docs(auth): document fine-grained PAT permission for org publishing (+ pagination-cap test) (#1435)

Follow-up to #1383, surfaced while validating that change end-to-end
against staging.

## Why

#1383 hardened org-namespace publishing to require Owner (`admin`) role,
read via `GET /user/memberships/orgs`. Validating on staging revealed a
gap: the docs only mention the classic `read:org` scope, but a
**fine-grained PAT** (GitHub's recommended token type) needs a
*different* permission to expose org membership. Without it, GitHub
returns no org memberships for the token, so the exchange silently
grants only the personal namespace — with no hint why org publishing
"doesn't work."

This is **not** a code bug (the behavior is fail-closed and correct
given GitHub's response); it's a documentation/UX gap.

## What

- **Docs** (`authentication.mdx`, `github-actions.mdx`): spell out both
token types —
  - Classic PAT → `read:org` scope
- Fine-grained PAT → **Organization permissions → Members → Read-only**
(the equivalent), noting a fine-grained PAT is bound to a single
resource owner.
  - Also clarified `read:user` is not required.
- **Test** (`github_at_test.go`): cover the `maxOrgMembershipPages`
pagination cap — when every page is full, the exchange **fails closed**
(no token) rather than returning a possibly-truncated org grant. This
path was previously untested.
- **Comment** (`github_at.go`): qualify the `X-GitHub-SSO` 403 check as
best-effort — we have not confirmed the memberships *list* endpoint
emits that header on SSO enforcement (it may just omit the org). The
check is safe either way, but the comment no longer overstates it as a
guarantee.

## Verification (live, against staging)

Confirmed by exchanging real tokens for `rdimitrov` on
`staging.registry.modelcontextprotocol.io`:

- **Classic `read:org` PAT** across 16 real org memberships → the JWT
granted exactly the 8 **admin** orgs + personal namespace, and **zero**
of the 8 **member** orgs (incl. `stacklok`, `modelcontextprotocol`) —
the core #1383 behavior, working.
- **Fine-grained PAT**: without Members:read → personal namespace only
(fail-closed); after adding Members:read → the org (Owner) namespace is
granted. This is what the new docs describe.

No runtime behavior change here beyond the added test; the docs and
comment are the substance.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/modelcontextprotocol-io/authentication.mdx

@@ -53,7 +53,12 @@ GitHub authentication always grants your personal namespace, `io.github.<your-us
 
 To publish under an **organization** namespace (`io.github.<orgname>/*`), you must be an **Owner** of that organization. Ordinary org membership is no longer sufficient: the registry checks your membership role and only grants the org namespace to admins. This prevents anyone who merely belongs to an org from publishing — or overwriting — servers under the org's name.
 
-If you authenticate with a Personal Access Token (for example in CI), the token must include the `read:org` scope for the registry to see your organization role. A token without `read:org` can still publish to your personal namespace, but org publishing will be silently unavailable. The token needs **no** repository scopes — the registry never reads or writes your code.
+If you authenticate with a Personal Access Token (for example in CI), the token must let the registry read your organization role. A token that can't will still publish to your personal namespace, but org publishing will be silently unavailable. The exact requirement depends on the token type:
+
+- **Classic PAT**: grant the `read:org` scope.
+- **Fine-grained PAT**: grant the **Organization permissions → Members → Read-only** permission (the fine-grained equivalent of `read:org`). Without it, GitHub returns no organization membership for the token and you'll get your personal namespace only. Note that a fine-grained PAT is bound to a single resource owner, so it can only see the organization it was created for.
+
+Either way the token needs **no** repository scopes — the registry never reads or writes your code.
 
