registry/docs/modelcontextprotocol-io/github-actions.mdx
Tadas Antanavicius 2bc37b1999
fix(auth): grant org namespace only to org Owners, not all members (#1383)
## The bug (scoped to `github-at`)

When you exchange a GitHub OAuth/PAT token for a registry JWT, the
handler granted `io.github.<org>/*` publish permission for **every**
organization you belong to. It derived that list from [`GET
/users/{username}/orgs`](https://docs.github.com/en/rest/orgs/orgs#list-organizations-for-a-user),
which:

1. returns only **public** org memberships, and
2. carries **no role** — an org Owner and a brand-new member look
identical.

So membership was silently treated as publishing authority. Anyone who
is (or whose public membership lists them as) a member of `acme` could
publish — and, because publish is a pure namespace-glob with no
per-server ownership check, **overwrite** — any server under
`io.github.acme/*`.

## The fix

Switch to [`GET
/user/memberships/orgs`](https://docs.github.com/en/rest/orgs/members#list-organization-memberships-for-the-authenticated-user),
which returns the **authenticated caller's role** per org (and includes
private memberships), and grant the org namespace only when the role is
`admin` (org Owner).

- **Personal namespaces are unchanged** — you always get
`io.github.<your-username>/*`.
- **Org namespaces now require Owner.** GitHub has no org-level
"maintainer" role; org membership is either `admin` (Owner) or `member`.
We grant only on `admin`.
- **`read:org` is the only scope needed.** A minimal token without it
still authenticates and still publishes to your personal namespace; a
genuine missing-scope `403` from the memberships call is treated as "no
admin orgs" rather than a hard failure, so we don't push anyone to
over-scope a token. A `403`/`429` that is actually a rate limit
(`X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0` / `Retry-After`) fails closed instead, so a
throttle can't silently strip a real Owner's org grant. Critically, the
token needs **no repository scopes** — the registry never reads or
writes code, so an org Owner can hand CI a near-powerless `read:org`
token.

The authorization decision stays stateless and delegated to GitHub — no
new storage, no new endpoints, no schema changes — consistent with
[design principle #2](docs/design/design-principles.md) (minimal
operational burden).

### Containing the CI token

The registry-side change makes the org Owner the only one who can mint
org-namespace authority. But if that Owner drops the resulting PAT into
a plain repo secret, **every repository writer** can reach it (via
branch/tag pushes that run repo-controlled build/test code in the
privileged job) — quietly re-widening publish access beyond Owners.
External fork contributors still cannot reach it by default (no secrets
on fork PRs, no branch push), barring misconfigurations like
`pull_request_target`-with-checkout or self-hosted runners on public
repos.

`docs/modelcontextprotocol-io/github-actions.mdx` documents how to
contain that blast radius:

- store the token as a **GitHub Actions Environment secret** (the PAT
example uses `environment:`),
- restrict that environment to the default branch / release tags and
require PR reviews on it, so only reviewed, maintainer-approved code can
reach the token,
- optionally add a **required environment reviewer** for explicit
per-publish approval,
- and avoid the two footguns (`pull_request_target` checkout,
self-hosted runners on public repos).

This shrinks *who holds* the org credential; it does not change the fact
that an authorized publish can still overwrite a different server in the
same namespace until per-server publisher ownership exists (the
follow-up noted below).

## Why this shape, given the alternatives

[Pree's
writeup](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/issues/982#issuecomment-3982959559)
([Notion analysis
doc](https://www.notion.so/MCP-Registry-Authorization-Model-Analysis-Issue-982-31736f79f74980bc90c6e53de1c564c5))
is the clearest framing of the problem and the option space, laying out
three broad solutions:

- **Approach A — GitHub App as the authority layer.** Strong model, but
its natural unit of authority is a *repo*, so it needs a repo→server
mapping to authorize a namespace. The safe, flexible version of that
mapping is registry-managed state — which collapses into Approach B.
It's also GitHub-only.
- **Approach B — a registry-managed grants table** (OIDC bootstrap, or
device-flow admin check). The most capable and provider-agnostic option,
and probably where v1 wants to go. But it introduces exactly the
"registry manages an authorization database" layer we wanted to avoid
taking on right now: revocation, sync, audit, migration.
- **Approach C — scoped bearer tokens (npm-style).** Good ergonomics,
but again implies issuance/storage the registry would own.

