registry/cmd/publisher/auth/googlekms/common.go
Joel Verhagen 88c2e1be16
Enable Google KMS and Azure Key Vault for publisher login tool (#696)
<!-- Provide a brief summary of your changes -->

## Motivation and Context

This allows the private key used for DNS or HTTP based authentication to
be stored securely in a cloud key management system. These services
often provide HSM storage which makes it very hard to leak the private
key.

The full context is described in my design document here:

https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/issues/482#issuecomment-3437117171

## How Has This Been Tested?

I have tested it against PROD using an Ed25519 key stored in Google KMS.
I have added unit tests. I have tested both ECDSA P-384 and Ed25519 with
Az KV and Google KMS against a locally running server.

## Breaking Changes

None intended.

## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [x] Documentation update

## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [x] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [x] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [x] New and existing tests pass locally
- [x] I have added appropriate error handling
- [x] I have added or updated documentation as needed

## Additional context
<!-- Add any other context, implementation notes, or design decisions
-->

---------

Co-authored-by: adam jones <domdomegg+git@gmail.com>
2025-10-29 13:23:20 +00:00

147 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

package googlekms
import (
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/sha512"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"os"
kms "cloud.google.com/go/kms/apiv1"
"cloud.google.com/go/kms/apiv1/kmspb"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/cmd/publisher/auth"
)
// GetSignatureProvider validates inputs and returns a GoogleKMSSigner implementing auth.Signer.
func GetSignatureProvider(resourceName string) (auth.Signer, error) {
if resourceName == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("--resource is required, e.g. projects/my-project/locations/global/keyRings/fellowship/cryptoKeys/bilbo/cryptoKeyVersions/1")
}
return &Signer{
resource: resourceName,
}, nil
}
type Signer struct {
resource string
}
type ecdsaSignature struct {
R, S *big.Int
}
func derToRS(der []byte, curve elliptic.Curve) ([]byte, error) {
var sig ecdsaSignature
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &sig); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid DER ECDSA signature: %w", err)
}
if sig.R == nil || sig.S == nil || sig.R.Sign() <= 0 || sig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid ECDSA signature components")
}
size := (curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
rBytes := sig.R.Bytes()
sBytes := sig.S.Bytes()
if len(rBytes) > size || len(sBytes) > size {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ECDSA signature component too large")
}
out := make([]byte, 2*size)
copy(out[size-len(rBytes):size], rBytes)
copy(out[2*size-len(sBytes):], sBytes)
return out, nil
}
func (g *Signer) GetSignedTimestamp(ctx context.Context) (*string, []byte, error) {
client, err := kms.NewKeyManagementClient(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create KMS client: %w", err)
}
defer client.Close()
// Fetch public key (PEM) so we can output expected proof record.
algo, err := g.showPublicKeyAndGetAlgorithm(ctx, client)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
timestamp := auth.GetTimestamp()
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stdout, "Executing the sign request...")
switch algo {
case auth.AlgorithmEd25519:
signReq := &kmspb.AsymmetricSignRequest{
Name: g.resource,
Data: []byte(timestamp),
}
signResp, err := client.AsymmetricSign(ctx, signReq)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign with KMS: %w", err)
}
return &timestamp, signResp.Signature, nil
case auth.AlgorithmECDSAP384:
digest := sha512.Sum384([]byte(timestamp))
signReq := &kmspb.AsymmetricSignRequest{
Name: g.resource,
Digest: &kmspb.Digest{Digest: &kmspb.Digest_Sha384{Sha384: digest[:]}},
}
signResp, err := client.AsymmetricSign(ctx, signReq)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign with KMS: %w", err)
}
sigBytes, err := derToRS(signResp.Signature, elliptic.P384())
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to convert DER signature: %w", err)
}
return &timestamp, sigBytes, nil
}
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported algorithm: %s", algo)
}
func (g *Signer) showPublicKeyAndGetAlgorithm(ctx context.Context, client *kms.KeyManagementClient) (auth.CryptoAlgorithm, error) {
pubResp, err := client.GetPublicKey(ctx, &kmspb.GetPublicKeyRequest{Name: g.resource})
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get public key: %w", err)
}
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(pubResp.Pem))
if block == nil {
return "", errors.New("failed to decode PEM public key from KMS")
}
parsed, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse public key: %w", err)
}
switch pubResp.Algorithm { //nolint:exhaustive
case kmspb.CryptoKeyVersion_EC_SIGN_ED25519:
pk, ok := parsed.(ed25519.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return "", errors.New("KMS reported ED25519 but parsed key is different type")
}
auth.PrintEd25519KeyInfo(pk)
return auth.AlgorithmEd25519, nil
case kmspb.CryptoKeyVersion_EC_SIGN_P384_SHA384:
pk, ok := parsed.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
if !ok || pk.Curve != elliptic.P384() {
return "", errors.New("KMS reported P-384 but parsed key mismatch")
}
auth.PrintEcdsaP384KeyInfo(*pk)
return auth.AlgorithmECDSAP384, nil
default:
return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported KMS key algorithm: %s", pubResp.Algorithm.String())
}
}