Let the client_credentials and jwt-bearer grants run without Protected Resource Metadata
## Motivation and Context
When a server publishes no Protected Resource Metadata, discovery takes the legacy 2025-03-26 path and `prm` is `nil`.
The authorization-code branch of `run!` allowed for that by passing `prm || {}` to `resolve_scope`,
but `run_client_credentials!` and `run_jwt_bearer!` passed `prm` as is, and `resolve_scope` then
called `prm["scopes_supported"]` on `nil`. Without a non-empty challenge scope, a `ClientCredentialsProvider` or
`CrossAppAccessProvider` pointed at such a server therefore failed with `NoMethodError` after discovery and before
the token request or the ID-JAG callback, instead of running its grant against the legacy authorization base
the way `Provider` does.
`resolve_scope` now treats a missing PRM as advertising no scopes, so the challenge scope or the provider's own scope applies,
and the authorization-code branch passes `prm` unchanged like the other two.
## How Has This Been Tested?
New tests in `test/mcp/client/oauth/flow_test.rb` run the `client_credentials` grant against a PRM-less server with metadata
at the origin, checking the provider's scope, the `resource`, and the recorded issuer, and run the `jwt-bearer` grant against
a server without any metadata, checking the default token endpoint, the assertion audience, the `resource`, and the recorded
issuer. Both raise `NoMethodError` against the previous library.
## Breaking Changes
None.
This commit is contained in:
parent
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2 changed files with 72 additions and 2 deletions
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@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ module MCP
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ensure_pkce_supported!(as_metadata)
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effective_scope = resolve_scope(scope: scope, prm: prm || {})
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effective_scope = resolve_scope(scope: scope, prm: prm)
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effective_scope = normalize_offline_access_scope(effective_scope, as_metadata: as_metadata)
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# Asked before registering, not after: a refusal must not leave this client registered at an authorization server
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@ -898,7 +898,8 @@ module MCP
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def resolve_scope(scope:, prm:)
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return scope if scope && !scope.empty?
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supported = prm["scopes_supported"]
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# `prm` is nil on the legacy path, where nothing advertises scopes.
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supported = prm && prm["scopes_supported"]
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return supported.join(" ") if supported.is_a?(Array) && !supported.empty?
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return @provider.scope if @provider.scope && !@provider.scope.empty?
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@ -991,6 +991,75 @@ module MCP
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end
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end
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def test_run_client_credentials_without_prm_uses_the_legacy_authorization_base
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# A PRM-less server takes the legacy path for this grant too: metadata at the origin, no advertised scopes,
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# so the provider's own scope is used and the tokens are bound to the origin.
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stub_prm_not_found
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stub_request(:get, "https://srv.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server").to_return(
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status: 200,
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headers: { "Content-Type" => "application/json" },
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body: JSON.generate(
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issuer: "https://srv.example.com",
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token_endpoint: "https://srv.example.com/token",
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token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ["client_secret_basic"],
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),
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)
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stub_request(:post, "https://srv.example.com/token").to_return(
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status: 200,
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headers: { "Content-Type" => "application/json" },
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body: JSON.generate(access_token: "legacy-token", token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600),
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)
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provider = ClientCredentialsProvider.new(client_id: "cc-client", client_secret: "cc-secret", scope: "mcp:read")
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result = Flow.new(provider: provider).run!(server_url: @server_url)
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assert_equal(:authorized, result)
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assert_equal("legacy-token", provider.access_token)
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assert_equal("https://srv.example.com", provider.tokens["issuer"])
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assert_requested(:post, "https://srv.example.com/token") do |req|
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form = URI.decode_www_form(req.body).to_h
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form["grant_type"] == "client_credentials" &&
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form["scope"] == "mcp:read" &&
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form["resource"] == "https://srv.example.com/mcp"
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end
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end
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def test_run_jwt_bearer_without_any_metadata_uses_the_legacy_default_endpoints
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stub_prm_not_found
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stub_request(:get, "https://srv.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server").to_return(status: 404)
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stub_request(:get, "https://srv.example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration").to_return(status: 404)
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stub_request(:post, "https://srv.example.com/token").to_return(
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status: 200,
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headers: { "Content-Type" => "application/json" },
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body: JSON.generate(access_token: "legacy-token", token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600),
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)
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received = nil
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provider = CrossAppAccessProvider.new(
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client_id: "xaa-client",
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client_secret: "xaa-secret",
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assertion_provider: ->(audience:, resource:) {
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received = { audience: audience, resource: resource }
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"id-jag-assertion"
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},
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)
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result = Flow.new(provider: provider).run!(server_url: @server_url)
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assert_equal(:authorized, result)
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# The assertion is minted for the legacy authorization base, which is the only identity such a server has.
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assert_equal({ audience: "https://srv.example.com", resource: "https://srv.example.com/mcp" }, received)
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assert_equal("https://srv.example.com", provider.tokens["issuer"])
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assert_requested(:post, "https://srv.example.com/token") do |req|
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form = URI.decode_www_form(req.body).to_h
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form["grant_type"] == "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer" &&
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form["assertion"] == "id-jag-assertion" &&
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form["resource"] == "https://srv.example.com/mcp" &&
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!form.key?("scope")
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end
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end
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def test_run_legacy_fallback_rejects_insecure_authorization_base
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# The Communication Security requirement still applies on the legacy path: a remote plain-http origin must not
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# become the authorization base URL.
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