The two-property test (does the registry control the decision? is it
granted through an act requiring real authority?) is the right lens.
This change satisfies it **without** new state: the registry makes the
decision (it filters on role), and the authority is real (live GitHub
Owner role, re-checked on every short-lived token exchange).

**What this deliberately gives up**, so reviewers can weigh it honestly:

- **Owners are always in the loop.** Only org Owners can publish org
servers; there's no delegated "this team can publish this server" — that
needs Approach B's state. Reduced flexibility in exchange for zero new
infrastructure.
- **Blast radius within an org is unchanged.** An Owner (or Owner-scoped
CI token) can still overwrite *any* server under the org namespace,
because there's still no per-server publisher ownership. That
hijack-an-existing-server problem is real but **orthogonal** to this fix
and belongs in its own change (record publisher identity per server;
enforce it on update) — a follow-up to take alongside the OIDC hardening
below.
- **OIDC is untouched and remains coarser.** The `github-oidc` path
still grants the whole `io.github.<owner>/*` namespace to any workflow
with `id-token: write`, i.e. effectively anyone with write access to any
repo in the org, and it excludes non-Actions CI (Jenkins/GitLab can't
mint GitHub Actions OIDC). The admin-PAT path here is the
higher-assurance option for org publishing; OIDC stays as a
lower-assurance Actions convenience to be tightened separately.

## Revocation

The registry JWT is **5-minute, no-refresh** (per #264/#273), so loss of
Owner status propagates within minutes on the next token exchange, with
no revocation list to maintain.

## Tests

`go test ./internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/...` passes, including:

- member-role org is **not** granted; only admin orgs are
- a missing-scope `403` (no `read:org`) still yields the personal
namespace and no error
- an admin org on a **later page** of memberships is still granted
(pagination correctness)
- a `5xx` from the memberships call **fails closed** (no token issued)
rather than degrading to personal-only
- a rate-limit `403` (`X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0` / `Retry-After`)
**fails closed** — not mistaken for a missing-scope `403`
- existing org/name-validation tests updated to the new endpoint + role
shape

`gofmt`/`go vet`/`golangci-lint` (CI-pinned v2.11.4) clean; CI green on
all checks.

## Live verification

Confirmed end-to-end against real `api.github.com` (not just mocks) by
exercising this branch's `ExchangeToken` and decoding the `permissions`
claim of the returned JWT.

A dedicated org, **Tadasant Test Org** (login `Tadasant-Test-Org`), is
Owned by one account and has a second account joined as a plain
**member**. Both memberships are `active`, verified via the same
endpoint the fix uses (`GET /user/memberships/orgs/{org}`):

| Token (role) | `io.github.Tadasant-Test-Org/*` granted? | Other
patterns granted |
|---|---|---|
| Owner (`admin`) | ✅ yes | personal `io.github.<owner>/*` |
| member | ❌ no | personal `io.github.<member>/*` + the orgs that
account actually Owns |

The member case is the meaningful one: that membership is **active and
returned** by `GET /user/memberships/orgs`, and is excluded purely
because its role is `member`, not `admin`. Under the previous `GET
/users/{username}/orgs` behavior (membership = authority, no role), the
same active membership **would have granted** the org namespace. The
role filter is also selective rather than blanket-deny — the member
account still receives the namespaces of the orgs where it genuinely
holds Owner.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Radoslav Dimitrov <radoslav@stacklok.com>
2026-07-10 17:05:47 -04:00

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---
title: How to Automate Publishing with GitHub Actions
sidebarTitle: GitHub Actions
---
<Note>
The MCP Registry is currently in preview. Breaking changes or data resets may occur before general availability. If you encounter any issues, please report them on [GitHub](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/issues).
</Note>
## Step 1: Create a Workflow File
In your server project directory, create a `.github/workflows/publish-mcp.yml` file. Here is an example for npm-based local server, but the MCP Registry publishing steps are the same for all package types:
<CodeGroup>
```yaml OIDC authentication (recommended)
name: Publish to MCP Registry
on:
push:
tags: ["v*"] # Triggers on version tags like v1.0.0
jobs:
publish:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
id-token: write # Required for OIDC authentication
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v5
### Publish underlying npm package:
- name: Set up Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@v5
with:
node-version: "lts/*"
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
- name: Run tests
run: npm run test --if-present
- name: Build package
run: npm run build --if-present
- name: Publish package to npm
run: npm publish
env:
NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
### Publish MCP server:
- name: Install mcp-publisher
run: |
curl -L "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/releases/latest/download/mcp-publisher_$(uname -s | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')_$(uname -m | sed 's/x86_64/amd64/;s/aarch64/arm64/').tar.gz" | tar xz mcp-publisher
- name: Authenticate to MCP Registry
run: ./mcp-publisher login github-oidc
# Optional:
# - name: Set version in server.json
# run: |
# VERSION=${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/v}
# jq --arg v "$VERSION" '.version = $v' server.json > server.tmp && mv server.tmp server.json
- name: Publish server to MCP Registry
run: ./mcp-publisher publish
```
```yaml PAT authentication
name: Publish to MCP Registry
on:
push:
tags: ["v*"] # Triggers on version tags like v1.0.0
jobs:
publish:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Source MCP_GITHUB_TOKEN from a protected Environment, not a plain repo
# secret, and restrict that environment to your default branch / release
# tags. See "Securing your registry token in CI" below for why this matters.
environment: mcp-registry-publish
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v5
### Publish underlying npm package:
- name: Set up Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@v5
with:
node-version: "lts/*"
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
- name: Run tests
run: npm run test --if-present
- name: Build package
run: npm run build --if-present
- name: Publish package to npm
run: npm publish
env:
NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
### Publish MCP server:
- name: Install mcp-publisher
run: |
curl -L "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/releases/latest/download/mcp-publisher_$(uname -s | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')_$(uname -m | sed 's/x86_64/amd64/;s/aarch64/arm64/').tar.gz" | tar xz mcp-publisher
- name: Authenticate to MCP Registry
run: ./mcp-publisher login github --token ${{ secrets.MCP_GITHUB_TOKEN }}
# Optional:
# - name: Set version in server.json
# run: |
# VERSION=${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/v}
# jq --arg v "$VERSION" '.version = $v' server.json > server.tmp && mv server.tmp server.json
- name: Publish server to MCP Registry
run: ./mcp-publisher publish
```
```yaml DNS authentication
name: Publish to MCP Registry
on:
push:
tags: ["v*"] # Triggers on version tags like v1.0.0
jobs:
publish:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v5
### Publish underlying npm package:
- name: Set up Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@v5
with:
node-version: "lts/*"
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
- name: Run tests
run: npm run test --if-present
- name: Build package
run: npm run build --if-present
- name: Publish package to npm
run: npm publish
env:
NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
### Publish MCP server:
- name: Install mcp-publisher
run: |
curl -L "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/releases/latest/download/mcp-publisher_$(uname -s | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')_$(uname -m | sed 's/x86_64/amd64/;s/aarch64/arm64/').tar.gz" | tar xz mcp-publisher
# !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
# TODO: Replace `example.com` with your domain name
# !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
- name: Authenticate to MCP Registry
run: ./mcp-publisher login dns --domain example.com --private-key ${{ secrets.MCP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
# Optional:
# - name: Set version in server.json
# run: |
# VERSION=${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/v}
# jq --arg v "$VERSION" '.version = $v' server.json > server.tmp && mv server.tmp server.json
- name: Publish server to MCP Registry
