registry/internal/api/server.go
Radoslav Dimitrov 1201cbd82b
security: fix open redirect and add small hardening (#1227)
## What this does

Fixes an open redirect plus a handful of small, mostly-invisible
hardening changes around it.

## What's in it

- **The fix**: trailing-slash redirects no longer let `//evil.com/`
redirect off-host.
- **SSRF block** on the DNS/HTTP namespace verification — refuses to
dial loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or
IP-literal/single-label \"domains\".
- **Slow-client guard**: `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` on the HTTP
server (no `WriteTimeout` — would risk cutting off legitimate
multi-package publishes).
- **Defence-in-depth headers** on the UI (`/`) and 404 responses.
- **5xx responses** stop leaking raw DB error text to clients (logged
server-side instead).
- **Search filter** stops treating `%` and `_` as wildcards.
- **Validators**: PyPI/NuGet identifiers URL-escaped before fetching;
MCPB no longer follows redirects.
- **Misc**: `Version` field bounded to 255 chars; logs quote user input;
`BlockedNamespaces` denylist now catches subdomain claimants.

Each change is its own commit so they can be reviewed (or reverted)
independently.

## Test plan

- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Synthetic publish in staging for each package type (npm, pypi,
nuget, oci, mcpb) — confirms validator changes don't regress
- [ ] Quick browser check of `/` after deploy to confirm UI still loads
with the new CSP
- [ ] `curl https://<host>//evil.com/` — confirm the open redirect is
closed

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 19:14:00 -04:00

159 lines
5.3 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
"path"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2"
"github.com/rs/cors"
v0 "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/api/handlers/v0"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/api/router"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/config"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/service"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/telemetry"
)
// NulByteValidationMiddleware rejects requests containing NUL bytes in URL path or query parameters.
// This prevents PostgreSQL encoding errors (SQLSTATE 22021) and returns a proper 400 Bad Request.
// Checks for both literal NUL bytes (\x00) and URL-encoded form (%00).
func NulByteValidationMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Check URL path for literal NUL bytes or URL-encoded %00
// Path needs %00 check because handlers call url.PathUnescape() which would decode it
if containsNulByte(r.URL.Path) {
writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request: URL path contains null bytes")
return
}
// Check raw query string for literal NUL bytes or URL-encoded %00
if containsNulByte(r.URL.RawQuery) {
writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request: query parameters contain null bytes")
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// writeErrorResponse writes a JSON error response using huma's ErrorModel format
// for consistency with the rest of the API.
func writeErrorResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, detail string) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
errModel := &huma.ErrorModel{
Title: http.StatusText(status),
Status: status,
Detail: detail,
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(errModel)
}
// containsNulByte checks if a string contains a NUL byte, either as a literal \x00
// or URL-encoded as %00.
func containsNulByte(s string) bool {
// Check for literal NUL byte
if strings.ContainsRune(s, '\x00') {
return true
}
// Check for URL-encoded NUL byte (%00)
// Using Contains directly since %00 has no case variation (both hex digits are 0)
return strings.Contains(s, "%00")
}
// TrailingSlashMiddleware redirects requests with trailing slashes to their canonical form
func TrailingSlashMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Only redirect if the path is not "/" and ends with a "/"
if r.URL.Path != "/" && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/") {
// path.Clean both removes the trailing slash and collapses any
// leading "//" to "/", which prevents an open-redirect via a
// protocol-relative path like "//evil.com/" (GHSA-v8vw-gw5j-w7m6).
newURL := *r.URL
newURL.Path = path.Clean(r.URL.Path)
// Use 308 Permanent Redirect to preserve the request method
http.Redirect(w, r, newURL.String(), http.StatusPermanentRedirect)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// Server represents the HTTP server
type Server struct {
config *config.Config
registry service.RegistryService
humaAPI huma.API
server *http.Server
}
// NewServer creates a new HTTP server
func NewServer(cfg *config.Config, registryService service.RegistryService, metrics *telemetry.Metrics, versionInfo *v0.VersionBody) *Server {
// Create HTTP mux and Huma API
mux := http.NewServeMux()
api := router.NewHumaAPI(cfg, registryService, mux, metrics, versionInfo)
// Configure CORS with permissive settings for public API
corsHandler := cors.New(cors.Options{
AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"},
AllowedMethods: []string{
http.MethodGet,
http.MethodPost,
http.MethodPut,
http.MethodDelete,
http.MethodOptions,
},
AllowedHeaders: []string{"*"},
ExposedHeaders: []string{"Content-Type", "Content-Length"},
AllowCredentials: false, // Must be false when AllowedOrigins is "*"
MaxAge: 86400, // 24 hours
})
// Wrap the mux with middleware stack
// Order: NulByteValidation -> TrailingSlash -> CORS -> Mux
handler := NulByteValidationMiddleware(TrailingSlashMiddleware(corsHandler.Handler(mux)))
server := &Server{
config: cfg,
registry: registryService,
humaAPI: api,
server: &http.Server{
Addr: cfg.ServerAddress,
Handler: handler,
ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
// WriteTimeout intentionally not set: the publish path runs
// outbound package validators sequentially (npm/pypi/nuget up to
// 10s each, OCI up to 30s), so any tight cap could cut off a
// legitimate multi-package publish mid-response — surfacing as a
// truncated read to the publisher even when the DB commit
// succeeded. Slow-response-read DoS is bounded upstream by
// NGINX ingress timeouts and the per-IP rate limit. Revisit once
// validators are parallelised or per-request package counts are
// bounded.
IdleTimeout: 120 * time.Second,
},
}
return server
}
// Start begins listening for incoming HTTP requests
func (s *Server) Start() error {
log.Printf("HTTP server starting on %s", s.config.ServerAddress)
return s.server.ListenAndServe()
}
// Shutdown gracefully shuts down the server
func (s *Server) Shutdown(ctx context.Context) error {
return s.server.Shutdown(ctx)
}