recordedIssuer,
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currentIssuer: failure.currentIssuer,
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serverName: options?.serverName,
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}),
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};
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}
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export function reAuthBannerMessage(options: {
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serverName?: string;
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detail?: string;
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}): string {
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const prefix = options.serverName
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? `Authentication for "${options.serverName}" needs attention.`
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: "Authentication needs attention.";
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return options.detail ? `${prefix} ${options.detail}` : prefix;
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}
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