## Motivation and Context See https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/issues/482#issuecomment-3436993157 for full details. This adds ECDSA P-384 (a popular NIST approved curve) in addition to Ed25519. ## How Has This Been Tested? I have tested with a local deployment against `mcp.joelverhagen.com`. Also, I have added significant tests. ## Breaking Changes None. (hopefully) ## Types of changes <!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all the boxes that apply: --> - [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue) - [x] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality) - [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change) - [x] Documentation update ## Checklist <!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes that apply. --> - [x] I have read the [MCP Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) - [x] My code follows the repository's style guidelines - [x] New and existing tests pass locally - [x] I have added appropriate error handling - [x] I have added or updated documentation as needed ## Additional context <!-- Add any other context, implementation notes, or design decisions --> @domdomegg and I spoke a bit about this on Discord: https://discord.com/channels/1358869848138059966/1369487942862504016/1423710918180606052 --------- Co-authored-by: adam jones <domdomegg+git@gmail.com>
319 lines
9.4 KiB
Go
319 lines
9.4 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/sha512"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"fmt"
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"math/big"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/auth"
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"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/config"
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)
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// CryptoAlgorithm represents the cryptographic algorithm used for a public key
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type CryptoAlgorithm string
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const (
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AlgorithmEd25519 CryptoAlgorithm = "ed25519"
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// ECDSA with NIST P-384 curve
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// public key is in compressed format
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// signature is in R || S format
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AlgorithmECDSAP384 CryptoAlgorithm = "ecdsap384"
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)
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// PublicKeyInfo contains a public key along with its algorithm type
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type PublicKeyInfo struct {
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Algorithm CryptoAlgorithm
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Key any
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}
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// SignatureTokenExchangeInput represents the common input structure for token exchange
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type SignatureTokenExchangeInput struct {
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Domain string `json:"domain" doc:"Domain name" example:"example.com" required:"true"`
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Timestamp string `json:"timestamp" doc:"RFC3339 timestamp" example:"2023-01-01T00:00:00Z" required:"true"`
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SignedTimestamp string `json:"signed_timestamp" doc:"Hex-encoded signature of timestamp" example:"abcdef1234567890" required:"true"`
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}
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// KeyFetcher defines a function type for fetching keys from external sources
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type KeyFetcher func(ctx context.Context, domain string) ([]string, error)
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// CoreAuthHandler represents the common handler structure
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type CoreAuthHandler struct {
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config *config.Config
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jwtManager *auth.JWTManager
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}
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// NewCoreAuthHandler creates a new core authentication handler
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func NewCoreAuthHandler(cfg *config.Config) *CoreAuthHandler {
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return &CoreAuthHandler{
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config: cfg,
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jwtManager: auth.NewJWTManager(cfg),
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}
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}
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// ValidateDomainAndTimestamp validates the domain format and timestamp
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func ValidateDomainAndTimestamp(domain, timestamp string) (*time.Time, error) {
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if !IsValidDomain(domain) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid domain format")
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}
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ts, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, timestamp)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid timestamp format: %w", err)
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}
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// Check timestamp is within 15 seconds, to allow for clock skew
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now := time.Now()
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if ts.Before(now.Add(-15*time.Second)) || ts.After(now.Add(15*time.Second)) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("timestamp outside valid window (±15 seconds)")
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}
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return &ts, nil
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}
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func DecodeAndValidateSignature(signedTimestamp string) ([]byte, error) {
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signature, err := hex.DecodeString(signedTimestamp)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid signature format, must be hex: %w", err)
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}
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return signature, nil
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}
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func VerifySignatureWithKeys(publicKeys []PublicKeyInfo, messageBytes []byte, signature []byte) error {
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for _, publicKeyInfo := range publicKeys {
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err := publicKeyInfo.VerifySignature(messageBytes, signature)
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if err == nil {
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return nil
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}
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if len(publicKeys) == 1 {
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return err
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}
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("signature verification failed")
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}
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// VerifySignature verifies a signature using the appropriate algorithm
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func (pki *PublicKeyInfo) VerifySignature(message, signature []byte) error {
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switch pki.Algorithm {
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case AlgorithmEd25519:
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if ed25519Key, ok := pki.Key.(ed25519.PublicKey); ok {
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if len(signature) != ed25519.SignatureSize {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid signature size for Ed25519")
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}
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if !ed25519.Verify(ed25519Key, message, signature) {
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return fmt.Errorf("Ed25519 signature verification failed")
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}
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return nil
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}
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case AlgorithmECDSAP384:
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if ecdsaKey, ok := pki.Key.(ecdsa.PublicKey); ok {
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if len(signature) != 96 {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid signature size for ECDSA P-384")
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}
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r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(signature[:48])
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s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(signature[48:])
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digest := sha512.Sum384(message)
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if !ecdsa.Verify(&ecdsaKey, digest[:], r, s) {
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return fmt.Errorf("ECDSA P-384 signature verification failed")
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}
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return nil
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}
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("unsupported public key algorithm")
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}
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// BuildPermissions builds permissions for a domain with optional subdomain support
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func BuildPermissions(domain string, includeSubdomains bool) []auth.Permission {
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reverseDomain := ReverseString(domain)
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permissions := []auth.Permission{
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// Grant permissions for the exact domain (e.g., com.example/*)
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{
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Action: auth.PermissionActionPublish,
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ResourcePattern: fmt.Sprintf("%s/*", reverseDomain),
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},
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}
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if includeSubdomains {
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permissions = append(permissions, auth.Permission{
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Action: auth.PermissionActionPublish,
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ResourcePattern: fmt.Sprintf("%s.*", reverseDomain),
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})
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}
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return permissions
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}
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// CreateJWTClaimsAndToken creates JWT claims and generates a token response
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func (h *CoreAuthHandler) CreateJWTClaimsAndToken(ctx context.Context, authMethod auth.Method, domain string, permissions []auth.Permission) (*auth.TokenResponse, error) {
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// Create JWT claims
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jwtClaims := auth.JWTClaims{
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AuthMethod: authMethod,
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AuthMethodSubject: domain,
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Permissions: permissions,
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}
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// Generate Registry JWT token
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tokenResponse, err := h.jwtManager.GenerateTokenResponse(ctx, jwtClaims)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate JWT token: %w", err)
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}
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return tokenResponse, nil
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}
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// ExchangeToken is a shared method for token exchange that takes a key fetcher function,
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// subdomain inclusion flag, and auth method
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func (h *CoreAuthHandler) ExchangeToken(
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ctx context.Context,
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domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp string,
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keyFetcher KeyFetcher,
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includeSubdomains bool,
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authMethod auth.Method) (*auth.TokenResponse, error) {
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_, err := ValidateDomainAndTimestamp(domain, timestamp)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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signature, err := DecodeAndValidateSignature(signedTimestamp)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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keyStrings, err := keyFetcher(ctx, domain)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch keys: %w", err)
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}
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publicKeysAndErrors := ParseMCPKeysFromStrings(keyStrings)
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if len(publicKeysAndErrors) == 0 {
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switch authMethod {
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case auth.MethodHTTP:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("no MCP public key found in HTTP response")
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case auth.MethodDNS:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("no MCP public key found in DNS TXT records")
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case auth.MethodGitHubAT, auth.MethodGitHubOIDC, auth.MethodOIDC, auth.MethodNone:
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("no MCP public key found using %s authentication", authMethod)
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}
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}
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// provide a specific error message if there's only one key found
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if len(publicKeysAndErrors) == 1 && publicKeysAndErrors[0].error != nil {
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return nil, publicKeysAndErrors[0].error
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}
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var publicKeys []PublicKeyInfo
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for _, pke := range publicKeysAndErrors {
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if pke.error == nil {
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publicKeys = append(publicKeys, *pke.PublicKeyInfo)
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}
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}
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if len(publicKeys) == 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("no valid MCP public key found")
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}
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messageBytes := []byte(timestamp)
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err = VerifySignatureWithKeys(publicKeys, messageBytes, signature)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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permissions := BuildPermissions(domain, includeSubdomains)
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return h.CreateJWTClaimsAndToken(ctx, authMethod, domain, permissions)
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}
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func ParseMCPKeysFromStrings(inputs []string) []struct {
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*PublicKeyInfo
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error
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} {
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var publicKeys []struct {
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*PublicKeyInfo
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error
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}
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// proof record pattern: v=MCPv1; k=<algo>; p=<base64-public-key>
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cryptoPattern := regexp.MustCompile(`v=MCPv1;\s*k=([^;]+);\s*p=([A-Za-z0-9+/=]+)`)
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for _, record := range inputs {
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if matches := cryptoPattern.FindStringSubmatch(record); len(matches) == 3 {
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publicKey, err := ParsePublicKey(matches[1], matches[2])
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publicKeys = append(publicKeys, struct {
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*PublicKeyInfo
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error
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}{publicKey, err})
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}
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}
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return publicKeys
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}
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func ParsePublicKey(algorithm, publicKey string) (*PublicKeyInfo, error) {
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publicKeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(publicKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode public key: %w", err)
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}
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// match to a supported crypto algorithm
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switch algorithm {
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case string(AlgorithmEd25519):
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if len(publicKeyBytes) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid Ed25519 public key size")
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}
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return &PublicKeyInfo{
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Algorithm: AlgorithmEd25519,
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Key: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKeyBytes),
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}, nil
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case string(AlgorithmECDSAP384):
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if len(publicKeyBytes) != 49 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid ECDSA P-384 public key size")
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}
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if publicKeyBytes[0] != 0x02 && publicKeyBytes[0] != 0x03 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid ECDSA P-384 public key format (must be compressed, with a leading 0x02 or 0x03 byte)")
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}
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curve := elliptic.P384()
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x, y := elliptic.UnmarshalCompressed(curve, publicKeyBytes)
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if x == nil || y == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decompress ECDSA P-384 public key")
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}
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return &PublicKeyInfo{
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Algorithm: AlgorithmECDSAP384,
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Key: ecdsa.PublicKey{Curve: curve, X: x, Y: y},
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}, nil
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported public key algorithm: %s", algorithm)
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}
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// ReverseString reverses a domain string (example.com -> com.example)
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func ReverseString(domain string) string {
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parts := strings.Split(domain, ".")
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for i, j := 0, len(parts)-1; i < j; i, j = i+1, j-1 {
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parts[i], parts[j] = parts[j], parts[i]
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}
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return strings.Join(parts, ".")
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}
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func IsValidDomain(domain string) bool {
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if len(domain) == 0 || len(domain) > 253 {
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return false
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}
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// Check for valid characters and structure
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domainPattern := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?(\.[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?)*$`)
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return domainPattern.MatchString(domain)
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}
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