 ## DNS Authentication
 

docs/modelcontextprotocol-io/github-actions.mdx

@@ -199,7 +199,11 @@ jobs:
 You may need to add a secret depending on which authentication method you choose:
 
 - **GitHub OIDC Authentication**: No dedicated secret necessary.
-- **GitHub PAT Authentication**: Add a `MCP_GITHUB_TOKEN` secret with a GitHub Personal Access Token (PAT) that has the `read:org` scope. `read:org` is what lets the registry confirm you are an **Owner** of the organization before granting its namespace; the token needs **no** repository scopes (the registry never reads or writes your code), and no other scopes are required — `read:user` is not needed, and a bare token still authenticates and publishes to your personal namespace. For an **organization** token, store it as an **Environment secret** on the `mcp-registry-publish` environment rather than a plain repository secret — see "Securing your registry token in CI" below for why this matters and how to configure the environment.
+- **GitHub PAT Authentication**: Add a `MCP_GITHUB_TOKEN` secret with a GitHub Personal Access Token. The registry only needs to read your organization role to confirm you are an **Owner** before granting its namespace, so grant the minimum for that and **no** repository scopes (the registry never reads or writes your code):
+  - **Classic PAT**: the `read:org` scope (`read:user` is *not* needed; a bare token still authenticates and publishes to your personal namespace).
+  - **Fine-grained PAT**: the **Organization permissions → Members → Read-only** permission (the equivalent of `read:org`). Without it you'll get your personal namespace only. A fine-grained PAT is scoped to one resource owner, so create it for the organization you're publishing to.
+
+  For an **organization** token, store it as an **Environment secret** on the `mcp-registry-publish` environment rather than a plain repository secret — see "Securing your registry token in CI" below for why this matters and how to configure the environment.
 - **DNS Authentication**: Add a `MCP_PRIVATE_KEY` secret with your Ed25519 private key.
 
 You may also need to add secrets for your package registry. For example, the workflow above needs an `NPM_TOKEN` secret with your npm token.

internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_at.go

@@ -255,10 +255,15 @@ func (h *GitHubHandler) fetchOrgMembershipsPage(ctx context.Context, token strin
 		if resp.Header.Get("X-RateLimit-Remaining") == "0" || resp.Header.Get("Retry-After") != "" {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("GitHub API rate limit exceeded while listing org memberships (status 403): %s", readErrorBody(resp.Body))
 		}
-		// A SAML/SSO-enforced org returns 403 with an X-GitHub-SSO header when the
-		// token has not been SSO-authorized. That is an Owner being blocked, not a
-		// missing scope, so fail closed rather than silently dropping the org grant
-		// (which would degrade a legitimate Owner to personal-only with no signal).
+		// Best-effort defense: GitHub uses the X-GitHub-SSO header to signal that a
+		// resource is behind SAML/SSO the token hasn't been authorized for. If we see
+		// it, treat that as an Owner being blocked (not a missing scope) and fail
+		// closed rather than silently degrading them to personal-only. NOTE: we have
+		// not confirmed that the memberships *list* endpoint emits this header on SSO
+		// enforcement (it may instead just omit the SSO-protected org); this check is
+		// safe either way — if the header is absent we fall through to the same
+		// graceful degrade as before — but it is not a proven guarantee that every
+		// SSO-blocked Owner is caught here.
 		if resp.Header.Get("X-GitHub-SSO") != "" {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("GitHub org memberships require SSO authorization for this token (status 403): %s", readErrorBody(resp.Body))
 		}

internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_at_test.go

@@ -665,6 +665,34 @@ func TestGitHubHandler_ExchangeToken_403FailClosed(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 
+func TestGitHubHandler_ExchangeToken_PaginationCap(t *testing.T) {
+	testSeed := make([]byte, ed25519.SeedSize)
+	_, err := rand.Read(testSeed)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	cfg := &config.Config{JWTPrivateKey: hex.EncodeToString(testSeed)}
+
+	t.Run("all-full pages past the cap fails closed", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Every page comes back full (100), so the loop never sees a short final page
+		// and runs to maxOrgMembershipPages. Rather than return a possibly-truncated
+		// org set, the exchange must fail closed (error, no token).
+		server := newMockGitHubServer(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			page := make([]orgMembership, 0, 100)
+			for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
+				page = append(page, orgMembership{
+					State: "active", Role: "member",
+					Organization: v0auth.GitHubUserOrOrg{Login: fmt.Sprintf("org-%d", i), ID: i},
+				})
+			}
+			w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+			json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(page) //nolint:errcheck
+		})
+		defer server.Close()
+
+		assertExchangeFailsClosed(t, cfg, server)
+	})
+}
+
 func TestJWTTokenValidation(t *testing.T) {
 	testSeed := make([]byte, ed25519.SeedSize)
 	_, err := rand.Read(testSeed)