## What this does Fixes an open redirect plus a handful of small, mostly-invisible hardening changes around it. ## What's in it - **The fix**: trailing-slash redirects no longer let `//evil.com/` redirect off-host. - **SSRF block** on the DNS/HTTP namespace verification — refuses to dial loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or IP-literal/single-label \"domains\". - **Slow-client guard**: `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` on the HTTP server (no `WriteTimeout` — would risk cutting off legitimate multi-package publishes). - **Defence-in-depth headers** on the UI (`/`) and 404 responses. - **5xx responses** stop leaking raw DB error text to clients (logged server-side instead). - **Search filter** stops treating `%` and `_` as wildcards. - **Validators**: PyPI/NuGet identifiers URL-escaped before fetching; MCPB no longer follows redirects. - **Misc**: `Version` field bounded to 255 chars; logs quote user input; `BlockedNamespaces` denylist now catches subdomain claimants. Each change is its own commit so they can be reviewed (or reverted) independently. ## Test plan - [ ] CI green - [ ] Synthetic publish in staging for each package type (npm, pypi, nuget, oci, mcpb) — confirms validator changes don't regress - [ ] Quick browser check of `/` after deploy to confirm UI still loads with the new CSP - [ ] `curl https://<host>//evil.com/` — confirm the open redirect is closed 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1312 lines
43 KiB
Go
1312 lines
43 KiB
Go
package auth_test
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha512"
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"crypto/tls"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/api/handlers/v0/auth"
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intauth "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/auth"
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"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/config"
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)
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const wellKnownPath = "/.well-known/mcp-registry-auth"
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func newClientForTLSServer(t *testing.T, srv *httptest.Server) *http.Client {
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t.Helper()
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dialAddr := srv.Listener.Addr().String()
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transport := &http.Transport{
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TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, //nolint:gosec // testing only
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DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
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d := &net.Dialer{}
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return d.DialContext(ctx, network, dialAddr)
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},
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ForceAttemptHTTP2: false,
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MaxIdleConns: 10,
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IdleConnTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
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TLSHandshakeTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
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}
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return &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
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}
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const testDomain = "example.com"
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// MockHTTPKeyFetcher for testing
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type MockHTTPKeyFetcher struct {
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keyResponses map[string]string
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err error
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}
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func (m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) FetchKey(_ context.Context, domain string) (string, error) {
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if m.err != nil {
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return "", m.err
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}
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return m.keyResponses[domain], nil
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}
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// generateECDSAP384KeyPair generates an ECDSA P-384 key pair for testing
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func generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t *testing.T) ([]byte, *ecdsa.PrivateKey) {
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t.Helper()
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privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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// Compress the public key
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compressedPubKey := elliptic.MarshalCompressed(elliptic.P384(), privateKey.X, privateKey.Y)
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return compressedPubKey, privateKey
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}
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// signWithECDSAP384HTTP signs a message using ECDSA P-384
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func signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t *testing.T, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, message []byte) []byte {
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t.Helper()
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digest := sha512.Sum384(message)
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r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, privateKey, digest[:])
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require.NoError(t, err)
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// Convert to R || S format (48 bytes each for P-384)
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signature := make([]byte, 96)
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r.FillBytes(signature[:48])
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s.FillBytes(signature[48:])
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return signature
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}
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func TestHTTPAuthHandler_ExchangeToken(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := &config.Config{
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JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
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}
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handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
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// Generate a test key pair
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publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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// Create mock HTTP key fetcher
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publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey)
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mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
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keyResponses: map[string]string{
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testDomain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
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},
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}
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handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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domain string
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timestamp string
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signedTimestamp string
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setupMock func(*MockHTTPKeyFetcher)
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expectError bool
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errorContains string
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}{
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{
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name: "successful authentication",
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domain: testDomain,
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timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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setupMock: func(_ *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
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// Mock is already set up with valid key
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},
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expectError: false,
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},
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{
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name: "invalid domain format",
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domain: "invalid..domain",
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timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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expectError: true,
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errorContains: "invalid domain format",
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},
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{
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name: "invalid timestamp format",
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domain: testDomain,
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timestamp: "invalid-timestamp",
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expectError: true,
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errorContains: "invalid timestamp format",
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},
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{
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name: "timestamp too old",
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domain: testDomain,
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timestamp: time.Now().Add(-30 * time.Second).UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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expectError: true,
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errorContains: "timestamp outside valid window",
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},
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{
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name: "timestamp too far in the future",
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domain: testDomain,
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timestamp: time.Now().Add(30 * time.Second).UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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expectError: true,
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errorContains: "timestamp outside valid window",
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},
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{
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name: "invalid signature format",
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domain: testDomain,
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timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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signedTimestamp: "invalid-hex",
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expectError: true,
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errorContains: "invalid signature format",
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},
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{
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name: "signature wrong length",
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domain: testDomain,
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timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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signedTimestamp: "abcdef", // too short
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expectError: true,
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errorContains: "invalid signature size for Ed25519",
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},
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{
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name: "HTTP key fetch failure",
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domain: "nonexistent.com",
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timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
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m.err = fmt.Errorf("HTTP 404: not found")
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},
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expectError: true,
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errorContains: "failed to fetch public key",
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},
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{
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name: "invalid key format",
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domain: "invalidkey.com",
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timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
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m.keyResponses["invalidkey.com"] = "invalid key format"
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m.err = nil
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},
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expectError: true,
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errorContains: "no MCP public key found in HTTP response",
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},
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{
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name: "invalid base64 key",
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domain: "badkey.com",
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timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
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m.keyResponses["badkey.com"] = "v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=invalid-base64!!!"
