Four findings, all suppressed, all real. Three are the same mistake in
different places: a state that was never established being reported as a
confident answer.
- **`readOnDiskEncryption` conflated "no file" with "unreadable file".**
Both answered `null`, and the descriptor falls back to the configured
write policy on `null` — so a passphrase-configured install reported
"File (encrypted)" about a file whose envelope had never parsed, and
which `set` was in fact about to refuse rather than overwrite. It now
returns a four-state result, and only `absent` falls back to the policy
(honestly: the first write really will create it that way). `unreadable`
produces `encryptionUnknown` on the descriptor, `plaintext` is omitted
entirely so nothing can read a default out of it, and the label, caveat,
tone and footer all carry "unreadable" rather than guessing a mode.
- **The loose-mode warning overstated exposure for an encrypted file.**
"Anyone who can read it can read the secrets in it" is false when the
file is ciphertext — a reader gets the bytes and still needs the
passphrase. Both the caveat and the footer tooltip now branch on
encryption: the passphrase becomes the only protection, which is the
real consequence. Overstating it is not harmless, because a warning that
cries wolf is discounted on the occasion it is literally true.
- **The keychain hand-off could invert its own keychain-wins rule.**
`SecretStore.get` answers `null` both for a missing entry and for a
keychain it could not read, and the migration *writes* on `null` — so a
transient read failure would overwrite a newer keychain value with the
older file copy. Added an optional `getStrict` (throws instead of
swallowing) implemented by `KeyringSecretStore`, with
`secretStoreGetStrict` falling back to `get` for stores whose reads
cannot fail. A throw now aborts the hand-off with the file left in
place, so the next run retries.
Writing the tests turned up one more, in code the review had passed:
`parseOwner` recorded a garbled pid as `-1`, and `process.kill(-1, 0)` is
a *wildcard* asking about every process this user can signal — it answers
"alive" almost always, which would have made a lock with a corrupt stamp
permanently unstealable. Only a positive pid is usable now; anything else
is treated as no pid at all and the mtime decides.
Tests: the four envelope states kept distinct; the descriptor refusing to
guess, with the genuine no-file case as the control; strict-read abort
without a write and with the file preserved, plus a store whose `get` and
`getStrict` disagree so the test proves which one the migration consults;
encryption-aware wording asserted in both directions in the caveat and the
band; three unusable owner stamps and a wildcard pid; and the descriptor
shapes that must now be rejected — neither half of the encryption question
answered, or both. Full `npm run ci` green — 5,750 tests under the
coverage gate.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
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