security: fix open redirect and add small hardening (#1227)
## What this does Fixes an open redirect plus a handful of small, mostly-invisible hardening changes around it. ## What's in it - **The fix**: trailing-slash redirects no longer let `//evil.com/` redirect off-host. - **SSRF block** on the DNS/HTTP namespace verification — refuses to dial loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or IP-literal/single-label \"domains\". - **Slow-client guard**: `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` on the HTTP server (no `WriteTimeout` — would risk cutting off legitimate multi-package publishes). - **Defence-in-depth headers** on the UI (`/`) and 404 responses. - **5xx responses** stop leaking raw DB error text to clients (logged server-side instead). - **Search filter** stops treating `%` and `_` as wildcards. - **Validators**: PyPI/NuGet identifiers URL-escaped before fetching; MCPB no longer follows redirects. - **Misc**: `Version` field bounded to 255 chars; logs quote user input; `BlockedNamespaces` denylist now catches subdomain claimants. Each change is its own commit so they can be reviewed (or reverted) independently. ## Test plan - [ ] CI green - [ ] Synthetic publish in staging for each package type (npm, pypi, nuget, oci, mcpb) — confirms validator changes don't regress - [ ] Quick browser check of `/` after deploy to confirm UI still loads with the new CSP - [ ] `curl https://<host>//evil.com/` — confirm the open redirect is closed 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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1 changed files with 330 additions and 48 deletions
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"math/big"
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"net"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"time"
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@ -376,6 +377,18 @@ func IsValidDomain(domain string) bool {
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return false
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}
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// Reject IP literals — this auth method proves domain ownership, not IP
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// ownership, and IP literals are an SSRF vector into internal networks.
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if net.ParseIP(domain) != nil {
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return false
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}
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// Require at least one dot — rejects single-label names like "localhost"
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// or "kubernetes" that resolve only inside private networks.
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if !strings.Contains(domain, ".") {
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return false
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}
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// Check for valid characters and structure
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domainPattern := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?(\.[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?)*$`)
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return domainPattern.MatchString(domain)
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