registry/internal/auth/jwt.go
Radoslav Dimitrov 1201cbd82b
security: fix open redirect and add small hardening (#1227)
## What this does

Fixes an open redirect plus a handful of small, mostly-invisible
hardening changes around it.

## What's in it

- **The fix**: trailing-slash redirects no longer let `//evil.com/`
redirect off-host.
- **SSRF block** on the DNS/HTTP namespace verification — refuses to
dial loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or
IP-literal/single-label \"domains\".
- **Slow-client guard**: `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` on the HTTP
server (no `WriteTimeout` — would risk cutting off legitimate
multi-package publishes).
- **Defence-in-depth headers** on the UI (`/`) and 404 responses.
- **5xx responses** stop leaking raw DB error text to clients (logged
server-side instead).
- **Search filter** stops treating `%` and `_` as wildcards.
- **Validators**: PyPI/NuGet identifiers URL-escaped before fetching;
MCPB no longer follows redirects.
- **Misc**: `Version` field bounded to 255 chars; logs quote user input;
`BlockedNamespaces` denylist now catches subdomain claimants.

Each change is its own commit so they can be reviewed (or reverted)
independently.

## Test plan

- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Synthetic publish in staging for each package type (npm, pypi,
nuget, oci, mcpb) — confirms validator changes don't regress
- [ ] Quick browser check of `/` after deploy to confirm UI still loads
with the new CSP
- [ ] `curl https://<host>//evil.com/` — confirm the open redirect is
closed

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 19:14:00 -04:00

173 lines
5.1 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"context"
"crypto/ed25519"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/config"
)
// PermissionAction represents the type of action that can be performed
type PermissionAction string
const (
PermissionActionPublish PermissionAction = "publish"
// PermissionActionEdit allows editing server configuration.
PermissionActionEdit PermissionAction = "edit"
)
type Permission struct {
Action PermissionAction `json:"action"` // The action type (publish or edit)
ResourcePattern string `json:"resource"` // e.g., "io.github.username/*"
}
// JWTClaims represents the claims for the Registry JWT token
type JWTClaims struct {
jwt.RegisteredClaims
// Authentication method used to obtain this token
AuthMethod Method `json:"auth_method"`
AuthMethodSubject string `json:"auth_method_sub"`
Permissions []Permission `json:"permissions"`
}
type TokenResponse struct {
RegistryToken string `json:"registry_token"`
ExpiresAt int `json:"expires_at"`
}
// JWTManager handles JWT token operations
type JWTManager struct {
privateKey ed25519.PrivateKey
publicKey ed25519.PublicKey
tokenDuration time.Duration
}
func NewJWTManager(cfg *config.Config) *JWTManager {
seed, err := hex.DecodeString(cfg.JWTPrivateKey)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("JWTPrivateKey must be a valid hex-encoded string: %v", err))
}
// Require a valid Ed25519 seed (32 bytes)
if len(seed) != ed25519.SeedSize {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("JWTPrivateKey seed must be exactly %d bytes for Ed25519, got %d bytes", ed25519.SeedSize, len(seed)))
}
// Generate the full Ed25519 key pair from the seed
privateKey := ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
publicKey := privateKey.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
return &JWTManager{
privateKey: privateKey,
publicKey: publicKey,
tokenDuration: 5 * time.Minute, // 5-minute tokens as per requirements
}
}
// GenerateToken generates a new Registry JWT token
func (j *JWTManager) GenerateTokenResponse(_ context.Context, claims JWTClaims) (*TokenResponse, error) {
// Check whether they have global permissions (used by admins)
hasGlobalPermissions := false
for _, perm := range claims.Permissions {
if perm.ResourcePattern == "*" {
hasGlobalPermissions = true
break
}
}
// Check permissions against denylist, provided they are not an admin.
// Probe two synthetic resources per blocked namespace so that both the
// slash-suffix patterns (e.g. com.evil/*) and the dot-wildcard patterns
// (e.g. com.evil.mailer.* — granted to a subdomain claimant) are
// detected. Probing only "<blocked>/test" misses the dot-wildcard form
// because the prefix match against "com.evil.mailer." does not start
// with "com.evil/test".
if !hasGlobalPermissions {
for _, blockedNamespace := range BlockedNamespaces {
if j.HasPermission(blockedNamespace+"/test", PermissionActionPublish, claims.Permissions) ||
j.HasPermission(blockedNamespace+".test/x", PermissionActionPublish, claims.Permissions) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("your namespace is blocked. raise an issue at https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/ if you think this is a mistake")
}
}
}
if claims.IssuedAt == nil {
claims.IssuedAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now())
}
if claims.ExpiresAt == nil {
claims.ExpiresAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(j.tokenDuration))
}
if claims.NotBefore == nil {
claims.NotBefore = jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now())
}
if claims.Issuer == "" {
claims.Issuer = "mcp-registry"
}
// Create token with claims
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(&jwt.SigningMethodEd25519{}, claims)
// Sign token with Ed25519 private key
tokenString, err := token.SignedString(j.privateKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign token: %w", err)
}
return &TokenResponse{
RegistryToken: tokenString,
ExpiresAt: int(claims.ExpiresAt.Unix()),
}, nil
}
// ValidateToken validates a Registry JWT token and returns the claims
func (j *JWTManager) ValidateToken(_ context.Context, tokenString string) (*JWTClaims, error) {
// Parse token
// This also validates expiry
token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(
tokenString,
&JWTClaims{},
func(_ *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { return j.publicKey, nil },
jwt.WithValidMethods([]string{"EdDSA"}),
jwt.WithExpirationRequired(),
)
// Validate token
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse token: %w", err)
}
if !token.Valid {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token")
}
// Extract claims
claims, ok := token.Claims.(*JWTClaims)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token claims")
}
return claims, nil
}
func (j *JWTManager) HasPermission(resource string, action PermissionAction, permissions []Permission) bool {
for _, perm := range permissions {
if perm.Action == action && isResourceMatch(resource, perm.ResourcePattern) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func isResourceMatch(resource, pattern string) bool {
if pattern == "*" {
return true
}
if strings.HasSuffix(pattern, "*") {
return strings.HasPrefix(resource, strings.TrimSuffix(pattern, "*"))
}
return resource == pattern
}