Support Client ID Metadata Documents in OAuth client

## Motivation and Context

The MCP 2025-11-25 authorization specification and `draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-00` define
Client ID Metadata Documents (CIMD): a client publishes its OAuth metadata at an HTTPS URL and uses that URL
as the OAuth `client_id` instead of going through Dynamic Client Registration. The Python and TypeScript SDKs
already implement this; the Ruby SDK now reaches parity.

The change adds:

- `MCP::Client::OAuth::Provider` accepts an optional `client_id_metadata_document_url:` keyword.
- A new `Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?` validator enforces structural requirements.
  Spec-required: `https` scheme, a non-root path, and no fragment, userinfo, or `.`/`..` segments
  (including the percent-encoded form `%2E`). Stricter than the draft as an SDK policy: query strings
  are also rejected, because different encodings of the same query would yield distinct `client_id` strings for
  the same logical document. The loopback `http` carve-out used for discovery URLs does not extend to CIMD URLs,
  since the value is sent verbatim to the authorization server as the OAuth `client_id` and travels off-loopback.
  Validation failures raise `Provider::InvalidClientIDMetadataDocumentURLError`.
- `Flow#ensure_client_registered` routes through CIMD only when the authorization server advertises
  `client_id_metadata_document_supported` as JSON `boolean true`; truthy non-boolean values
  (string `"true"`, `"false"`, etc.) fall back to DCR, matching the gating in the Python and TypeScript SDKs.
- The CIMD `client_id` is NOT persisted to storage. AS support is re-read on every flow so a server
  that later drops CIMD support stops receiving the stale URL. Pre-registered `client_information`
  continues to win over CIMD when both are available.
- `Flow#refresh!` reconstructs the CIMD `client_id` from live AS metadata when refreshing tokens obtained via CIMD.
  When support has been withdrawn and no other identity is stored, it raises a clear `AuthorizationError` rather than
  sending a `client_id` the authorization server no longer recognises.
- The Provider docstring and README OAuth section explain that DCR `client_metadata` and the JSON document served at
  the CIMD URL are separate artifacts: DCR metadata MUST NOT include `client_id`, while the CIMD document MUST include
  `client_id` set to the URL, `client_name`, and `redirect_uris` covering `redirect_uri`.
- `auth/basic-cimd` is removed from `conformance/expected_failures.yml`.

## How Has This Been Tested?

`Discovery` tests cover: https with path accepted; non-https rejected (http, ftp, file); root and empty path rejected;
fragment, query, and userinfo rejected; dot segments rejected including the percent-encoded form `%2E`; nil, empty,
and malformed inputs rejected.

`Provider` tests cover: the default `nil`; rejection of http URLs (loopback included); non-https schemes;
root and empty path; fragment; query; userinfo; and dot segments.

`Flow#run!` tests cover: skip DCR when the authorization server advertises CIMD and the provider has a URL;
fall back to DCR when the authorization server does not advertise support; fall back to DCR when the value is
the string `"false"` or `"true"`; pre-registered `client_information` wins over CIMD; the CIMD `client_id` is not
persisted to storage; a second flow against an authorization server that has dropped CIMD support recovers via DCR.

`Flow#refresh!` tests cover: refresh reconstructs the CIMD `client_id` without a stored `client_information`;
refresh raises when the authorization server no longer advertises CIMD support; stored `client_information`
takes precedence over the CIMD URL during refresh.

Conformance: `auth/basic-cimd` now passes 12/12 with no warnings. `bundle exec rake test`, `bundle exec rake rubocop`,
and `bundle exec rake conformance` are all green.

## Breaking Changes

None. The `client_id_metadata_document_url:` keyword is purely opt-in and defaults to `nil`.
When the keyword is omitted, the DCR flow is unchanged. Existing OAuth users see no behaviour change.
The CIMD path is only entered when both the user explicitly configures a URL and the authorization server
advertises support via `client_id_metadata_document_supported: true`.
This commit is contained in:
Koichi ITO 2026-05-25 02:42:13 +09:00
commit 355c904899

View file

@ -367,6 +367,68 @@ module MCP
refute(Discovery.secure_url?("not a url"))
end
def test_client_id_metadata_document_url_accepts_https_with_path
assert(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com/client-metadata.json"))
assert(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com/path/to/cm"))
assert(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com:8443/cm"))
end
def test_client_id_metadata_document_url_accepts_boundary_forms
# An uppercase scheme is `https` after case folding (URIs are scheme-insensitive, RFC 3986 Section 3.1).
assert(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("HTTPS://app.example.com/cm"))
# A trailing slash and consecutive slashes are non-root, non-dot paths.
# RFC 3986 `remove_dot_segments` does not collapse them, so they remain
# stable `client_id` strings rather than aliasing another URL.
assert(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com/cm/"))
assert(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com//cm"))
# The default https port is equivalent to omitting it; either form is a valid origin.
assert(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com:443/cm"))
# IPv6 literal hosts and Punycode (IDN) hosts are ordinary hosts.
assert(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://[2001:db8::1]/cm"))
assert(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://[::1]/cm"))
assert(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://xn--e1afmkfd.example.com/cm"))
end
def test_client_id_metadata_document_url_rejects_non_https_schemes
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("http://localhost/cm"))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("http://app.example.com/cm"))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("ftp://app.example.com/cm"))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("file:///cm"))
end
def test_client_id_metadata_document_url_rejects_root_and_empty_path
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com"))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com/"))
end
def test_client_id_metadata_document_url_rejects_fragment_query_userinfo
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com/cm#frag"))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com/cm?x=1"))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://user:pass@app.example.com/cm"))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://user@app.example.com/cm"))
end
def test_client_id_metadata_document_url_rejects_dot_segments
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com/./cm"))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com/a/../cm"))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com/cm/."))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com/cm/.."))
# Percent-encoded `.` would otherwise let `%2E` and `.` produce
# different `client_id` values for the same document.
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com/%2E/cm"))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://app.example.com/%2e/cm"))
end
def test_client_id_metadata_document_url_rejects_nil_or_empty_or_malformed
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?(nil))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?(""))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("not a url"))
refute(Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?("https://"))
end
def test_resource_covers_blocks_percent_encoded_dot_segment_bypass
server = Discovery.canonicalize_url("https://srv.example.com/api/%2e%2e/mcp")
prm = Discovery.canonicalize_url("https://srv.example.com/api")