run: ./mcp-publisher publish
```
</CodeGroup>
## Step 2: Add Secrets
You may need to add a secret depending on which authentication method you choose:
- **GitHub OIDC Authentication**: No dedicated secret necessary.
- **GitHub PAT Authentication**: Add a `MCP_GITHUB_TOKEN` secret with a GitHub Personal Access Token (PAT) that has the `read:org` scope. `read:org` is what lets the registry confirm you are an **Owner** of the organization before granting its namespace; the token needs **no** repository scopes (the registry never reads or writes your code), and no other scopes are required — `read:user` is not needed, and a bare token still authenticates and publishes to your personal namespace. For an **organization** token, store it as an **Environment secret** on the `mcp-registry-publish` environment rather than a plain repository secret — see "Securing your registry token in CI" below for why this matters and how to configure the environment.
- **DNS Authentication**: Add a `MCP_PRIVATE_KEY` secret with your Ed25519 private key.
You may also need to add secrets for your package registry. For example, the workflow above needs an `NPM_TOKEN` secret with your npm token.
For information about how to add secrets to a repository, see [Using secrets in GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/write-workflows/choose-what-workflows-do/use-secrets).
### Securing your registry token in CI
Whichever token you use to authenticate, treat it as a high-value credential. When you authenticate to an **organization** namespace, the resulting registry token can publish — and overwrite — **any** server under `io.github.<org>/*`, not just the one in this repository. The relevant question for your threat model is therefore: *who can cause code to run in a job where this secret is exposed?* By default that is **every repository writer** (via branch or tag pushes), not only org Owners — so a plain repo secret quietly widens publish access to everyone with write access.
GitHub gives you the tools to close that gap. We recommend, in increasing order of strength:
1. **Store the token as an [Environment secret](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/deploy/configure-and-manage-deployments/manage-environments), not a repository or organization secret.** A job can only read an environment secret when it declares `environment:` (as the PAT example above does). Note that the `environment:` key alone protects nothing: if the environment does not exist yet, GitHub **auto-creates it with no protection rules** on first run, and a job that declares `environment:` still also receives ordinary repository and organization secrets. The protection comes from storing the token *as a secret on that environment* and configuring the environment (steps 2–3 below) — not from the `environment:` key by itself.
2. **Restrict that environment to your default branch and/or release tags** with a [deployment branch rule](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/deploy/configure-and-manage-deployments/manage-environments#deployment-branches-and-tags), and protect that branch with [required pull request reviews](https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches). Now only reviewed, maintainer-approved code can ever reach the token.
3. **(Strongest) Add a [required reviewer](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/deploy/configure-and-manage-deployments/manage-environments#required-reviewers) to the environment** so each publish pauses for an explicit human approval.
Two pitfalls to avoid regardless of the above:
- **Never publish from a `pull_request_target` workflow that checks out PR-head code.** That trigger runs with your secrets in the base-repo context, so an untrusted fork PR could exfiltrate the token. Environment branch rules do **not** protect you here (the ref is still your base branch) — only required reviewers do.
- **Avoid self-hosted runners for the publish job on public repositories**, where fork PRs may be able to schedule jobs onto them.
By default, pull requests **from forks** receive no secrets and cannot push branches, so external contributors cannot reach the token without one of the misconfigurations above.
## Step 3: Tag and Release
Create and push a version tag to trigger the workflow:
```bash
git tag v1.0.0
git push origin v1.0.0
```
The workflow will run tests, build the package, publish the package to npm, and publish the server to the MCP Registry.
## Troubleshooting
{/* prettier-ignore-start */}
| Error Message | Action |
| --- | --- |
| "Authentication failed" | Ensure `id-token: write` permission is set for OIDC, or check secrets. |
| "invalid audience" | Your `mcp-publisher` binary is too old for this registry deployment. Re-run the install step shown above so you pick up the latest release. |
| "Package validation failed" | Verify your package successfully published to the package registry (e.g., npm, PyPI), and that your package has the [necessary verification information](./package-types). |
{/* prettier-ignore-end */}