security: fix open redirect and add small hardening (#1227)

## What this does

Fixes an open redirect plus a handful of small, mostly-invisible
hardening changes around it.

## What's in it

- **The fix**: trailing-slash redirects no longer let `//evil.com/`
redirect off-host.
- **SSRF block** on the DNS/HTTP namespace verification — refuses to
dial loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or
IP-literal/single-label \"domains\".
- **Slow-client guard**: `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` on the HTTP
server (no `WriteTimeout` — would risk cutting off legitimate
multi-package publishes).
- **Defence-in-depth headers** on the UI (`/`) and 404 responses.
- **5xx responses** stop leaking raw DB error text to clients (logged
server-side instead).
- **Search filter** stops treating `%` and `_` as wildcards.
- **Validators**: PyPI/NuGet identifiers URL-escaped before fetching;
MCPB no longer follows redirects.
- **Misc**: `Version` field bounded to 255 chars; logs quote user input;
`BlockedNamespaces` denylist now catches subdomain claimants.

Each change is its own commit so they can be reviewed (or reverted)
independently.

## Test plan

- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Synthetic publish in staging for each package type (npm, pypi,
nuget, oci, mcpb) — confirms validator changes don't regress
- [ ] Quick browser check of `/` after deploy to confirm UI still loads
with the new CSP
- [ ] `curl https://<host>//evil.com/` — confirm the open redirect is
closed

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Radoslav Dimitrov 2026-04-29 19:14:00 -04:00 • committed by GitHub
commit 1201cbd82b
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"net"
"regexp"
"strings"
"time"
@ -376,6 +377,18 @@ func IsValidDomain(domain string) bool {
return false
}
// Reject IP literals — this auth method proves domain ownership, not IP
// ownership, and IP literals are an SSRF vector into internal networks.
if net.ParseIP(domain) != nil {
return false
}
// Require at least one dot — rejects single-label names like "localhost"
// or "kubernetes" that resolve only inside private networks.
if !strings.Contains(domain, ".") {
return false
}
// Check for valid characters and structure
domainPattern := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?(\.[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?)*$`)
return domainPattern.MatchString(domain)