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m.err = nil
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},
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expectError: true,
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errorContains: "failed to decode public key: illegal base64 data at input byte 4",
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},
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{
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name: "wrong key size",
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domain: "wrongsize.com",
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timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
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// Generate a key that's too short
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shortKey := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("short"))
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m.keyResponses["wrongsize.com"] = fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", shortKey)
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m.err = nil
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},
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expectError: true,
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errorContains: "invalid Ed25519 public key size",
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},
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{
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name: "signature verification failure",
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domain: testDomain,
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timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
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// Generate different key pair for signature verification failure
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wrongPublicKey, _, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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wrongPublicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(wrongPublicKey)
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m.keyResponses[testDomain] = fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", wrongPublicKeyB64)
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m.err = nil
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},
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expectError: true,
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errorContains: "signature verification failed",
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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// Reset mock fetcher
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mockFetcher.err = nil
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if tt.setupMock != nil {
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tt.setupMock(mockFetcher)
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}
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// Generate signature if not provided
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signedTimestamp := tt.signedTimestamp
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if signedTimestamp == "" {
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// Generate a valid signature for all cases
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signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, []byte(tt.timestamp))
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signedTimestamp = hex.EncodeToString(signature)
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}
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// Call the handler
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result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), tt.domain, tt.timestamp, signedTimestamp)
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if tt.expectError {
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assert.Error(t, err)
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if tt.errorContains != "" {
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assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.errorContains)
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}
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assert.Nil(t, result)
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} else {
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assert.NoError(t, err)
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assert.NotNil(t, result)
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assert.NotEmpty(t, result.RegistryToken)
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// Verify the token contains expected claims
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jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
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claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), result.RegistryToken)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, intauth.MethodHTTP, claims.AuthMethod)
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assert.Equal(t, tt.domain, claims.AuthMethodSubject)
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assert.Len(t, claims.Permissions, 1) // domain permissions only
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// Check permissions use reverse DNS patterns
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patterns := make([]string, len(claims.Permissions))
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for i, perm := range claims.Permissions {
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patterns[i] = perm.ResourcePattern
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}
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// Convert domain to reverse DNS for expected patterns
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parts := strings.Split(tt.domain, ".")
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for i, j := 0, len(parts)-1; i < j; i, j = i+1, j-1 {
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parts[i], parts[j] = parts[j], parts[i]
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}
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reverseDomain := strings.Join(parts, ".")
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assert.Contains(t, patterns, fmt.Sprintf("%s/*", reverseDomain))
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestDefaultHTTPKeyFetcher_FetchKey(t *testing.T) {
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// This test would require a real HTTP server or more sophisticated mocking
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// For now, we'll test the basic structure
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fetcher := auth.NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcher()
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assert.NotNil(t, fetcher)
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// Test that it returns an error for non-existent domains
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// (This will fail with network error, which is expected)
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_, err := fetcher.FetchKey(context.Background(), "nonexistent-test-domain-12345.com")
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assert.Error(t, err)
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}
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func TestDefaultHTTPKeyFetcher(t *testing.T) {
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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handler http.HandlerFunc
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wantErrSub string
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customClient *http.Client
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expectOK bool
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wantBody string
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}{
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{
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name: "oversized body",
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handler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.URL.Path != wellKnownPath {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
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_, _ = w.Write(bytes.Repeat([]byte("A"), 6000))
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},
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wantErrSub: "too large",
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},
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{
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name: "non-OK status",
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handler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.URL.Path == wellKnownPath {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
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},
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wantErrSub: "HTTP 500",
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},
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{
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name: "connection failure",
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handler: nil,
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customClient: &http.Client{
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Transport: &http.Transport{
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TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, //nolint:gosec // testing only
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DialContext: func(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial blocked")
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},
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},
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Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
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},
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wantErrSub: "failed to fetch key",
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},
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{
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name: "response body failure",
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handler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.URL.Path != wellKnownPath {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
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w.Header().Set("Content-Length", "100")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("PARTIAL"))
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},
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wantErrSub: "failed to read response body",
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},
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{
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name: "success",
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handler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.URL.Path != wellKnownPath {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("response"))
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},
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expectOK: true,
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wantBody: "response",
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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if tt.handler != nil {
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srv := httptest.NewTLSServer(tt.handler)
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defer srv.Close()
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c := newClientForTLSServer(t, srv)
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f := auth.NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcherWithClient(c)
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got, err := f.FetchKey(context.Background(), "example.com")
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if tt.expectOK {
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
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}
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if got != tt.wantBody {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected body: got %q want %q", got, tt.wantBody)
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}
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return
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}
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if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErrSub) {
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t.Fatalf("got err=%v, want substring %q", err, tt.wantErrSub)
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}
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return
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}
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f := auth.NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcherWithClient(tt.customClient)
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got, err := f.FetchKey(context.Background(), "example.com")
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if tt.expectOK {
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
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}
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if got != tt.wantBody {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected body: got %q want %q", got, tt.wantBody)
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}
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return
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}
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if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErrSub) {
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t.Fatalf("got err=%v, want substring %q", err, tt.wantErrSub)
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}
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})
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}
|
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}
|
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|
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func TestHTTPAuthHandler_Permissions(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := &config.Config{
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JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
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}
|
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handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
|
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jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
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|
|
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// Generate a test key pair
|
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publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
|
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require.NoError(t, err)
|
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|
|
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey)
|
|
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
domain string
|
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expectedPatterns []string
|
|
unexpectedPatterns []string
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "simple domain",
|
|
domain: testDomain,
|
|
expectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example/*", // exact domain pattern only (HTTP does not include subdomains)
|
|
},
|
|
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
"example.com/*", // should be reversed
|
|
"*.com.example", // wrong wildcard position
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "subdomain",
|
|
domain: "api.example.com",
|
|
expectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example.api/*", // exact subdomain pattern only
|
|
},
|
|
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example.api.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
"com.example/*", // parent domain should not be included
|
|
"api.example.com/*", // should be reversed
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "multi-level subdomain",
|
|
domain: "v1.api.example.com",
|
|
expectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example.api.v1/*", // exact pattern only
|
|
},
|
|
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example.api.v1.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
"com.example/*", // parent domain should not be included
|
|
"com.example.api/*", // intermediate domain should not be included
|
|
"v1.api.example.com/*", // should be reversed
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "hyphenated domain",
|
|
domain: "my-app.example-site.com",
|
|
expectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example-site.my-app/*", // exact pattern only
|
|
},
|
|
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example-site.my-app.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
"my-app.example-site.com/*", // should be reversed
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Set up mock fetcher
|
|
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
|
|
keyResponses: map[string]string{
|
|
tt.domain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
|
|
|
|
// Generate signature
|
|
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, []byte(timestamp))
|
|
signedTimestamp := hex.EncodeToString(signature)
|
|
|
|
// Exchange token
|
|
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), tt.domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
require.NotNil(t, result)
|
|
|
|
// Validate JWT token
|
|
claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), result.RegistryToken)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Verify claims structure
|
|
assert.Equal(t, intauth.MethodHTTP, claims.AuthMethod)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, tt.domain, claims.AuthMethodSubject)
|
|
assert.Len(t, claims.Permissions, 1) // HTTP only grants exact domain permissions
|
|
|
|
// Extract permission patterns
|
|
patterns := make([]string, len(claims.Permissions))
|
|
for i, perm := range claims.Permissions {
|
|
patterns[i] = perm.ResourcePattern
|
|
// All permissions should be for publish action
|
|
assert.Equal(t, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, perm.Action)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check expected patterns are present
|
|
for _, expectedPattern := range tt.expectedPatterns {
|
|
assert.Contains(t, patterns, expectedPattern, "Expected pattern %s not found", expectedPattern)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check unexpected patterns are not present
|
|
for _, unexpectedPattern := range tt.unexpectedPatterns {
|
|
assert.NotContains(t, patterns, unexpectedPattern, "Unexpected pattern %s found", unexpectedPattern)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the permission patterns work correctly with the JWT manager's HasPermission method
|
|
for _, expectedPattern := range tt.expectedPatterns {
|
|
// Find the permission with this pattern
|
|
var foundPerm *intauth.Permission
|
|
for _, perm := range claims.Permissions {
|
|
if perm.ResourcePattern == expectedPattern {
|
|
foundPerm = &perm
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
require.NotNil(t, foundPerm, "Permission with pattern %s not found", expectedPattern)
|
|
|
|
// Test resource scenarios - only exact domain should work for HTTP
|
|
if strings.HasSuffix(expectedPattern, "/*") {
|
|
// Exact domain permissions (e.g., "com.example/*")
|
|
basePattern := strings.TrimSuffix(expectedPattern, "/*")
|
|
testResource := basePattern + "/my-package"
|
|
assert.True(t, jwtManager.HasPermission(testResource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, claims.Permissions),
|
|
"Should have permission for %s with pattern %s", testResource, expectedPattern)
|
|
|
|
// Test that subdomain resources are NOT allowed for HTTP
|
|
subdomainResource := basePattern + ".subdomain/my-package"
|
|
assert.False(t, jwtManager.HasPermission(subdomainResource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, claims.Permissions),
|
|
"Should NOT have permission for subdomain %s with HTTP auth", subdomainResource)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_PermissionValidation(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &config.Config{
|
|
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
|
|
}
|
|
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
|
|
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
|
|
|
|
// Generate a test key pair
|
|
publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey)
|
|
domain := testDomain
|
|
|
|
// Set up mock fetcher
|
|
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
|
|
keyResponses: map[string]string{
|
|
domain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
|
|
|
|
// Generate signature and exchange token
|
|
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, []byte(timestamp))
|
|
signedTimestamp := hex.EncodeToString(signature)
|
|
|
|
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), result.RegistryToken)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Test permission validation scenarios
|
|
testCases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
resource string
|
|
action intauth.PermissionAction
|
|
shouldPass bool
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "exact domain resource with publish action",
|
|
resource: "com.example/my-package",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
|
|
shouldPass: true,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "subdomain resource should fail for HTTP",
|
|
resource: "com.example.api/my-package",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
|
|
shouldPass: false, // HTTP does not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "deep subdomain resource should fail for HTTP",
|
|
resource: "com.example.v1.api/my-package",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
|
|
shouldPass: false, // HTTP does not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "different domain should fail",
|
|
resource: "com.otherdomain/my-package",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
|
|
shouldPass: false,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "partial domain match should fail",
|
|
resource: "com.example-other/my-package",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
|
|
shouldPass: false,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "parent domain should fail",
|
|
resource: "com/my-package",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
|
|
shouldPass: false,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "edit action should fail (not granted)",
|
|
resource: "com.example/my-package",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionEdit,
|
|
shouldPass: false,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "resource without package separator should fail",
|
|
resource: "com.example",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
|
|
shouldPass: false,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tc := range testCases {
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
hasPermission := jwtManager.HasPermission(tc.resource, tc.action, claims.Permissions)
|
|
if tc.shouldPass {
|
|
assert.True(t, hasPermission, "Expected permission for resource %s with action %s", tc.resource, tc.action)
|
|
} else {
|
|
assert.False(t, hasPermission, "Expected no permission for resource %s with action %s", tc.resource, tc.action)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestHTTPvsDNS_PermissionDifferences(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &config.Config{
|
|
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
|
|
}
|
|
httpHandler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
|
|
dnsHandler := auth.NewDNSAuthHandler(cfg)
|
|
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
|
|
|
|
// Generate a test key pair
|
|
publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey)
|
|
domain := testDomain
|
|
|
|
// Set up mocks
|
|
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
|
|
keyResponses: map[string]string{
|
|
domain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
httpHandler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
|
|
|
|
mockResolver := &MockDNSResolver{
|
|
txtRecords: map[string][]string{
|
|
domain: {
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
dnsHandler.SetResolver(mockResolver)
|
|
|
|
// Generate tokens from both handlers
|
|
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, []byte(timestamp))
|
|
signedTimestamp := hex.EncodeToString(signature)
|
|
|
|
httpResult, err := httpHandler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
dnsResult, err := dnsHandler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Validate both tokens
|
|
httpClaims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), httpResult.RegistryToken)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
dnsClaims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), dnsResult.RegistryToken)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Compare permission counts
|
|
assert.Len(t, httpClaims.Permissions, 1, "HTTP should grant 1 permission (exact domain only)")
|
|
assert.Len(t, dnsClaims.Permissions, 2, "DNS should grant 2 permissions (exact domain + subdomains)")
|
|
|
|
// Test resources that should behave differently
|
|
testCases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
resource string
|
|
httpAllowed bool
|
|
dnsAllowed bool
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "exact domain resource",
|
|
resource: "com.example/my-package",
|
|
httpAllowed: true,
|
|
dnsAllowed: true,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "subdomain resource",
|
|
resource: "com.example.api/my-package",
|
|
httpAllowed: false, // HTTP does not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
dnsAllowed: true, // DNS grants subdomain permissions
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "deep subdomain resource",
|
|
resource: "com.example.v1.api/my-package",
|
|
httpAllowed: false, // HTTP does not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
dnsAllowed: true, // DNS grants subdomain permissions
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tc := range testCases {
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
httpPermission := jwtManager.HasPermission(tc.resource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, httpClaims.Permissions)
|
|
dnsPermission := jwtManager.HasPermission(tc.resource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, dnsClaims.Permissions)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, tc.httpAllowed, httpPermission, "HTTP permission mismatch for %s", tc.resource)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, tc.dnsAllowed, dnsPermission, "DNS permission mismatch for %s", tc.resource)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_ExchangeToken_ECDSAP384(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &config.Config{
|
|
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
|
|
}
|
|
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
|
|
|
|
// Generate ECDSA P-384 test key pair
|
|
compressedPubKey, privateKey := generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t)
|
|
|
|
// Create mock HTTP key fetcher
|
|
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(compressedPubKey)
|
|
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
|
|
keyResponses: map[string]string{
|
|
testDomain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
|
|
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
domain string
|
|
timestamp string
|
|
signedTimestamp string
|
|
setupMock func(*MockHTTPKeyFetcher)
|
|
expectError bool
|
|
errorContains string
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "successful ECDSA P-384 authentication",
|
|
domain: testDomain,
|
|
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
setupMock: func(_ *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
|
|
// Mock is already set up with valid key
|
|
},
|
|
expectError: false,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "invalid ECDSA P-384 signature format",
|
|
domain: testDomain,
|
|
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
signedTimestamp: "invalid-hex",
|
|
expectError: true,
|
|
errorContains: "invalid signature format",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "ECDSA P-384 signature wrong length",
|
|
domain: testDomain,
|
|
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
signedTimestamp: "abcdef", // too short
|
|
expectError: true,
|
|
errorContains: "invalid signature size for ECDSA P-384",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "HTTP ECDSA P-384 key fetch failure",
|
|
domain: "nonexistent.com",
|
|
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
|
|
m.err = fmt.Errorf("HTTP 404: not found")
|
|
},
|
|
expectError: true,
|
|
errorContains: "failed to fetch public key",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "invalid ECDSA P-384 key format",
|
|
domain: "invalidkey.com",
|
|
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
|
|
m.keyResponses["invalidkey.com"] = "invalid key format"
|
|
m.err = nil
|
|
},
|
|
expectError: true,
|
|
errorContains: "no MCP public key found in HTTP response",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "invalid base64 ECDSA P-384 key",
|
|
domain: "badkey.com",
|
|
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
|
|
m.keyResponses["badkey.com"] = "v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=invalid-base64!!!"
|
|
m.err = nil
|
|
},
|
|
expectError: true,
|
|
errorContains: "failed to decode public key: illegal base64 data at input byte 4",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "wrong ECDSA P-384 key size",
|
|
domain: "wrongsize.com",
|
|
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
|
|
// Generate a key that's too short
|
|
shortKey := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("short"))
|
|
m.keyResponses["wrongsize.com"] = fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", shortKey)
|
|
m.err = nil
|
|
},
|
|
expectError: true,
|
|
errorContains: "invalid ECDSA P-384 public key size",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "ECDSA P-384 signature verification failure",
|
|
domain: testDomain,
|
|
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
|
|
// Generate different key pair for signature verification failure
|
|
wrongCompressedPubKey, _ := generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t)
|
|
wrongPublicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(wrongCompressedPubKey)
|
|
m.keyResponses[testDomain] = fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", wrongPublicKeyB64)
|
|
m.err = nil
|
|
},
|
|
expectError: true,
|
|
errorContains: "signature verification failed",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "invalid ECDSA P-384 key compression format",
|
|
domain: "invalidcompression.com",
|
|
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
|
|
// Generate a key with wrong compression byte
|
|
invalidKey := make([]byte, 49)
|
|
invalidKey[0] = 0x04 // uncompressed format, should be 0x02 or 0x03
|
|
invalidKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(invalidKey)
|
|
m.keyResponses["invalidcompression.com"] = fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", invalidKeyB64)
|
|
m.err = nil
|
|
},
|
|
expectError: true,
|
|
errorContains: "invalid ECDSA P-384 public key format (must be compressed, with a leading 0x02 or 0x03 byte)",
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Reset mock fetcher
|
|
mockFetcher.err = nil
|
|
if tt.setupMock != nil {
|
|
tt.setupMock(mockFetcher)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate signature if not provided
|
|
signedTimestamp := tt.signedTimestamp
|
|
if signedTimestamp == "" {
|
|
// Generate a valid signature for all cases
|
|
signature := signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t, privateKey, []byte(tt.timestamp))
|
|
signedTimestamp = hex.EncodeToString(signature)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Call the handler
|
|
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), tt.domain, tt.timestamp, signedTimestamp)
|
|
|
|
if tt.expectError {
|
|
assert.Error(t, err)
|
|
if tt.errorContains != "" {
|
|
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.errorContains)
|
|
}
|
|
assert.Nil(t, result)
|
|
} else {
|
|
assert.NoError(t, err)
|
|
assert.NotNil(t, result)
|
|
assert.NotEmpty(t, result.RegistryToken)
|
|
|
|
// Verify the token contains expected claims
|
|
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
|
|
claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), result.RegistryToken)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, intauth.MethodHTTP, claims.AuthMethod)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, tt.domain, claims.AuthMethodSubject)
|
|
assert.Len(t, claims.Permissions, 1) // domain permissions only
|
|
|
|
// Check permissions use reverse DNS patterns
|
|
patterns := make([]string, len(claims.Permissions))
|
|
for i, perm := range claims.Permissions {
|
|
patterns[i] = perm.ResourcePattern
|
|
}
|
|
// Convert domain to reverse DNS for expected patterns
|
|
parts := strings.Split(tt.domain, ".")
|
|
for i, j := 0, len(parts)-1; i < j; i, j = i+1, j-1 {
|
|
parts[i], parts[j] = parts[j], parts[i]
|
|
}
|
|
reverseDomain := strings.Join(parts, ".")
|
|
assert.Contains(t, patterns, fmt.Sprintf("%s/*", reverseDomain))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_ECDSAP384_Permissions(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &config.Config{
|
|
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
|
|
}
|
|
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
|
|
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
|
|
|
|
// Generate ECDSA P-384 test key pair
|
|
compressedPubKey, privateKey := generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t)
|
|
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(compressedPubKey)
|
|
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
domain string
|
|
expectedPatterns []string
|
|
unexpectedPatterns []string
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "simple domain with ECDSA P-384",
|
|
domain: testDomain,
|
|
expectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example/*", // exact domain pattern only (HTTP does not include subdomains)
|
|
},
|
|
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
"example.com/*", // should be reversed
|
|
"*.com.example", // wrong wildcard position
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "subdomain with ECDSA P-384",
|
|
domain: "api.example.com",
|
|
expectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example.api/*", // exact subdomain pattern only
|
|
},
|
|
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example.api.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
"com.example/*", // parent domain should not be included
|
|
"api.example.com/*", // should be reversed
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "hyphenated domain with ECDSA P-384",
|
|
domain: "my-app.example-site.com",
|
|
expectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example-site.my-app/*", // exact pattern only
|
|
},
|
|
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
|
|
"com.example-site.my-app.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
"my-app.example-site.com/*", // should be reversed
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Set up mock fetcher
|
|
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
|
|
keyResponses: map[string]string{
|
|
tt.domain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
|
|
|
|
// Generate signature
|
|
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
signature := signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t, privateKey, []byte(timestamp))
|
|
signedTimestamp := hex.EncodeToString(signature)
|
|
|
|
// Exchange token
|
|
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), tt.domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
require.NotNil(t, result)
|
|
|
|
// Validate JWT token
|
|
claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), result.RegistryToken)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Verify claims structure
|
|
assert.Equal(t, intauth.MethodHTTP, claims.AuthMethod)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, tt.domain, claims.AuthMethodSubject)
|
|
assert.Len(t, claims.Permissions, 1) // HTTP only grants exact domain permissions
|
|
|
|
// Extract permission patterns
|
|
patterns := make([]string, len(claims.Permissions))
|
|
for i, perm := range claims.Permissions {
|
|
patterns[i] = perm.ResourcePattern
|
|
// All permissions should be for publish action
|
|
assert.Equal(t, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, perm.Action)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check expected patterns are present
|
|
for _, expectedPattern := range tt.expectedPatterns {
|
|
assert.Contains(t, patterns, expectedPattern, "Expected pattern %s not found", expectedPattern)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check unexpected patterns are not present
|
|
for _, unexpectedPattern := range tt.unexpectedPatterns {
|
|
assert.NotContains(t, patterns, unexpectedPattern, "Unexpected pattern %s found", unexpectedPattern)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the permission patterns work correctly with the JWT manager's HasPermission method
|
|
for _, expectedPattern := range tt.expectedPatterns {
|
|
// Find the permission with this pattern
|
|
var foundPerm *intauth.Permission
|
|
for _, perm := range claims.Permissions {
|
|
if perm.ResourcePattern == expectedPattern {
|
|
foundPerm = &perm
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
require.NotNil(t, foundPerm, "Permission with pattern %s not found", expectedPattern)
|
|
|
|
// Test resource scenarios - only exact domain should work for HTTP
|
|
basePattern := strings.TrimSuffix(expectedPattern, "/*")
|
|
testResource := basePattern + "/my-package"
|
|
assert.True(t, jwtManager.HasPermission(testResource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, claims.Permissions),
|
|
"Should have permission for %s with pattern %s", testResource, expectedPattern)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_ECDSAP384_PermissionValidation(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &config.Config{
|
|
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
|
|
}
|
|
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
|
|
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
|
|
|
|
// Generate ECDSA P-384 test key pair
|
|
compressedPubKey, privateKey := generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t)
|
|
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(compressedPubKey)
|
|
domain := testDomain
|
|
|
|
// Set up mock fetcher
|
|
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
|
|
keyResponses: map[string]string{
|
|
domain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
|
|
|
|
// Generate signature and exchange token
|
|
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
signature := signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t, privateKey, []byte(timestamp))
|
|
signedTimestamp := hex.EncodeToString(signature)
|
|
|
|
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), result.RegistryToken)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Test permission validation scenarios (same as Ed25519, algorithm shouldn't affect permissions)
|
|
testCases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
resource string
|
|
action intauth.PermissionAction
|
|
shouldPass bool
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "exact domain resource with publish action",
|
|
resource: "com.example/my-package",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
|
|
shouldPass: true,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "subdomain resource should fail for HTTP",
|
|
resource: "com.example.api/my-package",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
|
|
shouldPass: false, // HTTP does not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "deep subdomain resource should fail for HTTP",
|
|
resource: "com.example.v1.api/my-package",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
|
|
shouldPass: false, // HTTP does not grant subdomain permissions
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "different domain should fail",
|
|
resource: "com.otherdomain/my-package",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
|
|
shouldPass: false,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "edit action should fail (not granted)",
|
|
resource: "com.example/my-package",
|
|
action: intauth.PermissionActionEdit,
|
|
shouldPass: false,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tc := range testCases {
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
hasPermission := jwtManager.HasPermission(tc.resource, tc.action, claims.Permissions)
|
|
if tc.shouldPass {
|
|
assert.True(t, hasPermission, "Expected permission for resource %s with action %s", tc.resource, tc.action)
|
|
} else {
|
|
assert.False(t, hasPermission, "Expected no permission for resource %s with action %s", tc.resource, tc.action)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_Ed25519_vs_ECDSAP384_Equivalence(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &config.Config{
|
|
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
|
|
}
|
|
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
|
|
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
|
|
|
|
// Generate Ed25519 key pair
|
|
ed25519PubKey, ed25519PrivKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
ed25519PubKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ed25519PubKey)
|
|
|
|
// Generate ECDSA P-384 key pair
|
|
ecdsaCompressedPubKey, ecdsaPrivKey := generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t)
|
|
ecdsaPubKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ecdsaCompressedPubKey)
|
|
|
|
testDomains := []string{testDomain, "api.example.com", "v1.api.example.com"}
|
|
|
|
for _, domain := range testDomains {
|
|
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("domain_%s", domain), func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
|
|
// Test Ed25519
|
|
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
|
|
keyResponses: map[string]string{
|
|
domain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", ed25519PubKeyB64),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
|
|
|
|
ed25519Signature := ed25519.Sign(ed25519PrivKey, []byte(timestamp))
|
|
ed25519Result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), domain, timestamp, hex.EncodeToString(ed25519Signature))
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Test ECDSA P-384
|
|
mockFetcher.keyResponses[domain] = fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", ecdsaPubKeyB64)
|
|
|
|
ecdsaSignature := signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t, ecdsaPrivKey, []byte(timestamp))
|
|
ecdsaResult, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), domain, timestamp, hex.EncodeToString(ecdsaSignature))
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Validate both tokens produce identical claims structure
|
|
ed25519Claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), ed25519Result.RegistryToken)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
ecdsaClaims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), ecdsaResult.RegistryToken)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Compare claims (excluding token-specific fields like timestamps)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, ed25519Claims.AuthMethod, ecdsaClaims.AuthMethod)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, ed25519Claims.AuthMethodSubject, ecdsaClaims.AuthMethodSubject)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, len(ed25519Claims.Permissions), len(ecdsaClaims.Permissions))
|
|
|
|
// Compare permission patterns (should be identical for HTTP auth)
|
|
ed25519Patterns := make([]string, len(ed25519Claims.Permissions))
|
|
ecdsaPatterns := make([]string, len(ecdsaClaims.Permissions))
|
|
|
|
for i, perm := range ed25519Claims.Permissions {
|
|
ed25519Patterns[i] = perm.ResourcePattern
|
|
}
|
|
for i, perm := range ecdsaClaims.Permissions {
|
|
ecdsaPatterns[i] = perm.ResourcePattern
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert.ElementsMatch(t, ed25519Patterns, ecdsaPatterns, "Permission patterns should be identical for both algorithms")
|
|
|
|
// Test that both tokens grant identical permissions for various resources
|
|
testResources := []string{
|
|
"com.example/package1",
|
|
"com.example.api/package2",
|
|
"com.example.v1.api/package3",
|
|
"com.otherdomain/package4",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, resource := range testResources {
|
|
ed25519HasPerm := jwtManager.HasPermission(resource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, ed25519Claims.Permissions)
|
|
ecdsaHasPerm := jwtManager.HasPermission(resource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, ecdsaClaims.Permissions)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, ed25519HasPerm, ecdsaHasPerm, "Permission mismatch for resource %s between Ed25519 and ECDSA P-384", resource)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_Algorithm_Support(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &config.Config{
|
|
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
|
|
}
|
|
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
|
|
|
|
// Generate both key pairs
|
|
ed25519PubKey, ed25519PrivKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
ed25519PubKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ed25519PubKey)
|
|
|
|
ecdsaCompressedPubKey, ecdsaPrivKey := generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t)
|
|
ecdsaPubKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ecdsaCompressedPubKey)
|
|
|
|
t.Run("single_ed25519_key", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// HTTP should work with a single Ed25519 key
|
|
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
|
|
keyResponses: map[string]string{
|
|
testDomain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", ed25519PubKeyB64),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
|
|
|
|
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
ed25519Signature := ed25519.Sign(ed25519PrivKey, []byte(timestamp))
|
|
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), testDomain, timestamp, hex.EncodeToString(ed25519Signature))
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
assert.NotNil(t, result)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("single_ecdsa_p384_key", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// HTTP should work with a single ECDSA P-384 key
|
|
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
|
|
keyResponses: map[string]string{
|
|
testDomain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", ecdsaPubKeyB64),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
|
|
|
|
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
ecdsaSignature := signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t, ecdsaPrivKey, []byte(timestamp))
|
|
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), testDomain, timestamp, hex.EncodeToString(ecdsaSignature))
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
assert.NotNil(t, result)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("http_response_with_extra_content", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// HTTP response can contain extra content, but only one key should be parsed
|
|
httpResponse := fmt.Sprintf("MCP Registry Auth Keys:\nv=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s\nSome other text",
|
|
ed25519PubKeyB64)
|
|
|
|
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
|
|
keyResponses: map[string]string{
|
|
testDomain: httpResponse,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
|
|
|
|
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
ed25519Signature := ed25519.Sign(ed25519PrivKey, []byte(timestamp))
|
|
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), testDomain, timestamp, hex.EncodeToString(ed25519Signature))
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
assert.NotNil(t, result)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("wrong_signature_for_single_key", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// If there's only one key and the signature doesn't match, it should fail
|
|
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
|
|
keyResponses: map[string]string{
|
|
testDomain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", ed25519PubKeyB64),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
|
|
|
|
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
// Use ECDSA signature with Ed25519 key - should fail
|
|
ecdsaSignature := signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t, ecdsaPrivKey, []byte(timestamp))
|
|
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), testDomain, timestamp, hex.EncodeToString(ecdsaSignature))
|
|
require.Error(t, err)
|
|
assert.Nil(t, result)
|
|
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid signature size for Ed25519")
|
|
})
|
|
}
|