feat: RFC 6570 URI templates with operator-aware security (#2356)

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Max 2026-06-26 20:29:17 +02:00 • committed by GitHub
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@ -9,6 +9,152 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel
from mcp.server.mcpserver import Context, MCPServer
from mcp.server.mcpserver.exceptions import ResourceError
from mcp.server.mcpserver.resources import FunctionResource, ResourceTemplate
from mcp.server.mcpserver.resources.templates import (
DEFAULT_RESOURCE_SECURITY,
ResourceSecurity,
ResourceSecurityError,
)
def _make(uri_template: str, security: ResourceSecurity = DEFAULT_RESOURCE_SECURITY) -> ResourceTemplate:
def handler(**kwargs: Any) -> str:
raise NotImplementedError # these tests only exercise matches()
return ResourceTemplate.from_function(fn=handler, uri_template=uri_template, security=security)
def test_matches_rfc6570_reserved_expansion():
# {+path} allows / — the feature the old regex implementation couldn't support
t = _make("file://docs/{+path}")
assert t.matches("file://docs/src/main.py") == {"path": "src/main.py"}
def test_matches_rejects_encoded_slash_traversal():
# %2F decodes to / in UriTemplate.match(), giving "../../etc/passwd".
# ResourceSecurity's traversal check then rejects the '..' components.
t = _make("file://docs/{name}")
with pytest.raises(ResourceSecurityError, match="'name'"):
t.matches("file://docs/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd")
def test_matches_rejects_path_traversal_by_default():
t = _make("file://docs/{name}")
with pytest.raises(ResourceSecurityError):
t.matches("file://docs/..")
def test_matches_rejects_path_traversal_in_reserved_var():
# Even {+path} gets the traversal check — it's semantic, not structural
t = _make("file://docs/{+path}")
with pytest.raises(ResourceSecurityError):
t.matches("file://docs/../../etc/passwd")
def test_matches_rejects_absolute_path():
t = _make("file://docs/{+path}")
with pytest.raises(ResourceSecurityError):
t.matches("file://docs//etc/passwd")
def test_matches_allows_dotdot_as_substring():
# .. is only dangerous as a path component
t = _make("git://refs/{range}")
assert t.matches("git://refs/v1.0..v2.0") == {"range": "v1.0..v2.0"}
def test_matches_exempt_params_skip_security():
policy = ResourceSecurity(exempt_params={"range"})
t = _make("git://diff/{+range}", security=policy)
assert t.matches("git://diff/../foo") == {"range": "../foo"}
def test_matches_disabled_policy_allows_traversal():
policy = ResourceSecurity(reject_path_traversal=False, reject_absolute_paths=False)
t = _make("file://docs/{name}", security=policy)
assert t.matches("file://docs/..") == {"name": ".."}
def test_matches_rejects_null_byte_by_default():
# %00 decodes to \x00 which defeats string comparisons
# ("..\x00" != "..") and can truncate in C extensions.
t = _make("file://docs/{name}")
with pytest.raises(ResourceSecurityError):
t.matches("file://docs/key%00.txt")
# Null byte also defeats the traversal check's component comparison
with pytest.raises(ResourceSecurityError):
t.matches("file://docs/..%00%2Fsecret")
def test_matches_null_byte_check_can_be_disabled():
policy = ResourceSecurity(reject_null_bytes=False)
t = _make("file://docs/{name}", security=policy)
assert t.matches("file://docs/key%00.txt") == {"name": "key\x00.txt"}
def test_security_rejection_does_not_fall_through_to_next_template():
# A strict template's security rejection must halt iteration, not
# fall through to a later permissive template. Previously matches()
# returned None for both "no match" and "security failed", making
# registration order security-critical.
strict = _make("file://docs/{name}")
lax = _make(
"file://docs/{+path}",
security=ResourceSecurity(exempt_params={"path"}),
)
uri = "file://docs/..%2Fsecrets"
# Strict matches structurally then fails security -> raises.
with pytest.raises(ResourceSecurityError) as exc:
strict.matches(uri)
assert exc.value.param == "name"
# If this raised, the resource manager never reaches the lax
# template. Verify the lax template WOULD have accepted it.
assert lax.matches(uri) == {"path": "../secrets"}
def test_matches_explode_checks_each_segment():
t = _make("api{/parts*}")
assert t.matches("api/a/b/c") == {"parts": ["a", "b", "c"]}
# Any segment with traversal rejects the whole match
with pytest.raises(ResourceSecurityError):
t.matches("api/a/../c")
def test_matches_encoded_backslash_caught_by_traversal_check():
# %5C decodes to '\\'. The traversal check normalizes '\\' to '/'
# and catches the '..' components.
t = _make("file://docs/{name}")
with pytest.raises(ResourceSecurityError):
t.matches("file://docs/..%5C..%5Csecret")
def test_matches_encoded_dots_caught_by_traversal_check():
# %2E%2E decodes to '..' which the traversal check rejects.
t = _make("file://docs/{name}")
with pytest.raises(ResourceSecurityError):
t.matches("file://docs/%2E%2E")
def test_matches_mixed_encoded_and_literal_slash():
# The literal '/' stops the simple-var regex, so the URI doesn't
# match the template at all.
t = _make("file://docs/{name}")
assert t.matches("file://docs/..%2F../etc") is None
def test_matches_encoded_slash_without_traversal_allowed():
# %2F decoding to '/' is fine when there's no traversal involved.
# UriTemplate accepts it; ResourceSecurity only blocks '..' and
# absolute paths. Handlers that need single-segment should use
# safe_join or validate explicitly.
t = _make("file://docs/{name}")
assert t.matches("file://docs/sub%2Ffile.txt") == {"name": "sub/file.txt"}
def test_matches_escapes_template_literals():
# Regression: old impl treated . as regex wildcard
t = _make("data://v1.0/{id}")
assert t.matches("data://v1.0/42") == {"id": "42"}
assert t.matches("data://v1X0/42") is None
class TestResourceTemplate: