## What this does Fixes an open redirect plus a handful of small, mostly-invisible hardening changes around it. ## What's in it - **The fix**: trailing-slash redirects no longer let `//evil.com/` redirect off-host. - **SSRF block** on the DNS/HTTP namespace verification — refuses to dial loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or IP-literal/single-label \"domains\". - **Slow-client guard**: `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` on the HTTP server (no `WriteTimeout` — would risk cutting off legitimate multi-package publishes). - **Defence-in-depth headers** on the UI (`/`) and 404 responses. - **5xx responses** stop leaking raw DB error text to clients (logged server-side instead). - **Search filter** stops treating `%` and `_` as wildcards. - **Validators**: PyPI/NuGet identifiers URL-escaped before fetching; MCPB no longer follows redirects. - **Misc**: `Version` field bounded to 255 chars; logs quote user input; `BlockedNamespaces` denylist now catches subdomain claimants. Each change is its own commit so they can be reviewed (or reverted) independently. ## Test plan - [ ] CI green - [ ] Synthetic publish in staging for each package type (npm, pypi, nuget, oci, mcpb) — confirms validator changes don't regress - [ ] Quick browser check of `/` after deploy to confirm UI still loads with the new CSP - [ ] `curl https://<host>//evil.com/` — confirm the open redirect is closed 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
173 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
173 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
package auth
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"crypto/ed25519"
|
|
"encoding/hex"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/config"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// PermissionAction represents the type of action that can be performed
|
|
type PermissionAction string
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
PermissionActionPublish PermissionAction = "publish"
|
|
// PermissionActionEdit allows editing server configuration.
|
|
PermissionActionEdit PermissionAction = "edit"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
type Permission struct {
|
|
Action PermissionAction `json:"action"` // The action type (publish or edit)
|
|
ResourcePattern string `json:"resource"` // e.g., "io.github.username/*"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// JWTClaims represents the claims for the Registry JWT token
|
|
type JWTClaims struct {
|
|
jwt.RegisteredClaims
|
|
// Authentication method used to obtain this token
|
|
AuthMethod Method `json:"auth_method"`
|
|
AuthMethodSubject string `json:"auth_method_sub"`
|
|
Permissions []Permission `json:"permissions"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type TokenResponse struct {
|
|
RegistryToken string `json:"registry_token"`
|
|
ExpiresAt int `json:"expires_at"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// JWTManager handles JWT token operations
|
|
type JWTManager struct {
|
|
privateKey ed25519.PrivateKey
|
|
publicKey ed25519.PublicKey
|
|
tokenDuration time.Duration
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func NewJWTManager(cfg *config.Config) *JWTManager {
|
|
seed, err := hex.DecodeString(cfg.JWTPrivateKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
panic(fmt.Sprintf("JWTPrivateKey must be a valid hex-encoded string: %v", err))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Require a valid Ed25519 seed (32 bytes)
|
|
if len(seed) != ed25519.SeedSize {
|
|
panic(fmt.Sprintf("JWTPrivateKey seed must be exactly %d bytes for Ed25519, got %d bytes", ed25519.SeedSize, len(seed)))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate the full Ed25519 key pair from the seed
|
|
privateKey := ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
|
|
publicKey := privateKey.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
|
|
|
|
return &JWTManager{
|
|
privateKey: privateKey,
|
|
publicKey: publicKey,
|
|
tokenDuration: 5 * time.Minute, // 5-minute tokens as per requirements
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GenerateToken generates a new Registry JWT token
|
|
func (j *JWTManager) GenerateTokenResponse(_ context.Context, claims JWTClaims) (*TokenResponse, error) {
|
|
// Check whether they have global permissions (used by admins)
|
|
hasGlobalPermissions := false
|
|
for _, perm := range claims.Permissions {
|
|
if perm.ResourcePattern == "*" {
|
|
hasGlobalPermissions = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check permissions against denylist, provided they are not an admin.
|
|
// Probe two synthetic resources per blocked namespace so that both the
|
|
// slash-suffix patterns (e.g. com.evil/*) and the dot-wildcard patterns
|
|
// (e.g. com.evil.mailer.* — granted to a subdomain claimant) are
|
|
// detected. Probing only "<blocked>/test" misses the dot-wildcard form
|
|
// because the prefix match against "com.evil.mailer." does not start
|
|
// with "com.evil/test".
|
|
if !hasGlobalPermissions {
|
|
for _, blockedNamespace := range BlockedNamespaces {
|
|
if j.HasPermission(blockedNamespace+"/test", PermissionActionPublish, claims.Permissions) ||
|
|
j.HasPermission(blockedNamespace+".test/x", PermissionActionPublish, claims.Permissions) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("your namespace is blocked. raise an issue at https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/ if you think this is a mistake")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if claims.IssuedAt == nil {
|
|
claims.IssuedAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now())
|
|
}
|
|
if claims.ExpiresAt == nil {
|
|
claims.ExpiresAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(j.tokenDuration))
|
|
}
|
|
if claims.NotBefore == nil {
|
|
claims.NotBefore = jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now())
|
|
}
|
|
if claims.Issuer == "" {
|
|
claims.Issuer = "mcp-registry"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create token with claims
|
|
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(&jwt.SigningMethodEd25519{}, claims)
|
|
|
|
// Sign token with Ed25519 private key
|
|
tokenString, err := token.SignedString(j.privateKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return &TokenResponse{
|
|
RegistryToken: tokenString,
|
|
ExpiresAt: int(claims.ExpiresAt.Unix()),
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ValidateToken validates a Registry JWT token and returns the claims
|
|
func (j *JWTManager) ValidateToken(_ context.Context, tokenString string) (*JWTClaims, error) {
|
|
// Parse token
|
|
// This also validates expiry
|
|
token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(
|
|
tokenString,
|
|
&JWTClaims{},
|
|
func(_ *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { return j.publicKey, nil },
|
|
jwt.WithValidMethods([]string{"EdDSA"}),
|
|
jwt.WithExpirationRequired(),
|
|
)
|
|
// Validate token
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !token.Valid {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Extract claims
|
|
claims, ok := token.Claims.(*JWTClaims)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token claims")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return claims, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (j *JWTManager) HasPermission(resource string, action PermissionAction, permissions []Permission) bool {
|
|
for _, perm := range permissions {
|
|
if perm.Action == action && isResourceMatch(resource, perm.ResourcePattern) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func isResourceMatch(resource, pattern string) bool {
|
|
if pattern == "*" {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.HasSuffix(pattern, "*") {
|
|
return strings.HasPrefix(resource, strings.TrimSuffix(pattern, "*"))
|
|
}
|
|
return resource == pattern
|
|
}
|