registry/internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/http_test.go
Radoslav Dimitrov 1201cbd82b
security: fix open redirect and add small hardening (#1227)
## What this does

Fixes an open redirect plus a handful of small, mostly-invisible
hardening changes around it.

## What's in it

- **The fix**: trailing-slash redirects no longer let `//evil.com/`
redirect off-host.
- **SSRF block** on the DNS/HTTP namespace verification — refuses to
dial loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or
IP-literal/single-label \"domains\".
- **Slow-client guard**: `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` on the HTTP
server (no `WriteTimeout` — would risk cutting off legitimate
multi-package publishes).
- **Defence-in-depth headers** on the UI (`/`) and 404 responses.
- **5xx responses** stop leaking raw DB error text to clients (logged
server-side instead).
- **Search filter** stops treating `%` and `_` as wildcards.
- **Validators**: PyPI/NuGet identifiers URL-escaped before fetching;
MCPB no longer follows redirects.
- **Misc**: `Version` field bounded to 255 chars; logs quote user input;
`BlockedNamespaces` denylist now catches subdomain claimants.

Each change is its own commit so they can be reviewed (or reverted)
independently.

## Test plan

- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Synthetic publish in staging for each package type (npm, pypi,
nuget, oci, mcpb) — confirms validator changes don't regress
- [ ] Quick browser check of `/` after deploy to confirm UI still loads
with the new CSP
- [ ] `curl https://<host>//evil.com/` — confirm the open redirect is
closed

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 19:14:00 -04:00

1312 lines
43 KiB
Go

package auth_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha512"
"crypto/tls"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/api/handlers/v0/auth"
intauth "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/auth"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/config"
)
const wellKnownPath = "/.well-known/mcp-registry-auth"
func newClientForTLSServer(t *testing.T, srv *httptest.Server) *http.Client {
t.Helper()
dialAddr := srv.Listener.Addr().String()
transport := &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, //nolint:gosec // testing only
DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
d := &net.Dialer{}
return d.DialContext(ctx, network, dialAddr)
},
ForceAttemptHTTP2: false,
MaxIdleConns: 10,
IdleConnTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
TLSHandshakeTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
}
return &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
}
const testDomain = "example.com"
// MockHTTPKeyFetcher for testing
type MockHTTPKeyFetcher struct {
keyResponses map[string]string
err error
}
func (m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) FetchKey(_ context.Context, domain string) (string, error) {
if m.err != nil {
return "", m.err
}
return m.keyResponses[domain], nil
}
// generateECDSAP384KeyPair generates an ECDSA P-384 key pair for testing
func generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t *testing.T) ([]byte, *ecdsa.PrivateKey) {
t.Helper()
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Compress the public key
compressedPubKey := elliptic.MarshalCompressed(elliptic.P384(), privateKey.X, privateKey.Y)
return compressedPubKey, privateKey
}
// signWithECDSAP384HTTP signs a message using ECDSA P-384
func signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t *testing.T, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, message []byte) []byte {
t.Helper()
digest := sha512.Sum384(message)
r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, privateKey, digest[:])
require.NoError(t, err)
// Convert to R || S format (48 bytes each for P-384)
signature := make([]byte, 96)
r.FillBytes(signature[:48])
s.FillBytes(signature[48:])
return signature
}
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_ExchangeToken(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
}
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
// Generate a test key pair
publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Create mock HTTP key fetcher
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey)
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
keyResponses: map[string]string{
testDomain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
},
}
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
tests := []struct {
name string
domain string
timestamp string
signedTimestamp string
setupMock func(*MockHTTPKeyFetcher)
expectError bool
errorContains string
}{
{
name: "successful authentication",
domain: testDomain,
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(_ *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
// Mock is already set up with valid key
},
expectError: false,
},
{
name: "invalid domain format",
domain: "invalid..domain",
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
expectError: true,
errorContains: "invalid domain format",
},
{
name: "invalid timestamp format",
domain: testDomain,
timestamp: "invalid-timestamp",
expectError: true,
errorContains: "invalid timestamp format",
},
{
name: "timestamp too old",
domain: testDomain,
timestamp: time.Now().Add(-30 * time.Second).UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
expectError: true,
errorContains: "timestamp outside valid window",
},
{
name: "timestamp too far in the future",
domain: testDomain,
timestamp: time.Now().Add(30 * time.Second).UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
expectError: true,
errorContains: "timestamp outside valid window",
},
{
name: "invalid signature format",
domain: testDomain,
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
signedTimestamp: "invalid-hex",
expectError: true,
errorContains: "invalid signature format",
},
{
name: "signature wrong length",
domain: testDomain,
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
signedTimestamp: "abcdef", // too short
expectError: true,
errorContains: "invalid signature size for Ed25519",
},
{
name: "HTTP key fetch failure",
domain: "nonexistent.com",
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
m.err = fmt.Errorf("HTTP 404: not found")
},
expectError: true,
errorContains: "failed to fetch public key",
},
{
name: "invalid key format",
domain: "invalidkey.com",
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
m.keyResponses["invalidkey.com"] = "invalid key format"
m.err = nil
},
expectError: true,
errorContains: "no MCP public key found in HTTP response",
},
{
name: "invalid base64 key",
domain: "badkey.com",
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
m.keyResponses["badkey.com"] = "v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=invalid-base64!!!"
m.err = nil
},
expectError: true,
errorContains: "failed to decode public key: illegal base64 data at input byte 4",
},
{
name: "wrong key size",
domain: "wrongsize.com",
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
// Generate a key that's too short
shortKey := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("short"))
m.keyResponses["wrongsize.com"] = fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", shortKey)
m.err = nil
},
expectError: true,
errorContains: "invalid Ed25519 public key size",
},
{
name: "signature verification failure",
domain: testDomain,
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
// Generate different key pair for signature verification failure
wrongPublicKey, _, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
wrongPublicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(wrongPublicKey)
m.keyResponses[testDomain] = fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", wrongPublicKeyB64)
m.err = nil
},
expectError: true,
errorContains: "signature verification failed",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Reset mock fetcher
mockFetcher.err = nil
if tt.setupMock != nil {
tt.setupMock(mockFetcher)
}
// Generate signature if not provided
signedTimestamp := tt.signedTimestamp
if signedTimestamp == "" {
// Generate a valid signature for all cases
signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, []byte(tt.timestamp))
signedTimestamp = hex.EncodeToString(signature)
}
// Call the handler
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), tt.domain, tt.timestamp, signedTimestamp)
if tt.expectError {
assert.Error(t, err)
if tt.errorContains != "" {
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.errorContains)
}
assert.Nil(t, result)
} else {
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, result)
assert.NotEmpty(t, result.RegistryToken)
// Verify the token contains expected claims
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), result.RegistryToken)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, intauth.MethodHTTP, claims.AuthMethod)
assert.Equal(t, tt.domain, claims.AuthMethodSubject)
assert.Len(t, claims.Permissions, 1) // domain permissions only
// Check permissions use reverse DNS patterns
patterns := make([]string, len(claims.Permissions))
for i, perm := range claims.Permissions {
patterns[i] = perm.ResourcePattern
}
// Convert domain to reverse DNS for expected patterns
parts := strings.Split(tt.domain, ".")
for i, j := 0, len(parts)-1; i < j; i, j = i+1, j-1 {
parts[i], parts[j] = parts[j], parts[i]
}
reverseDomain := strings.Join(parts, ".")
assert.Contains(t, patterns, fmt.Sprintf("%s/*", reverseDomain))
}
})
}
}
func TestDefaultHTTPKeyFetcher_FetchKey(t *testing.T) {
// This test would require a real HTTP server or more sophisticated mocking
// For now, we'll test the basic structure
fetcher := auth.NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcher()
assert.NotNil(t, fetcher)
// Test that it returns an error for non-existent domains
// (This will fail with network error, which is expected)
_, err := fetcher.FetchKey(context.Background(), "nonexistent-test-domain-12345.com")
assert.Error(t, err)
}
func TestDefaultHTTPKeyFetcher(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
handler http.HandlerFunc
wantErrSub string
customClient *http.Client
expectOK bool
wantBody string
}{
{
name: "oversized body",
handler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path != wellKnownPath {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
_, _ = w.Write(bytes.Repeat([]byte("A"), 6000))
},
wantErrSub: "too large",
},
{
name: "non-OK status",
handler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == wellKnownPath {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
},
wantErrSub: "HTTP 500",
},
{
name: "connection failure",
handler: nil,
customClient: &http.Client{
Transport: &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, //nolint:gosec // testing only
DialContext: func(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial blocked")
},
},
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
},
wantErrSub: "failed to fetch key",
},
{
name: "response body failure",
handler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path != wellKnownPath {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", "100")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("PARTIAL"))
},
wantErrSub: "failed to read response body",
},
{
name: "success",
handler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path != wellKnownPath {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("response"))
},
expectOK: true,
wantBody: "response",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if tt.handler != nil {
srv := httptest.NewTLSServer(tt.handler)
defer srv.Close()
c := newClientForTLSServer(t, srv)
f := auth.NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcherWithClient(c)
got, err := f.FetchKey(context.Background(), "example.com")
if tt.expectOK {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if got != tt.wantBody {
t.Fatalf("unexpected body: got %q want %q", got, tt.wantBody)
}
return
}
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErrSub) {
t.Fatalf("got err=%v, want substring %q", err, tt.wantErrSub)
}
return
}
f := auth.NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcherWithClient(tt.customClient)
got, err := f.FetchKey(context.Background(), "example.com")
if tt.expectOK {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if got != tt.wantBody {
t.Fatalf("unexpected body: got %q want %q", got, tt.wantBody)
}
return
}
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErrSub) {
t.Fatalf("got err=%v, want substring %q", err, tt.wantErrSub)
}
})
}
}
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_Permissions(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
}
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
// Generate a test key pair
publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey)
tests := []struct {
name string
domain string
expectedPatterns []string
unexpectedPatterns []string
}{
{
name: "simple domain",
domain: testDomain,
expectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example/*", // exact domain pattern only (HTTP does not include subdomains)
},
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
"example.com/*", // should be reversed
"*.com.example", // wrong wildcard position
},
},
{
name: "subdomain",
domain: "api.example.com",
expectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example.api/*", // exact subdomain pattern only
},
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example.api.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
"com.example/*", // parent domain should not be included
"api.example.com/*", // should be reversed
},
},
{
name: "multi-level subdomain",
domain: "v1.api.example.com",
expectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example.api.v1/*", // exact pattern only
},
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example.api.v1.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
"com.example/*", // parent domain should not be included
"com.example.api/*", // intermediate domain should not be included
"v1.api.example.com/*", // should be reversed
},
},
{
name: "hyphenated domain",
domain: "my-app.example-site.com",
expectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example-site.my-app/*", // exact pattern only
},
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example-site.my-app.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
"my-app.example-site.com/*", // should be reversed
},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Set up mock fetcher
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
keyResponses: map[string]string{
tt.domain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
},
}
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
// Generate signature
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, []byte(timestamp))
signedTimestamp := hex.EncodeToString(signature)
// Exchange token
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), tt.domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, result)
// Validate JWT token
claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), result.RegistryToken)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Verify claims structure
assert.Equal(t, intauth.MethodHTTP, claims.AuthMethod)
assert.Equal(t, tt.domain, claims.AuthMethodSubject)
assert.Len(t, claims.Permissions, 1) // HTTP only grants exact domain permissions
// Extract permission patterns
patterns := make([]string, len(claims.Permissions))
for i, perm := range claims.Permissions {
patterns[i] = perm.ResourcePattern
// All permissions should be for publish action
assert.Equal(t, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, perm.Action)
}
// Check expected patterns are present
for _, expectedPattern := range tt.expectedPatterns {
assert.Contains(t, patterns, expectedPattern, "Expected pattern %s not found", expectedPattern)
}
// Check unexpected patterns are not present
for _, unexpectedPattern := range tt.unexpectedPatterns {
assert.NotContains(t, patterns, unexpectedPattern, "Unexpected pattern %s found", unexpectedPattern)
}
// Verify the permission patterns work correctly with the JWT manager's HasPermission method
for _, expectedPattern := range tt.expectedPatterns {
// Find the permission with this pattern
var foundPerm *intauth.Permission
for _, perm := range claims.Permissions {
if perm.ResourcePattern == expectedPattern {
foundPerm = &perm
break
}
}
require.NotNil(t, foundPerm, "Permission with pattern %s not found", expectedPattern)
// Test resource scenarios - only exact domain should work for HTTP
if strings.HasSuffix(expectedPattern, "/*") {
// Exact domain permissions (e.g., "com.example/*")
basePattern := strings.TrimSuffix(expectedPattern, "/*")
testResource := basePattern + "/my-package"
assert.True(t, jwtManager.HasPermission(testResource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, claims.Permissions),
"Should have permission for %s with pattern %s", testResource, expectedPattern)
// Test that subdomain resources are NOT allowed for HTTP
subdomainResource := basePattern + ".subdomain/my-package"
assert.False(t, jwtManager.HasPermission(subdomainResource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, claims.Permissions),
"Should NOT have permission for subdomain %s with HTTP auth", subdomainResource)
}
}
})
}
}
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_PermissionValidation(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
}
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
// Generate a test key pair
publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey)
domain := testDomain
// Set up mock fetcher
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
keyResponses: map[string]string{
domain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
},
}
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
// Generate signature and exchange token
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, []byte(timestamp))
signedTimestamp := hex.EncodeToString(signature)
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
require.NoError(t, err)
claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), result.RegistryToken)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Test permission validation scenarios
testCases := []struct {
name string
resource string
action intauth.PermissionAction
shouldPass bool
}{
{
name: "exact domain resource with publish action",
resource: "com.example/my-package",
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
shouldPass: true,
},
{
name: "subdomain resource should fail for HTTP",
resource: "com.example.api/my-package",
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
shouldPass: false, // HTTP does not grant subdomain permissions
},
{
name: "deep subdomain resource should fail for HTTP",
resource: "com.example.v1.api/my-package",
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
shouldPass: false, // HTTP does not grant subdomain permissions
},
{
name: "different domain should fail",
resource: "com.otherdomain/my-package",
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
shouldPass: false,
},
{
name: "partial domain match should fail",
resource: "com.example-other/my-package",
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
shouldPass: false,
},
{
name: "parent domain should fail",
resource: "com/my-package",
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
shouldPass: false,
},
{
name: "edit action should fail (not granted)",
resource: "com.example/my-package",
action: intauth.PermissionActionEdit,
shouldPass: false,
},
{
name: "resource without package separator should fail",
resource: "com.example",
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
shouldPass: false,
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
hasPermission := jwtManager.HasPermission(tc.resource, tc.action, claims.Permissions)
if tc.shouldPass {
assert.True(t, hasPermission, "Expected permission for resource %s with action %s", tc.resource, tc.action)
} else {
assert.False(t, hasPermission, "Expected no permission for resource %s with action %s", tc.resource, tc.action)
}
})
}
}
func TestHTTPvsDNS_PermissionDifferences(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
}
httpHandler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
dnsHandler := auth.NewDNSAuthHandler(cfg)
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
// Generate a test key pair
publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey)
domain := testDomain
// Set up mocks
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
keyResponses: map[string]string{
domain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
},
}
httpHandler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
mockResolver := &MockDNSResolver{
txtRecords: map[string][]string{
domain: {
fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
},
},
}
dnsHandler.SetResolver(mockResolver)
// Generate tokens from both handlers
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, []byte(timestamp))
signedTimestamp := hex.EncodeToString(signature)
httpResult, err := httpHandler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
require.NoError(t, err)
dnsResult, err := dnsHandler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Validate both tokens
httpClaims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), httpResult.RegistryToken)
require.NoError(t, err)
dnsClaims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), dnsResult.RegistryToken)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Compare permission counts
assert.Len(t, httpClaims.Permissions, 1, "HTTP should grant 1 permission (exact domain only)")
assert.Len(t, dnsClaims.Permissions, 2, "DNS should grant 2 permissions (exact domain + subdomains)")
// Test resources that should behave differently
testCases := []struct {
name string
resource string
httpAllowed bool
dnsAllowed bool
}{
{
name: "exact domain resource",
resource: "com.example/my-package",
httpAllowed: true,
dnsAllowed: true,
},
{
name: "subdomain resource",
resource: "com.example.api/my-package",
httpAllowed: false, // HTTP does not grant subdomain permissions
dnsAllowed: true, // DNS grants subdomain permissions
},
{
name: "deep subdomain resource",
resource: "com.example.v1.api/my-package",
httpAllowed: false, // HTTP does not grant subdomain permissions
dnsAllowed: true, // DNS grants subdomain permissions
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
httpPermission := jwtManager.HasPermission(tc.resource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, httpClaims.Permissions)
dnsPermission := jwtManager.HasPermission(tc.resource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, dnsClaims.Permissions)
assert.Equal(t, tc.httpAllowed, httpPermission, "HTTP permission mismatch for %s", tc.resource)
assert.Equal(t, tc.dnsAllowed, dnsPermission, "DNS permission mismatch for %s", tc.resource)
})
}
}
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_ExchangeToken_ECDSAP384(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
}
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
// Generate ECDSA P-384 test key pair
compressedPubKey, privateKey := generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t)
// Create mock HTTP key fetcher
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(compressedPubKey)
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
keyResponses: map[string]string{
testDomain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
},
}
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
tests := []struct {
name string
domain string
timestamp string
signedTimestamp string
setupMock func(*MockHTTPKeyFetcher)
expectError bool
errorContains string
}{
{
name: "successful ECDSA P-384 authentication",
domain: testDomain,
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(_ *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
// Mock is already set up with valid key
},
expectError: false,
},
{
name: "invalid ECDSA P-384 signature format",
domain: testDomain,
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
signedTimestamp: "invalid-hex",
expectError: true,
errorContains: "invalid signature format",
},
{
name: "ECDSA P-384 signature wrong length",
domain: testDomain,
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
signedTimestamp: "abcdef", // too short
expectError: true,
errorContains: "invalid signature size for ECDSA P-384",
},
{
name: "HTTP ECDSA P-384 key fetch failure",
domain: "nonexistent.com",
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
m.err = fmt.Errorf("HTTP 404: not found")
},
expectError: true,
errorContains: "failed to fetch public key",
},
{
name: "invalid ECDSA P-384 key format",
domain: "invalidkey.com",
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
m.keyResponses["invalidkey.com"] = "invalid key format"
m.err = nil
},
expectError: true,
errorContains: "no MCP public key found in HTTP response",
},
{
name: "invalid base64 ECDSA P-384 key",
domain: "badkey.com",
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
m.keyResponses["badkey.com"] = "v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=invalid-base64!!!"
m.err = nil
},
expectError: true,
errorContains: "failed to decode public key: illegal base64 data at input byte 4",
},
{
name: "wrong ECDSA P-384 key size",
domain: "wrongsize.com",
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
// Generate a key that's too short
shortKey := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("short"))
m.keyResponses["wrongsize.com"] = fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", shortKey)
m.err = nil
},
expectError: true,
errorContains: "invalid ECDSA P-384 public key size",
},
{
name: "ECDSA P-384 signature verification failure",
domain: testDomain,
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
// Generate different key pair for signature verification failure
wrongCompressedPubKey, _ := generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t)
wrongPublicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(wrongCompressedPubKey)
m.keyResponses[testDomain] = fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", wrongPublicKeyB64)
m.err = nil
},
expectError: true,
errorContains: "signature verification failed",
},
{
name: "invalid ECDSA P-384 key compression format",
domain: "invalidcompression.com",
timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
setupMock: func(m *MockHTTPKeyFetcher) {
// Generate a key with wrong compression byte
invalidKey := make([]byte, 49)
invalidKey[0] = 0x04 // uncompressed format, should be 0x02 or 0x03
invalidKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(invalidKey)
m.keyResponses["invalidcompression.com"] = fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", invalidKeyB64)
m.err = nil
},
expectError: true,
errorContains: "invalid ECDSA P-384 public key format (must be compressed, with a leading 0x02 or 0x03 byte)",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Reset mock fetcher
mockFetcher.err = nil
if tt.setupMock != nil {
tt.setupMock(mockFetcher)
}
// Generate signature if not provided
signedTimestamp := tt.signedTimestamp
if signedTimestamp == "" {
// Generate a valid signature for all cases
signature := signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t, privateKey, []byte(tt.timestamp))
signedTimestamp = hex.EncodeToString(signature)
}
// Call the handler
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), tt.domain, tt.timestamp, signedTimestamp)
if tt.expectError {
assert.Error(t, err)
if tt.errorContains != "" {
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.errorContains)
}
assert.Nil(t, result)
} else {
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, result)
assert.NotEmpty(t, result.RegistryToken)
// Verify the token contains expected claims
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), result.RegistryToken)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, intauth.MethodHTTP, claims.AuthMethod)
assert.Equal(t, tt.domain, claims.AuthMethodSubject)
assert.Len(t, claims.Permissions, 1) // domain permissions only
// Check permissions use reverse DNS patterns
patterns := make([]string, len(claims.Permissions))
for i, perm := range claims.Permissions {
patterns[i] = perm.ResourcePattern
}
// Convert domain to reverse DNS for expected patterns
parts := strings.Split(tt.domain, ".")
for i, j := 0, len(parts)-1; i < j; i, j = i+1, j-1 {
parts[i], parts[j] = parts[j], parts[i]
}
reverseDomain := strings.Join(parts, ".")
assert.Contains(t, patterns, fmt.Sprintf("%s/*", reverseDomain))
}
})
}
}
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_ECDSAP384_Permissions(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
}
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
// Generate ECDSA P-384 test key pair
compressedPubKey, privateKey := generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t)
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(compressedPubKey)
tests := []struct {
name string
domain string
expectedPatterns []string
unexpectedPatterns []string
}{
{
name: "simple domain with ECDSA P-384",
domain: testDomain,
expectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example/*", // exact domain pattern only (HTTP does not include subdomains)
},
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
"example.com/*", // should be reversed
"*.com.example", // wrong wildcard position
},
},
{
name: "subdomain with ECDSA P-384",
domain: "api.example.com",
expectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example.api/*", // exact subdomain pattern only
},
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example.api.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
"com.example/*", // parent domain should not be included
"api.example.com/*", // should be reversed
},
},
{
name: "hyphenated domain with ECDSA P-384",
domain: "my-app.example-site.com",
expectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example-site.my-app/*", // exact pattern only
},
unexpectedPatterns: []string{
"com.example-site.my-app.*", // HTTP should not grant subdomain permissions
"my-app.example-site.com/*", // should be reversed
},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Set up mock fetcher
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
keyResponses: map[string]string{
tt.domain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
},
}
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
// Generate signature
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
signature := signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t, privateKey, []byte(timestamp))
signedTimestamp := hex.EncodeToString(signature)
// Exchange token
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), tt.domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, result)
// Validate JWT token
claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), result.RegistryToken)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Verify claims structure
assert.Equal(t, intauth.MethodHTTP, claims.AuthMethod)
assert.Equal(t, tt.domain, claims.AuthMethodSubject)
assert.Len(t, claims.Permissions, 1) // HTTP only grants exact domain permissions
// Extract permission patterns
patterns := make([]string, len(claims.Permissions))
for i, perm := range claims.Permissions {
patterns[i] = perm.ResourcePattern
// All permissions should be for publish action
assert.Equal(t, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, perm.Action)
}
// Check expected patterns are present
for _, expectedPattern := range tt.expectedPatterns {
assert.Contains(t, patterns, expectedPattern, "Expected pattern %s not found", expectedPattern)
}
// Check unexpected patterns are not present
for _, unexpectedPattern := range tt.unexpectedPatterns {
assert.NotContains(t, patterns, unexpectedPattern, "Unexpected pattern %s found", unexpectedPattern)
}
// Verify the permission patterns work correctly with the JWT manager's HasPermission method
for _, expectedPattern := range tt.expectedPatterns {
// Find the permission with this pattern
var foundPerm *intauth.Permission
for _, perm := range claims.Permissions {
if perm.ResourcePattern == expectedPattern {
foundPerm = &perm
break
}
}
require.NotNil(t, foundPerm, "Permission with pattern %s not found", expectedPattern)
// Test resource scenarios - only exact domain should work for HTTP
basePattern := strings.TrimSuffix(expectedPattern, "/*")
testResource := basePattern + "/my-package"
assert.True(t, jwtManager.HasPermission(testResource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, claims.Permissions),
"Should have permission for %s with pattern %s", testResource, expectedPattern)
}
})
}
}
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_ECDSAP384_PermissionValidation(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
}
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
// Generate ECDSA P-384 test key pair
compressedPubKey, privateKey := generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t)
publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(compressedPubKey)
domain := testDomain
// Set up mock fetcher
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
keyResponses: map[string]string{
domain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", publicKeyB64),
},
}
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
// Generate signature and exchange token
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
signature := signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t, privateKey, []byte(timestamp))
signedTimestamp := hex.EncodeToString(signature)
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
require.NoError(t, err)
claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), result.RegistryToken)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Test permission validation scenarios (same as Ed25519, algorithm shouldn't affect permissions)
testCases := []struct {
name string
resource string
action intauth.PermissionAction
shouldPass bool
}{
{
name: "exact domain resource with publish action",
resource: "com.example/my-package",
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
shouldPass: true,
},
{
name: "subdomain resource should fail for HTTP",
resource: "com.example.api/my-package",
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
shouldPass: false, // HTTP does not grant subdomain permissions
},
{
name: "deep subdomain resource should fail for HTTP",
resource: "com.example.v1.api/my-package",
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
shouldPass: false, // HTTP does not grant subdomain permissions
},
{
name: "different domain should fail",
resource: "com.otherdomain/my-package",
action: intauth.PermissionActionPublish,
shouldPass: false,
},
{
name: "edit action should fail (not granted)",
resource: "com.example/my-package",
action: intauth.PermissionActionEdit,
shouldPass: false,
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
hasPermission := jwtManager.HasPermission(tc.resource, tc.action, claims.Permissions)
if tc.shouldPass {
assert.True(t, hasPermission, "Expected permission for resource %s with action %s", tc.resource, tc.action)
} else {
assert.False(t, hasPermission, "Expected no permission for resource %s with action %s", tc.resource, tc.action)
}
})
}
}
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_Ed25519_vs_ECDSAP384_Equivalence(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
}
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
jwtManager := intauth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
// Generate Ed25519 key pair
ed25519PubKey, ed25519PrivKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
ed25519PubKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ed25519PubKey)
// Generate ECDSA P-384 key pair
ecdsaCompressedPubKey, ecdsaPrivKey := generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t)
ecdsaPubKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ecdsaCompressedPubKey)
testDomains := []string{testDomain, "api.example.com", "v1.api.example.com"}
for _, domain := range testDomains {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("domain_%s", domain), func(t *testing.T) {
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
// Test Ed25519
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
keyResponses: map[string]string{
domain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", ed25519PubKeyB64),
},
}
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
