ci: add strict-no-cover to detect unnecessary coverage pragmas (#1897)

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Max Isbey 2026-01-23 20:00:20 +00:00 • committed by GitHub
commit a7ddfdae07
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2 changed files with 355 additions and 358 deletions

View file

@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ class TokenHandler:
except TokenError as e:
return self.response(TokenErrorResponse(error=e.error, error_description=e.error_description))
case RefreshTokenRequest(): # pragma: no cover
case RefreshTokenRequest(): # pragma: no branch
refresh_token = await self.provider.load_refresh_token(client_info, token_request.refresh_token)
if refresh_token is None or refresh_token.client_id != token_request.client_id:
# if token belongs to different client, pretend it doesn't exist

View file

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ from mcp.shared.auth import OAuthClientInformationFull
class AuthenticationError(Exception):
def __init__(self, message: str):
self.message = message # pragma: no cover
self.message = message
class ClientAuthenticator:
@ -96,15 +96,15 @@ class ClientAuthenticator:
# If client from the store expects a secret, validate that the request provides
# that secret
if client.client_secret: # pragma: no branch
if client.client_secret:
if not request_client_secret:
raise AuthenticationError("Client secret is required") # pragma: no cover
raise AuthenticationError("Client secret is required")
# hmac.compare_digest requires that both arguments are either bytes or a `str` containing
# only ASCII characters. Since we do not control `request_client_secret`, we encode both
# arguments to bytes.
if not hmac.compare_digest(client.client_secret.encode(), request_client_secret.encode()):
raise AuthenticationError("Invalid client_secret") # pragma: no cover
raise AuthenticationError("Invalid client_secret")
if client.client_secret_expires_at and client.client_secret_expires_at < int(time.time()):
raise AuthenticationError("Client secret has expired") # pragma: no cover