registry/internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/http.go
Radoslav Dimitrov 1201cbd82b
security: fix open redirect and add small hardening (#1227)
## What this does

Fixes an open redirect plus a handful of small, mostly-invisible
hardening changes around it.

## What's in it

- **The fix**: trailing-slash redirects no longer let `//evil.com/`
redirect off-host.
- **SSRF block** on the DNS/HTTP namespace verification — refuses to
dial loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or
IP-literal/single-label \"domains\".
- **Slow-client guard**: `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` on the HTTP
server (no `WriteTimeout` — would risk cutting off legitimate
multi-package publishes).
- **Defence-in-depth headers** on the UI (`/`) and 404 responses.
- **5xx responses** stop leaking raw DB error text to clients (logged
server-side instead).
- **Search filter** stops treating `%` and `_` as wildcards.
- **Validators**: PyPI/NuGet identifiers URL-escaped before fetching;
MCPB no longer follows redirects.
- **Misc**: `Version` field bounded to 255 chars; logs quote user input;
`BlockedNamespaces` denylist now catches subdomain claimants.

Each change is its own commit so they can be reviewed (or reverted)
independently.

## Test plan

- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Synthetic publish in staging for each package type (npm, pypi,
nuget, oci, mcpb) — confirms validator changes don't regress
- [ ] Quick browser check of `/` after deploy to confirm UI still loads
with the new CSP
- [ ] `curl https://<host>//evil.com/` — confirm the open redirect is
closed

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 19:14:00 -04:00

232 lines
8.1 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2"
v0 "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/api/handlers/v0"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/auth"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/config"
)
// MaxKeyResponseSize is the maximum size of the response body from the HTTP endpoint.
const MaxKeyResponseSize = 4096
// HTTPTokenExchangeInput represents the input for HTTP-based authentication
type HTTPTokenExchangeInput struct {
Body SignatureTokenExchangeInput
}
// HTTPKeyFetcher defines the interface for fetching HTTP keys
type HTTPKeyFetcher interface {
FetchKey(ctx context.Context, domain string) (string, error)
}
// DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher uses Go's standard HTTP client
type DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher struct {
client *http.Client
}
// NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcher creates a new HTTP key fetcher with timeout
func NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcher() *DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher {
transport := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
transport.DialContext = safeDialContext
return &DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher{
client: &http.Client{
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
// Disable redirects for security purposes:
// Prevents people doing weird things like sending us to internal endpoints at different paths
CheckRedirect: func(_ *http.Request, _ []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
Transport: transport,
},
}
}
// safeDialContext resolves the target hostname and refuses to dial loopback,
// private (RFC1918, ULA), link-local, or unspecified addresses. Combined with
// IsValidDomain rejecting IP literals, this neutralises SSRF abuse of the
// well-known fetcher: an attacker cannot reach internal HTTPS services
// (Kubernetes API server, internal admin panels, internal DNS-resolved hosts)
// even if they control DNS for an attacker domain.
//
// The hostname is resolved once here; we then dial the resolved IP directly,
// which pins the connection against DNS rebinding (a TOCTOU where the resolver
// returns a public IP to a pre-flight check and an internal IP to the actual
// dial). TLS SNI and the Host header continue to use the original hostname
// since they are set by http.Transport from the request URL, not the dial
// address.
func safeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var resolver net.Resolver
ips, err := resolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Try each non-blocked address in order, falling through on dial failure.
// Without this, a stale public AAAA record that no longer routes (or any
// individually-unreachable IP) breaks auth where the default transport
// would have recovered by trying the next answer.
//
// Each attempt is bounded by perIPDialTimeout so that a single hanging
// address can't consume the whole http.Client budget. This is a
// simpler substitute for Happy Eyeballs (parallel A/AAAA racing) — we
// fail fast and try the next answer instead of racing them.
const perIPDialTimeout = 3 * time.Second
var lastErr error
allBlocked := true
for _, ip := range ips {
if isBlockedIP(ip.IP) {
continue
}
allBlocked = false
dialCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, perIPDialTimeout)
var d net.Dialer
conn, dialErr := d.DialContext(dialCtx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ip.IP.String(), port))
cancel()
if dialErr == nil {
return conn, nil
}
lastErr = dialErr
}
if allBlocked {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial %s: refusing to connect to private or loopback address", host)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial %s: all resolved public addresses failed: %w", host, lastErr)
}
// cgnatRange covers RFC 6598 Carrier-Grade NAT (100.64.0.0/10), which the
// stdlib does not classify via any Is* helper but is reachable on some
// cloud / mobile networks where it shadows internal infrastructure.
var cgnatRange = func() *net.IPNet {
_, n, _ := net.ParseCIDR("100.64.0.0/10")
return n
}()
// isBlockedIP reports whether an IP must not be dialled by the namespace
// verification fetcher. Covers loopback (127/8, ::1), RFC1918 + ULA via
// IsPrivate, link-local (169.254/16, fe80::/10 — includes cloud metadata
// 169.254.169.254), unspecified (0.0.0.0, ::), all multicast (admin-scoped
// 239/8 and ff00::/8 in addition to link-local-multicast), and CGNAT.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
if ip == nil {
return true
}
return ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsMulticast() ||
ip.IsUnspecified() ||
cgnatRange.Contains(ip)
}
// NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcherWithClient creates a new HTTP key fetcher with a custom HTTP client.
// This is primarily useful in tests to inject transports or TLS settings.
func NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcherWithClient(client *http.Client) *DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher {
return &DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher{client: client}
}
// FetchKey fetches the public key from the well-known HTTP endpoint
func (f *DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher) FetchKey(ctx context.Context, domain string) (string, error) {
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/.well-known/mcp-registry-auth", domain)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Accept", "text/plain")
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "mcp-registry/1.0")
resp, err := f.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch key: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return "", fmt.Errorf("HTTP %d: failed to fetch key from %s", resp.StatusCode, url)
}
// Limit response size to prevent DoS attacks.
// Read up to MaxKeyResponseSize+1 and error if exceeded.
limited := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, MaxKeyResponseSize+1)
body, err := io.ReadAll(limited)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to read response body: %w", err)
}
if len(body) > MaxKeyResponseSize {
return "", fmt.Errorf("HTTP auth key response too large")
}
return strings.TrimSpace(string(body)), nil
}
// HTTPAuthHandler handles HTTP-based authentication
type HTTPAuthHandler struct {
CoreAuthHandler
fetcher HTTPKeyFetcher
}
// NewHTTPAuthHandler creates a new HTTP authentication handler
func NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg *config.Config) *HTTPAuthHandler {
return &HTTPAuthHandler{
CoreAuthHandler: *NewCoreAuthHandler(cfg),
fetcher: NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcher(),
}
}
// SetFetcher sets a custom HTTP key fetcher (used for testing)
func (h *HTTPAuthHandler) SetFetcher(fetcher HTTPKeyFetcher) {
h.fetcher = fetcher
}
// RegisterHTTPEndpoint registers the HTTP authentication endpoint
func RegisterHTTPEndpoint(api huma.API, pathPrefix string, cfg *config.Config) {
handler := NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
// HTTP authentication endpoint
huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{
OperationID: "exchange-http-token" + strings.ReplaceAll(pathPrefix, "/", "-"),
Method: http.MethodPost,
Path: pathPrefix + "/auth/http",
Summary: "Exchange HTTP signature for Registry JWT",
Description: "Authenticate using HTTP-hosted public key and signed timestamp",
Tags: []string{"auth"},
}, func(ctx context.Context, input *HTTPTokenExchangeInput) (*v0.Response[auth.TokenResponse], error) {
response, err := handler.ExchangeToken(ctx, input.Body.Domain, input.Body.Timestamp, input.Body.SignedTimestamp)
if err != nil {
return nil, huma.Error401Unauthorized("HTTP authentication failed", err)
}
return &v0.Response[auth.TokenResponse]{
Body: *response,
}, nil
})
}
// ExchangeToken exchanges HTTP signature for a Registry JWT token
func (h *HTTPAuthHandler) ExchangeToken(ctx context.Context, domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp string) (*auth.TokenResponse, error) {
keyFetcher := func(ctx context.Context, domain string) ([]string, error) {
keyResponse, err := h.fetcher.FetchKey(ctx, domain)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch public key: %w", err)
}
return []string{keyResponse}, nil
}
allowSubdomains := false
return h.CoreAuthHandler.ExchangeToken(ctx, domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp, keyFetcher, allowSubdomains, auth.MethodHTTP)
}