ed25519Signature := ed25519.Sign(ed25519PrivKey, []byte(timestamp))
ed25519Result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), domain, timestamp, hex.EncodeToString(ed25519Signature))
require.NoError(t, err)
// Test ECDSA P-384
mockFetcher.keyResponses[domain] = fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", ecdsaPubKeyB64)
ecdsaSignature := signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t, ecdsaPrivKey, []byte(timestamp))
ecdsaResult, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), domain, timestamp, hex.EncodeToString(ecdsaSignature))
require.NoError(t, err)
// Validate both tokens produce identical claims structure
ed25519Claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), ed25519Result.RegistryToken)
require.NoError(t, err)
ecdsaClaims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(context.Background(), ecdsaResult.RegistryToken)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Compare claims (excluding token-specific fields like timestamps)
assert.Equal(t, ed25519Claims.AuthMethod, ecdsaClaims.AuthMethod)
assert.Equal(t, ed25519Claims.AuthMethodSubject, ecdsaClaims.AuthMethodSubject)
assert.Equal(t, len(ed25519Claims.Permissions), len(ecdsaClaims.Permissions))
// Compare permission patterns (should be identical for HTTP auth)
ed25519Patterns := make([]string, len(ed25519Claims.Permissions))
ecdsaPatterns := make([]string, len(ecdsaClaims.Permissions))
for i, perm := range ed25519Claims.Permissions {
ed25519Patterns[i] = perm.ResourcePattern
}
for i, perm := range ecdsaClaims.Permissions {
ecdsaPatterns[i] = perm.ResourcePattern
}
assert.ElementsMatch(t, ed25519Patterns, ecdsaPatterns, "Permission patterns should be identical for both algorithms")
// Test that both tokens grant identical permissions for various resources
testResources := []string{
"com.example/package1",
"com.example.api/package2",
"com.example.v1.api/package3",
"com.otherdomain/package4",
}
for _, resource := range testResources {
ed25519HasPerm := jwtManager.HasPermission(resource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, ed25519Claims.Permissions)
ecdsaHasPerm := jwtManager.HasPermission(resource, intauth.PermissionActionPublish, ecdsaClaims.Permissions)
assert.Equal(t, ed25519HasPerm, ecdsaHasPerm, "Permission mismatch for resource %s between Ed25519 and ECDSA P-384", resource)
}
})
}
}
func TestHTTPAuthHandler_Algorithm_Support(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{
JWTPrivateKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
}
handler := auth.NewHTTPAuthHandler(cfg)
// Generate both key pairs
ed25519PubKey, ed25519PrivKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
ed25519PubKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ed25519PubKey)
ecdsaCompressedPubKey, ecdsaPrivKey := generateECDSAP384KeyPairHTTP(t)
ecdsaPubKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ecdsaCompressedPubKey)
t.Run("single_ed25519_key", func(t *testing.T) {
// HTTP should work with a single Ed25519 key
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
keyResponses: map[string]string{
testDomain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", ed25519PubKeyB64),
},
}
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
ed25519Signature := ed25519.Sign(ed25519PrivKey, []byte(timestamp))
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), testDomain, timestamp, hex.EncodeToString(ed25519Signature))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, result)
})
t.Run("single_ecdsa_p384_key", func(t *testing.T) {
// HTTP should work with a single ECDSA P-384 key
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
keyResponses: map[string]string{
testDomain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=%s", ecdsaPubKeyB64),
},
}
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
ecdsaSignature := signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t, ecdsaPrivKey, []byte(timestamp))
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), testDomain, timestamp, hex.EncodeToString(ecdsaSignature))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, result)
})
t.Run("http_response_with_extra_content", func(t *testing.T) {
// HTTP response can contain extra content, but only one key should be parsed
httpResponse := fmt.Sprintf("MCP Registry Auth Keys:\nv=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s\nSome other text",
ed25519PubKeyB64)
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
keyResponses: map[string]string{
testDomain: httpResponse,
},
}
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
ed25519Signature := ed25519.Sign(ed25519PrivKey, []byte(timestamp))
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), testDomain, timestamp, hex.EncodeToString(ed25519Signature))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, result)
})
t.Run("wrong_signature_for_single_key", func(t *testing.T) {
// If there's only one key and the signature doesn't match, it should fail
mockFetcher := &MockHTTPKeyFetcher{
keyResponses: map[string]string{
testDomain: fmt.Sprintf("v=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=%s", ed25519PubKeyB64),
},
}
handler.SetFetcher(mockFetcher)
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
// Use ECDSA signature with Ed25519 key - should fail
ecdsaSignature := signWithECDSAP384HTTP(t, ecdsaPrivKey, []byte(timestamp))
result, err := handler.ExchangeToken(context.Background(), testDomain, timestamp, hex.EncodeToString(ecdsaSignature))
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Nil(t, result)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid signature size for Ed25519")
})
}