Enable Google KMS and Azure Key Vault for publisher login tool (#696)
<!-- Provide a brief summary of your changes --> ## Motivation and Context This allows the private key used for DNS or HTTP based authentication to be stored securely in a cloud key management system. These services often provide HSM storage which makes it very hard to leak the private key. The full context is described in my design document here: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/issues/482#issuecomment-3437117171 ## How Has This Been Tested? I have tested it against PROD using an Ed25519 key stored in Google KMS. I have added unit tests. I have tested both ECDSA P-384 and Ed25519 with Az KV and Google KMS against a locally running server. ## Breaking Changes None intended. ## Types of changes <!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all the boxes that apply: --> - [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue) - [x] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality) - [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change) - [x] Documentation update ## Checklist <!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes that apply. --> - [x] I have read the [MCP Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) - [x] My code follows the repository's style guidelines - [x] New and existing tests pass locally - [x] I have added appropriate error handling - [x] I have added or updated documentation as needed ## Additional context <!-- Add any other context, implementation notes, or design decisions --> --------- Co-authored-by: adam jones <domdomegg+git@gmail.com>
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1 changed files with 641 additions and 91 deletions
147
cmd/publisher/auth/googlekms/common.go
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147
cmd/publisher/auth/googlekms/common.go
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package googlekms
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/sha512"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/asn1"
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"encoding/pem"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"math/big"
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"os"
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kms "cloud.google.com/go/kms/apiv1"
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"cloud.google.com/go/kms/apiv1/kmspb"
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"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/cmd/publisher/auth"
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)
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// GetSignatureProvider validates inputs and returns a GoogleKMSSigner implementing auth.Signer.
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func GetSignatureProvider(resourceName string) (auth.Signer, error) {
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if resourceName == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("--resource is required, e.g. projects/my-project/locations/global/keyRings/fellowship/cryptoKeys/bilbo/cryptoKeyVersions/1")
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}
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return &Signer{
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resource: resourceName,
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}, nil
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}
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type Signer struct {
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resource string
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}
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type ecdsaSignature struct {
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R, S *big.Int
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}
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func derToRS(der []byte, curve elliptic.Curve) ([]byte, error) {
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var sig ecdsaSignature
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if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &sig); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid DER ECDSA signature: %w", err)
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}
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if sig.R == nil || sig.S == nil || sig.R.Sign() <= 0 || sig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid ECDSA signature components")
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}
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size := (curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
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rBytes := sig.R.Bytes()
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sBytes := sig.S.Bytes()
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if len(rBytes) > size || len(sBytes) > size {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("ECDSA signature component too large")
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}
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out := make([]byte, 2*size)
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copy(out[size-len(rBytes):size], rBytes)
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copy(out[2*size-len(sBytes):], sBytes)
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return out, nil
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}
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func (g *Signer) GetSignedTimestamp(ctx context.Context) (*string, []byte, error) {
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client, err := kms.NewKeyManagementClient(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create KMS client: %w", err)
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}
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defer client.Close()
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// Fetch public key (PEM) so we can output expected proof record.
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algo, err := g.showPublicKeyAndGetAlgorithm(ctx, client)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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timestamp := auth.GetTimestamp()
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stdout, "Executing the sign request...")
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switch algo {
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case auth.AlgorithmEd25519:
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signReq := &kmspb.AsymmetricSignRequest{
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Name: g.resource,
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Data: []byte(timestamp),
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}
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signResp, err := client.AsymmetricSign(ctx, signReq)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign with KMS: %w", err)
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}
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return ×tamp, signResp.Signature, nil
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case auth.AlgorithmECDSAP384:
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digest := sha512.Sum384([]byte(timestamp))
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signReq := &kmspb.AsymmetricSignRequest{
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Name: g.resource,
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Digest: &kmspb.Digest{Digest: &kmspb.Digest_Sha384{Sha384: digest[:]}},
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}
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signResp, err := client.AsymmetricSign(ctx, signReq)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign with KMS: %w", err)
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}
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sigBytes, err := derToRS(signResp.Signature, elliptic.P384())
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to convert DER signature: %w", err)
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}
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return ×tamp, sigBytes, nil
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}
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported algorithm: %s", algo)
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}
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func (g *Signer) showPublicKeyAndGetAlgorithm(ctx context.Context, client *kms.KeyManagementClient) (auth.CryptoAlgorithm, error) {
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pubResp, err := client.GetPublicKey(ctx, &kmspb.GetPublicKeyRequest{Name: g.resource})
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get public key: %w", err)
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}
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block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(pubResp.Pem))
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if block == nil {
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return "", errors.New("failed to decode PEM public key from KMS")
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}
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parsed, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(block.Bytes)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse public key: %w", err)
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}
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switch pubResp.Algorithm { //nolint:exhaustive
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case kmspb.CryptoKeyVersion_EC_SIGN_ED25519:
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pk, ok := parsed.(ed25519.PublicKey)
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if !ok {
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return "", errors.New("KMS reported ED25519 but parsed key is different type")
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}
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auth.PrintEd25519KeyInfo(pk)
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return auth.AlgorithmEd25519, nil
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case kmspb.CryptoKeyVersion_EC_SIGN_P384_SHA384:
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pk, ok := parsed.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
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if !ok || pk.Curve != elliptic.P384() {
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return "", errors.New("KMS reported P-384 but parsed key mismatch")
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}
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auth.PrintEcdsaP384KeyInfo(*pk)
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return auth.AlgorithmECDSAP384, nil
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default:
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return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported KMS key algorithm: %s", pubResp.Algorithm.String())
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}
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}
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