inspector/core/react/useInitialConfig.ts
cliffhall fdeffa1f00 fix(auth): address Copilot review round 6 on the secret-store PR
Four findings, all suppressed, all real. Three are the same mistake in
different places: a state that was never established being reported as a
confident answer.

- **`readOnDiskEncryption` conflated "no file" with "unreadable file".**
  Both answered `null`, and the descriptor falls back to the configured
  write policy on `null` — so a passphrase-configured install reported
  "File (encrypted)" about a file whose envelope had never parsed, and
  which `set` was in fact about to refuse rather than overwrite. It now
  returns a four-state result, and only `absent` falls back to the policy
  (honestly: the first write really will create it that way). `unreadable`
  produces `encryptionUnknown` on the descriptor, `plaintext` is omitted
  entirely so nothing can read a default out of it, and the label, caveat,
  tone and footer all carry "unreadable" rather than guessing a mode.

- **The loose-mode warning overstated exposure for an encrypted file.**
  "Anyone who can read it can read the secrets in it" is false when the
  file is ciphertext — a reader gets the bytes and still needs the
  passphrase. Both the caveat and the footer tooltip now branch on
  encryption: the passphrase becomes the only protection, which is the
  real consequence. Overstating it is not harmless, because a warning that
  cries wolf is discounted on the occasion it is literally true.

- **The keychain hand-off could invert its own keychain-wins rule.**
  `SecretStore.get` answers `null` both for a missing entry and for a
  keychain it could not read, and the migration *writes* on `null` — so a
  transient read failure would overwrite a newer keychain value with the
  older file copy. Added an optional `getStrict` (throws instead of
  swallowing) implemented by `KeyringSecretStore`, with
  `secretStoreGetStrict` falling back to `get` for stores whose reads
  cannot fail. A throw now aborts the hand-off with the file left in
  place, so the next run retries.

Writing the tests turned up one more, in code the review had passed:
`parseOwner` recorded a garbled pid as `-1`, and `process.kill(-1, 0)` is
a *wildcard* asking about every process this user can signal — it answers
"alive" almost always, which would have made a lock with a corrupt stamp
permanently unstealable. Only a positive pid is usable now; anything else
is treated as no pid at all and the mtime decides.

Tests: the four envelope states kept distinct; the descriptor refusing to
guess, with the genuine no-file case as the control; strict-read abort
without a write and with the file preserved, plus a store whose `get` and
`getStrict` disagree so the test proves which one the migration consults;
encryption-aware wording asserted in both directions in the caveat and the
band; three unusable owner stamps and a wildcard pid; and the descriptor
shapes that must now be rejected — neither half of the encryption question
answered, or both. Full `npm run ci` green — 5,750 tests under the
coverage gate.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-22 14:40:29 -04:00

211 lines
8.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* React hook over the `GET /api/config` endpoint — the single fetch of the
* static `InitialConfigPayload` the dev/prod web backends serve alongside the
* SPA (see `core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts`). It exposes the three fields the
* web app reads off that payload:
*
* - `sandboxUrl` — the MCP Apps sandbox proxy URL. The backend mounts
* `sandbox_proxy.html` on a separate controller port and advertises the URL
* here; the Apps screen embeds it as the trusted outer iframe. `undefined`
* until the fetch resolves, and whenever the backend omits it (legacy backend,
* or a build without the sandbox controller) — callers treat that as "Apps
* unavailable" rather than a blank iframe.
* - `writable` — whether the session's server list is a writable catalog or a
* read-only session (`--config` / ad-hoc `--server-url`). Defaults to `true`
* until the fetch resolves and whenever the field is absent (a legacy backend
* predating the flag), so the default catalog keeps full CRUD.
* - `version` — the Inspector version the backend reads from the root
* `package.json` (the browser can't read it off disk). `undefined` until the
* fetch resolves, and whenever the backend omits it (legacy backend) — the UI
* renders nothing then.
* - `secretStorage` — which store this session's secrets go to (#1950),
* resolved on the Node side where the keychain probe happens. `undefined`
* until the fetch resolves and on a backend that omits it; the settings-modal
* footers render nothing then, because a guessed answer under a secret field
* is worse than no answer.
*
* This consolidates the three former single-field hooks (`useSandboxUrl`,
* `useServerListWritable`, `useInspectorVersion`), each of which fetched the
* same static payload separately, into one request (#1643).
*
* Fetches on mount, and re-fetches if `baseUrl` or `authToken` changes (rare —
* effectively a full reload; the GET is idempotent). A response that resolves
* after unmount or a re-fetch is dropped rather than overwriting current state.
*/
import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from "react";
import type { SecretStorageInfo } from "../auth/secret-storage-info.js";
export interface UseInitialConfigOptions {
/** Base URL of the remote server (typically `window.location.origin`). */
baseUrl: string;
/** Optional auth token for the `x-mcp-remote-auth` header. */
authToken?: string;
/** Fetch function to use (default: globalThis.fetch). Useful in tests. */
fetchFn?: typeof fetch;
}
export interface UseInitialConfigResult {
/** The Inspector version, or undefined when unavailable / not yet loaded. */
version: string | undefined;
/** The sandbox proxy URL, or undefined when unavailable / not yet loaded. */
sandboxUrl: string | undefined;
/** Whether the server list is writable (catalog) or read-only (session). */
writable: boolean;
/** Where this session's secrets are stored, or undefined when unknown. */
secretStorage: SecretStorageInfo | undefined;
/** True while the initial fetch is in flight. */
loading: boolean;
}
/** Minimal shape we read from the `/api/config` payload. */
interface ConfigPayload {
version?: unknown;
sandboxUrl?: unknown;
writable?: unknown;
secretStorage?: unknown;
}
/**
* Narrow the payload's `secretStorage` before trusting it.
*
* The footer states, in the UI, where a user's secret is about to go, so a
* malformed or partial descriptor must render as "unknown" rather than as a
* confident half-answer.
*
* Every field the footer reads is checked, not just `kind`. A partial
* `{ kind: "file" }` would otherwise pass, and because a missing `plaintext`
* is falsy it would render as the quiet, neutral *encrypted* file — the
* single most misleading thing this component can say, produced by the
* absence of information rather than by any claim the backend made. Each
* kind's own required fields are checked for the same reason: a file store
* with no `path` cannot answer the question a file store exists to answer.
*/
function usableSecretStorage(value: unknown): SecretStorageInfo | undefined {
if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null) return undefined;
const v = value as Record<string, unknown>;
if (v.kind !== "keyring" && v.kind !== "file" && v.kind !== "memory") {
return undefined;
}
if (
v.reason !== "configured" &&
v.reason !== "default" &&
v.reason !== "fallback"
) {
return undefined;
}
if (typeof v.durable !== "boolean") return undefined;
if (v.kind === "file") {
if (typeof v.path !== "string" || v.path === "") return undefined;
// Exactly one of the two must be present: either we know the encryption
// state, or we know we could not read it. A descriptor carrying neither
// (or both) was not built by a backend we understand, and the footer
// would have to invent the missing half.
const knowsEncryption = typeof v.plaintext === "boolean";
const knowsItCannotRead = typeof v.encryptionUnknown === "string";
if (knowsEncryption === knowsItCannotRead) return undefined;
if (v.encryptionUnknown !== undefined && !knowsItCannotRead) {
return undefined;
}
// Optional, so absent is fine — but a *present* value must be a real
// boolean. `pendingEncryption: "false"` is a truthy string, and the
// footer would read it as "already re-encrypting" and print advice that
// is the opposite of the truth.
if (
v.pendingEncryption !== undefined &&
typeof v.pendingEncryption !== "boolean"
) {
return undefined;
}
if (v.looseMode !== undefined && typeof v.looseMode !== "number") {
return undefined;
}
if (
v.permissionsUnknown !== undefined &&
typeof v.permissionsUnknown !== "string"
) {
return undefined;
}
} else if (
// File-only fields on a keychain or memory descriptor mean the payload
// was not built by a backend we understand. Rejecting is cheap and the
// alternative is rendering a mixture of two stores' answers.
v.path !== undefined ||
v.plaintext !== undefined ||
v.pendingEncryption !== undefined ||
v.looseMode !== undefined ||
v.permissionsUnknown !== undefined ||
v.encryptionUnknown !== undefined
) {
return undefined;
}
return value as SecretStorageInfo;
}
/** Coerce a payload field to a usable non-empty string, else undefined. */
function usableString(value: unknown): string | undefined {
return typeof value === "string" && value ? value : undefined;
}
export function useInitialConfig(
opts: UseInitialConfigOptions,
): UseInitialConfigResult {
const { baseUrl, authToken, fetchFn } = opts;
const doFetch = fetchFn ?? globalThis.fetch;
const base = baseUrl.replace(/\/$/, "");
const [version, setVersion] = useState<string | undefined>(undefined);
const [sandboxUrl, setSandboxUrl] = useState<string | undefined>(undefined);
// Default writable so the common (catalog) case shows CRUD immediately and a
// legacy backend that omits the field keeps working.
const [writable, setWritable] = useState<boolean>(true);
const [secretStorage, setSecretStorage] = useState<
SecretStorageInfo | undefined
>(undefined);
const [loading, setLoading] = useState<boolean>(true);
// `isCancelled` lets the effect drop a response that resolves after unmount or
// after a re-run (baseUrl/authToken change), so a stale payload can't overwrite
// current state. React 18 no longer warns on setState-after-unmount — it's a
// silent no-op — so the guard is about correctness, not the warning.
const load = useCallback(
async (isCancelled: () => boolean): Promise<void> => {
const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
if (authToken) headers["x-mcp-remote-auth"] = `Bearer ${authToken}`;
try {
const res = await doFetch(`${base}/api/config`, {
method: "GET",
headers,
});
if (isCancelled() || !res.ok) return;
const body = (await res.json()) as ConfigPayload;
if (isCancelled()) return;
// Tolerate missing/non-usable fields — a legacy backend that omits any
// of them leaves that value at its "unavailable" default rather than
// showing a bogus value.
setVersion(usableString(body.version));
setSandboxUrl(usableString(body.sandboxUrl));
// Only an explicit `false` makes the list read-only; a missing field
// (legacy backend) stays writable.
setWritable(body.writable !== false);
setSecretStorage(usableSecretStorage(body.secretStorage));
} catch {
// Network error / aborted fetch: leave every field at its default
// (version/sandboxUrl undefined, writable true).
} finally {
if (!isCancelled()) setLoading(false);
}
},
[base, authToken, doFetch],
);
useEffect(() => {
let cancelled = false;
void load(() => cancelled);
return () => {
cancelled = true;
};
}, [load]);
return { version, sandboxUrl, writable, secretStorage, loading };
}