## What this does Fixes an open redirect plus a handful of small, mostly-invisible hardening changes around it. ## What's in it - **The fix**: trailing-slash redirects no longer let `//evil.com/` redirect off-host. - **SSRF block** on the DNS/HTTP namespace verification — refuses to dial loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or IP-literal/single-label \"domains\". - **Slow-client guard**: `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` on the HTTP server (no `WriteTimeout` — would risk cutting off legitimate multi-package publishes). - **Defence-in-depth headers** on the UI (`/`) and 404 responses. - **5xx responses** stop leaking raw DB error text to clients (logged server-side instead). - **Search filter** stops treating `%` and `_` as wildcards. - **Validators**: PyPI/NuGet identifiers URL-escaped before fetching; MCPB no longer follows redirects. - **Misc**: `Version` field bounded to 255 chars; logs quote user input; `BlockedNamespaces` denylist now catches subdomain claimants. Each change is its own commit so they can be reviewed (or reverted) independently. ## Test plan - [ ] CI green - [ ] Synthetic publish in staging for each package type (npm, pypi, nuget, oci, mcpb) — confirms validator changes don't regress - [ ] Quick browser check of `/` after deploy to confirm UI still loads with the new CSP - [ ] `curl https://<host>//evil.com/` — confirm the open redirect is closed 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
232 lines
8.1 KiB
Go
232 lines
8.1 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2"
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v0 "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/api/handlers/v0"
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"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/auth"
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"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/config"
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)
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// MaxKeyResponseSize is the maximum size of the response body from the HTTP endpoint.
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const MaxKeyResponseSize = 4096
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// HTTPTokenExchangeInput represents the input for HTTP-based authentication
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type HTTPTokenExchangeInput struct {
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Body SignatureTokenExchangeInput
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}
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// HTTPKeyFetcher defines the interface for fetching HTTP keys
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type HTTPKeyFetcher interface {
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FetchKey(ctx context.Context, domain string) (string, error)
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}
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// DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher uses Go's standard HTTP client
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type DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher struct {
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client *http.Client
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}
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// NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcher creates a new HTTP key fetcher with timeout
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func NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcher() *DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher {
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transport := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
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transport.DialContext = safeDialContext
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return &DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher{
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client: &http.Client{
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Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
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// Disable redirects for security purposes:
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// Prevents people doing weird things like sending us to internal endpoints at different paths
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CheckRedirect: func(_ *http.Request, _ []*http.Request) error {
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return http.ErrUseLastResponse
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},
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Transport: transport,
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},
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}
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}
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// safeDialContext resolves the target hostname and refuses to dial loopback,
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// private (RFC1918, ULA), link-local, or unspecified addresses. Combined with
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// IsValidDomain rejecting IP literals, this neutralises SSRF abuse of the
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// well-known fetcher: an attacker cannot reach internal HTTPS services
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// (Kubernetes API server, internal admin panels, internal DNS-resolved hosts)
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// even if they control DNS for an attacker domain.
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//
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// The hostname is resolved once here; we then dial the resolved IP directly,
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// which pins the connection against DNS rebinding (a TOCTOU where the resolver
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// returns a public IP to a pre-flight check and an internal IP to the actual
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// dial). TLS SNI and the Host header continue to use the original hostname
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// since they are set by http.Transport from the request URL, not the dial
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// address.
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func safeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
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host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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var resolver net.Resolver
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ips, err := resolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// Try each non-blocked address in order, falling through on dial failure.
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// Without this, a stale public AAAA record that no longer routes (or any
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// individually-unreachable IP) breaks auth where the default transport
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// would have recovered by trying the next answer.
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//
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// Each attempt is bounded by perIPDialTimeout so that a single hanging
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// address can't consume the whole http.Client budget. This is a
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// simpler substitute for Happy Eyeballs (parallel A/AAAA racing) — we
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// fail fast and try the next answer instead of racing them.
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const perIPDialTimeout = 3 * time.Second
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var lastErr error
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allBlocked := true
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for _, ip := range ips {
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if isBlockedIP(ip.IP) {
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continue
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}
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allBlocked = false
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dialCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, perIPDialTimeout)
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var d net.Dialer
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conn, dialErr := d.DialContext(dialCtx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ip.IP.String(), port))
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cancel()
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if dialErr == nil {
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return conn, nil
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}
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lastErr = dialErr
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}
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if allBlocked {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial %s: refusing to connect to private or loopback address", host)
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial %s: all resolved public addresses failed: %w", host, lastErr)
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}
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// cgnatRange covers RFC 6598 Carrier-Grade NAT (100.64.0.0/10), which the
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// stdlib does not classify via any Is* helper but is reachable on some
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// cloud / mobile networks where it shadows internal infrastructure.
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var cgnatRange = func() *net.IPNet {
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_, n, _ := net.ParseCIDR("100.64.0.0/10")
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return n
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}()
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// isBlockedIP reports whether an IP must not be dialled by the namespace
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// verification fetcher. Covers loopback (127/8, ::1), RFC1918 + ULA via
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// IsPrivate, link-local (169.254/16, fe80::/10 — includes cloud metadata
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// 169.254.169.254), unspecified (0.0.0.0, ::), all multicast (admin-scoped
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// 239/8 and ff00::/8 in addition to link-local-multicast), and CGNAT.
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func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
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if ip == nil {
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return true
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}
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return ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() ||
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ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsMulticast() ||
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ip.IsUnspecified() ||
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cgnatRange.Contains(ip)
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}
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// NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcherWithClient creates a new HTTP key fetcher with a custom HTTP client.
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// This is primarily useful in tests to inject transports or TLS settings.
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func NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcherWithClient(client *http.Client) *DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher {
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return &DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher{client: client}
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}
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// FetchKey fetches the public key from the well-known HTTP endpoint
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func (f *DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher) FetchKey(ctx context.Context, domain string) (string, error) {
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url := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/.well-known/mcp-registry-auth", domain)
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
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}
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req.Header.Set("Accept", "text/plain")
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req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "mcp-registry/1.0")
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resp, err := f.client.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch key: %w", err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("HTTP %d: failed to fetch key from %s", resp.StatusCode, url)
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}
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// Limit response size to prevent DoS attacks.
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// Read up to MaxKeyResponseSize+1 and error if exceeded.
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limited := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, MaxKeyResponseSize+1)
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body, err := io.ReadAll(limited)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to read response body: %w", err)
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}
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if len(body) > MaxKeyResponseSize {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("HTTP auth key response too large")
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}
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return strings.TrimSpace(string(body)), nil
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}
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// HTTPAuthHandler handles HTTP-based authentication
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type HTTPAuthHandler struct {
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CoreAuthHandler
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fetcher HTTPKeyFetcher
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}
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// NewHTTPAuthHandler creates a new HTTP authentication handler
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func NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg *config.Config) *HTTPAuthHandler {
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return &HTTPAuthHandler{
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CoreAuthHandler: *NewCoreAuthHandler(cfg),
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fetcher: NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcher(),
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}
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}
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// SetFetcher sets a custom HTTP key fetcher (used for testing)
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func (h *HTTPAuthHandler) SetFetcher(fetcher HTTPKeyFetcher) {
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h.fetcher = fetcher
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}
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// RegisterHTTPEndpoint registers the HTTP authentication endpoint
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func RegisterHTTPEndpoint(api huma.API, pathPrefix string, cfg *config.Config) {
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handler := NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
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// HTTP authentication endpoint
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huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{
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OperationID: "exchange-http-token" + strings.ReplaceAll(pathPrefix, "/", "-"),
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Method: http.MethodPost,
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Path: pathPrefix + "/auth/http",
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Summary: "Exchange HTTP signature for Registry JWT",
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Description: "Authenticate using HTTP-hosted public key and signed timestamp",
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Tags: []string{"auth"},
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}, func(ctx context.Context, input *HTTPTokenExchangeInput) (*v0.Response[auth.TokenResponse], error) {
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response, err := handler.ExchangeToken(ctx, input.Body.Domain, input.Body.Timestamp, input.Body.SignedTimestamp)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, huma.Error401Unauthorized("HTTP authentication failed", err)
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}
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return &v0.Response[auth.TokenResponse]{
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Body: *response,
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}, nil
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})
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}
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// ExchangeToken exchanges HTTP signature for a Registry JWT token
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func (h *HTTPAuthHandler) ExchangeToken(ctx context.Context, domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp string) (*auth.TokenResponse, error) {
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keyFetcher := func(ctx context.Context, domain string) ([]string, error) {
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keyResponse, err := h.fetcher.FetchKey(ctx, domain)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch public key: %w", err)
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}
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return []string{keyResponse}, nil
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}
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allowSubdomains := false
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return h.CoreAuthHandler.ExchangeToken(ctx, domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp, keyFetcher, allowSubdomains, auth.MethodHTTP)
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}
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