Support Client ID Metadata Documents in OAuth client

## Motivation and Context

The MCP 2025-11-25 authorization specification and `draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-00` define
Client ID Metadata Documents (CIMD): a client publishes its OAuth metadata at an HTTPS URL and uses that URL
as the OAuth `client_id` instead of going through Dynamic Client Registration. The Python and TypeScript SDKs
already implement this; the Ruby SDK now reaches parity.

The change adds:

- `MCP::Client::OAuth::Provider` accepts an optional `client_id_metadata_document_url:` keyword.
- A new `Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?` validator enforces structural requirements.
  Spec-required: `https` scheme, a non-root path, and no fragment, userinfo, or `.`/`..` segments
  (including the percent-encoded form `%2E`). Stricter than the draft as an SDK policy: query strings
  are also rejected, because different encodings of the same query would yield distinct `client_id` strings for
  the same logical document. The loopback `http` carve-out used for discovery URLs does not extend to CIMD URLs,
  since the value is sent verbatim to the authorization server as the OAuth `client_id` and travels off-loopback.
  Validation failures raise `Provider::InvalidClientIDMetadataDocumentURLError`.
- `Flow#ensure_client_registered` routes through CIMD only when the authorization server advertises
  `client_id_metadata_document_supported` as JSON `boolean true`; truthy non-boolean values
  (string `"true"`, `"false"`, etc.) fall back to DCR, matching the gating in the Python and TypeScript SDKs.
- The CIMD `client_id` is NOT persisted to storage. AS support is re-read on every flow so a server
  that later drops CIMD support stops receiving the stale URL. Pre-registered `client_information`
  continues to win over CIMD when both are available.
- `Flow#refresh!` reconstructs the CIMD `client_id` from live AS metadata when refreshing tokens obtained via CIMD.
  When support has been withdrawn and no other identity is stored, it raises a clear `AuthorizationError` rather than
  sending a `client_id` the authorization server no longer recognises.
- The Provider docstring and README OAuth section explain that DCR `client_metadata` and the JSON document served at
  the CIMD URL are separate artifacts: DCR metadata MUST NOT include `client_id`, while the CIMD document MUST include
  `client_id` set to the URL, `client_name`, and `redirect_uris` covering `redirect_uri`.
- `auth/basic-cimd` is removed from `conformance/expected_failures.yml`.

## How Has This Been Tested?

`Discovery` tests cover: https with path accepted; non-https rejected (http, ftp, file); root and empty path rejected;
fragment, query, and userinfo rejected; dot segments rejected including the percent-encoded form `%2E`; nil, empty,
and malformed inputs rejected.

`Provider` tests cover: the default `nil`; rejection of http URLs (loopback included); non-https schemes;
root and empty path; fragment; query; userinfo; and dot segments.

`Flow#run!` tests cover: skip DCR when the authorization server advertises CIMD and the provider has a URL;
fall back to DCR when the authorization server does not advertise support; fall back to DCR when the value is
the string `"false"` or `"true"`; pre-registered `client_information` wins over CIMD; the CIMD `client_id` is not
persisted to storage; a second flow against an authorization server that has dropped CIMD support recovers via DCR.

`Flow#refresh!` tests cover: refresh reconstructs the CIMD `client_id` without a stored `client_information`;
refresh raises when the authorization server no longer advertises CIMD support; stored `client_information`
takes precedence over the CIMD URL during refresh.

Conformance: `auth/basic-cimd` now passes 12/12 with no warnings. `bundle exec rake test`, `bundle exec rake rubocop`,
and `bundle exec rake conformance` are all green.

## Breaking Changes

None. The `client_id_metadata_document_url:` keyword is purely opt-in and defaults to `nil`.
When the keyword is omitted, the DCR flow is unchanged. Existing OAuth users see no behaviour change.
The CIMD path is only entered when both the user explicitly configures a URL and the authorization server
advertises support via `client_id_metadata_document_supported: true`.
This commit is contained in:
Koichi ITO 2026-05-25 02:42:13 +09:00
commit 355c904899

View file

@ -104,8 +104,16 @@ module MCP
refresh_token = read_token("refresh_token")
raise AuthorizationError, "Cannot refresh: no refresh_token in provider storage." unless refresh_token
client_info = @provider.client_information
unless client_info.is_a?(Hash) && client_info_required_value(client_info, "client_id")
stored_client_info = @provider.client_information
have_stored_client_info = stored_client_info.is_a?(Hash) && client_info_required_value(stored_client_info, "client_id")
# A CIMD-configured provider stores no `client_information` on purpose
# (the CIMD URL is re-resolved against the live AS metadata on every flow).
# Allow refresh to proceed in that case so the `refresh_token` obtained via
# the CIMD flow remains usable.
have_cimd_url = !@provider.client_id_metadata_document_url.nil?
unless have_stored_client_info || have_cimd_url
raise AuthorizationError, "Cannot refresh: no client_information in provider storage."
end
@ -126,6 +134,18 @@ module MCP
ensure_issuer_matches!(expected: authorization_server, returned: as_metadata["issuer"])
ensure_secure_endpoints!(as_metadata)
client_info = if have_stored_client_info
# Pre-registered / DCR-issued `client_information` always wins: if the user picked an explicit identity,
# do not silently swap it for the CIMD URL even when the AS also advertises CIMD support.
stored_client_info
elsif as_metadata["client_id_metadata_document_supported"] == true
{ "client_id" => @provider.client_id_metadata_document_url }
else
raise AuthorizationError,
"Cannot refresh: provider has a CIMD URL but the authorization server no longer advertises " \
"`client_id_metadata_document_supported: true`."
end
new_tokens = exchange_refresh_token(
as_metadata: as_metadata,
client_info: client_info,
@ -285,6 +305,24 @@ module MCP
existing = @provider.client_information
return existing if existing.is_a?(Hash) && client_info_required_value(existing, "client_id")
# Per the MCP authorization specification and `draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document`,
# if the authorization server advertises Client ID Metadata Document support and the provider has
# a CIMD URL configured, use the URL as the OAuth `client_id` and skip Dynamic Client Registration.
#
# The `== true` comparison is intentional: only a JSON `boolean` `true` opts the flow in.
# A string `"false"`, an empty Hash, or any other truthy value MUST NOT be treated as CIMD support,
# otherwise a misconfigured AS could trick the client into using the CIMD `client_id` against
# a server that has not actually adopted it.
#
# The CIMD `client_id` is NOT persisted to storage. The AS may later stop advertising CIMD support
# (or the operator may rotate the CIMD URL), and a stale `client_information` entry would otherwise
# keep sending the old CIMD URL forever. Re-evaluating on every flow re-reads the current AS metadata
# and the current `provider.client_id_metadata_document_url`.
cimd_url = @provider.client_id_metadata_document_url
if cimd_url && as_metadata["client_id_metadata_document_supported"] == true
return { "client_id" => cimd_url }
end
registration_endpoint = as_metadata["registration_endpoint"]
unless registration_endpoint
raise AuthorizationError,