registry/tools/publisher/auth/common.go
adam jones ee910ca286
auth: Add HTTP-based authentication support to validate domain ownership (#282)
Add HTTP-based authentication to prove domain ownership, similar to
https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/pull/238's DNS
authentication but using HTTPS well-known URIs instead of DNS TXT
records.

Fixes #280

## Motivation and Context

Some organizations don't have easy access to DNS records, but can easily
deploy web assets. They would therefore prefer to be able to complete a
HTTP challenge rather than a DNS one to authenticate to the registry.

This would in some way mirror ACME challenges: where you can do a DNS-01
or a HTTP-01 challenge.

## How Has This Been Tested?

- Tested locally by stubbing out the HTTP getter
- Added unit tests

## Breaking Changes

None

## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update

## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [x] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [x] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [x] New and existing tests pass locally
- [x] I have added appropriate error handling
- [x] I have added or updated documentation as needed

## Additional context

I concern I had when building this that it might expose us to SSRF
attacks.

I think on reflection this is not a significant problem:
- We only GET a fixed file `.well-known/mcp-registry-auth` (redirects
disallowed) after sanitizing the domain, and then also don't expose the
response to the user. This means the user shouldn't be able to hit
anything very interesting.
- The information they might get is what domains/servers exist in the
network. Our infrastructure is already all open-source, so attackers
aren't getting any additional real info by prodding at the environment
this way.
2025-08-21 23:13:09 +01:00

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Go

package auth
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/ed25519"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"time"
)
// CryptoProvider provides common functionality for DNS and HTTP authentication
type CryptoProvider struct {
registryURL string
domain string
hexSeed string
authMethod string
}
// GetToken retrieves the registry JWT token using cryptographic authentication
func (c *CryptoProvider) GetToken(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
if c.domain == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%s domain is required", c.authMethod)
}
if c.hexSeed == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%s private key (hex seed) is required", c.authMethod)
}
// Decode hex seed to private key
seedBytes, err := hex.DecodeString(c.hexSeed)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid hex seed format: %w", err)
}
if len(seedBytes) != ed25519.SeedSize {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid seed length: expected %d bytes, got %d", ed25519.SeedSize, len(seedBytes))
}
privateKey := ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seedBytes)
// Generate current timestamp
timestamp := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
// Sign the timestamp
signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, []byte(timestamp))
signedTimestamp := hex.EncodeToString(signature)
// Exchange signature for registry token
registryToken, err := c.exchangeTokenForRegistry(ctx, c.domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to exchange %s signature: %w", c.authMethod, err)
}
return registryToken, nil
}
// NeedsLogin always returns false for cryptographic auth since no interactive login is needed
func (c *CryptoProvider) NeedsLogin() bool {
return false
}
// Login is not needed for cryptographic auth since authentication is cryptographic
func (c *CryptoProvider) Login(_ context.Context) error {
return nil
}
// exchangeTokenForRegistry exchanges signature for a registry JWT token
func (c *CryptoProvider) exchangeTokenForRegistry(ctx context.Context, domain, timestamp, signedTimestamp string) (string, error) {
if c.registryURL == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("registry URL is required for token exchange")
}
// Prepare the request body
payload := map[string]string{
"domain": domain,
"timestamp": timestamp,
"signed_timestamp": signedTimestamp,
}
jsonData, err := json.Marshal(payload)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal request: %w", err)
}
// Make the token exchange request
exchangeURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/v0/auth/%s", c.registryURL, c.authMethod)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, exchangeURL, bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
client := &http.Client{}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to send request: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to read response: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return "", fmt.Errorf("token exchange failed with status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
}
var tokenResp RegistryTokenResponse
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &tokenResp)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal response: %w", err)
}
return tokenResp.RegistryToken, nil
}