registry/internal/api/handlers/v0/edit.go
Radoslav Dimitrov 1201cbd82b
security: fix open redirect and add small hardening (#1227)
## What this does

Fixes an open redirect plus a handful of small, mostly-invisible
hardening changes around it.

## What's in it

- **The fix**: trailing-slash redirects no longer let `//evil.com/`
redirect off-host.
- **SSRF block** on the DNS/HTTP namespace verification — refuses to
dial loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or
IP-literal/single-label \"domains\".
- **Slow-client guard**: `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` on the HTTP
server (no `WriteTimeout` — would risk cutting off legitimate
multi-package publishes).
- **Defence-in-depth headers** on the UI (`/`) and 404 responses.
- **5xx responses** stop leaking raw DB error text to clients (logged
server-side instead).
- **Search filter** stops treating `%` and `_` as wildcards.
- **Validators**: PyPI/NuGet identifiers URL-escaped before fetching;
MCPB no longer follows redirects.
- **Misc**: `Version` field bounded to 255 chars; logs quote user input;
`BlockedNamespaces` denylist now catches subdomain claimants.

Each change is its own commit so they can be reviewed (or reverted)
independently.

## Test plan

- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Synthetic publish in staging for each package type (npm, pypi,
nuget, oci, mcpb) — confirms validator changes don't regress
- [ ] Quick browser check of `/` after deploy to confirm UI still loads
with the new CSP
- [ ] `curl https://<host>//evil.com/` — confirm the open redirect is
closed

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 19:14:00 -04:00

115 lines
4.6 KiB
Go

package v0
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/auth"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/config"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/database"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/service"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/validators"
apiv0 "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/pkg/api/v0"
)
// EditServerInput represents the input for editing a server
type EditServerInput struct {
Authorization string `header:"Authorization" doc:"Registry JWT token with edit permissions" required:"true"`
ServerName string `path:"serverName" doc:"URL-encoded server name" example:"com.example%2Fmy-server"`
Version string `path:"version" doc:"URL-encoded version to edit" example:"1.0.0"`
Body apiv0.ServerJSON `body:""`
}
// RegisterEditEndpoints registers the edit endpoint with a custom path prefix
func RegisterEditEndpoints(api huma.API, pathPrefix string, registry service.RegistryService, cfg *config.Config) {
jwtManager := auth.NewJWTManager(cfg)
// Edit server endpoint
huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{
OperationID: "edit-server" + strings.ReplaceAll(pathPrefix, "/", "-"),
Method: http.MethodPut,
Path: pathPrefix + "/servers/{serverName}/versions/{version}",
Summary: "Edit MCP server",
Description: "Update the configuration of a specific version of an existing MCP server. Requires edit permission for the server. Use PATCH /servers/{serverName}/versions/{version}/status to update status metadata.",
Tags: []string{"servers"},
Security: []map[string][]string{
{"bearer": {}},
},
}, func(ctx context.Context, input *EditServerInput) (*Response[apiv0.ServerResponse], error) {
// Extract bearer token
const bearerPrefix = "Bearer "
authHeader := input.Authorization
if len(authHeader) < len(bearerPrefix) || !strings.EqualFold(authHeader[:len(bearerPrefix)], bearerPrefix) {
return nil, huma.Error401Unauthorized("Invalid Authorization header format. Expected 'Bearer <token>'")
}
token := authHeader[len(bearerPrefix):]
// Validate Registry JWT token
claims, err := jwtManager.ValidateToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return nil, huma.Error401Unauthorized("Invalid or expired Registry JWT token", err)
}
// URL-decode the server name
serverName, err := url.PathUnescape(input.ServerName)
if err != nil {
return nil, huma.Error400BadRequest("Invalid server name encoding", err)
}
// URL-decode the version
version, err := url.PathUnescape(input.Version)
if err != nil {
return nil, huma.Error400BadRequest("Invalid version encoding", err)
}
// Get current server to check permissions against existing name
// Deleted servers return 404 - restore via status endpoint first
currentServer, err := registry.GetServerByNameAndVersion(ctx, serverName, version, false)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, database.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, huma.Error404NotFound("Server not found")
}
log.Printf("edit: get current server (%q/%q) failed: %v", serverName, version, err)
return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError("Failed to get current server")
}
// Verify edit permissions for this server using the existing server name
if !jwtManager.HasPermission(currentServer.Server.Name, auth.PermissionActionEdit, claims.Permissions) {
return nil, huma.Error403Forbidden("You do not have edit permissions for this server")
}
// Prevent renaming servers
if currentServer.Server.Name != input.Body.Name {
return nil, huma.Error400BadRequest("Cannot rename server")
}
// Validate that the version in the body matches the URL parameter
if input.Body.Version != version {
return nil, huma.Error400BadRequest("Version in request body must match URL path parameter")
}
// Validate server JSON structure and schema (returns 422 on validation failure)
validationResult := validators.ValidateServerJSON(&input.Body, validators.ValidationSchemaVersionAndSemantic)
if !validationResult.Valid {
return nil, huma.Error422UnprocessableEntity("Failed to edit server, invalid schema: call /validate for details")
}
updatedServer, err := registry.UpdateServer(ctx, serverName, version, &input.Body, nil)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, database.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, huma.Error404NotFound("Server not found")
}
return nil, huma.Error400BadRequest("Failed to edit server", err)
}
return &Response[apiv0.ServerResponse]{
Body: *updatedServer,
}, nil
})
}