security: fix open redirect and add small hardening (#1227)
## What this does Fixes an open redirect plus a handful of small, mostly-invisible hardening changes around it. ## What's in it - **The fix**: trailing-slash redirects no longer let `//evil.com/` redirect off-host. - **SSRF block** on the DNS/HTTP namespace verification — refuses to dial loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or IP-literal/single-label \"domains\". - **Slow-client guard**: `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` on the HTTP server (no `WriteTimeout` — would risk cutting off legitimate multi-package publishes). - **Defence-in-depth headers** on the UI (`/`) and 404 responses. - **5xx responses** stop leaking raw DB error text to clients (logged server-side instead). - **Search filter** stops treating `%` and `_` as wildcards. - **Validators**: PyPI/NuGet identifiers URL-escaped before fetching; MCPB no longer follows redirects. - **Misc**: `Version` field bounded to 255 chars; logs quote user input; `BlockedNamespaces` denylist now catches subdomain claimants. Each change is its own commit so they can be reviewed (or reverted) independently. ## Test plan - [ ] CI green - [ ] Synthetic publish in staging for each package type (npm, pypi, nuget, oci, mcpb) — confirms validator changes don't regress - [ ] Quick browser check of `/` after deploy to confirm UI still loads with the new CSP - [ ] `curl https://<host>//evil.com/` — confirm the open redirect is closed 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
f7663fe91a
commit
1201cbd82b
1 changed files with 330 additions and 48 deletions
52
internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/http_internal_test.go
Normal file
52
internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/http_internal_test.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
|||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestIsBlockedIP(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
tests := []struct {
|
||||
ip string
|
||||
blocked bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
// Blocked — loopback
|
||||
{"127.0.0.1", true},
|
||||
{"::1", true},
|
||||
// Blocked — RFC1918 / ULA (IsPrivate)
|
||||
{"10.0.0.1", true},
|
||||
{"172.16.0.1", true},
|
||||
{"192.168.1.1", true},
|
||||
{"fc00::1", true},
|
||||
// Blocked — link-local (includes cloud metadata 169.254.169.254)
|
||||
{"169.254.169.254", true},
|
||||
{"fe80::1", true},
|
||||
// Blocked — unspecified
|
||||
{"0.0.0.0", true},
|
||||
{"::", true},
|
||||
// Blocked — admin-scoped and broader multicast
|
||||
{"239.0.0.1", true},
|
||||
{"ff00::1", true},
|
||||
// Blocked — Carrier-Grade NAT (RFC 6598)
|
||||
{"100.64.0.1", true},
|
||||
{"100.127.255.254", true},
|
||||
// Allowed — public
|
||||
{"1.1.1.1", false},
|
||||
{"8.8.8.8", false},
|
||||
{"2606:4700:4700::1111", false},
|
||||
// Allowed — outside CGNAT range
|
||||
{"100.63.255.255", false},
|
||||
{"100.128.0.1", false},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tc := range tests {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.ip, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ip := net.ParseIP(tc.ip)
|
||||
if ip == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("ParseIP(%q) returned nil", tc.ip)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := isBlockedIP(ip); got != tc.blocked {
|
||||
t.Errorf("isBlockedIP(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.ip, got, tc.blocked)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue