fix(auth): reject github.io domains in DNS/HTTP token exchange (org namespace takeover) (#1506)
## Summary - The GitHub token method grants `io.github.<org>/*` publish rights **only to org Owners** (active `admin` membership — `github_at.go`). - The DNS/HTTP token methods grant `reversed(domain)/*` for any proven domain, with no `github.io` special-casing and an empty `BlockedNamespaces` list. - `<org>.github.io` is served by GitHub Pages from the `<org>/<org>.github.io` repository. **Push access to that one repository** — routinely held by ordinary org members, a much weaker bar than Owner — is enough to serve a key at `/.well-known/mcp-registry-auth`, exchange it for a JWT, and publish under the org's entire `io.github.<org>/*` namespace. - Reject `github.io` (and subdomains) at the shared `ValidateDomainAndTimestamp` seam used by both DNS and HTTP exchange; `io.github.*` publishers already have the GitHub method. ## Impact if unsolved Any org member with write access to the org's GitHub Pages repo (or an attacker compromising such a member) can mint MCP packages under the org's trusted namespace — supply-chain poisoning of every downstream user who installs `<org>`'s servers from the registry, bypassing the deliberate Owner-only gate. ## Test plan - New `TestValidateDomainAndTimestampRejectsGitHubPages`: rejects `my-org.github.io` (incl. mixed case and subdomains), still allows lookalikes (`github.io.evil-example.com`, `my-org.github.io.example.com`) and ordinary domains. - Full `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth` package passes. Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com) Signed-off-by: SashaMIT <sash@ela.city> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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2 changed files with 49 additions and 0 deletions
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@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ func ValidateDomainAndTimestamp(domain, timestamp string) (*time.Time, error) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid domain format")
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}
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if isGitHubPagesDomain(domain) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf(
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"github.io domains cannot be used with DNS/HTTP authentication; " +
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"use GitHub authentication for io.github.* namespaces")
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}
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ts, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, timestamp)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid timestamp format: %w", err)
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@ -382,6 +388,18 @@ func ReverseString(domain string) string {
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return strings.Join(parts, ".")
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}
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// isGitHubPagesDomain reports whether domain is github.io or a subdomain of it.
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// GitHub Pages serves <name>.github.io from the <name>/<name>.github.io repository,
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// so the HTTP proof only demonstrates push access to that one repository. For an
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// organization that is a far weaker bar than the org-Owner ("admin") check the
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// GitHub authentication method enforces for io.github.<org>/* namespaces — accepting
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// the proof here would let any member with write access to the Pages repo mint the
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// whole org namespace. Users of io.github.* namespaces authenticate via GitHub.
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func isGitHubPagesDomain(domain string) bool {
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d := strings.ToLower(domain)
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return d == "github.io" || strings.HasSuffix(d, ".github.io")
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}
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func IsValidDomain(domain string) bool {
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if len(domain) == 0 || len(domain) > 253 {
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return false
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@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package auth_test
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import (
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/api/handlers/v0/auth"
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)
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@ -47,3 +48,33 @@ func TestIsValidDomain(t *testing.T) {
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})
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}
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}
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func TestValidateDomainAndTimestampRejectsGitHubPages(t *testing.T) {
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timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
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tests := []struct {
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domain string
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wantError bool
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}{
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// GitHub Pages domains must not mint io.github.* namespaces via DNS/HTTP
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{"my-org.github.io", true},
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{"my-org.GitHub.IO", true},
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{"github.io", true},
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{"sub.my-org.github.io", true},
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// Lookalikes and ordinary domains stay allowed
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{"github.io.evil-example.com", false},
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{"example.com", false},
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{"my-org.github.io.example.com", false},
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}
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for _, tc := range tests {
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t.Run(tc.domain, func(t *testing.T) {
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_, err := auth.ValidateDomainAndTimestamp(tc.domain, timestamp)
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if tc.wantError && err == nil {
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t.Errorf("ValidateDomainAndTimestamp(%q) succeeded, want github.io rejection", tc.domain)
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}
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if !tc.wantError && err != nil {
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t.Errorf("ValidateDomainAndTimestamp(%q) failed: %v", tc.domain, err)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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